Judgement Appeal (No. 4 of 1938), by special leave, from a decree of the High Court (March 13, 1936), affirming an order of the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta (March 23, 1934). The respondents were the owners of premises, No. 82 Nalini Sett Road, Calcutta, and they had erected a building thereon. The appellants, the Corporation of Calcutta, in discharge of their statutory duties, caused those premises, including the building, to be valued as provided by s. 131 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, for the purpose of assessing them to the consolidated rate which the appellants were empowered by s. 124 of the Act to impose on all lands and buildings in Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 42 ( 1938- 1939) C orporation of C alcutta V. Moti C hand C howdhury 176 Calcutta. Part of the building was in the occupation of the respondents, part was vacant, and part again was occupied by tenants of the respondents. The question for decision in this appeal was what in those circumstances was the correct mode of assessment. The appellants, through their assessor, proceeded under s. 127 (b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, and, estimating the present value of the land to be Rs. 64,983, and the present cost of erecting the building thereon to be Rs. 24,230; determined the annual value of the premises to be five per cent, of the sum of those figures—namely, Rs. 4460. The appellants gave special notice to the respondents of the assessment so made, as required by s. 138 of the Act. Respondent No. 1, Moti Chand Chowdhury, then delivered a written notice of objection under s. 139, objecting on general grounds to the assessment that " it is very high and unjust." The Second Deputy Executive Officer of the appellants heard the objection, and by order, dated September 15, 1933, reduced the assessment to Rs. 4025, on the basis that the value of the land was Rs. 58,020, and the cost of erecting the building Rs. 22,496. 4025, on the basis that the value of the land was Rs. 58,020, and the cost of erecting the building Rs. 22,496. Thereupon, on October 23, 1933, the respondents instituted the suit out of which this appeal arose in the Court of the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, against the appellants, setting out that they had erected the building for letting purposes, that in fact almost the entire building had been let out to tenants, and claiming that the premises fell to be assessed to the consolidated rate under s. 127 (a) instead of under s. 127 (b) of the Act. The terms of s. 127 (a) and (b) appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Chief Judge found on the facts that roughly half the building was in actual occupation of the respondents and half was used for letting purposes. He therefore assessed half the building under s. 127 (b) of the Act, and half under s. 127 (a), and in the result he fixed the annual value at Rs. 3168. On appeal by the appellants, the High Court (S. K. Ghose and Guha JJ.) were of opinion that the construction of s. 127 depended on the facts of each particular case ; that for the purpose of s. 127 building must include part of a building, and that it was possible for one part of a building to come under s. 127 (a) and another part under s. 127 (b). They therefore dismissed the appeal. 1938. Nov. 11. Dunne K.C. and J. M. Pringle for the appellants. The whole question turns on the proper con struction of s. 127 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, [It was read.] Sect. 127 (a) deals with buildings " erected for "letting purposes or ordinarily let,” and s. 127 (b) with those "not erected for letting purposes and not ordinarily let." It is submitted that the latter is a residuary clause, and that any case which does not come under (a) comes practically and definitely under (b). The Assessment Officer assessed it under (b). The High Court divided the building into two, and made a sort of assessment applying the principles in (a) and (b) to each part, and not treating the building as a unit. The Assessment Officer assessed it under (b). The High Court divided the building into two, and made a sort of assessment applying the principles in (a) and (b) to each part, and not treating the building as a unit. It is submitted that the " building " in the section means a building as a whole ; that in the present case it obviously was not a building for letting purposes, although some rooms in it have been let and the respondent has occupied some portion of the building himself. There is a definition of "building " in s. 3, sub-s. 7. The point is, what is meant by a building " erected for letting purposes or ordinarily let " ? Would it include such a case as the present, where no evidence is given as to the letting purposes, but all that is proved is that in fact about one-half of the building was occupied by the owner and about one-half by some person to whom he had let it. There is no evidence as to the purpose for which the building was erected. It was not erected for letting purposes. There are no decisions in India on the point. The matter cannot be treated as one of degree. [Reference was also made to ss. 149, 155-9, 319, 324 and 328 of the Act.] There must first be found what the unit of assessment is that is being Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 42 ( 1938- 1939) C orporation of C alcutta V. Moti C hand C howdhury 177 dealt with under s. 127, and if it is found to be a building, as in this case, a whole building, the question is, has it been erected for letting purposes that is not proved here, in fact it is disproved. Secondly, it is not ordinarily let as a building, there is only subletting of some of the rooms in the building by the person in possession. That takes it out of (a) and it must then