Judgement Appeal (No. 55 of 1937) from a judgment and decree of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (September 10, 1936) affirming a judgment and decree of that Court in its original civil jurisdiction (March 6, 1936). A widow named Gangabai was the indorsee and holder of a Government of India promissory note of Rs.5000. In July, 1932, a broker named Acharya, having possession of the note on her behalf, forged her signature to an indorsement in his favour, and himself indorsed the note for value to the respondents, the Bank of India, Ld. On July 20, 1932, the respondent bank, acting in good faith, presented the note for renewal at the Public Debt Office in Bombay under s. 12 of the Indian Securities Act, 1920. The renewal fee was paid, and a renewed note for the same amount was issued to the respondents for the note which they gave up in exchange. No express indemnity as prescribed by s. 21 of the Act of 1920 was exacted by the Government officer when issuing the renewed note. In due course Gangabai, becoming aware of the fraud practised by Acharya, and of the dealing with her note by the respondent bank and the appellant, the Secretary of State for India in Council, sued the appellant in conversion, and on March 19, 1935, obtained a decree for Rs.5016, with costs and interest. On August 14, 1935, the appellant brought the action out of which this appeal arises against the respondent bank, claiming to be indemnified against the loss sustained by him on the principle that the note had been renewed at the request of the respondents and that what had been done had involved an injury to a third partys rights. The appellant claimed Rs.5091, which had been paid by him to Gangabai, or, in the alternative, the return of the renewed note or the value thereof. The respondents (inter alia) denied liability or that any contract of indemnity was to be implied from the transaction. The facts and the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge (Wadia J.) dismissed the action. The respondents (inter alia) denied liability or that any contract of indemnity was to be implied from the transaction. The facts and the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge (Wadia J.) dismissed the action. On appeal by the Secretary of State to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (Beaumont C.J. and Rangnekar J.) it was held that since s. 21 of the Act of 1920 gave a right to demand an express indemnity, such right was inconsistent with the existence of an implied common law indemnity if the section was not acted upon, and the appeal was dismissed. 1938. March 31; April 1. H. U. Willink K.C. and Sir Thomas Strangman for the appellant. The question is whether in the circumstances of this case the Government is entitled to be indemnified by the respondent bank in respect of the loss sustained. The matter falls under two heads (a) On general principles would there be such a right to indemnity ? and (b) if the answer is " yes," is there anything in the relevant legislation—the Indian Securities Act, 1920—which alters the position adversely to the Government ? [Reference was made to ss. 10, 11, 13, 16, 18, 21 and 24 of the Act of 1920, and to r. 34 of the Indian Securities Rules, 1920, which states the prescribed indemnity exigible under s. 21 of the Act.] Gangabai remained the true owner of the promissory note at all times. The Bank of India had, before action brought, endorsed its new note away to one of its customers, but that has no direct materiality. The respondents, in making their application to the appellant for renewal of the note, were converting Gangabais note; she sued the appellant for that conversion, but no doubt the respondents are primarily liable to her. The respondents received a new note which was unaffected by the forgery on the old note, and no point arises on s. 16 of the Act Hunsraj Purmanand v. Ruttonji Walji (( 1899) I. L. R. 24 B. 65.); Mercantile Bank of India, Ld. v. Mascarenhas (( 1928) I. L. R. 52 B. 792.); Mascarenhas v. Mercantile Bank of India, Ld. (( 1931) I. R 58 I. A. 433.) Hunsraj Purmanands case (1) was disapproved of in the two last mentioned cases. Sects. v. Mascarenhas (( 1928) I. L. R. 52 B. 792.); Mascarenhas v. Mercantile Bank of India, Ld. (( 1931) I. R 58 I. A. 433.) Hunsraj Purmanands case (1) was disapproved of in the two last mentioned cases. Sects. 12 and 21 are the only relevant sections of the Act of 1920. The Government were completely unsuspicious, and had no means of finding out about the forgery. Sect. 12 does not give the Government any discretion, it gives the holder of a note a statutory right to a renewed note upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. The respondent bank presented the note on the basis of that section, and claimed to be entitled to a renewal. The appellant investigated the matter, and as he was satisfied of the justice of the banks claim, he prepared and issued a new note. The respondents, by requesting the appellant to issue that renewed note, impliedly promised to indemnify the appellant against all claims consequent upon his acting at their request Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay ([ 1905] A. C. 392, 395, 399, 403.); Dudgale v. hovering. (( 1875) L. R. 10 C. P. 196.) No inference is to be drawn from the fact that the appellant did not ask the respondent bank to sign the prescribed form giving an express indemnity. Brookss Wharf and Bull Wharf, Ld. v. Goodman Brothers ([ 1937] 1 K. B. 534, 543.) illustrates the general principle that in certain cases the Court considers as between two innocent parties which shall bear a loss the present case was one where both parties were liable to pay damages to the true owner of the note. It is submitted, therefore, that apart from s. 21 of the Act of 1920, and on general principles, there would be a right to indemnity. Is there anything in the Act which would abrogate that right ? There is nothing which would do so, either expressly or impliedly. [Reference was made to the history of the legislation, to ss. 11, 13 and 14 of the Act of 1886, which Act was repealed by the Act of 1920.] The additional statutory protection under s. 21 is not inconsistent with the existence of an implied common law right. Sect. There is nothing which would do so, either expressly or impliedly. [Reference was made to the history of the legislation, to ss. 11, 13 and 14 of the Act of 1886, which Act was repealed by the Act of 1920.] The additional statutory protection under s. 21 is not inconsistent with the existence of an implied common law right. Sect. 21 was not in the repealed Act of 1886, so that the only right then was the common law one, and in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 8th ed., p. 73, it is stated that there is a presumption against any alteration of the law beyond the specific object of the Act. The addition of s. 21 binds the Government, once certain conditions are fulfilled, to issue the renewal note; there is a right to an express indemnity; but there is no inference from the Government not taking advantage of their rights under s. 21 that they were waiving any implied right which they had at common law. Sir William Jowitt K.C. and C. P. Harvey for the respondents. Under s. 12 of the Act of 1920 something not a bearer security is being dealt with—a document which may be going to have upon it a large number of indorsements, and neither side can possibly tell whether all the indorsements are genuine or not. The respondent bank, when they presented that document for renewal with the object of getting a perfectly clean title, said in effect that they had no reason to suspect that there was anything wrong with the note, but that they could not be sure; all they said was "We claim to be entitled to the note, we do not assert that we are.” If that were the conversation it would be impossible to infer a statement, assertion or warranty that the respondent bank was in fact entitled to it. The principle of the common law is that whenever the conclusion can be drawn that a person puts forward a document and warrants or asserts that it is a genuine document, and asks for it to be acted upon, the common law will infer indemnity. The principle of the common law is that whenever the conclusion can be drawn that a person puts forward a document and warrants or asserts that it is a genuine document, and asks for it to be acted upon, the common law will infer indemnity. The vital point is that before the common law doctrine of implication of indemnity can be prayed in aid there mustbe found an assertion that it is a genuine document, and that there is a request for it to be acted upon. The facts of the present case, in the light of the statute, show that that is exactly what the respondent bank did not do Attorney-General v. Odell ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 47, 68, 71, 80-1.) In order to apply the principle of the Sheffield Corporation case ([ 1905] A. C. 392.) there must be an assertion or affirmation that the document on which the officer is asked to act is a genuine document. It is a question of principle. The Government must take the risk or exact an indemnity. Some one has to take the risk; which of two innocent parties ? There is very strong financial argument for saying that it is the Government, because it is taking a short view to say that the Government should be protected when they may lose very much more by doubts being cast on the value of the paper. Any piece of paper with many indorsements on it may be suspect in future. If a person does not act upon an assertion by the other party, but acts independently, they are out of the region of contract altogether. A contract always involves two parties, and if a person is found asserting something and the other person not accepting that assertion, but making his own independent inquiries—the Government official in the present case had to act on his own responsibility and judgment— then it follows that he is not acting on or accepting the assertion of the opposite contracting party Gowers and Others v. Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign Bank, Ld. (( 1938) 54 Times L. R. 550, 552.) The scheme of the Act is plain, and there is no room for implications. (( 1938) 54 Times L. R. 550, 552.) The scheme of the Act is plain, and there is no room for implications. Whenever the officer likes he can ask for an express indemnity, and, if he does not, it is submitted that the irresistible inference is that he does not want it, and that he cannot then rely as a matter of contract on an implied indemnity. Willink K.C. replied. Sect. 12 only applies to persons who do make assertions of title in regard to the securities they bring. The phrase " claiming to be entitled " is wholly different from a person saying that he does not know anything about it, but that he thinks he is entitled. Sect. 12 does not bear the construction the respondents seek to put upon it. The assertion is made coupled with a request; if the act requested is done on the basis that the assertion is true, the implied indemnity arises. May 2. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Wright. This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court in appeal at Bombay, which affirmed a judgment of Wadia J., as trial judge. These judgments rejected the claim of the appellant to be indemnified by the respondents against a liability which he had incurred, and been compelled to satisfy, under the circumstances of the case, which were shortly as follows A woman named Gangabai was the indorsee and holder of a Government promissory note for Rs.5000. A broker named Acharya, having possession of the note on Gangabais behalf, forged her indorsement to it in his favour, and indorsed it for value to the respondents. The respondents, acting in good faith, applied to the Public Debt Office under the Indian Securities Act, X. of 1920, to have a renewed promissory note payable to them issued in exchange for the note, which the respondents gave up in exchange. Gangabai, becoming aware of the fraud practised by Acharya and the dealing with her note on the part of the respondents and the appellant, which constituted a conversion of her property by either or both as well as by Acharya, sued the appellant in conversion and recovered the appropriate damages. Gangabai, becoming aware of the fraud practised by Acharya and the dealing with her note on the part of the respondents and the appellant, which constituted a conversion of her property by either or both as well as by Acharya, sued the appellant in conversion and recovered the appropriate damages. The appellant then brought the present action against the respondents, claiming to be indemnified against the loss thus sustained by him on the principle that the Public Debt Office had issued the renewed note at the request of the respondents, and was accordingly entitled to be indemnified against the damage resulting from the fact that what had been done involved an injury to a third partys rights. So far as the renewed note was concerned, it was rightly accepted on both sides before their Lordships that it constituted a new contract between the Government and the respondents, which was not affected by the circumstances under which it was issued, and certain contentions raised in the Courts below were abandoned by the appellant. Only questions of liability and of principle were argued before their Lordships, matters of amount being left for subsequent settlement if the necessity should arise. It is convenient, first of all, to refer to the material sections of the Indian Securities Act, 1920, which, having replaced the repealed Act of 1886 dealing with the same matters, now regulates the legal position of these Government promissory notes. Such notes circulate in large numbers in India; hence the importance to the parties, and to the Indian public generally, of the question of principle involved in this appeal. It appears from the print of the note in question, contained in the record, that the note was originally issued in 1854, and payable to a named payee or order. The actual note in question was a renewal note which had been issued in April, 1925. On its back spaces had been provided for ten indorsements. The forged indorsement occupied the fifth space, and Acharyas indorsement to the respondents occupied the sixth space. At the foot of these spaces was a receipt signed by the respondents for a renewed note in lieu of the note. It is clear that the system of renewing notes is largely used in ordinary practice. The forged indorsement occupied the fifth space, and Acharyas indorsement to the respondents occupied the sixth space. At the foot of these spaces was a receipt signed by the respondents for a renewed note in lieu of the note. It is clear that the system of renewing notes is largely used in ordinary practice. It is obviously convenient to have a clean note, in addition to the circumstance that in the course of years the spaces available for indorsements become exhausted. And the holder of a renewed note obtains a new promise from the Government free from any equities or disputes which might have attached to the prior note. Sect. 16 of the Act provides in terms that a renewed Government promissory note is to be deemed to constitute a new contract between the Government and the person to whom it is issued, and all persons deriving title through him. The Act contains express provisions for regulating the issue of renewed notes. In particular, s. 12 provides that, subject to the provisions of s. 13, a person claiming to be entitled to a Government promissory note may, on applying to the prescribed officer, and on satisfying him of the justice of his claim, and delivering the promissory note receipted in the prescribed manner, and paying the prescribed fee, if any, obtain from such officer a renewed promissory note payable to him. Sect. 13 deals with a case where there is a dispute as to the title to one of these notes, and enables the officer to refuse to act save on a judicial decision or on the result of a formal inquiry. Sect. 21, on which the judgment under appeal was based, provides that notwithstanding anything in certain specified sections, including s. 12, the prescribed officer might in any case arising, (i.) issue a renewed security upon the applicant giving the prescribed indemnity against the claims of all persons claiming under the security so renewed, or (ii.) refuse to issue a renewed security unless such indemnity is given. Rules have been made under the Act to “prescribe the indemnity which may be exacted, which is to be a bond of the applicant with two sureties in double the face amount of the note. In the present case the Government officer, when issuing the renewed note to the respondents, did not exact a security under s. 21. Rules have been made under the Act to “prescribe the indemnity which may be exacted, which is to be a bond of the applicant with two sureties in double the face amount of the note. In the present case the Government officer, when issuing the renewed note to the respondents, did not exact a security under s. 21. The question is whether the appellant is debarred from relying on an indemnity implied under the common law of India, which in this respect is identical with that of England. The statement of the principle under which such an indemnity is implied is stated by Lord Halsbury L.C. in Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay ([ 1905] A. C. 392.) to be correctly expressed in a quotation from counsels argument in Dugdale v. Lovering (( 1875) L. R. 10 C. P. 196.), which runs as follows ([ 1905] A. C. 397.) "It is a general principle of law when an act is done by one person at the request of another which act is not in itself manifestly tortious to the knowledge of the person doing it, and such act turns out to be injurious to the rights of a third party, the person doing it is entitled to an indemnity from him who requested that it should be done." This principle, which in England must now be read in connection with recent legislation as to contribution between tortfeasors, is of the widest general application. It is often, as in the statement by Lord Davey in the same case, to which reference will shortly be made, said to be based on a contract implied by law, the request importing a promise to indemnify the other party against the consequences to him of acting upon the request. But in the words adopted by Lord Halsbury, it is merely said that the person is entitled to an indemnity. The fiction of a contract implied by law adds nothing, though it may seem to justify the Court in holding as a matter of law that the party is entitled to the indemnity on the basis that the assertion by the applicant of his request is the offer of a promise to indemnify if the other party acts upon that request to his damage. Sir William Jowitt has contended that the necessary elements are the assertion and the action taken upon that assertion by the other party. Sir William Jowitt has contended that the necessary elements are the assertion and the action taken upon that assertion by the other party. He has contended that neither element is present in the case of the performance of a statutory duty like that in question. There was, he says, no assertion by the respondents, but only a claim in respect of which the Government official had to act on his own responsibility and judgment. His conduct, it is said, was not ministerial, but judicial or semi-judicial, since the statute by s. 21 gave him the right to refuse the renewed note except on the terms of his being granted the prescribed indemnity. Reliance was particularly placed on the form in which the rule was stated by Lord Davey in Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay ([ 1905] A. C. 392.), where he thus stated the principle ([ 1905] A. C. 399.) "I am further of opinion that where a person invested with a statutory or common law duty of a ministerial character is called upon to exercise that duty on the request, direction, or demand of another (it does not seem to me to matter which word you use), and without any default on his own part acts in a manner which is apparently legal but is, in fact, illegal and a breach of the duty, and thereby incurs liability to third parties, there is implied by law a contract by the person making the request to keep indemnified the person having he duty against any liability which may result from such exercise of the supposed duty. And it makes no difference that the person making the request is not aware of the invalidity in his title to make the request, or could not with reasonable diligence have discovered it." It seems that it was on this line of reasoning that Wadia J. decided in favour of the respondents. Beaumont C,J. (with whose judgment Rangnekar J. agreed) was not prepared to accept this reasoning, but preferred to rest his decision upon a different ground, which will be explained later in this judgment. Their Lordships are, with respect, unable to agree with Wadia J. Lord Davey, in their opinion, did not mean, when he used the word "ministerial", to indicate that the act done must be done without any element of choice, deliberation or decision on the part of the doer. Their Lordships are, with respect, unable to agree with Wadia J. Lord Davey, in their opinion, did not mean, when he used the word "ministerial", to indicate that the act done must be done without any element of choice, deliberation or decision on the part of the doer. All, it seems, that he meant, was that the official had no interest except to perform his statutory duty. But the mere performance of that duty may involve some degree of deliberation and judgment. Thus in the Sheffield case (1), which dealt with the requesting of transfers of stock in the Corporations