JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule was obtained by the Petitioner whose application under sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act to preempt an occupancy jote on the footing that he was the immediate landlord thereof has been dismissed on the finding that the Government was the landlord and not the Petitioner. The jote appertains to a temporarily settled estate named Mahal Chardeo Kandi and the raiyat was Khetra Mohan Saha. The Opposite Party No. 1 purchased the jote, deposited the landlord's fees and gave notice to the Petitioners and others under the impression that they were the landlords. He then discovered that the Government was the landlord and paid the Collector the landlord's fees. The Petitioner, however, pursuant to the notice applied under sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act that portion of the tenancy be transferred to him on the footing that he was a co-sharer landlord. The Opposite Party No. 1 objected to the application on the ground that the Government was the landlord and not the Petitioner. The application of the Petitioner has been dismissed on this ground. Against this order the present Rule has been obtained. 2. Three points have been urged before me. It is contended firstly that the learned Munsif has erred in law in holding that the Petitioner is not the landlord, secondly that the Opposite Party No. 1 is estopped from alleging that the Petitioner is not the landlord in view of the fact that in the notice under sec. 26C the Opposite Party No. 1 described him as such and thirdly that the Munsif is not empowered to enter into this question in a proceeding under sec. 26F. 3. For the reasons given by the learned Munsif I am of opinion that the Petitioner is not the landlord of the holding sold. Certain findings of fact have been arrived at by the learned Munsif. Those are now not challenged. The holding appertains to a mahal which was resumed in the year 1834 by Government under Regulation II of 1819 on the ground that it was held under an invalid lakheraj grant. It was assessed to revenue and held for sometime in khas management by the Government. For a time, the mahal was farmed out. Then it was settled with the proprietors, i.e., with the predecessors-in-interest of the Petitioner and his co-sharers for successive terms till March, 1932. It was assessed to revenue and held for sometime in khas management by the Government. For a time, the mahal was farmed out. Then it was settled with the proprietors, i.e., with the predecessors-in-interest of the Petitioner and his co-sharers for successive terms till March, 1932. After that year the proprietors were not given settlement and the mahal was let out in farm to Shibnath Bose as sadar mulguzar for a term of three years. This was done in accordance with the provisions of sec. 10 of Regulation VII of 1822. The farming settlement ended in 1935 and thereafter there has been no settlement of the mahal with the proprietors. An investigation is proceeding of the assets of the estate with a view to a fresh settlement of revenue. In these circumstances, the learned Munsif holds that the Government and not the Petitioner is the landlord. On behalf of the Petitioner the argument is that as he and his co-sharers are proprietors of the resumed mahal, although the mahal has not been settled with them they are in the eye of law the landlords and the Government is merely managing their estate for them for purposes of realizing Government revenue. I am unable to accept this view. Though the Petitioner and his co-sharers are the proprietors of the resumed mahal which they have been found to be holding under an invalid lakheraj grant, they have a right to demand settlement from Government with them in preference to any one else, but they can get such settlement only if they agree to the terms which the Government may impose under the law. If they do not accept these terms, Government may manage the estate in khas, let it out in farm or grant a settlement to any person who will accept the terms imposed by Government. If there is a settlement with persons other than the proprietors, the latter are entitled to malikana which is a sort of compensation. The proprietors can get nothing more. If as in this case there has been no settlement with them, the proprietors cannot claim any rights over the tenants on the land. The terms "landlord" and "tenant" have been defined in sec. 3, sub-sees. (6) and (17) respectively of the Bengal Tenancy Act. "Landlord " means a person immediately under whom a tenant holds including Government. If as in this case there has been no settlement with them, the proprietors cannot claim any rights over the tenants on the land. The terms "landlord" and "tenant" have been defined in sec. 3, sub-sees. (6) and (17) respectively of the Bengal Tenancy Act. "Landlord " means a person immediately under whom a tenant holds including Government. "Tenant" means a person who holds land under another person and is, or but for a special contract, would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that person. Now, when the Government holds a resumed mahal in khas management the tenant on the land has to pay rent to the Government or to such person as the Government may direct, the proprietor has no rights whatever to get rent from the tenants nor is there any relationship of any kind between them. The rights of the proprietor over the tenants accrue only when the proprietor engages with Government to pay the revenue assessed and not until then. The elements set out in sec. 3, sub-sees. (3) and (17) of the Bengal Tenancy Act as being necessary for the establishment of the relationship of landlord and tenant do not come into existence so far as the proprietor is concerned until the Government settles the resumed mahal with the proprietor. I hold therefore that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the Petitioner and the occupancy raiyat whose holding the Opposite Party No. 1 has purchased and that the landlord of the holding is the Government. My attention was drawn by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner to the fact that the Collector has taken action under sec. 99 of the Cess Act and it is pointed out that this conduct is inconsistent with the position taken up that the Government is the landlord. There is some substance in this argument. Sec. 99 of the Cess Act provides machinery for the collection of arrears of cess due from a defaulting proprietor or tenure-holder. The Collector under that section may attach the estate or tenure and collect the rents thereof from the tenants until the arrears are liquidated. The employment of the machinery provided by sec. 99 of the Cess Act by Government obviously presupposes that the Government is not the landlord of the estate. The Collector under that section may attach the estate or tenure and collect the rents thereof from the tenants until the arrears are liquidated. The employment of the machinery provided by sec. 99 of the Cess Act by Government obviously presupposes that the Government is not the landlord of the estate. I agree, however, with the argument of the learned Advocate for the Opposite Party that the Collector was in error in having recourse to the provision of sec. 99 of the Cess Act. There was no need for the Collector to do this. This action on the part of the Collector cannot, however, create a right, in the Petitioner which he did not have before and constitute him a landlord. 4. As regards the contention that the Opposite Party is estopped from raising this point I am of opinion that it is of no substance. For an estoppel to arise, it must be shown that the Petitioner was induced by the conduct of the Opposite Party into believing that he was the landlord and that he altered his position in some way acting under that belief. The Petitioner and Opposite Party are co-sharer proprietors, there can be no question of the Opposite Party inducing the Petitioner to believe that he was the landlord. All the facts were known to the Petitioner. 5. There remains the last point raised, viz., that, the Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain this question. I am unable to accept this point of view. Sec. 26 (F) of the Bengal Tenancy Act lays down that the Court shall do certain things when the immediate landlord makes an application under that section. Obviously the Court must first decide whether the person applying is the immediate landlord if this point is put in issue. The section does not say that any person upon whom a notice has been served as landlord has by reason of the fact that he has been served with such notice the right to get the reliefs which may be granted by the Court under that section. The section clearly lays down that it is to the immediate landlord that the reliefs can be granted. The Court must, therefore, be satisfied that the person applying is the immediate landlord. To give effect to the contention of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner would be to encourage and facilitate fraud. The section clearly lays down that it is to the immediate landlord that the reliefs can be granted. The Court must, therefore, be satisfied that the person applying is the immediate landlord. To give effect to the contention of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner would be to encourage and facilitate fraud. A fraudulent transferee would give notice to persons who are not the real landlords and thus put difficulties in the way of the real landlord applying for pre-emption. I hold therefore that the order of the learned Munsif is correct and I discharge the Rule. In view of the eon-duct of the Opposite Party in having served the Petitioner with notice as landlord I direct that each party shall bear its own costs in this Court.