come under (b). All the sections that have been referred to above show that the idea underlying this Act is that the building ordinarily referred to in the Act means the complete building. J. M. Pringle followed. That takes it out of (a) and it must then come under (b). All the sections that have been referred to above show that the idea underlying this Act is that the building ordinarily referred to in the Act means the complete building. J. M. Pringle followed. There is no evidence here that these premises fall to be assessed under either of the sub-branches of s. 127 (a)—either under " letting purposes " or "ordinarily let." The assessment authorities are here confronted during the currency of an assessment period with a newly constructed building, and in determining the unit of assessment the same principles apply as those enumerated in s. 133 of the Act. The building in question and the land on which it stands is a self-contained unit of assessment not amenable to subdivision and splitting into separate units of assessment. The premises were rightly assessed in the way laid down in s. 127 (b). De Silva K.C. and Wallach for the respondents. If it were possible to decide this question on economic principles, it is clear that the High Court have acted on the only fair basis. If any of the purposes for which this building has been erected satisfies the condition in s, 127 (a), then the building is one which has been ordinarily let. If there are a great number of purposes for which the building is used, and any one of them satisfies that condition, that is sufficient. The section does not say " erected wholly "—that word is not there. This building is covered by s. 127 (a), and does not fall within s. 127 (b). It is ordinarily let within the meaning of the section if any portion is let. If it is not possible to apply s. 127 in the way the High Court have done, then it is submitted that s. 135 of the Act is applicable, and the point there is whether the discretion is an absolute discretion or not. It is clear that the functions of the Executive Officer are quasi-judicial, and it would follow that he must use them in that way. It is submitted, first, that the case is covered by s. 127 (a) ; or secondly, that s. 135 should have been utilized. It is clear that the functions of the Executive Officer are quasi-judicial, and it would follow that he must use them in that way. It is submitted, first, that the case is covered by s. 127 (a) ; or secondly, that s. 135 should have been utilized. Lastly, if that be not so, one is driven to the conclusion in this context that " building " includes part of the building. Wallach followed. Nov. 29. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Macmillan. On September 15, 1932, the Corporation of Calcutta caused to be served upon the owners of certain premises within the municipality, known as No. 82 Nalini Sett Road, a notice assessing the premises at an annual value of Rs. 4460 for the purpose of the imposition of the consolidated rate which, by s. 124 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 (Bengal Act III. of 1923), the Corporation is authorized to impose upon all lands and buildings in Calcutta. The premises, having been newly erected, had not previously been valued. On an objection by the owners, the valuation was reduced by the Deputy Executive Officer to Rs. 4025. Being dissatisfied with his decision, the owners appealed under s. 141 of the Act to the Court of Small Causes, which reduced the valuation to Rs. 3168. From the order of the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes the Corporation in turn appealed under s. 142 of the Act to the High Court which, on March 13, 1936, dismissed the appeal. The High Court refused an application by the Corporation for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, but, on a petition subsequently presented to His Majesty in Council, special leave to appeal was granted, the Corporation by their counsel agreeing to pay the respondents costs of the appeal in any event. The Corporation is accordingly the appellant in the present appeal, and the owners of the premises are the respondents. The method of ascertaining the annual value of premises is prescribed in s. 127 of the Act of 1923 as follows — " 127. For the purpose of assessing land and buildings to "the consolidated rate,— Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. The Corporation is accordingly the appellant in the present appeal, and the owners of the premises are the respondents. The method of ascertaining the annual value of premises is prescribed in s. 127 of the Act of 1923 as follows — " 127. For the purpose of assessing land and buildings to "the consolidated rate,— Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 42 ( 1938- 1939) C orporation of C alcutta V. Moti C hand C howdhury 178 "(a) the annual value of land, and the annual value of "any building erected for letting purposes or ordinarily "let, shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which "the land or building might at the time of assessment "reasonably be expected to let from year to year, less, in "the case of a building, an allowance of ten per cent, for "the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary "to maintain the building in a state to command such "gross rent ; and " (b) the annual value of any building not erected for "letting purposes and not ordinarily let shall be deemed "to be five per cent, on the sum obtained by adding the "estimated present cost of erecting the building, less a "reasonable amount to be deducted on account of depre ciation (if any), to the estimated present value of the land "valued with the building as part of the same premises." It will be observed that two different methods of valuation are prescribed, one for " any building