JUDGMENT Khundkar, J. - This is an appeal by Anil Kumar Mustafi, a judgment-debtor, against the decision dated the 24th of June, 1937, of the learned District Judge of Hooghly, dismissing his appeal from an order passed by a Subordinate Judge, first Court, in an execution proceeding. The facts shortly stated are as follows : One Bhupendra Nath Mustafi obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 3,789-10 as. 9 ps., being arrears of rent, against the Appellant in a Court in the District of Nadia on the 17th of June, 1930, and that decree being transferred for execution to the Hooghly Court, certain properties of the Appellant situated in the District of Hooghly were attached on the 13th December, 1933. 2. On the 14th of March, 1935, the Respondent Jugal Kishore Pramanik obtained on the Original Side of this Court a decree for Rs. 3,070 against Bhupendra Nath Mustafi. It is admitted that no notice was directed to be served by this Court addressed either to the Court at Hooghly or to the Court at Nadia as required by Or. 21, r. 53, sub-r. (1), C. P. C. Nevertheless Jugal Kishore Pramanick made an application to the Hooghly Court on the 11th of January, 1936, to be substituted in the place of Bhupendra Nath Mustafi in the execution proceeding which Bhupendra was prosecuting against the Appellant, Anil Kumar Mustafi. This petition was granted. Bhupendra Nath Mustafi resisted Jugal Kishore's application, but his objection was dismissed for default on the 14th of March, 1936, and an application for review of the order of dismissal also failed. 3. On the 27th of November, 1936, Anil Kumar Mustafi effected what purported to be an adjustment with Bhupendra Nath of the decree obtained by the latter against him. The sale proclamation was published in December, 1936, and in January, 1937, and the sale was fixed to take place on the 8th of February, 1937. On the 2nd February, 1937, Anil Kumar Mustafi preferred an objection under sec. 47 of the CPC to the carriage of the execution proceeding against him by the Respondent Jugal Kishore Pramanik. This objection was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge and an appeal against that order was dismissed by the District Judge and it is against the decision of the learned District Judge that this appeal has been preferred. 4. 47 of the CPC to the carriage of the execution proceeding against him by the Respondent Jugal Kishore Pramanik. This objection was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge and an appeal against that order was dismissed by the District Judge and it is against the decision of the learned District Judge that this appeal has been preferred. 4. As stated before, it is not disputed that no notice was issued by this Court to either the Nadia Court or to the Hooghly Court, as required by Or. 21, r. 53, sub-r. (1), cl. (6) of the Code. Such notices were an essential pre-requisite for an attachment of the decree obtained by Bhupendra Nath Mustafi against Anil Kumar Mustafi. As has been clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Muthia Chetti v. Palaniappa Chetti L. R. 55 I, A, 256: s. c. 32 C. W. N. 821 (1928) an order of the Court that an attachment should be effected, does not by itself operate as an attachment. Certain measures are to be taken in order to effectuate the attachment, after the order of the Court has been pronounced. The language of the judgment makes this abundantly clear. At page 261 of the report, there is a passage which it would be well to quote: A fasciculus of clauses beginning at rule 41 of Order 21 and applicable to ' attachment of property' shows in instance after instance that attachment is a real thing with a variety of real applications Baited to the nature of the property to he attached. Where it ia movable property it is to be attached by 'actual seizure'; where it is agricultural pro. duce, the attachment is to be made by affixing a copy of the warrant on the land where there is a growing crop and on the threshing floor and other places where produce has been cut and gathered. In the case of an attachment of debt there is to be a written order prohibiting the creditor from recovery and the debtor from making payments and prohibiting the handing over of the property by any one in whose name it stands and this order is to be affixed publicly to the Court house. There are other provisions as to the attachment of shares of movables, even shares of salary and as to attachment of partnership property. There are other provisions as to the attachment of shares of movables, even shares of salary and as to attachment of partnership property. In regard to negotiable instruments the attachment is to be by actual seizure of the instrument which is to be brought into Court. These instances go to show that under the CPC in India the most anxious provisions are enacted in order to prevent a mere order of a Court from effecting attachment and plainly indicating that the attachment itself is something separate from the mere order and is something which is to be done and effected before attachment can be declared to have been accomplished. 5. At page 262, their Lordships observed, No property can be declared to be attached unless first the order for attachment has been issued and secondly in execution of that order the other things prescribed by the rules in the Code have been done. 6. The measures to be taken are not mere executive technicalities. They constitute a solemn legal ceremonial the performance of which is strictly enjoined by law. 7. The question of execution by attachment of a decree came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Bhavirisetti Lakshinarasimham v. Vetcha Lakshmarasimham I. L. R. 59 Mad. 677 (1927). The judgment makes reference to the provisions of r. 53 of Or. 21 of the Code in these terms: Rule 53, sub-rule (/), provides that attachment of a decree shall be made, if the decree sought to be attached was passed by another Court, then by issue to such other Court of a notice in the terms thereinafter referred to. There is to room for any doubt or ambiguity in the language employed. The expression by the issue to such Court of a notice' is apt and sufficient to indicate that for the making of the attachment the notice should be to the Court which passed the attached decree. It cannot of course be contended that the moment a mere order of attachment is passed by the Court seeking execution, the attachment becomes complete. It cannot of course be contended that the moment a mere order of attachment is passed by the Court seeking execution, the attachment becomes complete. The Code undoubtedly contemplates in all cases of attachment some kind of service of posting or proclamation for the purpose of effectuating the attachment and in the case of the attachment of a decree the form of effectuation provided is the service of a notice on the Court which passed the attached decree. 8. In the present case it was essential that notices should have been issued by this. Court to the Nadia Court and the Hooghly Court under Or. 21, r. 53, sub-r. (I), cl. (6) before attachment could have been made at all. Such notices were not issued. It follows, in my opinion, therefore, that there never was any legal attachment by Jugal Kishore Pramanik against Bhupendra and that Jugal Kishore never became the representative of Bhupendra in the execution proceeding. 9. It may be noted in passing that no notice under sub-r. (6) of Or. 21, r. 53 of the Code was directed to be issued by this Court on Anil Kumar Mustafi. Quite apart from the validity or otherwise of the attachment, this omission would vitally affect the question of Anil's liability in the execution proceeding, because it is his case as stated above that on the 26th November, 1936, there was an adjustment between himself and Bhupendra of the decree obtained against him by the latter. 10. In my judgment, the objection under sec. 47 of the CPC taken by Anil was well-founded and this appeal should be allowed. 11. We desire to make it clear that until an attachment at the instance of Jugal is effected according to law, it will be open to Bhupendra, should he be so advised, to continue the present execution proceeding. We desire also to make it clear that we express no opinion with regard to the truth or otherwise of the story of adjustment of Bhupendra's decree as set up by Anil and referred to above. Mitter, J. 12. I agree with my learned brother for the reasons given by him that there has not been any attachment at the instance of Jugal Kishore Pramanik of the decree which Bhupendra Mustafi had obtained against Anil Kumar Mustafi and others. Mitter, J. 12. I agree with my learned brother for the reasons given by him that there has not been any attachment at the instance of Jugal Kishore Pramanik of the decree which Bhupendra Mustafi had obtained against Anil Kumar Mustafi and others. The only manner in which a decree is to be attached is by issuing a notice by the Court which passed the decree sought to be executed to the Court, which passed the decree sought to be attached and further if the latter decree had been transferred for execution to another Court, by a further notice to that Court. The provisions of Or. 21, r. 53, sub-r. CO, cl. (b) of the CPC are mandatory. The holder of the decree sought to be executed becomes only by reason of the attachment the representative of the holder of the decree which his judgment-debtor had obtained against another person. As I have stated before, I agree for the reasons given by my learned brother in holding that Jugal Kishore has not become the representative of Bhupendra Mustafi. I wish, however, to notice another argument which has been advanced before us by Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the Respondent Jugal Kishore. The contention of Mr. Das with which I wish to deal is that it was not open to Anil Kumar Mustafi to raise the question that Jugal Kishore;was not the representative of Bhupendra Mustafi,--a question which Anil has sought to raise by his petition of objection which was filed on the 2nd of February, 1937. 13. The facts bearing upon this contention are as follows: In 1933 the decree which Bhupendra had obtained against Ami and others had been transferred by the Court of Nadia which passed that decree to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Hooghly for execution. This execution case (No. 13 of 1933) was pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Hooghly from the year 1933 and is still pending there. In that execution case, Jugal filed an application for being substituted in the place of Bhupendra as his representative. If the provisions of Or. 21, r. 53, sub-sec. (1) had been followed, Jugal would have become the representative of Bhupendra so far as that execution was concerned, by the fact of attachment of Bhupendra's decree against Anil Kumar Mustafi. In that execution case, Jugal filed an application for being substituted in the place of Bhupendra as his representative. If the provisions of Or. 21, r. 53, sub-sec. (1) had been followed, Jugal would have become the representative of Bhupendra so far as that execution was concerned, by the fact of attachment of Bhupendra's decree against Anil Kumar Mustafi. If there was no attachment, I do not see on what ground Jugal could claim to be the representative of Bhupendra.. Bhupendra's decree against Anil has not been assigned to Jugal and there was no question of Jugal becoming the representative of Bhupendra in any other way. The application of Jugal for substitution in the said execution proceeding in the place of Bhupendra without even any attempt for attachment was therefore a misconceived application, not warranted by the rules of procedure. Bhupendra's objection to Jugal's substitution in his place was dismissed for default on the 14th March, 1936. and Jugal was in fact substituted in the place of Bhupendra by an order of the Subordinate Judge of Hooghly dated the 28th of April, 1936 (Order No. 58). The order runs as follows: Let Jugal Kishore Pramanik be "substituted in place of the original decree-holder Bhupendra; issue sale proclamation fixing 8th June, 1936, for sale at noon. 14. Thereafter the sale proclamation was issued and published at some places on the 29th December, 1936, and in other places on 4th January, 1937. 15. On these facts, Mr. Das contends that it is not open to Anil Kumar to go behind the Order No. 58, the order by which Jugal Kishore was substituted in place of Bhupendra. It is admitted that this order was not made in the presence of Anil. He never appeared in the execution proceedings. Mr. Das however puts his case on the principle of constructive res judicata as formulated in the case of Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Girija Kant Lahiri L.R.8 IndAp 123: s.c. I. L. R. 8 Cal. 51 (1881). He says that Anil ought to have come and objected to Jugal being substituted in place of Bhupendra before the order for substitution, namely Order No. 58, was passed and not having done so, it was not open to him to challenge that order now. 16. 51 (1881). He says that Anil ought to have come and objected to Jugal being substituted in place of Bhupendra before the order for substitution, namely Order No. 58, was passed and not having done so, it was not open to him to challenge that order now. 16. The principle of constructive res judicata has been applied to execution proceedings, but the basis on which the principle rests is this that if a judgment-debtor had an opportunity to prefer a certain objection, he would not be entitled at a later stage of the same execution proceedings or at a later execution proceeding in respect of the same decree, to prefer it if the order that had already been passed be inconsistent with the validity of his objection. The whole point, therefore, depends upon this whether it can be said on the facts of this case that Anil had the opportunity to come to Court on or before the 28th of April, 1936, and to place his objections to the substitution of Jugal in place of his decree-holder Bhupendra. 17. The application for substitution of Jugal in the place of Bhupendra was an application not in the normal course of the proceeding. It was an application which is not provided for by law. Admittedly no notice of this application was served or ordered to be served upon Anil. The application for substitution was made on the 11th of January, 1936. The order of the Court on that date was for the service of a copy of the said application on Bhupendra's pleader alone. No notice of this application was directed to be served upon Anil. Upon these facts, I cannot say that Anil had an opportunity of presenting his objections to the said application for substitution at any time before the order for substitution was made by the Court on the 28th April, 1936. On these facts, in my judgment there is no scope for the application of the principle, or to be more precise, for the extension of the principle formulated in Mungul Per shad Dichit's case (3) referred to above. I accordingly do not see any substance in this contention and agree with the order that has already been made by my learned brother. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the orders of the Courts below are set aside. I accordingly do not see any substance in this contention and agree with the order that has already been made by my learned brother. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the orders of the Courts below are set aside. Each party will bear his respective costs not only in this Court but also in the Courts below.