JUDGMENT Mukherjea, J. - This appeal is on behalf of Defendant No. 1 and it arises out of a suit commenced by the Plaintiff for recovery of a sum of Rupees 742 as odd, together with interest, under the following circumstances: One Tarak Nath Bandoghati, who was the father of Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was indebted to the Tamluk Loan Office for certain sums of money due on two promissory notes. Tarak died in 1913; in 1916, the Loan Office instituted two money suits on the basis of the two promissory notes against Kamini Debya, widow of Tarak, and one Gurupada Kanji who was said to be an adopted son of Tarak, and obtained decrees. In execution of the decrees certain property belonging to Tarak was attached and 15th of August, 1917, was fixed as the date of sale. On 17th July, 1917, Kamini and Gurupada executed a conveyance in respect of three plots of land, which are described in the schedule attached to the present plaint, in favour of the Plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 840. Out of this consideration money, a sum of Rs. 592-as. 8, was deposited in Court, to satisfy the decretal dues of the Tamluk Loan Office, and the balance was spent partly in paying off rents due to the superior landlord to the extent of Rs. 150, and partly to meet certain personal necessities of Kamini herself. 2. Some years afterwards, Kamini died and the Appellant before me, who is one of the daughters of Tarak, commenced a suit in the Court of the Sub-Judge at Midnapur for setting aside the sale in favour of the Plaintiff. Her allegations were that Gurupada was not an adopted son of Tarak and had no interest in the property and Kamini who succeeded to the estate of her husband, had only the limited interest of a Hindu widow. It was said that the kobala was not supported by any consideration and there was no legal necessity which would justify the transaction. 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit, being of opinion that Gurupada was adopted as son by Tarak and consequently no question of legal necessity could arise. This decision was reversed by the lower Appellate Court, who came to the conclusion that Gurupada was not an adopted son and consequently the properties of Tarak vested after his death in his widow. The trial Court dismissed the suit, being of opinion that Gurupada was adopted as son by Tarak and consequently no question of legal necessity could arise. This decision was reversed by the lower Appellate Court, who came to the conclusion that Gurupada was not an adopted son and consequently the properties of Tarak vested after his death in his widow. As it was found on evidence that there was no legal necessity which could justify the alienation in favour of the Plaintiff, the sale was set aside. This decision was affirmed on second appeal by this Court on 29th January, 1935. In March, 1935, the present suit was commenced by the Plaintiff. His case is that though the sale was set aside, yet the estate of Tarak was benefited to the extent of Rs. 742 and as odd by the purchase money paid by him; Rs. 592 and as odd having gone to liquidate the debts due to the Tamluk Loan Office, and Rs. 150 being spent to meet the rents due to the superior landlord. Accordingly he claims refund of these amounts with interest from Defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who are the two daughters of Tarak and have got the estate of their father as reversionary heirs after the death of their mother. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit in part for Rs. 559 as odd, which was the amount actually spent in paying off the decretal dues of the Tamluk Loan Office, and dismissed the claim as to the rest. On appeal this decision was affirmed. 5. Two points arise for determination in this second appeal, viz. (1) whether the purchaser from the widow is entitled to have a refund of the purchase-money, from the reversioners to the extent, that it is alleged to have benefited the estate, after the sale has been already set aside, and (2) how far does the previous decision which set aside the sale on the ground of want of legal necessity, operate as res judicata in the present case? 6. The two questions are interconnected, and would best be considered together. 7. 6. The two questions are interconnected, and would best be considered together. 7. The trial Court, in support of the view that the purchaser was entitled to a refund of the purchase money, when the sale was set aside at the instance of the reversioners, relied upon certain decisions of this Court which are to be found in The Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co., Ltd. v. Rebati Kumar Roy 3 C.L.J. 260 (1906), Hem Chandra Sarkar v. Lalit Mohan Kar 16 C.W.N. 715: s.c. 16 C.L.J. 537 (1912), Manasharam Das v. Ahmad Hossein 21 C.W.N. 83 (1914) and Dwijendra Mohan Sarma v. Manorama Dasi ILR 49 Cal. 911: s.c. 28 C.W.N. 57 (1922). These are cases where sale of a property was set aside on the ground that the consent of the Court under the Guardian and Wards Act, or under the Probate and Administration Act was not taken, or where there was a condition precedent attached to alienation of property by Will or otherwise, and that condition was not fulfilled. In such cases, when the sale is avoided for non-compliance with certain conditions, absence of which would make it voidable in law, the Court applies the maxim that a man who seeks equity must do equity, and he cannot be allowed to avoid a transfer and at the same time to keep the money and other advantages which he obtained under the same. 8. I do not think that the same principle can be invoked by the purchaser in the present case. In case of transfer by a Hindu widow, the transferee gets the property at least for the life-time of the widow, even if there is no legal necessity justifying the transfer. If after the widow's death, the reversioner wants to avoid a sale made by her and the purchaser succeeds in proving legal necessity or benefit to the estate, the transfer is completely protected, and no question of refund of purchase money can at all arise. There cannot be a case, where there is legal necessity or benefit to the estate and at the same time the alienation is set aside. 9. There cannot be a case, where there is legal necessity or benefit to the estate and at the same time the alienation is set aside. 9. It is now well settled by the decisions of the Judicial Committee that when a particular transaction is justified by legal necessity, the mere fact that a portion of the purchase money was not applied for purposes of legal necessity would not entitle the Court to pass a decree setting aside the sale on condition that the reversioner pays to the purchaser the portion of the purchase-money actually spent for legal necessity, vide Sri Kishen Das v. Nathu Ram L.R. 54 IndAp 79: s.c. 31 C.W.N. 462 (1928), Nimat Rai v. Din Dayal L.R. 51 IndAp 211: s.c. 32 C.W.N. 283 (1927), Ram Sundar Lal v. Lachmi Narain ILR 51 All. 430: s.c. 33 C.W.N. 699 (P.C.) (1929) and S.T. Nagappa Chettiar v. Brahadambal Ammani Rajaya Sahiba 39 C.W.N. 709 (P. C) (1935). There are certain decisions where a conditional decree setting aside the sale was made in favour of the reversioner, as the sale was held to be in part justified by legal necessity; Shanti Kumar Pal v. Mukunda Lal Mandal ILR 62 Cal. 204: s.c. 39 C.W.N. 226 (1934); but I cannot conceive of any principle under which the purchaser who has failed to prove legal necessity either in whole or in part, can demand a refund of any portion of the purchase money as against the reversioner, who was not a party to the document and who certainly does not claim through the widow. 10. The decision in the earlier case is certainly res judicata on the point that there was no legal necessity justifying the alienation. The finding was that no pressure on the estate was proved, and the income of the properties in the hands of the widow, were not insufficient for payment of the debts. 11. This finding being conclusive between the parties, I do not think that the Plaintiff in the present suit can recover a portion of the purchase money on the ground, that it benefited the estate. 12. Mr. 11. This finding being conclusive between the parties, I do not think that the Plaintiff in the present suit can recover a portion of the purchase money on the ground, that it benefited the estate. 12. Mr. Jana tries to get round the previous decision by saying that the question of benefit to the estate, apart from legal necessity, was neither raised nor decided in that suit, and although the finding that there was no legal necessity is conclusive between the parties, it is open to the Plaintiff to prove that the estate was benefited by the payment, even though it did not, strictly speaking, come within the definition of legal necessity. 13. It is true, that according to the decision in Hanuman Prashad Pandey's case 6 M.I.A. 393 (1858), a transfer by a limited owner can be upheld not only on the ground of legal necessity, but on that of clear benefit to the estate, and what is beneficial may not always be necessary and vice versa. But the discussion in my opinion would be quite academic in the present case. The specific case made by the purchaser in this case as well as in the earlier one was that the purchase was made to pay off the debts due by Tarak, as well as to satisfy certain dues of the landlord. With regard to the liability for rent, it has been justly held by the Court below in this case that it was a mere personal liability of the widow which could not bind the estate. As regards the payment of the debts due to Tamluk Loan Office, the Court found on the previous occasion, that as there were other properties left by Tarak, and it was not proved that the income was not sufficient to pay off these debts, no legal necessity was established. If this finding stands, as stand it must, I fail to see how a case of benefit to the estate can possibly be made. As the widow must be deemed to have sufficient money in her hands, the fact that the money secured by purchase of this property was actually paid in liquidation of debts due by Tarak, would not make the sale beneficial to the estate. As the widow must be deemed to have sufficient money in her hands, the fact that the money secured by purchase of this property was actually paid in liquidation of debts due by Tarak, would not make the sale beneficial to the estate. In my opinion the finding in the previous suit negatives the case of a benefit to the estate and the Plaintiff is not entitled to succeed in the present suit. The result therefore is that the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are set aside, and the Plaintiff's suit dismissed. No order is made as to costs.