register, the indemnity was implied, though s. 30, sub-s. 1, of the Sheffield Corporation Act of 1883 provided that "the Corporation or the registrar before allowing any transfer of stock may if the circumstances of the case appear to them or him to make it expedient require evidence of the title of "the person claiming a right to make the transfer.” Similarly in Attorney-General v. Odell ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 47.) the Court of Appeal were, it seems, prepared to hold that a person who, acting in good faith, brought to the Land Registry a transfer apparently executed by the registered proprietor of the piece of land, but in fact a forgery, became subject to a contract implied by law to indemnify the person whose duty under the Land Transfer Acts it was to register transfers against any liability resulting from the exercise of the duty. There may, indeed, be cases where the person charged with the statutory duty is also charged with the responsibility of deciding in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity whether it is proper to exercise the duty in any particular case, so that he could not be regarded as acting on the applicants request, but solely on his own statutory responsibility. Such cases, which are contemplated as possible in Attorney-General v. Odell ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 47.), would depend on the particular construction of the particular statutes, but would involve considerations which are different from those presented in Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay ([ 1905] A. C. 392.) or Attorney-General v. Odell. ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 47.) It is on the analogy of these latter authorities that, in their Lordships judgment, the present case must be determined. 47.), would depend on the particular construction of the particular statutes, but would involve considerations which are different from those presented in Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay ([ 1905] A. C. 392.) or Attorney-General v. Odell. ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 47.) It is on the analogy of these latter authorities that, in their Lordships judgment, the present case must be determined. There is nothing anomalous in the presence of some element of choice or deliberation on the part of the officer who is the person doing the act, so long as he proceeds on the assertion, or claim, or direction, or evidence, of the applicant. Indeed, in the simpler type of case illustrated by Dugdale v. hovering (L. R. 10 C. P. 196.) it is not necessary that the plaint if should have been other than a free agent. He may act on the defendants request not under compulsion but of choice. That does not, however, deprive him of the right, if the circumstances are appropriate, to the implied indemnity, though no doubt he may waive the right. Similarly, where the duty is statutory, and must be performed if the statutory conditions are fulfilled, the fact that the official may have to see that these conditions are fulfilled does not per se debar him from saying that he has acted upon the assertion, or claim or request of the applicant. In this connection Beaumont C.J. says " If he [the prescribed officer] acts upon the request, "I doubt if it is relevant to say that he has also considered "the matter for himself." Their Lordships agree in this with the Chief Justice, except that they do not prima facie regard it as a matter of doubt. This view is fortified by considering the language of s. 12, which clearly puts the onus on the applicant "A person claiming to be entitled to a Government promissory note, may [that is, is entitled], on applying to the prescribed officer, and on satisfying him of the justice of his claim and delivering the promissory note receipted in the prescribed manner, and paying the prescribed fee, if any,” obtain the renewed note. "Claiming" involves an assertion of title, the act of applying is the applicants act; "satisfying" is, as Mr. Willink pointed out, in the active not passive, and is a condition to be fulfilled by the applicant. "Claiming" involves an assertion of title, the act of applying is the applicants act; "satisfying" is, as Mr. Willink pointed out, in the active not passive, and is a condition to be fulfilled by the applicant. These matters clearly, in their Lordships judgment, constitute a request, from which the common law indemnity may properly be prima facie implied, none the less because some deliberation may be involved on the part of the officer before he submits to be satisfied by what the applicant puts before him. But the Chief Justice held that the common law indemnity could not be implied under this Act because of s. 21, which, in his judgment, excludes any implied indemnity because it gives a right to demand an express indemnity and to refuse to give the renewed note unless an express indemnity is given. He thought that the express provision by s. 21 of the statutory right is inconsistent with the existence of an implied right if the section is not acted upon. He concluded that the Legislature must be deemed to have intended that there should not be a right of indemnity in every case, but only under the special conditions of s. 21. Their Lordships are, with respect, unable to accept this view. As a matter of construction they do not accept the view that s. 21 has not merely the positive effect of giving the special right which