JUDGMENT Costello, J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Ameer Ali dated 14th November, 1935. The suit was one for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,50,000 lent and advanced by the Plaintiff to the Defendants on the mortgage of certain properties. There was the usual claim for a mortgage-decree under Or. 34 of the CPC and there were also claims for the appointment of a receiver and for an injunction. The learned Judge at the outset of his judgment observed that this was a very simple suit except for one or two points of law. I am not disposed to agree in its entirety with the observation of the learned Judge, because the points of law which arise for our consideration are not altogether simple ones. The suit was brought on two sets of mortgages, or more accurately, one set of mortgages and one single mortgage. The first set of mortgages was dated 10th August, 1032, and the other mortgage is dated 26th November, 1932. The Plaintiff was described as a Marwari trader and the Defendants were members of a Marwari family consisting of two brothers named respectively Premsukh Mahata and Pannalal Mahata and six out of the seven children of Premsukh. The seventh child of Premsukh is named Ramratan and he was, for some reason or other, not made a Defendant. The eldest child of Pannaial was of full age and the remainder of the children of Pannalal were minors. It appears that the parties were known to each other for a considerable time in business-in connection with jute trade and in the course of transactions which had taken place between the parties the Plaintiff had advanced various sums of money to the Defendants and the set of mortgages dated 10th of August, 1932, was designed to cover such advances. The other mortgage, that is to say, the mortgage of the 26th November, 1932, was in connection with an additional advance made subsequent to the date of the first set of mortgages. It will be convenient, as the learned Judge has himself done, to refer to the mortgages as " the August mortgage " and " the November mortgage." All the mortgages were substantially in the same form. It will be convenient, as the learned Judge has himself done, to refer to the mortgages as " the August mortgage " and " the November mortgage." All the mortgages were substantially in the same form. For the purposes of this appeal we are only concerned with the November mortgage because it is quite clear that as regards the August mortgages the suit was bound to fail owing to want of jurisdiction in the Court below to deal with it. The November mortgage is said to have been made between Premsukh "for self and as karta of the joint family " and as a natural guardian of his six minor sons and Pannalal for self and guardian of his one son and also Jasoda Mahata, aunt of Premsukh and Pannalal. This lady executed the mortgage through her attorney-one Gopikissen. We are not concerned with her position in the matter because as regards her, the claim was either withdrawn or, at any rate, not pressed. There was no dispute at the trial as regards the consideration for the mortgages. In fact, it is conceded that the consideration mentioned in the deed passed from the Plaintiff to the Defendants. The mortgages contained certain covenants and one of the covenants was that the money was not repayable until the year 1936. The learned Judge has pointed out in his judgment that " as regards the covenant as to payment of interest no breach is alleged or has been relied on. The breach which was alleged, was as regards the covenant concerning insurance, maintenance of stocks of jute and keeping of the premises in repair." It is not necessary, I think, that I should refer in detail to the pleadings in the suit, because the matters for the consideration of this Court were ultimately set out in the " issues " which appear at page 13 of the printed paper-book in the case. They were as follows:- 1. Has the Court jurisdiction with regard to the mortgages dated 10th August, 1932? 2. Has this Court jurisdiction in respect of the mortgage of 26th November, 1932, (a) by reason of sec. 67 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, (b) on the ground that the leave granted under cl. They were as follows:- 1. Has the Court jurisdiction with regard to the mortgages dated 10th August, 1932? 2. Has this Court jurisdiction in respect of the mortgage of 26th November, 1932, (a) by reason of sec. 67 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, (b) on the ground that the leave granted under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent should be revoked and, (c) on the ground that the inclusion of the Calcutta property was a mere device to found jurisdiction? 3. Is the mortgage of 26th November, 1932, invalid for want of proper registration, on the ground that the inclusion of the Calcutta property was in fraud of the law of registration? 4. Is the Plaintiff entitled to proceed with the suit without the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the minor Defendants? 5. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties, (a) Ramratan, (b) on the ground stated in para. 17 of the written statement? 6. Were the mortgages procured by fraud and misrepresentation, such fraud being confined to the representation given in the particulars set out in para. 8 of the written statement? 7. Have the Defendants committed any breach of covenant as alleged in the plaint? The learned Judge made this comment: The defences are, I think, accurately indicated In the issues which were finally accepted by the Court and he restated the issues succinctly, thus: 1. Has this Court jurisdiction with regard to the mortgages of the 10th August, 1932?" 2. The learned Judge's decision upon that issue as stated by him succinctly was in these words: Clearly it has not. None of the mortgaged properties was within jurisdiction. The suit upon these mortgages is, therefore, bound to fail. 3. As I have already said, we are not now concerned with the August mortgages because no one has sought to show that the decision of the learned Judge was not in every way correct with regard to these mortgages. The learned Judge then made a summary of the remaining issues in these words: 2. Jurisdiction with regard to mortgaged properties of November, 1932, which being expanded amounts to this: Has the Court jurisdiction to deal with and make a decree in connection with the November mortgages. The learned Judge then stated: Under this issue-three points were taken first sec. 67A of the Transfer of Property Act. Jurisdiction with regard to mortgaged properties of November, 1932, which being expanded amounts to this: Has the Court jurisdiction to deal with and make a decree in connection with the November mortgages. The learned Judge then stated: Under this issue-three points were taken first sec. 67A of the Transfer of Property Act. In connection with this point 1 think two authorities were cited by the Defendants. The second point is on the ground that the leave granted under Clause 12 should be revoked. The point made here, though not originally made in the pleadings, where the matter is pleaded as one of registration, is that the in" elusion of the Calcutta properties in the properties mortgaged under the November mortgage was a device to obtain jurisdiction. The learned Judge then observed: This issue was raised by reason perhaps of my suggestion or rather of my understanding of what counsel wanted to argue and that, therefore, by analogy with the cases which dealt directly with the matter of registration. The Court should regard the property as non-existent and on that ground revoke the leave granted. The learned Judge then proceeds thus: The third issue deals specifically with the matter on the basis of registration and the recent decision in Collector of Gorakpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61. I. A. 286,: s c. 38 C. W. N. 1101 (1931)is relied upon for the proposition that notwithstanding that the property may in fact exist, if it is a notional property or a fictitious property or has been inserted merely for the purpose of jurisdiction, the Registrar will be regarded as having registered without jurisdiction and the document regarded as being improperly registered in which case of course the Plaintiff would be unable to enforce the mortgage which would be an unregistered document. 