JUDGMENT Thom, Ag. C.J. and Niamatullah J. 1. This is a Plaintiff's appeal and arises out of a suit for recovery of the sum of Rs. 670 in name of arrears of maintenance. The Plaintiff is one Mst. Tejjo who is the sister-in-law of one Makhan Lal deceased. 2. When Makhan Lal died one Shankar Lal alleged to be an adopted son took possession of his estate. Shankar Lal died in the year 1926 and then a dispute arose as to who was entitled to succeed to the estate of Makhan Lal. Chiranji Lal the natural father of Makhan Lal claimed as the heir of his son. His claim was disputed by certain other persons. The suit between the rival claimants to the estate was compromised by a deed of compromise of the 1st February, 1927. The decree passed in the suit embodied the terms of the compromise. 3. One of the terms of the compromise was that Chiranji Lal undertook to pay the sum of Rs. 10 per mensem to Mst. Tejjo in name of maintenance and further to give her the right of residence in a particular house. Mst. Tejjo's maintenance was secured by a charge upon certain property which was allotted to Chiranji Lal. 4. In her plaint Mst. Tejjo alleges that Chiranji Lal is due her the sum of Rs. 670 as arrears of maintenance. She claims that she is entitled to recover this sum by enforcing the charge afore-mentioned. 5. The suit has been dismissed by the learned Judge who heard the second appeal upon the ground that the deed of compromise under which the charge was created in favour of Mst. Tejjo was not registered. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the suit was not in fact based upon the deed of compromise but upon the decree which was passed embodying the terms of the compromise. We have considered the terms of the plaint and we are satisfied that the suit has been based in substance upon the decree. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that, inasmuch as the liability of Chiranji Lal to pay maintenance to the Plaintiff and the charge in the Plaintiff's favour had been created by a decree registration was not essential. In support of this contention he referred to Section 17 Sub-section (2)(vi) of the Registration Act of 1908. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that, inasmuch as the liability of Chiranji Lal to pay maintenance to the Plaintiff and the charge in the Plaintiff's favour had been created by a decree registration was not essential. In support of this contention he referred to Section 17 Sub-section (2)(vi) of the Registration Act of 1908. In virtue of the afore-mentioned Sub-section a decree of the Court need not be registered. The Act was amended in the year 1929. Prior to 1929 Sub-section (2; (vi) ran as follows: Any decree or order of the Court or award 8. After the amendment the Sub-section ran: Any decree or order except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding 9. It is clear therefore that prior to the year 1929 any decree including a decree embodying a compromise was not required to be registered. The decree upon which the Plaintiff founds in the present suit was passed prior to the year 1929. 10. The position therefore is that by virtue of the decree Mst. Tejjo is a charge holder and entitled to all the rights of a charge holder defined in Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. She is entitled to enforce her charge and it is not necessary that in proving the charge she should produce a registered document, inasmuch as u/s 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act as it was passed in 1929, the document which created the charge, namely, the decree, was not required to be registered. 11. In the result be hold that Mst. Tejjo is entitled to recover the sum sued for and to execute the charge upon the property subject to it under the decree embodying the terms of the compromise of the 1st February, 1927. We accordingly allow the appeal and decree the suit with costs throughout.