JUDGMENT Ghose, J. - The Plaintiff who is the Appellant before me is the eldest son and the pro forma Defendants are the other sons of one Ramkishore Lal. They used to carry on money-lending business under the name and style of Ramkishore Lal and sons having its office at Asansol. The Defendant No. 1 executed a promissory note for Rs. 2,300 in favour of the firm. The date of the note was originally given in the plaint as 1st April, 1931, but by a subsequent petition this was amended to 1st April, 1933. The heirs of Ramkishore Lal were parties to a partition suit No. 664 of 1927, and the Plaintiff has been appointed Receiver in that suit. With the leave of the Court the Plaintiff has brought the present suit for the realisation of dues upon the aforesaid promissory note. The defence is that the note in question was not executed at all and that a previous note of the 1st March, 1930, has been paid off. The Subordinate Judge negatived this defence and decreed the suit. There was another issue, namely, issue No. 2, which runs as follows:- Is the Plaintiff as receiver to the estate of Ramkishore Lal entitled to bring this suit on a pro-note in favour of Ramkishorelal and sons? The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge upon this issue shows that it was not argued before him but he said that the Plaintiff obtained the Court's permission to sue and the money apparently belonged to the estate of the deceased Ramkishorelal and he is the Receiver of his estate. 2. So the Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge agreed with the Subordinate Judge in holding that the money was really due and the defence was false, but issue No. 2 which was not argued in the first Court was again raised before the Lower Appellate Court and the learned Judge decided in favour of the Defendants, holding that the Plaintiff is not entitled to bring the suit as he is not the holder of the note under the Negotiable Instruments Act. In that view, he set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal by the Plaintiff. 3. In that view, he set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal by the Plaintiff. 3. It is contended, in the first place, that the Plaintiff has not been treated fairly inasmuch as the learned Judge below allowed the defence to raise again the question as to whether the Plaintiff is entitled to sue. However, this being a point of law, it was competent for the learned Judge to allow this matter to be raised. The relevant facts are these: The Plaintiff was appointed Receiver in the aforesaid partition suit in 1928 or 1929. On 19th November, 1932, the Court gave permission to the Receiver to file the suit. It appears that all the debts owing to the joint family were included in the subject-matter of the partition suit. On 4th December, 1932, an order was recorded to the effect that the firm of Ramkishorelal and sons is a part of the estate of Ramkishore Lal and the Petitioner (who is the present Plaintiff) is the Receiver of the said estate. He was permitted to sue the persons mentioned in a list which was filed. As mentioned already, the trial Court in this case has also found that the money sued for belongs to the testate of Ramkishore Lal of which the Plaintiff is the Receiver. The present suit was filed on 3rd April, 1934. In the cause-title to the plaint the Plaintiff described himself as Kali Charan Prasad Receiver in the estate of late Ram Kishore Lall of Asansol carrying on money-lending business under the name and style of Ramkishore Lall and sons having its office at Asansol, Thana and Chowki Asansol, District, Burdwan. 4. The same description has been brought forward to the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court. It is further pointed out that all interested persons are parties to the present suit, Plaintiff's co-sharers being made pro forma Defendants. Now the question arises whether the Plaintiff can bring the present suit. Under Or. 40, r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court may by order confer on the Receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realisation, etc... of the owner's property as the owner himself has. There is no doubt that this has been done with regard to the present Plaintiff. The learned Judge held that, reading sec. of the owner's property as the owner himself has. There is no doubt that this has been done with regard to the present Plaintiff. The learned Judge held that, reading sec. 78 with sec. 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Plaintiff is not entitled to bring the present suit. The question turns upon whether under sec. 8 the Plaintiff can be said to be the holder of the promissory note. Upon the face of the document, the holder of the document is the firm of Ramkishorelal and sons, but it is pointed out that the Plaintiff as Receiver is the only person who can act for the firm. If it were a question of endorsement the Plaintiff as a partner can endorse over to himself as Receiver, but it is contended that this formality is not necessary because the Plaintiff as Receiver is the person who is entitled by operation of law in his own name to the possession of the promissory note or to receive the amount sued thereon from the parties thereof. This is the whole question. The learned Judge below has relied on Harkishorc Barna v. Gura Mia Chowdhury 35 C. W. N. 53 (1930), but there the matter was different because the note in question was executed in favour of a person who was alleged to be the benamdar and the question was whether the real owner could sue without endorsement. It was held that he could not. But endorsement and delivery are not the only modes of transfer of a promissory note. There may be transfer by operation of law, as in the case of a Receiver. In Thangatur Subbarayudu v. Nichanametla Subbarayudu 35 C. W. N. 53 (1930), there was an award for partition and as a result