JUDGMENT S.K. Ghose, J. - This is an appeal by the Defendant against a decree in a mortgage suit, the only question raised in the appeal being that of interest. According to the Plaintiffs, Defendant No. 1 took a loan of Rs. 3,000 by executing a deed of mortgage on the 29th Falgoon, 1332, corresponding to 12th March, 1925 and the rate of interest mentioned in the bond was 14as. per cent per month with yearly rest. According to the calculation given in the plaint the amount of interest accumulated to Rs. 4,550-6-0, nothing having been paid since the date of loan. The suit was instituted on the 24th May, 1934. The Bengal Money-Lenders Act was passed in 1933 and by notification published on the 18th December, 1933, it actually came into operation on the 1st July, 1934, that is to say, subsequent to the institution of the suit. At the trial an issue was raised, namely issue No. 5, which runs as follows: Are the Plaintiffs entitled to compound interest as prayed for? Is the claim for interest excessive? In this connection the learned Judge below considered secs. 3 and 4 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. As to sec. 3 he held that the rate of interest which comes to Rs. 10-8 per cent, per annum does not militate against the provisions of that section. As to sec. 4 the points out that the Plaintiffs are to be given an opportunity to explain why they did not bring the suit earlier and he held that this they had done by the letters, Ext. 2 series, which show that the Plaintiffs had to wait not on account of their laches but to give the Defendant time to pay. In this view the learned Judge held that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the full rate of interest as claimed. As to other defences the Defendants denied altogether the Plaintiffs' right to sue, denied attestation and execution and pleaded limitation; on all these points the learned Judge held against the Defendant and decreed the suit. In this appeal as mentioned already the only point raised is that of interest and it is contended that in accordance with sec. 4 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act the Defendant is entitled to a reduction in the amount of interest and this amount is calculated to be Rs. 1,550-6-0 at which amount the appeal is valued. In this appeal as mentioned already the only point raised is that of interest and it is contended that in accordance with sec. 4 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act the Defendant is entitled to a reduction in the amount of interest and this amount is calculated to be Rs. 1,550-6-0 at which amount the appeal is valued. 2. The learned Judge below appears to have taken it for granted that the Bengal Money-Lenders Act applied to the present case. But the question that the learned Advocate for the Plaintiffs-Respondents has raised in this appeal and which he is entitled to raise as a point of law, is whether that Act applies at all to a suit which had been filed before the Act had come into operation. It is contended that the section, on the face of it, is retrospective because it applies to the case of money lent before the commencement of the Act and that so it must be applicable in spite of the fact that a suit was already pending when the Act came into force. In support of this the learned Advocate for the Appellant has relied on the case of Quilter v. Mapleson L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 672 (1882). That case was considered by a Bench of this Court in the case of Brojendra Kumar Dutta Roy v. Sushil Chandra Chakravarti 39 C. W. N. 1213 (1935) to which I shall presently refer. For the present, it will be necessary first to look to sec. 4 itself which runs thus: Notwithstanding anything in any other Act, where in any suit in respect of any money lent by a money-lender before the commencement of this Act it is found that [the arrears of interest amount to a "sum greater than the principal of the loan, the Court, unless it is satisfied that the money-lender had reasonable grounds for not enforcing his claim earlier, shall limit the amount of such interest recoverable in the suit to an amount equal to the principal of the loan. 3. 3. It is quite clear to us that the section presupposes first that a suit has been filed, secondly that there is a finding that the arrears of loan amount to a sum greater than the principal loan, and thirdly that the money-lender has been given an opportunity to show that he had reasonable grounds for not bringing the suit earlier. It is upon the determination of these points that a decree is to be passed. It seems to us that these provisions cannot be made applicable to a suit which has already been instituted. The learned Advocate for the Appellant has contended that the exception in favour of the moneylender need not apply to a case and that, where it cannot apply, the rest of the section would apply in favour of the debtor. We think that such a construction of the section would lead to a most unfair result and is not consistent with the, actual language employed. A similar problem was before the Court in the case of Brojendra Kumar v. Sushil Chandra 39 C. W. N. 1213 (1935) referred to above. There the Act came into force after the decision of the trial Court and during the pendency of the appeal. It was pointed out that the argument of the Appellant involves the position that because the appeal, for congestion of the business of this Court, remained pending, the Plaintiff Respondent has to lose his money. Somewhat similar is the position here, because the suit might also have been disposed of before the Act came into operation. It was further pointed out that to deal with the proviso in favour of the moneylender an issue of fact will have to be decided necessitating an investigation into the facts and thus in all cases as regards interest pending in first or second appeal or in an appeal to the Judicial Committee a remand will have to be made. It seems to us that the present case cannot be distinguished from that in 39 C. W. N. 1213 [Brojendra Kumar v. Sushil Chandra (2)]. Our attention has been directed to the case of Durgapada Karmakar v. Nrisingha Chandra Nandy Chowdhury (3) in which sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was under consideration. But that is a quite different provision of law and it affords no guidance for the present case. Our attention has been directed to the case of Durgapada Karmakar v. Nrisingha Chandra Nandy Chowdhury (3) in which sec. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was under consideration. But that is a quite different provision of law and it affords no guidance for the present case. We consider, having regard to the terms of sec. 4 of the Money Lenders Act, that it is not applicable to a suit which was instituted before the Act came into force. That being so, the decree as passed by the Court below cannot be interfered with and the appeal must fail. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs-hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs. Patterson, J. I agree.