JUDGMENT Khundkar, J. - The facts upon which this appeal arises are simple and may be shortly stated. The Respondent obtained a decree for arrears of rent in a suit instituted against the Appellant as executor of the estate of Sitanath Banerji. The decree was put into execution and certain immovable properties other than the property in respect of which rent was in arrear were attached. The Appellant preferred an objection under sec. 47 of the CPC to the attachment on the ground that the decree was passed against him in his capacity as executor when as a fact he had ceased to function as executor before the suit was instituted. The objection was disallowed by the learned Munsif and an appeal against that order was dismissed by the learned District Judge. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr. Bagchi has taken two points. His first contention is that a decree passed against a person in a wrong capacity is really a decree against a wrong person and therefore a nullity. The short answer to such contention is that it amounts to saying that as against that person there was no cause of action. Now the mere absence of cause of action is not a circumstance which would entitle the executing Court to go behind the decree. The limits within which this is permissible have been strictly defined in the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Gora Chand Haldar v. Trafulla Kumar Roy I. L. R. 53 Cal. 166 at p. 173: s. c. 29 C. W. N 945 (F. B.) (1925). In the language of Walmsley, J.-- Where the decree presented for execution was made by a Court which apparently had not jurisdiction, whether pecuniary or territorial, or in respect of the judgment-debtor's person, to make the decree, the executing Court is entitled to refuse to execute it on the ground that it wan made without jurisdiction. Within these narrow limits think that the executing Court is authorised to question the validity of a decree. 2. This language has been interpreted in the case of Amalabala Dasi v. Sarat Kumari Dasi 54 C. L. J. 593 at p. 595 (1931). Within these narrow limits think that the executing Court is authorised to question the validity of a decree. 2. This language has been interpreted in the case of Amalabala Dasi v. Sarat Kumari Dasi 54 C. L. J. 593 at p. 595 (1931). In the judgment in that case, it is observed that what the proposition just quoted means is that the executing Court would be competent to refuse to execute the decree only when on the face of the decree it would appear that the Court which passed it had no jurisdiction. In our judgment, it is clear that the decree in question did not fall within any of the descriptions thus indicated and this contention must therefore fail. 3. Mr. Bagchi's second contention is that at the time of the execution proceedings, the properties sought to be attached had vested in the legatees and that the decree-holder's remedy was to pursue those properties in the hands of the legatees by a properly constituted suit. In support of this proposition reliance is placed on the case of Joy Chand Roy v. Satis Chandra Roy I. L. R. 58 Cal. 170 : S. C 31 C. W. N. 761 (1930). In that case, however, it was established as a fact that the properties were the subject-matter of a specific legacy, and that at the time of the attachment the administrator of the estate had already put the legatees in possession of the properties; and this decision is in consonance with the rule embodied in sec. 333 of the Indian Succession Act. Mr. Bagchi contends that it has been established in the present case that the properties had vested in the legatees before the attachment. He argues in the first instance that the Appellant had ceased to function as executor even before the suit for rent was instituted. Now the learned Munsif carefully considered the evidence and the circumstances relating to this question. In his judgment, he pointed out that although the Appellant claimed that he had ceased to function as executor in the year 1332 B. S., he executed a decree in December, 1933, which would correspond with Agrahayan or Poush, 1340, B. S., in proceedings in which he described himself as executor of the estate of Sitanath Banerji. In his judgment, he pointed out that although the Appellant claimed that he had ceased to function as executor in the year 1332 B. S., he executed a decree in December, 1933, which would correspond with Agrahayan or Poush, 1340, B. S., in proceedings in which he described himself as executor of the estate of Sitanath Banerji. The learned Munsif pointed out also that in an earlier proceeding in execution against him, the Appellant-had taken an objection that he was not the executor, but did not press that objection. Upon a consideration of these circumstances as well as others, the learned Munsif found as a fact that the Appellant had not ceased to function as an executor at the date of the attachment. This finding was upheld by the learned District Judge and it is not one which can now be disturbed. 4. Mr. Bagchi's next contention is that even if it be assumed that the Appellant was still clothed with his original capacity as executor at the date of the attachment, the properties in question had nevertheless vested in the legatees long before, that is to say, upon the death of their grandmother who was the widow of the testator. From a perusal of the judgments of the Courts below it does not appear that this point was ever seriously pressed. In any case, it appears from the will itself that the properties were the subject-matter of a universal legacy, and such a legacy would not vest until the estate had been completely administered. In the case of Ganoda Sundari Chaudhurani v. Nalini Ranjan Raha I. L. R. 36 Cal. 28 at p. 42; S.C. 12 C.W.N. 1065 (1908) it was laid down by Mr. Justice Woodroffe sitting in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction that-- the residuary legatee does not become 'proprietor' until after the administration has been complete, and interest thus ascertained. This interest is subject to the payment of debts and legacies and the discharge of the other trusts contained in the will. No doubt he is beneficially interested in the estate subject to these payments and the discharge of these trusts, but he is not proprietor except when the residue has been ascertained which on completion of the administration is made over to him by the executrix. 5. The same rule would certainly apply in the case of a universal legacy. No doubt he is beneficially interested in the estate subject to these payments and the discharge of these trusts, but he is not proprietor except when the residue has been ascertained which on completion of the administration is made over to him by the executrix. 5. The same rule would certainly apply in the case of a universal legacy. The fact found that the Appellant was still the executor of the estate of Sitanath Banerji at the time of the attachment and the evidence upon which this finding is based are clearly inconsistent with the position that the estate had been completely administered. It follows that the properties in question were validly attached in execution of the decree obtained against the Appellant as executor of Sitanath's estate. The appeal must accordingly be dismissed with costs, hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs. Mitter, J. I agree with the order made by my learned brother.