JUDGMENT S.K. Ghose, J. - This is an application for refund of Court-fees under the inherent powers of this Court. The Petitioner filed an appeal before this Court which was out of time. He made an application for extension of time under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and a Rule was issued calling on the Opposite Parties to show cause why the appeal should not be registered. The application itself shows that the grounds urged went into the merits of the matter. Upon the Rule coming up for hearing an order was made by this Court on the 24th January, 1936, which runs as follows:- " By consent this Rule is disposed of on the following terms:-If the entire decretal amount as mentioned in the final decree be paid by the 30th Chaitra next this Rule will be made absolute. If on the other hand this sum is not deposited by that date the Rule will stand discharged. In any event the Opposite Parties are entitled to costs. The hearing-fee is assessed at one gold mohur." The Petitioner failed to comply with this order in consequence of which the Rule stood discharged with costs on the 13th April, 1936. Thereupon the Petitioners' Advocate applied to the Assistant Registrar for the return of the memorandum of appeal in order to enable him to apply to the Collector for refund of the court-fees. In accordance with the Rules of the Court the stamp on the memorandum of appeal had been already punched. The Advocate then applied to the Registrar to issue a certificate to enable the Petitioner to get a refund of the court-fees whereupon the Registrar directed the Advocate to move the Division Bench. Hence this application. It is contended in the first place that the memorandum of appeal need not have been stamped until it was filed, that is to say, admitted for registration. For this purpose reliance is placed on the case of Amjad Ali v. Muhammad Israil I. L. R. 20 All. 11 at p. 16 (F. B.) (1897), where the meaning of the word or expression " filed " is discussed. Those remarks however appear to be obiter as they were not the subject-matter of the reference to the Full Bench. In any case it is not necessary for us to go behind the provisions of sees. 6 and 30 of the Court Fees Act. Those remarks however appear to be obiter as they were not the subject-matter of the reference to the Full Bench. In any case it is not necessary for us to go behind the provisions of sees. 6 and 30 of the Court Fees Act. It is quite clear from, these two provisions that a document which requires to be stamped cannot be received by any public officer unless it is stamped and secondly that on such receipt the stamp is forthwith to be cancelled. In fact no Rule could have been issued in this case and no action could have been taken unless the memorandum of appeal had been filed in the office with the court-fees stamped thereon. The word " filed " does not appear in the CPC but under Or. 4, r. 1 every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. Similarly under Or. 41, r. 1 a memorandum of appeal shall be presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. Under the rules of the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction r. 14, Chapter V, Part II, page 29 provides that every memorandum of appeal shall be presented to the Deputy Registrar or such other officer as the Registrar may appoint for the purpose. In the present case this was done and thereafter on the report of the Stamp Reporter the document was returned for presenting to the Division Bench which was done. Thereupon further action was taken which resulted in the filing of the application. The only question that arises there is whether the Petitioner is entitled to a refund on the ground that the memorandum of appeal has not been used. For this purpose the learned Advocate for the Petitioner has relied on the case of J. C. Galstaun v. Raja Janaki Nath Ray 38 C. W. N. 185 (1933). In that case the Court proceeded on equitable considerations which were first that gross negligence on the part of the legal adviser had occasioned the delay in the filing of the memorandum of appeal and secondly that it was not only not necessary to make any use of the contents, of the memorandum of appeal but even to read the document. In the present case however it is quite clear that the memorandum of appeal had been used and that upon that memorandum of appeal a conditional order was made by this Court for admission, but the condition was not complied with by the Petitioner. We have also been referred to an order of this Court dated the 27th February, 1933, in Civil Revision No. 699 (F) of 1932, by which a memorandum of appeal was directed to be returned with a certificate that the court-fee stamp had not been used. This order was made ex parte without notice to the Government Pleader. We are not prepared to take it as an authority in the present case. Considering all these circumstances I think that the application should be rejected but without costs. Patterson, J. I agree.