2. In addition to that there was an issue framed for the purpose of trying the question as to whether or not the absence of an alleged necessary party rendered the suit bad on the ground of non-joinder of parties or want of parties, and the question whether or not it was possible to make a decree under Or. 34 having regard to the fact that the guardian ad litem not being properly appointed could not represent the Defendants who were minors. 34 having regard to the fact that the guardian ad litem not being properly appointed could not represent the Defendants who were minors. I may summarise the points which we have to decide in this way: (1) Whether or not the conditions of sec. 67A of the Transfer of Property Act were complied with and if they were not, what is the effect of the noncompliance with the provisions of that section; (2) Was there on the facts and circumstances of this case a proper and valid registration of the November mortgage; (3) Can it be rightly said that there was no jurisdiction in the Court below to adjudicate on the November mortgage by reason of the fact that in the eye of the law there was not included in that mortgage any property which could rightly be described as land situated or existing within the ambit of the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, that is, within the circumference of the territorial original jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal. (4) The fourth point we have to consider is in connection with the fact that there were Defendants who were minors and that there was another son, the seventh child of Premsukh, who had not been a party in the suit. Of these four points the most important are, in my opinion, the middle two, that is to say, the question whether there was a valid registration and the question whether there was want of jurisdiction because for juristic purpose there was no "Calcutta land'' if I may so put it, included in the November mortgage. I propose to deal with these two points first and in the order I have mentioned. 3. I deal, therefore first of all, with the question of registration. The November mortgage was registered in the office of the Registrar of Assurances in Calcutta as it appears from the endorsement on the document. The learned Judge in the passage to which I have already referred and which I will again quote says this. 3. I deal, therefore first of all, with the question of registration. The November mortgage was registered in the office of the Registrar of Assurances in Calcutta as it appears from the endorsement on the document. The learned Judge in the passage to which I have already referred and which I will again quote says this. The third issue deals specifically with the matter on the basis of registration and the recent decision in Collector of Gorakpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61 I A. 286, s. c. 38 C. W. N. 1101 (1934).is rolled upon for the proposition that notwithstanding that the property may in fact exist, if it is a notional property or a fictitious property or has been inserted merely for the purpose of jurisdiction, the Registrar will be regarded as having registered without jurisdiction and the document regarded as being improperly registered in which case of course the Plaintiff would be unable to enforce the mortgage which would be an unregistered document. 4. Then he referred to a passage in paragraph 15 of the written statement which runs thus: Defendants were never the owners of "premises No. 43 1 European Asylum Lane and never authorised anyone to purchase the said property or to include the same in the mortgage dated 26th November, 1932. The said property purporting to be 1-84th share in the said premises has been fraudulently included in the document solely for the purpose of obtaining registration in Calcutta and is a fraud on the registration law. The said mortgage in any event is invalid and inoperative and should be avoided. 5. That plea in itself amounts to this that the registration was bad and therefore, the mortgage deed, in law and for all practical purposes, was an unregistered document and not enforcible by any action at law. It will be convenient perhaps to deal with this point with reference to the facts of the case as regards the property, or so called property, referred to in paragraph 15 of the written statement which I have just read. It will be convenient perhaps to deal with this point with reference to the facts of the case as regards the property, or so called property, referred to in paragraph 15 of the written statement which I have just read. It appears that persons who would otherwise be willing to make advances or give loans to prospective borrowers-in particular such persons as may be described as professional lenders -are disinclined to lend money to persons who can only tender as security properties outside the jurisdiction of this Court; and for reasons into which I need not enter, it is quite clear upon the evidence given in this case that lenders prefer to find themselves in such a position that if it is necessary with regard to mortgages to resort to process of law in order to enforce their security they are able to institute their suit in the High Court, rather than in some Court in the Mofussil It comes about therefore, that if the prospective borrower is not in a position to offer any Calcutta property as security, because he is not at the time possessed of any such property, then he takes steps to procure a property of that description or, in other words, he takes steps to be put into possession of such a property in order to be able to offer to the mortgagees security which includes some interest in land which lies or exists within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 6. In this particular instance, it appears from the evidence that the Plaintiff from the time when the first mortgages were entered into was not disposed to make any further advance to be covered by a fresh mortgage, unless and until the borrower Premsukh and his family were in a position to offer as security some Calcutta property. It further emerges from the evidence that there was in existence in this city one person and probably considerably more than one person who may be described as professional providers of jurisdiction property. I use the expression "jurisdiction property " because that was the expression actually used by the attorney who happened to act as the go-between and as the lawyer for both the parties in the transaction with which we are now concerned, i.e., the November mortgage. I use the expression "jurisdiction property " because that was the expression actually used by the attorney who happened to act as the go-between and as the lawyer for both the parties in the transaction with which we are now concerned, i.e., the November mortgage. Resort had to be made to a gentleman named Naresh Chandra Pal who entered into a conveyance, a copy of which is set out at page 148 of the printed paper-book in the case and which bears the same date as the mortgage of the 26th November, 1932, whereby the interest in the property referred to in paragraph (15) of the written statement, is 48-1, European Asylum Lane, was