JUDGMENT Mukherjea, J. - This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 9 who joined the suit in pursuance of a notice issued under Or. 1, r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit commenced by the Plaintiffs was of a composite character and the main prayers were four in number. In the first place, the Plaintiff wanted a declaration that the strip of land which was described as A, B, C. X, Y, E, F, G, H in the rough sketch attached to the schedule of the plaint, was a public pathway and all the members of the public including the Plaintiff had the right of way over it. In the second place, she wanted a declaration that the triangular plot of land which was marked X, Y, Z in the rough plan was a part of the public pathway mentioned above and principal Defendants had no right to raise structures upon the same and obstruct the rights of the public. In the third place, there was a claim in the alternative on the allegation that the Plaintiff had an easement right of way over the triangular piece of land which was interfered with by the structures raised by the principal Defendants and the Plaintiff wanted a mandatory injunction for removing the structures that were raised. Lastly, the Plaintiff wanted to establish certain easement rights to air and light in respect to the apertures in her own building which stood to the west of the disputed land and she prayed for an injunction restraining the Defendants from raising the height of the structures which would interfere with her enjoyment of light and air. The trial Court decreed the suit only to the extent of allowing the last prayer mentioned above, all the other reliefs being disallowed. 2. There was an appeal and a cross-appeal against this decree and the lower Appellate Court has dismissed the Plaintiff's suit in its entirety and has rejected all her prayers. It is against this decree of total dismissal that the present second appeal has been preferred. 3. Mr. Sen who appears before me on behalf of the Appellant has not pressed the second and third prayers made by the Plaintiff in the plaint. He has assailed the decision of the lower Appellate Court in so far as it rejected the 1st and 4th prayers of the Plaintiff. 3. Mr. Sen who appears before me on behalf of the Appellant has not pressed the second and third prayers made by the Plaintiff in the plaint. He has assailed the decision of the lower Appellate Court in so far as it rejected the 1st and 4th prayers of the Plaintiff. He has argued in the first place that the finding of the Court of Appeal below that the disputed strip of land marked A, B, C, X, Y, E, F, G, H is not a public highway is based upon a misapprehension of law and the Subordinate Judge has not attached proper weight to the important fact that the pathway has as its termini on both sides two admitted public roads. In the second place, it is said, that the Court of Appeal below should have granted the Plaintiff an injunction restraining the Defendants from raising the height of the structures raised on the triangular piece of land on the ground that it interfered with the Plaintiff's right to light and air. 4. So far as the first point is concerned what is said really is this: that the disputed strip of land connected Girish Banerjee's Lane on the east and Naba Kumar Nandi's Lane on the west. The owner of the disputed site raised buildings on both sides of the passage which he has let out to others and consequently a presumption of dedication should arise. Reliance has been placed for this view in the case of Woodyer v. Hadden [1813] 5 Taunt 1265. The lower Appellate Court distinguished that case by saying that all the buildings on both sides of this passage were not let out to others and consequently the principle enunciated therein had no application to the facts of the present case. This view of the Subordinate Judge may no doubt be open to objection. The principle undoubtedly is, that when a man builds a row of houses with a road in front and the road opens into an existing public highway at each end and he sells and lets these houses and thus invites others to come and use the passage, a presumption may legitimately be drawn (that he intended to dedicate it to the public. The question, however, is one of fact and not of law and the Court is not bound to draw an inference, if on other grounds he thinks that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to make out a case of dedication. Here, on the facts, it appears that though the buildings were erected many years ago, the land-owner had raised a wall completely separating the eastern portion of the passage from the western portion. The wall was removed only 10 or 11 years before the institution of the present suit. Then again the eastern portion of the passage which, it is said, leads into Girish Bannerjee Lane has been found by the trial Court to be extremely narrow and the over-hangings or verandahs on both sides encroach upon the passage to such an extent that it is difficult to use it as a pathway for ordinary purposes. The evidence adduced is that a few persons who are mostly occupants of the holdings that stand upon the land use it as a short-cut for the purpose of going into Girish Bannerjee's Lane and it further appears that the Municipality has not assumed any control over this passage and the lightings and repairs are not done by them. At the top of all, there is this letter, Ex. A, which clearly shows that the Plaintiff or her husband all through treated the passage as a property of the Bannerjees. I am unable to hold that the finding arrived at by the lower Appellate Court upon the facts mentioned above is in any way erroneous in law and can be assailed in second appeal. The result, therefore, is that the first point which has been urged by Mr. Sen fails. 5. As regards the second point, it seems to me that it was not at all proper to allow the Plaintiff to join a claim in this suit which was one for a declaration of a public right and was instituted in a representative capacity, to certain private easement rights of the Plaintiff appertaining to her own holding which stands on the western side of the disputed passage. It appears that the permission of the Court was taken under the provisions of Or. It appears that the permission of the Court was taken under the provisions of Or. 1, r. 8 of the CPC and a number of people who reside in the locality did join as Defendants on receipt of notices which were issued in pursuance of the Court's directions. These Defendants obviously have no interest whatsoever in the private rights which the Plaintiff seeks to establish in the suit and such a prayer cannot but embarrass the suit as it was framed. The learned Advocate for the Appellant concedes that the plaint is defective as regards this prayer and he prays for the withdrawal of the suit so far as it relates to the establishment of the easement rights to light and air with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. I accede to his request and I allow the Plaintiff to withdraw her suit so far as it relates to the establishment of her rights to light and air and seeks to restrain the Defendants from raising the height of the structures on the triangular piece of land. Subject to this modification the decision of the lower Appellate Court is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs.