JUDGMENT Niamatullah, Ag. C.J., and Allsop J. 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit instituted by certain Plaintiffs for a declaration that a sale of property in execution of a decree was not binding upon them. The decree for sale was obtained on the basis of a deed of mortgage executed on the 13th September, 1915, by the fathers and uncles of the Plaintiffs. In the suit for sale all the members of the family, including the Plaintiffs, were impleaded. 2. The Plaintiffs were minors and were represented by their fathers as guardians ad litem. The sale took place in execution of the decree on the basis of the mortgage, and formal possession of the property was delivered. After that the Plaintiffs instituted the suit which his given rise to this appeal. The Courts below held that the Plaintiffs were not properly represented in the former litigation because their interests were not the same as those of their fathers and because at least in respect of an item of Rs. 100, part of the alleged consideration, the Courts below thought that it was evident that this was not a sum borrowed for necessity. It* has been argued in second appeal that the question whether the minors were properly represented is not the deciding factor. This is a case were joint family property has been sold in execution of a decree against the father and has passed out of possession of the joint family. It is argued that the Plaintiffs that is the sons are not entitled to obtain possession of the property, unless they can prove that the debts incurred by their father were for immoral purposes. There is no question that this is the correct law. 3. It has been laid in Jahan Singh v. Hardat Singh (1934) 4 A.W.R. 727 and Gajadhar Pande v. Jadubir Pande (1924) 47 All. 122 that sons cannot obtain possession of property which has passed out of the family in execution of a decree for sale against the father, unless they can prove that the debts incurred by the father were incurred for immoral purposes. It has been suggested on the other hand in this case that that principle does not apply because the Plaintiffs in the suit on the basis of the mortgage purported to impaled as Defendants the Plaintiffs in the present suit. 4. It has been suggested on the other hand in this case that that principle does not apply because the Plaintiffs in the suit on the basis of the mortgage purported to impaled as Defendants the Plaintiffs in the present suit. 4. It does not appear to us that this makes any difference. The Plaintiffs can impeach the decree alleged to have been passed against them in the former suit only upon the ground that they were not properly represented, or in other words, that they to all intents and purposes must be deemed not to have been parties to the suit on the basis of the mortgage. If they were not parties to the suit, then the principle that they cannot impeach the sale without proving that the debts were incurred for immoral purposes must apply. The only other complication which has arisen in this case is that the question now raised was not raised in the Courts below. It seems to us, however, that the question is one of pure law. The Plaintiffs knew all the relevant facts which indeed were mentioned in their plaint and they should have known that they could not question the sale without alleging and proving immorality. They have neither alleged, nor attempted to prove this. It has been urged upon us to remit an issue; but we cannot remit an issue upon a point which was not taken by the Plaintiffs in the plaint. We cannot allow them in effect to say that they are prepared to allege or prove anything which is necessary, even if the allegations are not in accordance with the real facts. In our opinion the suit should have been dismissed by the Courts below. We allow the appeal and dismiss the suit with costs in all Courts.