conveyed by Naresh Chandra Pal to one Narain Chandra Das. The interest which was conveyed was a one-sixth in that property. The consideration for the conveyance was said to be Rs. 300 paid by the proposed borrower. But the sum actually paid was Rs. 350-Rs. 50 for the costs of the attorney who acted in this behalf. Simultaneously with the conveyance of this one-sixth share in the premises from Naresh Chandra Pal to Narain Chandra Das the latter granted a perpetual lease of that one-sixth share to his vendor-the rent reserved for the perpetual lease thus created amounting to Re. 1 per annum. Contemporaneously with this transaction Narain completed the matter by conveying to Premsukh and his family a one-fourteenth part of the one-sixth share and it was really in respect of that conveyance that the Rs. 300 was provided. It appears, therefore, that Premsukh and the other members of his family acquired by virtue of this transaction a reversionary interest, dependent upon the perpetual lease, in a one-fourteenth of one-sixth share of the premises No. 43-1 of European Asylum Lane, in other words a reversion dependent upon the lease of which the rent reserved, as I have said, was not more than one rupee per annum. I need hardly pause to consider that figure as lending to the conclusion that the value of the property acquired by Premsukh and his family was almost infinitesimal. The property so acquired was included or said to have been included in the November mortgage. The actual properties which are the subject-matter of that mortgage are enumerated in Schedule A to the indenture of mortgage, which is set out at page 140 of the paper-book. The property so acquired was included or said to have been included in the November mortgage. The actual properties which are the subject-matter of that mortgage are enumerated in Schedule A to the indenture of mortgage, which is set out at page 140 of the paper-book. The only part of the property which is said to be within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is described as follows: All that piece or parcel of land containing by admeasurement an area of fire cottahs eleven chittacks forty-two square feet, be the same a little more or less, situate lying at and formerly portion of premises No. 43, European Asylum Lane thereafter a portion of premises No. 16, 1, Komedan Bagan Lane and now No. 43 1, European Aslyum Lane, Holding No. 62 Block No. Ill, South Division of the town of Calcutta in respect of which entire holding an annual rent of Rs. 10-15-9 is payable to the Calcutta Collectorate. 7. Then follows the description of boundaries. So that, it is to be seen from the description in the schedule, that what was included as regards property in Calcutta was the 1/14th share, the annual rent of which was one rupee. There is no doubt that the mere fact that a part of the land which is said to have been situated in a particular place for the purpose of registration is unsubstantial in character will not, by itself, be a bar to registration at that particular place. It has been clearly laid down repeatedly that sec. 28 of the Indian Registration Act is satisfied by registration being effected in the place where any portion of the registered property is situated. It is not necessary that such portion should be a substantial portion. Sec. 28 runs thus: Save as in this part otherwise provided, every document mentioned in sec. 17, sub-sec. (1), clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d), and sec. 18, clauses (a), (b) and (c), shall be presented for registration in the office of a Sub Registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property to which such document relates is situate. 8. But although it is not necessary that such a portion should be a substantial one it is necessary that the alleged portion which is said to be situated within the sub-district, should have a real existence. 8. But although it is not necessary that such a portion should be a substantial one it is necessary that the alleged portion which is said to be situated within the sub-district, should have a real existence. The fictitious inclusion of a property will not be enough to bring it about that registration can take place in the district or sub-district where the property which is fictitious is supposed to exist. It sometimes happens that parties to a deed of conveyance include in the deed a parcel or piece of land described as situated in a particular place but which does not in fact exist, and they get the document registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the parcel or piece of land is alleged to be situated. In such a case, it has been held and I think rightly held, that if the fictitious entry was intentionally made use of by the parties solely for the purpose of obtaining registration in a particular sub district, where in fact no part of the property actually transferred or intended to be transferred in fact exists, it is a fraud on the registration law, and no registration obtained by means thereof is valid. There are a number of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which make that perfectly clear and it is not necessary that I should refer to more than two or three of them. The leading case on the subject is that of Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhury v. Hari Dasi Debt L. R. 41 I. A. 110: s. c. I. L. R. 41 Cal 972; 18 C.W.N. 817 (1914). which was decided by the Privy Council in the year 1914. That was a case where the property said to have been situated in a particular sub-district had no existence at all. The next case to which I will refer is Biswanath Prashad v. Chandra Narayan Chowdhury L. R. 48 I. A, 127 s. c, 25 C. W. N. 985 (1921). which followed the principle laid down in Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhury's case 972; 18 C.W.N. 817 (1914 )The head-note runs thus: By sec. 28 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, every instrument which by sec. 17 is required to be mortgaged must be presented for registration in the sub-district within which the whole or a portion of the property affected is situate. 28 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, every instrument which by sec. 17 is required to be mortgaged must be presented for registration in the sub-district within which the whole or a portion of the property affected is situate. A mortgage bond for Rs. 8,000/- was registered in the Mozafferpur District; the only property with, in that district which the bond purported to mortgage was a one kauri share in a village. The mortgagor had bought that share for Rs. 50/- shortly before executing the mortgage, and had paid the price, but there was no registered instrument of transfer nor delivery of possession, as required by sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The share was included in the bond in order that registration might be effected in the Mozafferpur District, and the parties did not intend that it should vest in the mogtgagor or pass under the mortgage Held that the mortgage bond was not validly registered, and consequently that by sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it was not an enforceable security. 9. Now if it can be said in the present case that the November mortgage was not properly registered then it necessarily follows that that mortgage is not to be treated as security. What has been argued here by Mr. Bose on behalf of the Appellants is that the property or the so-called property No. 43-1, European Asylum Lane, was merely a notional property and had no real existence or any existence sufficiently substantial, if I may so put it, to enable the mortgagee to say that there was a valid registration in the District of Calcutta. The decision of the Privy Council in Biswanath Prashad's case L. R. 48 I. A. 127.: s. c, 25 C. W. N. 985 (1921). is to be gathered from the judgment of His Lordship Viscount Finlay in the passage which appears at pages 133 and 134 as follows:- The view which their Lordships take of the facts is that which is compendiously stated by the High Court in the judgment of Coxe, J.: I agree. The circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the parties never intended that the share of Kolhua should really bo sold to Udit Narayan or mortgaged to Polai Lal. The so-called sale was a mere device to evade the Registration Act'. The circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the parties never intended that the share of Kolhua should really bo sold to Udit Narayan or mortgaged to Polai Lal. The so-called sale was a mere device to evade the Registration Act'. The more detailed judgment of Sharfuddin, J., is to the same effect. In coming to the conclusion that this appeal must be dismissed, their Lordships judgment rests on the view that none of the parties ever intended that the one-kauri share in mauza Kolhua should vest in Udit or should pass by the mortgage from him to the mortgagee. 10. Upon that view of the matter their Lordships were of opinion that there was no valid registration in the sub-district. This question of registration, it may be observed in passing, has generally nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. The reason for inserting a fictitious or notional property in a conveyance is to enable registration to take place in a particular district which is convenient of access for the parties. 11. In the present instance Mr. Bose's argument, as I have said, is that the inclusion of the European Asylum Lane property was not real enough to justify the registration which took place in the office of the Registrar of Assurances in Calcutta. The answer made to that by the Respondent is that the matter is covered by the provisions of sec. 30 of the Indian Registration Act. That section says in sub-sec. (1):- Any Registrar may in his discretion receive and register any document which might be registered by any sub-registrar subordinate to him. 12. If, therefore, there was amongst the properties included in the November mortgage any property in Calcutta, however small, the Registrar of Assurances of Calcutta could have acted under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30 of the Registration Act. Mr. Bose says that the Registrar did not act under that sub-section or under sec. 30 (2) because the fee charged for registration was the fee chargeable under sec. 28, and not for registration under sec. 30. On the other hand, Mr. Ghose on behalf of the Respondent says it does not matter what the fees charged were. It must be taken that the Registrar acted under the wider power conferred upon him by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 30. That sub-sec. 28, and not for registration under sec. 30. On the other hand, Mr. Ghose on behalf of the Respondent says it does not matter what the fees charged were. It must be taken that the Registrar acted under the wider power conferred upon him by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 30. That sub-sec. is as follows:- The Registrar of a district including a Presidency town and the Registrar of the Lahore District may receive and register any document refer, red to in sec. 28 without regard to the situation in any part of British India of the property to which the document relates. 13. Mr. Ghose invites us to take the view that whether or not the Registrar was right in regard to the fees charged for the registration, he was, in fact, empowered to register the document with which we are now concerned. The learned Judge on this point at page 77 of the Paper Book says this:- The Plaintiff's answer is that in this particular case sec. 30 of the Registration Act will in any event apply and Counsel for the Plaintiff did not feel compelled to distinguish the case in Collector of Gorakpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61 I. A. 286: s. c. 38 C. W. N. 1101 (1934). It is suggested that the procedure under sees. 28 and 30 are different and that this document was in fact registered under sec. 28. There is however nothing to establish this and having regard to the fact that Calcutta property or no Calcutta property, the Registrar had jurisdiction to register the document, in my view the point in issue No. 3 must fail. 14. It is perhaps convenient that at this stage I should refer to the case mentioned by the learned Judge. It has been discussed in detail before us during the hearing of this appeal. It is the case reported in 61 I. A. under the title of Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61 I. A. 286: s. c. 38 C. W. N. 1101 (1934). which is at page 286 of that volume of the Indian Appeals. In that case the facts were that a sale deed comprised four villages within one registration sub-district and also a one-third share in a garden-room situated within another sub-district. which is at page 286 of that volume of the Indian Appeals. In that case the facts were that a sale deed comprised four villages within one registration sub-district and also a one-third share in a garden-room situated within another sub-district. The deed gave the purchasers no access to the garden-room, and one of the purchasers had admitted that it was of no value to them; and further that the vendor had no title to it. The deed was registered in the sub-district in which the so-called garden room was situated and not in the sub-district within which the four villages were situated. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the deed was not validly registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, sec. as the evidence showed that the parties did not intend to transfer the share in the garden-room, its inclusion in the deed being merely a device to evade the Registration Act. Lord Blanesburgh in giving judgment says:- Now the learned District Judge, as soon as he found that the sitting-room was an existing thing, so that its insertion as a subject of sale could not, as he thought within the decision of this Board in Harendra Lal Roy v. Hari Dasi Debi L. R. 41 I. A. 110: s. c. I. L. R. 41 cal, 972: 18 C. W. N. 817 (1914). be regarded as fictitious, decided that he was not at liberty to consider whether it was the intention of the parties that the sitting-room should be an effective subject of sale. They had kept within the letter of the law, he thought and the registration must be upheld It seems from some passages in his judgment that if he has felt himself at liberty to consider the intentions of the parties in this matter he might have reached the same conclusion as that at which their Lordships have arrived. They had kept within the letter of the law, he thought and the registration must be upheld It seems from some passages in his judgment that if he has felt himself at liberty to consider the intentions of the parties in this matter he might have reached the same conclusion as that at which their Lordships have arrived. In the High Court the learned Judges were of opinion, and their Lordships think rightly so, that they were bound to go into this question of intention and having done so they arrived at the conclusion that the entry of the sitting-room in the deed was not a fictitious entry within the meaning of the decision of the Board already cited, and although on the facts of the present case one could not help feeling that the parties to the sale-deed under consideration attempted to juggle with the registration law, still the question was whether they had overstepped the bounds laid down by the law, and the learned Judges felt that that question must be answered in the negative. In reaching that