of the award a promissory note was transferred to another person without endorsement. It was held that the person to whom the note was allotted could sue because the award itself operated as a transfer. There is no doubt also that the Court has authority to confer on the Receiver power to sue in his own name. Fink v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh ILR 25 Cal. 642: s. c. 2 C. W N 469 (1898).. It has also been held that; a Receiver who is authorised to sue, though not expressly in his own name, may do so by virtue of his appointment. Fink v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh ILR 25 Cal. 642: s. c. 2 C. W N 469 (1898).. It has also been held that; a Receiver who is authorised to sue, though not expressly in his own name, may do so by virtue of his appointment. Jagat Tarini Dasi v. Nabagopal Chaki I. L. R 34 Cal. 305 (1907). For the Respondents it is contended that the Receiver is not entitled to come in because he was appointed prior to the execution of the promissory note, the first note being on the 1st March, 1930, and the second being in April, 1933. That, however, does not affect the question whether the Receiver was entitled in his own name to the possession of the note, nor did the learned Judge below proceed on that ground. He proceeded on the ground that the Receiver was not entitled to sue because his name did not appear on the body of the document as the original payee or endorsee. But the question is whether the Receiver could give a valid discharge. There seems to be no reason why he could not. Analogy may be drawn from the case of death of the holder of a promissory note and it is conceded that in such a case his heir or executor or administrator could give a valid discharge and, therefore, would be entitled to sue. In other words, such a person would be the holder of the note. Sec. 57 prescribes how a note may be negotiated by the legal representative of a deceased person, but this is not the only method of passing title to a promissory note. It has been held in Ramanadhn Chetty v. Katha Velau I. L. R. 41 Mad. 363 (1917), that a promissory note executed in favour of a trustee can be sued on by his successor without endorsement or assignment, the Negotiable Instruments Act not affecting devolution of rights by operation of law. In Surath Chandra Shaha v. Narayan Chandra Chaudhuri I. L. R. 61 Cal. 425: s. c. 38 C. W. N. 465 (1934),, it was held that a hand-note has two characters: it is negotiable and it is also actionable, and title may be transferred by act of parties, for example, by assignment, as also by the procedure prescribed in the Negotiable Instruments Act. 425: s. c. 38 C. W. N. 465 (1934),, it was held that a hand-note has two characters: it is negotiable and it is also actionable, and title may be transferred by act of parties, for example, by assignment, as also by the procedure prescribed in the Negotiable Instruments Act. In that case the holder without endorsement sold his right, title and interest in the hand-note to the Plaintiff by a registered kobala and it was held that the Plaintiff was entitled to sue. The case of a benamdar or of an undisclosed principal is a different matter. It seems to us, therefore, that the terms of sec. 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act do not exclude the Plaintiff as Receiver from being the holder of the promissory note and so he is entitled to bring the suit. We think that the learned Advocate for the Appellant is also correct in arguing that apart from the question of applicability of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the suit can be regarded in sub-stance as being one on the consideration which was admittedly due upon the previous note of 1st March, 1930. It is alleged that there was an acknowledgment in 1933 and some payment had been made before that date and the plea of payment on the part of the defence was negatived. Therefore, it was not necessary that the Plaintiff should rely on the Negotiable Instruments Act itself for the purpose of his suit. In any view, it seems to us that the learned Judge below was not right in holding that the suit is not maintainable by the Plaintiff. We hold that the suit is maintainable. 5. The next question is whether upon the merits the learned Judge below was right in holding that the Plaintiff has proved his case. This part of the subject the learned Judge has dealt with in a summary manner. He says that there can be no doubt that the hand-note is genuine and that the transaction is properly entered in the accounts of the estate. Neither in the Lower Appellate Court nor in the First Court was any attention given to the fact that the date of the note in question had been altered by petition for amendment from 1st April, 1931, to 1st April, 1933. Both the Courts appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the document was of 1st April, 1931. Neither in the Lower Appellate Court nor in the First Court was any attention given to the fact that the date of the note in question had been altered by petition for amendment from 1st April, 1931, to 1st April, 1933. Both the Courts appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the document was of 1st April, 1931. It is contended that in the Lower Courts the parties were in error on this point and no body paid any attention to the correct date. Whatever it be, it seems to us that the matter requires re-consideration, especially in view of the fact that the learned Judge has dealt with the subject in a very summary manner. We, therefore, remand the appeal to the Lower Appellate Court fur consideration on the merits and final decision in accordance with law. The question as to the correct date of the document in suit is left open for consideration by the Lower Appellate Court. The appeal is allowed with costs. Future costs will abide the result. Patterson, J. I agree.