erected for letting "purposes or ordinarily let," and the other for "any building "not erected for letting purposes and not ordinarily let." The first question, therefore, which arises with regard to any building which has to be valued, is whether it falls within the first class or within the second class. In the present case the evidence of the facts is meagre and unsatisfactory, but both parties were content to accept, for the purpose of raising the question of principle, the finding of the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes that " roughly half the premises "is in actual occupation of the owner and half utilized for "letting purposes." This is not a finding in terms of the Act, but again the parties were content to accept it as equivalent to a finding that roughly the building as to one-half is " ordinarily let " and as to the other half is " not ordinarily let." Confronted with a building of this hybrid character, the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes solved the problem of valuation by valuing one-half of it under para, (a) of s. 127 as being ordinarily let, and one-half of it under para, (b) as not being ordinarily let, and arrived at the valuation of the building as a whole by adding together the products of the two calculations. The High Court endorsed this method as the right one to adopt. The learned judges stated that in the case of a building part of which answered the description in para, (a) and part of which answered the description in para, (b) " it would seem to be a misreading of the section to "say that in spite of this fact the entire building must be "taken as belonging to one of the two classes mentioned in "s. 127..... For the purpose of s. 127 building must "include part of a building, and it is quite conceivable that "one part of the building will come under cl. (a) and another "part of the building under cl. (b).” Their Lordships cannot regard this method of valuation as permissible on a sound construction of s. 127. The section may not be very satisfactorily framed, but it is sufficiently clear that it was intended to classify all buildings as falling within one or other of two mutually exclusive categories. (a) and another "part of the building under cl. (b).” Their Lordships cannot regard this method of valuation as permissible on a sound construction of s. 127. The section may not be very satisfactorily framed, but it is sufficiently clear that it was intended to classify all buildings as falling within one or other of two mutually exclusive categories. Each building is treated as a unit of valuation, and its value must be ascertained in conformity with one or other of the two prescribed methods ; it cannot be valued as to one part by one method and as to another part by another method, for in that case the building as a unit could not be said to have been valued by either method, having been valued by both methods. No provision is made in s. 127 for the case of a hybrid building, part of which answers the description in para, (a) and part of which answers the description in para, (b). The definition of the word " building " in s. 3, sub-s. 7, of the Act has no bearing on the present question, and in particular it does not define the word as including "part of a building.” The only provision for dividing a building appears to be in s. 135, which authorizes the Executive Officer " in his discretion " to assess any portion of a building separately from the other portions of such building, whereupon the portion so separately assessed is to be deemed a separate building. It does not appear that the Executive Officer was asked to adopt this course in the present case, and at any rate he did not do so. Consequently the entire building must be treated as a single building forming a unit of assessment, and, indeed, in the result the Courts below Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 42 ( 1938- 1939) C orporation of C alcutta V. Moti C hand C howdhury 179 have so treated it, for they have arrived at one valuation for the building as a whole, though they have utilized two methods of valuation for one and the same building. Of a building as to one-half ordinarily let and as to one-half not ordinarily let it cannot be predicated that it is ordinarily let, for only a part of it is ordinarily let. Of a building as to one-half ordinarily let and as to one-half not ordinarily let it cannot be predicated that it is ordinarily let, for only a part of it is ordinarily let. But it can be predicated of it that it is not ordinarily let if only a part of it is ordinarily let, for the whole of it is not ordinarily let. The test must be applied to every building as a whole, and one or other method of valuation must be applied to it as a whole. There may possibly be cases where the portion ordinarily let, or the portion not ordinarily let, is so negligible in proportion to the whole of the building that the building might on the principle of de minimis be reasonably held as a matter of fact to be not ordinarily let, or ordinarily let, as the case may be, but the present is clearly not such a case. Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that the building in question was rightly valued by the Executive Officer in conformity with the method prescribed in para, (b) of s. 127. They will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed ; that the judgment of the High Court, dated March 13, 1936, except in so far as it finds no costs due to or by either party, and the judgment of the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, dated March 23, 1934, should be recalled; and that the order of the Deputy Executive Officer, dated September 15, 1933, should be restored. The appellants, in fulfilment of their undertaking, will pay the respondents costs of the present appeal.