conclusion, however, they failed to refer to or to take into account all the circumstances which their Lordships have detailed, and it becomes the duty of the Board to consider the question afresh in their light. They have done so and, having regard specially, although not exclusively, to the facts that this undivided share in this sitting-room was agreed by one of the purchasers to be of no value, that both in respect of the interest taken in it and in respect of its complete inaccessibility, it was incapable either of being utilized or enjoyed by the purchaser; that the vendor refused to include in the sale any subject in Gorakhpur to which these disadvantages did not attach, they think that one of two inferences alone is possible; either that it was never intended by either party that the sitting-room should for any purpose other than that of registration be subject of sale at all, or that the vendor only included it because he knew that it never could become an effective subject of enjoyment or occupation by the purchasers. The word 'fictitious' used in Harendra Lal Roy v. Hari Dasi Debt L. R. 41 I. A. 110: s. c. I. L. R. 41 Cal 972 18 C. W. N. 817 (1914). is not confined to non-existing properties. The word 'fictitious' used in Harendra Lal Roy v. Hari Dasi Debt L. R. 41 I. A. 110: s. c. I. L. R. 41 Cal 972 18 C. W. N. 817 (1914). is not confined to non-existing properties. It is satisfied if the deed does not relate' to a specified property for any effective purpose of enjoyment or use. In their Lordships' opinion, all the facts of the ease, if not stronger, are at least as strong as those in either Harendra's case L. R. 41 I. A. 110: s. c. I. L. R. 41 Cal 972 18 C. W. N. 817 (1914) or Biswanath Pershad r. Chandra Narayan Chowdhuri L. R. 48 I. A. 127; s. c. 25 C. W. N. 985 (1921). and, paraphrasing the words used in the latter case, the circumstances here leave in their minds no doubt that the parties never intended that this undivided share of this sitting room should really be sold. The so-called Bale was a mere device to evade the Registration Act. 15. That judgment is of supreme importance for our present purpose because it indicates that it is permissible and right that the Court should go behind the face of the instrument, whether conveyance or mortgage, and ascertain for itself upon evidence whether or not the property which is said to be within the jurisdiction of the Court, is a real property included in the conveyance or mortgage as the case may be and fit for registration and whether it was the intention of the parties that a particular property should really be the subject-matter of a sale or mortgage as the case may be. 16. In the present instance the learned Judge arrived at certain conclusions on the facts as regards the character of the " property" which is said to be situated at 43-1, European Asylum Lane and his findings are of great importance in connection with the question of jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction. 16. In the present instance the learned Judge arrived at certain conclusions on the facts as regards the character of the " property" which is said to be situated at 43-1, European Asylum Lane and his findings are of great importance in connection with the question of jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction. In my opinion, however, the facts of this case are of no importance whatever upon the pure question of registration, because I have come to the conclusion that the learned Judge was quite right in taking the view that whether there was Calcutta property or no Calcutta property comprised in the mortgage, the Registrar of Assurances of Calcutta, in registering the document, must be taken to have acted within the four corners of the authority conferred upon him by the provisions of sec. 30 of the Registration Act, 1908. There is no necessity, for us to endeavour to ascertain whether he acted under the powers conferred on him by sub-sec. (1) or under the powers conferred on him by sub-sec. (2). I think the matter is entirely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Nilabjabarani Dasi v. Nandarani Dasi I. L. R. 58 Cal, 133 (1930). Sir George Rankin, Chief Justice, in that case said:- The question which arises...... has reference to the provisions of sec. 80 of the Registration Act that any Registrar may, in MB discretion, receive and register any document which might be registered by any Sub-Registrar subordinate to him; and it may be pointed out that, in this case, the Courts have come to the conclusion that, because the Sadar Sub-Registrar has not stated that he was acting as Registrar pursuant to a discretion under see. 30, the fact that he was entitled to act as Registrar does not make the registration valid. It appears to me that this contention is not really supported by authority. In the well known case of Baij Nath Tewari v. Sheo Sahay Bhagut I. L. R. 13 Cal. 556 (1891). the main question was whether the property had been substantially mis described. The Chief Justice, Sir Comer Petheram, who took the view that the mis-description was not material, considered the question whether the registration by the officer, who was the Sub-Registrar and the Registrar, was not good in the circumstances. He pointed out that by sec. 556 (1891). the main question was whether the property had been substantially mis described. The Chief Justice, Sir Comer Petheram, who took the view that the mis-description was not material, considered the question whether the registration by the officer, who was the Sub-Registrar and the Registrar, was not good in the circumstances. He pointed out that by sec. 51 one set of books only should be kept when the two offices had been amalgamated and that the registering officer acts precisely in the same way if he registers a document in his discretion as Registrar as he would do if he registered it as Sub-Registrar. Consequently, in the case before him the document was registered in an office and in a set of books which had been constituted and provided for registration of documents of this kind and, in those circumstances, the learned Chief Justice refused to hold the registration to be void. I may also point out that sec. 87 of the Registration Act provides that- Nothing done in good faith pursuant to this Act or any Act hereby repealed, by any registering officer, shall be deemed invalid merely by reason of any defect in his appointment or procedure. 17. Even if therefore, it was the case that the Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta, ought to have charged a larger fee than he actually did nevertheless by the saving provisions of sec. 87 of the Registration Act, the registration would still hold good. I am of opinion, therefore, that on the question of registration the decision arrived at by the learned Judge was right. 18. Now the other principal question and the one which is indeed the paramount question in this case, is that relating to jurisdiction. Mr. Ghose has argued that whether registration was good or bad that does not really affect the question of jurisdiction. I am not disposed to differ from that proposition. What we are really concerned with here, for the purpose of determining whether or not this High Court has jurisdiction to deal with the November mortgage, is whether there was a real inclusion amongst the properties given as security for the loan, any land or interest in land situated or existing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Leave to institute the suit out of which this appeal arises was given under the provisions of cl. Leave to institute the suit out of which this appeal arises was given under the provisions of cl. 12 of the Letters Patent which provides, so far as is material for present purposes, that the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction shall be empowered to receive, try, and determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property such land or property shall be situated or in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the said High Court. We have to ascertain and determine whether in the present case there was any land comprised in the mortgage which either wholly, or in part was within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court. The case for the Plaintiff was that he was entitled to sue because the subject-matter of the mortgage lay in part within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court, the part in question being the interest which the borrower, that is to say, the mortgagor, acquired in the premises No. 43-1, European Asylum Lane. 19. Now the authorities which I have cited, and in particular, the case reported in 41 I. A..[Harendra Lal v. Han Dasi L. R. 41 I. A. 110: s. c. I. L. R. 41 Cal 972, 18 C. W. N 817 (1914), (which seems to have troubled the mind of the learned Judge in the Court below) indicates that it is not only open to the Court but it is the duty of the Court to ascertain whether it was really the intention of the parties that the interest in land which is said to have founded jurisdiction should be an effective part of the security given in the mortgage. The learned Judge upon this question, which is of course a question of fact, says this: The remaining point of jurisdiction is one which in my view must be treated more seriously notwithstanding, as I have said it was not a point originally pleaded. Then follows: There is absolutely no doubt upon the evidence that the Calcutta property in this case was included for the purposes of jurisdiction, Plaintiff and his attorney very properly have not attempted to conceal the fact. Then follows: There is absolutely no doubt upon the evidence that the Calcutta property in this case was included for the purposes of jurisdiction, Plaintiff and his attorney very properly have not attempted to conceal the fact. In fact the Plaintiff's attorney somewhat ingenuously referred to jurisdiction property and to a gentleman whose business it is to collect such properties and split them up for purposes of jurisdiction. These means have been resorted to by reason of the fact that under the Charter as it stands, people with good mofussil property desiring to do business find great difficulty in obtaining finance unless by some means jurisdiction can be attracted to their security. This is what the attorney referred to as ' arranging for jurisdiction '. 20. have had our attention drawn to the relevant passages in the evidence. I do not think it necessary that I should refer to them in detail. They are to be found at pages 18, 19, 21, 26, 64 and 65 of the printed despositions. It is only necessary, I think, that I should say that after giving due consideration to the evidence mentioned I entirely concur in the opinion expressed by the learned Judge. It is significant and indeed, in my opinion, conclusive in favour of the Appellant in this case that Mr. B. C. Ghose, appearing on behalf of the Respondents, frankly conceded in the course of the argument that the " property " situated at 43-1, European Asylum Lane was included in the November mortgage simply and solely for the purpose of " arranging for jurisdiction." Mr. Ghose emphasised that by saying " for jurisdiction and for no other purpose." Mr. Ghose made a somewhat desperate attempt to escape from the consequence of the judicial decisions I have referred to by eneavouring to found an argument upon the passage in that judgment of the Privy Council which seems to indicate that a distinction may perhaps be drawn between motive and intention." Mr. Ghose made a somewhat desperate attempt to escape from the consequence of the judicial decisions I have referred to by eneavouring to found an argument upon the passage in that judgment of the Privy Council which seems to indicate that a distinction may perhaps be drawn between motive and intention." Mr. Ghose said that although undoubtedly the motive for including the property 43/1, European Asylum Lane was to confer jurisdiction on this Court which otherwise would have had no jurisdiction with regard to the November mortgage, nevertheless it was still the intention of the parties to make the property a real part of the security which Premsukh Mahata and his family were giving as the consideration for the loan which they were getting from the Plaintiff. I do not think it necessary to occupy any time in endeavouring to decide whether it is possible or proper for the purpose of deciding a matter of the kind now before us to draw a nice distinction between motive for the inclusion of the property and the intention attaching to this inclusion, because I am quite satisfied upon the evidence that it cannot be said in the present instance that there was any intention whatever to treat this property 43/1, European Asylum Lane as being an effective or even an inducing part of the mortgage. Bearing in mind the decision in The Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61 I. A. 286.: s. c. 88 C. W. 5. 1101 (1984). in my opinion, it cannot be said that the property was included for any effective purpose of enjoyment or use. I am definitely of the opinion that neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee ever imagined for one moment that the one was giving any extra security or the other thought he was obtaining any extra security by the inclusion of this " property." 21. The passage relied upon by Mr. Ghose-which I had in mind a moment ago, appears in the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Raja Inuganti Venkataram Rao L. R. 63 I. A. 169 at p. 178: s. c. 40 C, W. N. 545 (1936). The passage relied upon by Mr. Ghose-which I had in mind a moment ago, appears in the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Raja Inuganti Venkataram Rao L. R. 63 I. A. 169 at p. 178: s. c. 40 C, W. N. 545 (1936). where Sir George Lowndes says: Their Lordships can have no doubt that the oriterion by which the question now before them must be decided is whether, upon the facts established by the evidence, the parties intended this one yard of land to pass under the deed. The motive may be immaterial, as the Respondent contends if the requirements of the law have been complied with; but of this the intention is critical. They are satisfied that in the present case no such intention existed. 22. I, for my part, am satisfied that in the present case also " no such intention existed "with regard to the November mortgage. We need not elaborate or even consider the distinction between motive and intention. 23. The learned Judge in the Court below seems to have been of the same opinion. He says, in continuation of the passage I have already quoted: Speaking entirely for myself, I think that it is eminently desirable that instead of devices there should be a properly recognised legal right 'to arrange for such jurisdiction '. 24. I may interject this observation that no doubt parties often desire to confer jurisdiction on a particular Court with a view to having any dispute which may arise between them settled within a certain jurisdiction but their efforts in this behalf are not always warranted by the law as it at present stands. Mr. Justice Ameer Ali then says: '' That is not at present the law and a great deal longer than I have been at the Bar this system of 'arranging jurisdiction' has been going on. I remember many cases which have gone up to the Court on Appeal on other grounds in which mortgaged property in the Mofussil included the usual one square foot or whatever it may be of Calcutta land. I remember many cases which have gone up to the Court on Appeal on other grounds in which mortgaged property in the Mofussil included the usual one square foot or whatever it may be of Calcutta land. I have never been quite happy about this system bat it is a system which has proved of great value to the community and is no doubt known to every body and I for one Bitting in the Court of first instance do not propose to destroy a system which has been recognised for so many years. I quite see, having regard to the decision which specifically applies to the matter of registration in Collector of Gorakpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61 I. A. 286: s. c. 38 C. W. N. 1101 (1934)., an argument can be fouuded that a device of a similar nature directed to evade the limits, placed upon the jurisdiction by the Charter may be regarded in a similar manner. That is a matter which having appreciated its difficulties I deliberately leave to some higher authority. I propose to follow the many cases both on the Original Side and in Appeal where jurisdiction has been recognised and exercised in the cases of Mofussil land with the addition of some jurisdiction property'." 25. I am bound to say that I find myself quite at a loss to understand how the learned Judge could have thought that the case in 61 I. A. [Ram Sundar Mal's case L. R. 61 I, A. 286: s. c. 39 C. W. N. 1101 (1934) is any authority for saying that one could confer jurisdiction by a mere notional inclusion of a property. i.e., inclusion for the purpose of arranging jurisdiction and not for any other purpose. 26. Ram Sundar Mal's case L. R. 61 I, A. 286: s. c. 39 C. W. N. 1101 (1934). must, in my opinion, of course be regarded as a far higher authority than any decision either of the Original Side or of any Appellate Court of this Court. Once one comes to the conclusion that a property incuded in an instrument of conveyance or mortgage was there merely for the purpose of "arrange for jurisdiction "one is bound to hold that no jurisdiction is conferred thereby. Once one comes to the conclusion that a property incuded in an instrument of conveyance or mortgage was there merely for the purpose of "arrange for jurisdiction "one is bound to hold that no jurisdiction is conferred thereby. The kind of inclusion which took place, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, is not sufficient to warrant this Court in saying that as a part of the land mortgaged was situated in Calcutta it lies within the jurisdiction of this Court and that, therefore, all that is necessary is that to institute the suit, leave should be given-as required by cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. 27. Having regard to the conclusion I have come to concerning the purpose and intent of the inclusion of the so-called Calcutta property it follows that the leave which was granted under cl. 12 must be revoked, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit should have been dismissed. 28. With regard to the other two points raised in the appeal, in view of the decision I have arrived at on the question of jurisdiction it is not necessary to say very much. The first of these two points is concerned with sec. 67A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. That section is in these terms: A mortgagee who holds two or more mortgages executed by the same mortgagor in respect of each of which he has a right to obtain the same kind of decree u/s 67 and who sues to obtain such decree on any one of the mortgages, shall in the absence of a contract to the contrary be bound to SUE on all the mortgages in respect of which the mortgage money has become due. 29. The argument put forward on behalf of the Defendant Appellants by Mr. Bose was that by reason of the provisions of this section the Plaintiff as a mortgagee was bound to bring his suit on all the mortgages created by the Defendants in favour of the Plaintiff, that is to say, the August mortgages and the November mortgage. The argument of Mr. Bose was that the August mortgages could not be dealt with under the jurisdiction of this Court as none of the properties comprised in those mortgages was within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court. The argument of Mr. Bose was that the August mortgages could not be dealt with under the jurisdiction of this Court as none of the properties comprised in those mortgages was within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court. The provisions of sec. 67A were not properly complied with. Mr. Bose argued that as there was no real property which might properly be described as Calcutta property, there was no property within the jurisdiction of this Court at all. Whether this is so or not, however, the suit would in any case fail if the provisions of sec. 67A were not complied with. 30. It is to be observed that there is nothing in the section itself or elsewhere in the Act to indicate what would be the consequence of non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 67A. In other words, no sanction is attached to the directions contained in the section. There is nothing either in the section itself or in the rest of the Act to indicate that a mortgagee is bound to comply with the provisions of sec. 67A, where the circumstances were such that it was not possible to comply with the provisions of the section-as for example, where the subject-matter of a series of mortgages consists of properties lying within the territorial limits of a number of different jurisdiction. 31. In the present case, the Plaintiff in a sense attempted to comply with the provisions of the section by comprising within the scope of the present suit all the mortgages which he held as against the Defendant. The suit was originally constituted in respect of both the August mortgages and the November mortgage. I think it must he taken that the Plaintiff is only obliged to comply with the terms of sec. 67A so far as is possible in the circumstances of each particular case. 32. With regard to the last point raised by Mr. The suit was originally constituted in respect of both the August mortgages and the November mortgage. I think it must he taken that the Plaintiff is only obliged to comply with the terms of sec. 67A so far as is possible in the circumstances of each particular case. 32. With regard to the last point raised by Mr. Bose on behalf of the Defendants-Appellants, that is, as I have previously stated, concerned with the absence from the proceedings of Ramratan and the fact that the learned Judge in the Court below made a decree only as against those Defendants who were of full age; that is to say, he treated the case as if the Defendants who were minors were not necessary parties in the suit and or they had not been made parties for the reasons that they were not actually liable upon the mortgages. It must be borne in mind, however, that the mortgagors were members of a joint Hindu family and on the face of it, it appears that liability attached to each and every one of them. In such circumstances it is not possible to make a decree against some of the Defendants and not against the rest of the Defendants. It is not disputed that the Defendants who were minors were not properly represented tin the suit. No guardian-ad-litem had been appointed to represent them and. therefore, so far as they were concerned the suit was not properly constituted and in the eye of the law they were not there at all. In my opinion, therefore, the decree made by the learned Judge was not one which could properly have been made even if the learned Judge had had jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. As I hold however that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction in the matter, it is not necessary to discuss the question of the form of the decree any further. 