JUDGMENT S.K. Ghose, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of damages after declaration that the award given by the arbitrator appointed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, and the proceedings under the award in Money Execution Case No. 119 of 1935, in the first Court of the Munsif of Dinajpur is void and without jurisdiction. There is a prayer for permanent injunction restraining Defendant No. 1, Dinajpur Samabaya Bank, Ltd., from executing the award. The Plaintiff was an Inspector of the Co-operative Societies at Dinajpur in 1930-31. Defendant No. 2, since deceased, took a loan of Rs. 100 from the Defendant No. 1, Samabaya Bank, by executing a simple bond and the Plaintiff joined therein as surety. Defendant No. 2 having failed to repay the debt, the Bank filed a dispute which the Plaintiff himself forwarded to the Assistant Registrar with the recommendation that an arbitrator should be appointed. On that recommendation, an arbitrator was appointed and he served summons upon the Plaintiff as well as upon Defendant No. 2. Neither of these two persons having appeared, the arbitrator gave an award ex parte on 3rd October, 1931. The award was jointly against Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2. As neither of them made any payment in accordance with the award, Defendant No. 1 filed the award in the Munsif's Court at Dinajpur and in execution thereof attached the pay of the. Plaintiff. Thereupon, the Plaintiff has brought the present suit. The suit is contested by Defendant No. 1. The defence raised a preliminary issue, namely, that the suit is not maintainable in a Civil Court. The trial Court held in favour of the defence and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the lower Appellate Court took a different view, reversed the decision of the first Court and remanded the suit for trial on the merits. Hence the second appeal by Defendant No. 1. The first point is that sec. 47 of the CPC is a bar to the suit. I am not impressed by this point in support of the appeal. The plaint contains a prayer for injunction and damages which are outside the scope of sec. 47. Moreover, the Plaintiff calls into question the reference to the arbitrator which resulted in the award, one of his grounds being that he is not a member of the society. I am not impressed by this point in support of the appeal. The plaint contains a prayer for injunction and damages which are outside the scope of sec. 47. Moreover, the Plaintiff calls into question the reference to the arbitrator which resulted in the award, one of his grounds being that he is not a member of the society. On the other hand, the award, on the face of it, is not void for want of jurisdiction and therefore the question as to want of jurisdiction is not for agitation in the executing Court [Amalabala Dasi v. Sarat Kumari Dasi 54 C. L. J. 593(1931)]. 2. The really important question on which the fate of the appeal turns is whether the Plaintiff has brought himself within the scope of the rules framed under sec. 43 of the Co-operative Societies Act. Under Rule 22, sub-r. (6), the award under the circumstances is not liable to be called into question in any Civil or Revenue Court and shall be, in all respects, final and conclusive. The question is whether this applies to the Plaintiff. The first Court pointed cut that whether the Plaintiff be a member or not, he did, in fact, submit to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The learned Advocate for the Plaintiff Respondent has contended that merely because the Plaintiff consented to arbitration, that would not confer jurisdiction, where, in fact, there was want of jurisdiction ab initio [Rajlakshmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dassee I. L. R. 38 Cal. 639(1910)] But in the present case, it cannot be said that there was want of jurisdiction ab initio since the proceedings started with a dispute between the Committee and a member and jurisdiction would not cease simply because a non-member was also a party to the dispute. Rule 22, sub-r. (1) is in accordance with sec. 43, sub sec. (2), cl. (b) of the Act. The Plaintiff is an Inspector of Co-operative Societies and there is nothing to show that he is excluded from the definition of an " officer" under sec. 2, cl. (d) of the Act. For the Plaintiff Respondent it is contended that the dispute originally was not between a member on the one hand and the Plaintiff as an officer on the other. 2, cl. (d) of the Act. For the Plaintiff Respondent it is contended that the dispute originally was not between a member on the one hand and the Plaintiff as an officer on the other. But the dispute has developed into one between the Plaintiff as an officer on the one hand and the Committee and also a member, namely, Defendant No. 2 on the other. In any view of the matter, it seems to me that it would not be right to say that the proceedings before the arbitrator were ah initio void for want of jurisdiction. So the question is whether the Plaintiff by his conduct submitted to that jurisdiction. In the first place, it is found that when the dispute was filed before the Plaintiff himself, he wrote upon it " Auditor may be appointed arbitrator, recommended." It was on that recommendation that an arbitrator was appointed. It is not shown that the Plaintiff as Inspector was bound to make such recommendation, that he was bound to refer the matter to the Assistant Registrar or even to suggest the appointment of an arbitrator. But he did these things. Then when he received the summons from the arbitrator, all that he did was to write on the back of the summons that was served on him that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute against the Plaintiff. 3. The Munsif points out that the Plaintiff being a responsible officer of the department ought to have known how to file an objection under the rules and the alleged note on the back of the summons would not be considered in the arbitration proceedings. On the other hand, after the award was made in 1931, the Plaintiff took no further steps and, as the Munsif points out, he has brought a suit at a time when Defendant No. 1 cannot get any remedy in the Civil Court as his claim is barred by limitation. I think the learned Munsif was right in distinguishing the case of The Dacca Co-operative Industrial Union, Ltd. v. Dacca Co-operative Sankha Silpa Samity, Ltd. 37 C.W.N. 843 (1933). from the facts of the present case. Halsbury's Laws of England (Lord Hailsham's 2nd Edition, Vol. I think the learned Munsif was right in distinguishing the case of The Dacca Co-operative Industrial Union, Ltd. v. Dacca Co-operative Sankha Silpa Samity, Ltd. 37 C.W.N. 843 (1933). from the facts of the present case. Halsbury's Laws of England (Lord Hailsham's 2nd Edition, Vol. 15), page 376, Article 696, lays down as follows " The parties to a dispute in a registered Society or branch may also by consent, unless forbidden by the rules, refer the dispute to the Chief Registrar, and where the rules [direct a reference to justices may, by consent, refer the dispute to the County Court." 4. In the present case the dispute as filed by the secretary of the society was undoubtedly a dispute as against the original debtor as also the Plaintiff as surety. The Plaintiff by his conduct undoubtedly showed that he was submitting to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and it was he who was responsible for the appointment of an arbitrator and although at a subsequent stage he noted that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute against him, he did this in such a perfunctory manner that the arbitrator did not take any notice of it. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the Plaintiff has brought himself within the scope of Rule 22 and sub-r. (6) of that rule would bar the present suit. The question whether the provision is ultra vires has not been agitated and need not be gone into. 5. I, therefore, allow the appeal, reverse the order appealed against and restore the judgment of the trial Court. The Appellant is entitled to his costs in this Court as also the costs incurred by him in the lower Appellate Court, hearing-fee in this Court being assessed at three gold mohurs.