it provides for, but has also the negative effect of cutting out the implied right of indemnity undoubtedly, in their judgment, existing under the Act of 1886, which embodied the law on this matter until it was repealed and replaced by the Act of 1920. A statute is prima facie to be construed as changing the law to no greater extent than its words or necessary intendment require. Sect. 21 was not in the Act of 1886, If it had been intended by the insertion of that section in the Act of 1920 to abrogate the common law indemnity existing under the repealed Act, the Legislature would, it seems, have used words clearly expressing that intention, so as to secure that, save as provided by s. 21, there should be no right of indemnity. Their Lordships see no reason to justify reading in or implying such words. Their Lordships see no reason to justify reading in or implying such words. On the contrary, they construe s. 21 as giving an added statutory right, which is different from, and in no way inconsistent with, the common law right. That latter right is not complete merely because the officer has acted upon the request; to make it effective it is necessary that a further condition should be fulfilled— namely, that, in the words used in Dugdale v. Lovering (L. R. 10 C. P. 196, 197.), the act should turn out "to be injurious to the rights of a "third party.” Thus the common law right is required in a case where the officer, though satisfied by the applicant when he issues the renewed note of the justice of his claim, is wrongly satisfied. Though both he and the applicant were acting in perfect good faith and without suspicion, they may be, as they were in this case, unconsciously infringing the rights of the true owner of the note, and guilty of converting it. Cases in which the common law implies the indemnity are generally cases when the officer would not have thought of demanding an indemnity under s. 21. These are mostly, if not always, cases where the risk is due to the fraud of some other person. Sect. 21, if construed as it is by the Chief Justice, would put the burden of this risk on the Government, unless in every case the officer exacted the statutory indemnity under s. 21. This, however, would place a serious and unnecessary burden on the course of renewing these notes, which is a practice in constant use and to be facilitated, not obstructed. On the construction which their Lordships think is, merely as a matter of construction, correct, the common law indemnity would be operative in the cases, presumably rare on the average, where it turns out eventually to be wanted because of some concealed fraud. On the other hand, the officer would generally exercise the right to require the express indemnity before issuing the renewed note wherever he can say that he is satisfied, but still he is conscious that there are circumstances of doubt or otherwise which lead him to refuse to issue the renewed note without the express indemnity. On the other hand, the officer would generally exercise the right to require the express indemnity before issuing the renewed note wherever he can say that he is satisfied, but still he is conscious that there are circumstances of doubt or otherwise which lead him to refuse to issue the renewed note without the express indemnity. It may be noted that under s. 21 what can be demanded as a condition of issuing the renewed note is the "prescribed" indemnity, which under the rules prescribed under the statute is to be the bond of the applicant with two sureties for twice the amount of the note. This is obviously different from the common law indemnity. It may further be observed that, if the matter were to be decided on the basis of the equities between the parties, the loss would more properly, it seems, be borne by the respondents, who have thought fit in the course of their business, which they carry on for profit, to purchase the note from Acharya on the forged indorsement, and have assumed the responsibility of putting forward the note as being their own property, whereas the Government officer has merely performed his statutory duty in a ministerial capacity on the claim and assertion of the respondents. There is, in their Lordships judgment, every reason why the Court should imply an indemnity in this case, and no sufficient reason why they should treat s. 21 as excluding that implication. It is no doubt true that, if an express indemnity were exacted under s. 21, it would exclude any implied or tacit indemnity. But that is a different matter from construing s. 21 as removing from the scope of the statute the possibility in a proper case of the implied indemnity where no express indemnity has been required. For all these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal should succeed, that the judgments of the Courts below should be set aside, and that it should be adjudged that the appellant recover from the respondents the proper amount under his claim, and should also have the costs of this appeal and his costs in the Courts below. If the parties can agree what is the proper amount, it can be inserted in the Order in Council; if they cannot agree, the case must be remitted to the High Court at Bombay to assess the amount. If the parties can agree what is the proper amount, it can be inserted in the Order in Council; if they cannot agree, the case must be remitted to the High Court at Bombay to assess the amount. They will humbly so advise His Majesty.