JUDGMENT Edgley, J. - This Rule was obtained by certain judgment-debtors in a rent suit who sought to set aside an execution sale held in pursuance of the decree obtained in that rent suit against themselves and a man named Chand Mulla, Opposite Party No. 13. Their allegations were to the effect that their predecessors had mortgaged the holding, in respect of which the rent suit had been brought, to Chand Mulla on the understanding that he would remain in possession of the holding and would pay rent for the same. Subsequent; to this transaction, the landlords instituted the rent suit in question against the tenants, petitioners in this case, and also against Chand Mulla, and obtained a rent decree. In execution of this decree the holding was put up to sale and was purchased by a man named Abdul Gafur who has been found to be the benamdar of Chand Mulla, Opposite Party No. 13. The Petitioners some time afterwards redeemed their mortgage, but were unable to obtain possession of the holding which had been mortgaged to Chand Mulla who maintained that he purchased the same at an execution sale. The Petitioners thereupon filed an application for setting aside the execution sale under sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In their application under that section they made certain allegations to the effect that Chand Mulla had purchased the holding at an execution sale through his benamdar, Abdul Gafur, and that in these circumstances, sec. 173 (8) of the Bengal Tenancy Act was a bar to his purchase. The learned Munsif allowed the application under sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act on the ground that the processes had been fraudulently suppressed and that the applicants had suffered material injury owing to the fact that the holding had been sold at an inadequate price. He also held that sec. 173 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act operated as a bar to the purchase of the holding by Chand Mulla. An appeal was then taken to the Lower Court and the learned Subordinate Judge by his order, dated the 12th of June, 1937, set aside the order of the learned Munsif on the ground that it had not been established that the requisite processes had been fraudulently suppressed. He was in agreement with the learned Munsif as regards the effect of sec. He was in agreement with the learned Munsif as regards the effect of sec. 173 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, but he held that the Petitioner's application to the first Court was barred by the law of limitation. The main point urged by the learned Advocate for the Petitioners is that no appeal lay to the Lower Court, having regard to the fact that one of the grounds upon which the Petitioners' application had been allowed by the learned Munsif was that sec. 173 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act operated as a bar to the purchase by Chand Mulla. In support of this argument it is contended that no appeal is provided by law against an order under sec. 173 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act and an order of this nature must be regarded as final. In support of this contention reliance has been placed upon a decision of this Court in the case of Darya Charan Sarkar v. Bishnupada Sana 46 C.L.J. 172 (1926). In that case Mr. Justice D.N. Chakravarti pointed out that where an application for setting aside an execution sale had been made on two grounds, namely, (1) under sec. 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and (2) under Or. 21, r. 90 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the sale was set aside under the provisions of both, an appeal against the order so far as it purported to be under Or. 21. r. 90 of the Civil Procedure Code, was not entertainable as the Appellate Court could not give any relief to the Appellant although the order under Order 21, rule 90 might be erroneous. It appears, however, that the Appellant in that case was the auction-purchaser, who was not actually a party to the suit in which the decree had been obtained. The law appears to be settled that an auction-purchaser, who stands in such a position, is not entitled to appeal. [See Tamirannessa Bibi v. Kachhiman Bewa 32 C.W.N. 98 (1927)]. 2. In the case now before me, the Appellant in the Court of Appeal below, although he purchased the holding in the benami of Abdul Gafur, was also a party to the rent suit. With regard to parties to suits of this nature, the position was discussed in the case of Parthasarathi Ray v. Ahindra Nath Roy 60 C.L.J. 36 (1932). In the case now before me, the Appellant in the Court of Appeal below, although he purchased the holding in the benami of Abdul Gafur, was also a party to the rent suit. With regard to parties to suits of this nature, the position was discussed in the case of Parthasarathi Ray v. Ahindra Nath Roy 60 C.L.J. 36 (1932). In that case it was pointed out that an application by some of the judgment-debtors under sec. 173 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act for setting aside a sale involved a question relating to the execution and satisfaction of the decree as between the parties to the suit within the meaning of sec. 47 of the CPC so as to be open to an appeal by a party to the suit. In the case now before me, the application to set aside the sale under sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and also on the ground that the purchase was barred under sec. 173 (3) was made by the judgment-debtors, Petitioners, who were parties to the rent suit; the principal opposing party to the application appears to have been Chand Mulla who was also one of the Defendants. The landlords, who Were the Plaintiffs, were also made parties to the Petitioners' application. This being the case, in my opinion the principles laid down in Parthasarathi Ray's case (3) cited above must apply. I am therefore, of the opinion that the appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge did lie. Having regard to the circumstances stated above, this Rule must be discharged with costs--hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.