JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - The Petitioner in this Rule instituted a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 329-10 as. on account of principal and interest due in respect of a loan which is alleged to have been taken by Opposite Party No. 1 from Opposite Party No. 2, and for which the former is said to have executed a " promissory note" in favour of the latter. The Plaintiff claims to have acquired the interest in this promissory note by assignment from Opposite Party No. 2. The learned Small Cause Court Judge held that the Plaintiff being the assignee of the promissory note could rot sue on the original consideration, but had to rely on the promissory note alone, lie was, however, of opinion that the document could not be admitted in evidence by reason of sec. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. The document on the face of it bears two revenue stamps of one anna each. But the learned 'Subordinate Judge finds that at the time the document was executed, it bore only one stamp, namely, the one over which the signature of the executant appears. The other stamp was affixed at a much later time. This being so, he held that this note must be regarded as not duly stamped, and as a " promissory note " is expressly excluded from the benefit of proviso (a) to sec. 35, under which an insufficiently stamped instrument may be admitted on payment of the proper duty and a penalty, the Plaintiff could not invoke that proviso in his favour. The Plaintiff, it may be stated, actually offered to pay the duty and penalty and prayed for admission of the document in evidence upon such payment, but his prayer was rejected. In the result, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. 2. The main question in this Rule is whether the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the document was a " promissory note" within the definition of the Indian Stamp Act. This definition is to be found in cl. (22) of sec. 2, and is stated to be the same as that given in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The main question in this Rule is whether the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the document was a " promissory note" within the definition of the Indian Stamp Act. This definition is to be found in cl. (22) of sec. 2, and is stated to be the same as that given in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The definition in the latter enactment is in these terms: A promissory note is an instrument to writing (not being a bank-note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker to pay a certain earn of money only to or to the order of a certain 'person, or to the bearer of the instrument. 3. The document here is in Hindi and has been thus translated:-- I have executed this Hat-chita to the effect that I have taken a loan from Kaluman Saha Shankar Sardar in cash Rs. 253/10/- on which I shall pay interest at the rate of Be. I'8/-per cent, per month. (Signed) Nandkishore Darnal (Opposite Party No. 1) Dated 18.10 1935. 4. The Petitioner maintains that it does not fulfil the requirements of a promissory note at all, inasmuch as it does not contain any undertaking, unconditional or otherwise, to pay. There is no doubt a reference in the instrument to the principal amount of the loan of Rs. 253-10-0 p., but there is no stipulation to pay this sum. The learned Subordinate Judge recognises this, but says that there is an express condition to pay the interest in the concluding words to be found in the instrument. In his opinion, this amounts to a promise to pay the interest and must be deemed to involve by implication a promise to pay the principal. In that view he holds that it is a " promissory note." 5. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be supported. As their Lordships of the Judicial Committee point out in the case of Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh I. L. B. 17 Lah. 557(1936), it is indeed doubtful whether a document can properly he styled a promissory note which does not contain an undertaking to pay, not merely an undertaking which has to be inferred from the words used. 6. 557(1936), it is indeed doubtful whether a document can properly he styled a promissory note which does not contain an undertaking to pay, not merely an undertaking which has to be inferred from the words used. 6. Their Lordships go on to add, It is plain that the implied promise to pay arising from, an acknowledgment of a debt will not suffice. 7. A promise to pay interest cannot, in my judgment, imply a promise to pay the principal, no more than can an acknowledgment of a debt imply a promise to pay it. Reference may be made in this connection to the cases of Ferrier v. Ram Kulpa Ghose 23 W. R. 403 (1875) and Murari Mohun Roy v. Khettur Nath Mullick I. L. R 15 Cal. 150 (1887). The instrument in the first of these cases was in these terms: Received from Memshab the sum of Company's forty rupees, and I give interest for one month, two rupees. 8. The instrument in the other case ran thus: This document, hand-note, is executed by me for the purpose of purchasing a ghor, I take from you Rs. 7. I will pay interest on the sum at half-anna per rupee per mensem. Having received the Rs. 7 in cash, this document is executed. 9. There is very little to distinguish the instrument in the present case from that in Murari Mohun Roy's case I. L. R 15 Cal. 150 (1887). There also there was an express stipulation to pay interest, but this was held insufficient to make the instrument a promissory note inasmuch as there was no undertaking to pay the principal amount. All that was said in the document regarding the principal was a recital of the fact that the amount had been received by the executant of the note and that the note was executed on receipt of such sum. I am, therefore, of opinion that no undertaking to pay the principal sum of money may be spelt out of the words in which an agreement to pay interest is embodied in the present instrument; and as already indicated, the recital of the fact that Nandkishore had taken a loan from Kaluman Saha Shankar Sardar would be no more than a mere acknowledgment of the debt, which falls very far short of an undertaking to pay. In this view of the matter, I hold that the instrument in question is not a " promissory note," and that the learned Subordinate Judge was, therefore, wrong in holding that it was necessarily excluded from the benefit of proviso (a) to sec. 35. As to the real nature of the document, whether it is one chargeable with duty or not, or if so, whether it can or cannot come within the proviso otherwise than as a promissory note,-- that is a question on which I express no opinion and is left open. All that is decided is that this is not a "promissory note." 10. In the result, the decree of the learned Small Cause Court Judge is set aside and the suit is remanded to him for retrial on the merits, after admitting the document in evidence, if it is admissible otherwise than as a promissory note. Costs will abide the result, the hearing-fees in this Rule being assessed at two gold mohurs.