33. The appeal is allowed, the decree made by the learned Judge in the Court below is set aside and the suit will stand dismissed. 34. The Appellants are entitled to their costs both here and the Court below. Panckridge, J. I agree. I should not have thought it necessary to add anything to the judgment which has just been delivered, were it not. 34. The Appellants are entitled to their costs both here and the Court below. Panckridge, J. I agree. I should not have thought it necessary to add anything to the judgment which has just been delivered, were it not. that our decision is at variance with ideas hitherto universally held and frequently acted upon by borrowers and lenders in this province. 35. Having regard to the view that we take on the point of jurisdiction it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to say anything with regard to the other defences. 36. However, as the points raised by sec. 67A of the Transfer of Property Act and sees. 28 and 30 of the Indian Registration Act have been argued at some length, I will say a few words on each. 37. At to sec. 67A of the Transfer of Property Act I may observe that it is never easy to construe a statutory enactment which imposes an obligation but is silent as to what is to happen in the case of a breach of that obligation. It appears to me to be unreasonable to suppose that the statute compels a Plaintiff mortgagee to do what the Respondent did here, namely include in his suit mortgage claims over which the Court has no jurisdiction. If this is so, the inclusion cannot be pleaded as a, compliance with the obligation whatever it may be. I cannot however, agree with Mr. Ghose that the failure to include other claims cannot be pleaded by the mortgagor in the first suit which the mortgagee elects to bring although it can be pleaded in subsequent suits brought in respect of the claims which the mortgagee had neglected to include in the former suit. At the same time I can neither agree to the construction suggested by Mr. Bose. according to whcih where there is prima facie jurisdiction in more than one Court to entertain the mortgagee's claim in respect of a particular mortgage, the mortgagee is confined to that Court which has jurisdiction over the largest number of mortgage claims outstanding between the mortgagee and the mortgagor. The section, which was added to the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929, and which cuts down the former rights of the mortgagees, should not in my opinion be construed more widely than the language clearly warrants. Applying this principle the word? The section, which was added to the Transfer of Property Act by Act XX of 1929, and which cuts down the former rights of the mortgagees, should not in my opinion be construed more widely than the language clearly warrants. Applying this principle the word? " all the mortgages in respect of which the mortgage money has become due " must be limited to those mortgages which the Court, in which the mortgagee sues, has jurisdiction to enforce. 38. The position as regards registration in my judgment causes no difficulty. Having regard to the view which I take on the question of jurisdiction it may be conceded that the Registrar of Assurances at Calcutta had no power to register the document in suit under sec. 30, sub-sec. (1) read with sec. 28 of the Act. It is admitted, however, that on the face of it he had such power under sec. 30, sub-sec. (2). If he had the power to register, and did in fact register, there was to my mind effective registration, and it is quite immaterial under what particular provi sion of the statute he purported to act, or thought he was acting. 39. I now come to the main defence, namely the defence with regard to jurisdiction. As has already been stated, the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon cl. 12 of the Letters Patent which among other things gives the Court power to receive, try and determine suits of every description, if, in case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated, or in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly or, in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court's leave was obtained in this case, and we have to consider whether the suit is a suit for land situated in part within the local limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the Court. It appears to me that the same principles which caused the Judicial Committee to hold in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61 I. A 286: s. c 38 C. W. N. 1101 (1934). It appears to me that the same principles which caused the Judicial Committee to hold in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal L. R. 61 I. A 286: s. c 38 C. W. N. 1101 (1934). that the document purporting to convey the undivided share in the sitting room did not in the circumstances "relate to" that property, compel us to hold that the present suit is not a suit for the undivided fractional share in the European Asylum Lane property. 40. If, adopting the language used by Lord Blanesburgh and repeated by Sir George Lowndes in Raja Inunganti Venkatarama Rao v. Raja Subhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur Guru L. R. 63 I. A. 169 at p. 178: s. c. 40 C. W. N. 545 (1936). we ask: 'Did the mortgage-deed transfer a specified property for any effective purpose of enjoyment or use, the answer, in view of the evidence and the admission made by learned Counsel for the Respondent, must, I think, be that it did not. It is true that the Respondent was not willing to make further advances unless Calcutta property was included in the mortgage. But this was not on account of any misgivings as to the sufficiency of the old security, but because he supposed that an infinitesimal undivided share in a Calcutta property would enable him to enforce his mortgage in the High Court. It cannot by any stretch of the imagination be said that he contemplated any effective " use " of the property for the purpose for which it was ostensibly made the subject of the mortgage-deed. 41. To take a parallel case-suppose the fractional interest had been included in a contract for the sale of Mojussil immovable properties, for the purpose of giving this Court jurisdiction in case a purchaser's suit for specific performance became necessary. I do not think that such a suit could in view of the Privy Council decisions be properly described as a suit for such fractional share. No one could suppose that the purchaser, if unsuccessful in the suit, would take any steps to enforce his decree by ejectment or partition proceedings against the fractional interest. 42. In my opinion, the suit was not for land situated partly within the local limits of the jurisdiction and in consequence the Court had no power to grant leave under cl. 42. In my opinion, the suit was not for land situated partly within the local limits of the jurisdiction and in consequence the Court had no power to grant leave under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent or to entertain the suit. 43. The appeal must be allowed with costs here and before the learned trial Judge. In conclusion, I may say that this result is to me a matter of regret. 44. The Appellants have had the use of the Respondent's money. They have furnished security for it and been at pains to comply with a procedure which has hitherto always been considered to attract the jurisdiction of the Court. They now decline to pay, and have so far successfully prevented the Respondent from having recourse to the security that they have given as consideration for the loan. In the circumstances, I confess I was surprised that learned Counsel appearing for these defaulting debtors, in whose conduct there is so little to admire, saw fit to make a charge of dishonesty against the unfortunate Respondent.