JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the Plaintiff and arises out of a suit for partition instituted in the year 1927 in respect of three properties described in Schedules Ka, Kha and Ga annexed to the plaint. In this anneal we are only concerned with the properties of Schedule Kha in which the Plaintiff claims l/6th share. His suit has been finally dismissed by the lower Appellate Court by its decree dated the 30th June, 1933. The conflict before us is between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 5. The following genealogical tree is necessary for following the case of the respective parties. 2. On the 2nd January, 1870, Ramdhan executed a conveyance in favour of Soudamini and Ramramani of the property of which Schedule Kha is a part. The conveyance recited that the said ladies were purchasing the same with their stridhan - money Kaliprasanno, the husband of Ramramani, was an attesting witness to the same. On the 7th January, 1885, a portion of the property was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for constructing a municipal drain, 3. Kaliprosonno died first, then Jogendra and then Ramramani. Ramramani was accordingly survived by her son, Mohendra, and her grandson Batahari. If the property was her stridhan, then Mohendra only would take by inheritance to the exclusion of Batahari her 8 annas share, but if the property was of Kaliprasanna, both would take equally. On the 30th April, 1917, Mohendra sold the said eight annas share to Defendant No. 5, on the footing that the property was his mother's stridhan property. In this transaction Defendant No. 4, Surendra, acted for his wife, the Defendant No. 5. On the 3rd January, 1923, the Plaintiff purchased from Bibhabati, the widow of Batahari. 4. The trial Court, and the Court of Appeal below by its judgment and decree dated the 16th May, 1929, held that Ramramani was the benomdar of her husband and on that footing held that the Plaintiff had the share claimed by him in the plaint. Against this judgment and decree Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 preferred a second appeal to this Court being No. 2664 of 1929. Against this judgment and decree Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 preferred a second appeal to this Court being No. 2664 of 1929. This Court by its judgment dated the 7th August, 1931, mentioned the finding that the said eight annas share of the property belonged to Kaliprasanna, but remanded the case to the lower Appellate Court for considering the question as to whether the Defendant No. 5 could invoke the provisions of sec 41 of the Transfer of Property Act or the principle of estoppel as embodied in sec. 115 of the Evidence Act. The remand order was in the following terms:- It is necessary that the evidence, documentary and oral, on the record should be considered for determining if the Defendant No. 5 is a bona fide purchaser from Mohendra, believing in good faith that he WAS he owner of the property and whether in the event of it being found that the Appellants are bond fide purchase a the Plaintiff can claim any interest in the property. 5. After remand the lower Appellate Court has held that Defendant No. 5 is protected by sec. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act and by the doctrine of estoppel. 6. In applying sec. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act the learned Additional District Judge apparently felt the position that Surendra made no enquiry as to the title when he was negotiating the purchase on behalf of his wife from Mohendra, but said that the said fact was not material, for any enquiry would not have disclosed to him the state of the real title, as the members of the family would not have disclosed the benami nature of the purchase effected by Soudamini and Ramramani in 1870. For this purpose the learned Additional District Judge refers to the evidence of Chandra (Defendant No. 1) who said that they had all conspired in maintaining that Soudamini and Ramramani were the real purchasers for the purpose of preventing the daughter's sons of Kalimohan from claiming a share. In our opinion the learned Additional District Judge has overlooked important facts which we will state hereafter. 7. In answering the question of estoppel as defined in sec. 115 of the Evidence Act the learned Additional District Judge stated that the Plaintiffs who profited by representing one state of affiairs are now estopped from seeking to profit by representing the opposite point of view. 7. In answering the question of estoppel as defined in sec. 115 of the Evidence Act the learned Additional District Judge stated that the Plaintiffs who profited by representing one state of affiairs are now estopped from seeking to profit by representing the opposite point of view. 8. This view is clearly unsupportable, for the Plaintiff never made any representation that the property was of Ramramani, and there is no question of bis having made a profit thereby. 9. Regarding the applicability of sec. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act the position is clear. Two things must concur (1) that the person (ostensible owner) who has no real title was clothed with the insignia of ownership with the consent, express or implied, of the real owner; and (2) that the person purchasing for value from the ostensible owner shall take reasonable care to ascertain that his transferor has authority to make the transfer. 10. A person purchasing from a person who is not the real owner can only protect himself by showing that he acted as a prudent man. If he makes no enquiry into title, such as a prudent purchaser would make, or avoids prosecuting such an enquiry he cannot claim protection and the principle that a man cannot give what he has not must apply. 11. In this case the fact that the conveyance of 1870 attested by Kaliprasanna recited that the property was being purchased by Ramramani in our opinion satisfies the first condition, but the second element is not present and in coming to his conclusion the learned Additional District Judge had overlooked important facts. 12. The evidence of Surendra discloses that he made no enquiry whatsoever. It further discloses that he knew that the property was in possession of a tenant who had been paying rent also to Batahari. This fact appears from the following. In 1911, Mohendra had obtained a decree against one Pitambar Dass. In execution of the decree he attached this property. One Jogeswar Ruidas preferred a claim on the footing that he was in possession as a tenant under Batahari and his co-sharers and in support of his case he produced a dakhila Ex. 17 granted by Batahari, and on that his claim was allowed. Surendra admits that he deposed in favour of Jogeswar in that claim case. One Jogeswar Ruidas preferred a claim on the footing that he was in possession as a tenant under Batahari and his co-sharers and in support of his case he produced a dakhila Ex. 17 granted by Batahari, and on that his claim was allowed. Surendra admits that he deposed in favour of Jogeswar in that claim case. It further appears that in the Land Acquisition proceedings of 1885 compensation was given to the sons of Soudamini and Ramramani, although the latter were then living. The amount of the land and description of the boundaries existing at the date of Defendant No. 5's purchase would have put Surendra, who is a resident of the locality, on enquiry and if he had prosecuted his enquiries which he as a prurient man ought to have done, he would have found that the land acquisition compensation had been paid without objection to the heirs of Kalikanta and Kaliprasanna and not to their wives who were then alive. We accordingly hold that Defendant No. 5 cannot get the benefit of sec. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. We accordingly allow the appeal and restore the decree of the trial Court so far as the Plaintiff is concerned. The Plaintiff will have costs of this appeal from Defendant No. 5-hearing-fee, one gold mohur. Nasim Ali, J. I agree.