JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Panckridge made on June 2nd, 1938, wherein he refused to set aside the confirmation of a report made by Mr. Justice Ameer Ali on January 10th, 1938, and a decree in favour of the Plaintiff consequent upon that confirmation. The Plaintiff is a contractor who did work for the present Appellant who is one of the four Defendants--all brothers. A suit was commenced against all the four Defendants in 1932 and was compromised--one of the terms of compromise being that the question of the amount owing by the Defendants to the Plaintiff should be referred to the Official Referee for him to ascertain and report to the Court. That settlement took place on January 17th, 1934, and in July of the same year the matter was allocated to the Official Referee. 2. The present Defendant-Appellant had as his attorney a gentleman who was then practising under a firm name in Calcutta and who was, in June of 1937, suspended from practice for 18 months. Apparently the proceedings began before the Official Referee and the Appellant appeared by his attorney. At some stage during the proceedings the other three Defendants compromised the claim against themselves by agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 2,500 to the Plaintiff in full settlement of the claim against them. 3. The Appellant--the first Defendant-- says that from the time the reference was made he left the matter entirely in the hands of his attorney and heard nothing more about it. He alleges that he did not know that his co-Defendants --his brothers--had compromised their claims. I am unable to accept that allegation. I do not believe the Appellant when he says that. He also says that he was unaware that in June of 1937 his attorney was suspended from further practice. Again I am unable to believe him. The attorney in question had attained some eminence in Calcutta and his suspension is a matter of notoriety; the Appellant lived a matter of some eight miles from Calcutta, and he must have known about it. 4. The Appellant says that after the first appearance before the Official Referee by his attorney there were no further appearances and that he was virtually unrepresented. That may be so or may not be. If the Appellant was not adequately represented it was his own fault. 4. The Appellant says that after the first appearance before the Official Referee by his attorney there were no further appearances and that he was virtually unrepresented. That may be so or may not be. If the Appellant was not adequately represented it was his own fault. Any reasonable man would have enquired how that reference was proceeding. My own view is that he did know what had happened in that reference. 5. In August of 1937 the Official Referee had come to his conclusions on the matter and wished to settle his report. Apparently, the report was settled about that time and in January of 1938 the report was brought by the Plaintiff before Mr. Justice Ameer Ali for confirmation. Mr. Justice Ameer Ali confirmed the report and made a decree in terms of it. The amount of the Plaintiff's just claims he assessed at about Rs. 6,376, and as the Defendants Nos. 2, 3, and 4 had already paid or agreed to pay Rs. 2,500 the amount which the Appellant was held liable to pay under the decree was about Rs. 3,876. The Appellant says that he did not become aware of the proceedings before Mr. Justice Ameer Ali and of the decree until sometime in April of 1938. He then took steps to have the confirmation of the report and the decree set aside. Those steps ended in the proceedings before Mr. Justice Panckridge now appealed from. Mr. Justice Panckridge dismissed the Appellant's application. The Appellant says that he received no notice of the proceedings before Mr. Justice Ameer Ali and that he was, therefore, unable to challenge the report or in any way resist the decree that was made against him. 6. Rule 30 (c) of Chapter X of the Original Side Rules provides that when the report of the Referee is set down for consideration and confirmation notice in writing shall be given by the party applying to the other party or parties. In this case it is agreed that no notice was given either to the Appellant or anyone else on his behalf, It has been argued by the Respondent that no notice was necessary. I am unable to agree to that contention. The rule seems to be perfectly clear. In this case it is agreed that no notice was given either to the Appellant or anyone else on his behalf, It has been argued by the Respondent that no notice was necessary. I am unable to agree to that contention. The rule seems to be perfectly clear. It is true that at the time the report was set down for confirmation, the Appellant's attorney was unable to act as he was suspended. Notice could have been given to the Appellant direct or ii: there was any doubt as to how notice should be given to him, directions of the Court could have been asked on the matter. In any event I see no reason for not complying with the terms of Rule 30 (c) of Chapter X. 7. The result of the Appellant not receiving notice, he says, was that he was unable to challenge the report. I have some, doubt as to whether the Appellant did not know what was then going on. Re that as it may, I am of opinion that he was entitled under the rule to have notice. 8. What is the effect of his not receiving notice? It has been held in this Court that in such a case the principle embodied in Or. 9, r. 13 of the CPC should be applied. That rule provides: In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a Defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs payable into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit: Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such Defend ant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other Defendants also. 9. The question here is not of summons not having been duly served, but of notice not having been duly given. In my view the principle is the same. 9. The question here is not of summons not having been duly served, but of notice not having been duly given. In my view the principle is the same. A party must have the opportunity of being heard in his own cause unless he disables himself in some way from exercising that opportunity. I have considerable doubts in this matter as to whether the Appellant did not know what was going on and shut his eyes to it. At "the same time the Respondent--the Plaintiff--could, by the exercise of a little caution, have given requisite notices and so avoided the consequent trouble which has occurred. 10. In my opinion the confirmation of the report by Mr. Justice Ameer Ali and the decree consequent upon it passed by him should be set aside because the Appellant did not have notice as provided for by the rules. I think, however, that terms should be imposed upon the Appellant. In my view he ought not to have the costs of either this proceeding or the proceeding before Mr. Justice Panckridge. He ought to pay into Court the sum which, according to the report, he appears to be liable for, namely, Rs. 3,876. That payment must be made to the Registrar of the Original Side of this Court within one week from to-day, that is, by noon of November 16th, 1938. The result is that this appeal is allowed, subject to the payment by the Appellant of Rs. 3,876 by noon on November 16th, 1938. In default the appeal is dismissed with costs. In the event of the money being paid into Court by that time, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. Lort-Williams, J. I agree.