Judgement Appeal (No. 93 of 1934) from a decree of the High Court (November 22, 1932), which reversed a decree of the Subordinate Judge, at Allahabad (September 18, 1928). The firm of Bond Bros., of which the respondent Tandon was a partner, received a cheque for Rs. 14,950, dated August 12, 1923, drawn on the Central Bank of India by the Indian National Congress in payment of work done for the Congress. In a settlement of accounts between the partners Bond Bros, endorsed the cheque to Tandon for moneys due to him. Tandon advanced Rs. 14,950 by the cheque to the United Provinces Aniline Dyes Company, a firm represented by the appellant, Das. The cheque was cashed by the Central Bank on August 30, 1923. Tandon instituted the present suit for the recovery of the loan on August 27, 1926. Law. Rep. 65 Ind. App. 132 ( 1937- 1938) Babu Manmohan Das V. Baldeo Narain Tandon 253 The Subordinate Judge found there was a seal impressed on the face of the cheque bearing date August 20, 1923, which indicated encashment on that date, and that the suit was, therefore, barred by limitation under art.58 of the Limitation Act. In the High Court the question of limitation was not argued, and the High Court did not deal with it. The only questions raised were whether the cheque belonged to Bond Bros, or was the property of the plaintiff, and whether Manmohan Das was a partner in Aniline Dyes Company. On these questions the High Court held that the cheque was the property of the plaintiff, and that Manmohan Das was a partner, and reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge. 1937. July 15, 16. Dunne K.C. and Rashid for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence that the money was lent to the Aniline Dyes Company, and that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of the Subordinate Judge on that point. If there was a loan the suit is barred by limitation. The date of the loan would be the date of the payment of the cheque—namely, August 20, 1923. It was so found by the Subordinate Judge, and the onus is on the plaintiff to show that that finding is wrong. The only document antecedent to the bringing of the suit is the notice of October 31, 1924, given by Tandon to the Aniline Company. It was so found by the Subordinate Judge, and the onus is on the plaintiff to show that that finding is wrong. The only document antecedent to the bringing of the suit is the notice of October 31, 1924, given by Tandon to the Aniline Company. Abdul Majid for the first respondent referred to the evidence and submitted there was a loan to the Aniline Dyes Company. The suit was not barred by limitation. The cheque was not cashed till August 30, 1923. The plaint was presented on August 27, 1926. That would be the date of the institution of the suit. Under art.58 of the Limitation Act, limitation runs from the date when the cheque is paid. [Lord Thankerton. Does art.58 apply where the lender has not given his own cheque but has endorsed a cheque which he has received and given it?] Abdul Majid. In Komal Prasad v. Savitri Bibi (( 1905) I. L. R. 28 A. 54) on a transfer of a hundi, art.58 was applied. Chinna Durai followed. An endorsed cheque stands on the same footing as any other cheque under art.58. The other respondents did not appear. Dunne K.C. replied. Komal Prasad v. Savitri Bibi (( 1905) I. L. R. 28 A. 54.) was a case of a hundi, and the point was whether the date was the date of handing over of the hundi, and Garden v. Bruce (( 1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 300.) was applied. Handing over the lenders cheque would not be a loan till the cheque was cashed. It might not be cashed; but a negotiable instrument comes under art.57, and the time begins to run when the loan is made. Here what was handed over was a negotiable instrument. A cheque is negotiable when it is made so by endorsement. 1937. Dec. 20. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Shadi Lal. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff, Baldeo Narain Tandon (hereinafter referred to as Tandon), against a firm called the United Provinces Aniline Dyes Company (described as "the firm" for convenience), for the recovery of Rs. 14,950, with interest. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dissenting from the trial judge, has granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff, and from that decree Manmohan Das, one of the partners of the firm, has appealed to His Majesty in Council. 14,950, with interest. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dissenting from the trial judge, has granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff, and from that decree Manmohan Das, one of the partners of the firm, has appealed to His Majesty in Council. The plaintiff stated that the sum of Rs. 14,950 was advanced by him as a loan to the firm by a cheque Law. Rep. 65 Ind. App. 132 ( 1937- 1938) Babu Manmohan Das V. Baldeo Narain Tandon 254 for that amount. The cheque in question was drawn by the Secretary of the Finance Board of the Congress Reception Committee, Amritsar, on August 12, 1923, in favour of another firm, called Bond Bros., for the price of the work done by them for the Reception Committee. It was endorsed by two of the partners of Bond Bros., namely, Tandon and Banerji, in favour of one Sri Kishan Das Wahal. Now, it is common ground that Sri Kishan Das Wahal was the manager of the defendant firm, and it appears that the money payable on the cheque was received by him on behalf of the firm. The plaintiff claims that he received the cheque from his partners in Bond Bros, in part payment of the money due to him by the latter, and that he made it over to the firm as a loan. The first question for consideration is whether the firm received the money, which was payable on the cheque. It is conceded that, if the money was received by the firm, it must be deemed to be a loan made by the plaintiff. Now, a satisfactory proof of the receipt of the money is furnished by the account books of the firm, and it cannot, therefore, be disputed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover it. The money due on the cheque was paid on August 30, 1923, by the Central Bank of India at Amritsar, on which the cheque was drawn, and the suit for its recovery was instituted on August 27, 1926. It is suggested that the suit is governed by art. 58 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes a period of three years for a suit for the recovery of money lent when the lender has given a cheque for the money lent by him. It is suggested that the suit is governed by art. 58 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribes a period of three years for a suit for the recovery of money lent when the lender has given a cheque for the money lent by him. That article, however, applies to a case in which the lender draws his own cheque and gives it to the borrower. It does not govern a suit in which he transfers to the borrower a cheque which had been drawn by another person and endorsed in his favour by the payee. The period of three years prescribed by the article begins to run from the date on which the cheque is paid, and a cheque is paid when it is cashed by the lenders bankers Garden v. Bruce. (( 1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 300) It is only then that the lenders money passes into the hands of the borrower, and the loan is made by the former to the latter. The mere handing over of a cheque by the lender to the borrower does not amount to a payment of the cheque. Nor does the period begin to run against the lender when the cheque received by the borrower is given by him to his own bank, and the amount is credited to him by the bank. The suit does not, therefore, come within the ambit of art. 58, but is governed by art. 57, which is a general article applicable to a suit for the recovery of money payable for the money lent, and the terminus a quo is the date on which the loan is made. The loan in the present case was made on August 30, 1923, when the money was received by the borrower, and the suit, which was brought within three years from that date, must be held to be within the time. The only other point argued on behalf of the appellant, Manmohan Das, is that he was not a partner in the firm in question when the loan was contracted, and he cannot, therefore, be liable for the payment of the debt. The only other point argued on behalf of the appellant, Manmohan Das, is that he was not a partner in the firm in question when the loan was contracted, and he cannot, therefore, be liable for the payment of the debt. The learned judges of the High Court at Allahabad, upon an examination of the evidence, have decided that the appellant was a partner at the time of the transaction, and this conclusion is supported, not only by the testimony of the plaintiff, but also by the balance-sheets of the firm. The evidence, which stands unrebutted, shows that the appellant was a partner in the firm when the money was lent, and it is immaterial that he severed his connection with the firm afterwards. The judgment given by the High Court cannot be challenged on any of the grounds urged on behalf of the appellant, and must be affirmed. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed.