JUDGMENT Mulla, J. - This is an application in revision by two persons Sat Naraih and Munni Lal who have been convicted u/s 188 I.P.C. The first Applicant was admittedly the editor or a paper styled the Punch which was being published in Allahabad in April 1938, while the second Applicant, Munni Lal, was the printer and publisher of the same paper. It is a matter of common knowledge that in the month of April, 1938 serious communal riots took place in Allahabad resulting in the deaths of several persons. The District Magistrate of Allahabad found soon after those disturbances that some people were engaged in circulating false a id alarmist reports which had the effect of promoting communal tension and causing fear and alarm to the public. He therefore thought it necessary to stop the publication of such reports and with that object in view he issued an order u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure in the following terms: To the General Public. Whereas in Allahabad City serious rioting resulting in the deaths of eleven persons and injuries to many others has just recently subsided, but communal ill-feeling and panic are still prevalent and whereas irresponsible parsons are circulating communally biased or alarmist or false reports and statements and false or alarmist rumours by words written or spoken, which are likely to cause fear or alarm to the public or some section of the public whereby any parson may be induced to commit some offence against human life or against the public tranquility and whereas in my opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention and speedy remedy are desirable, I hereby prohibit the printing or publication or circulation in Allahabad Municipality and Cantonment of any such report, statement or rumour by any written word, in newspapers or in leaflets, or by any other means. 2. This order was promulgated all over the city of Allahabad by means of loudspeakers fixed to motor-lorries. The fact that this order came to the knowledge of the Applicant Sat Narain is not denied. The other Applicant pleaded ignorance of this order but the point has not been raised in this Court and it may therefore be taken for granted that be also had notice of the order. The fact that this order came to the knowledge of the Applicant Sat Narain is not denied. The other Applicant pleaded ignorance of this order but the point has not been raised in this Court and it may therefore be taken for granted that be also had notice of the order. Inspite of this knowledge a statement appeared in an issue of the Punch dated the 14th of April, 1938, setting out that a certain Hindu shrine had been destroyed and razed to the level of the ground. The shrine in question was in fact a very small temple about a cubit in height situated on a masonry platform under a pipal tree. It is not denied that this temple was destroyed but it is said that it was razed only to the level of the chabutra upon which it stood and not to the level of the ground as alleged in the statement published in the paper. The District Authorities were of opinion that this statement was false and alarmist and also communally biased within the meaning of the order u/s 144 referred to above and as the publication of the statement was a defiance of that order they filed a complaint against the Applicants charging them with an offence u/s 188 I.P.C. The Applicants were tried on that charge and were eventually convicted. 3. Two principal pleas were taken in defence; firstly that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue the order u/s 144 and secondly that the statement contained in the paper to which objection bad been taken was not false and hence it did not invoke any disobedience of the order u/s 144. 4. I shall confine myself to the first contention which is the real contention in the case. Upon a careful consideration of the terms of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure, I am constrained to hold that the order u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure to which objection has been taken on behalf of the Applicants did not conform to the provisions of the law, however desirable it may have been in view of the public situation. Upon a careful consideration of the terms of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure, I am constrained to hold that the order u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure to which objection has been taken on behalf of the Applicants did not conform to the provisions of the law, however desirable it may have been in view of the public situation. A careful perusal of the first two clauses of Section 144 leaves no doubt in my mind that they are confined to the case of an individual person or persons to whom a notice may be issued directing them to refrain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in their possession or management, Under these two clauses no order can be issued to the general public. It is significant to note in this connection that the order is required to be "served in manner provided by Section 134". Now Section 134 provides for the service of the order in the "manner herein provided for the service of a summons" and makes a definite reference to "such person", showing thereby that some individual person or persons have to be served with the order. The incorporation of these provisions in Sub-clause (1) of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the service of an order passed thereunder leaves no doubt in my mind that the said clause confers no jurisdiction upon the Magistrate to issue any such order to the general public The point is further clarified by reference to Sub-clause (2) of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure which runs as follows: An order under this section may in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed be passed ex parte. 5. It is thus clear to ray mind that the first two clauses of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure do not invest the Magistrate with any power to issue an order to the general public. A provision for such an order is however made in Sub-clause (3) of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure which runs as follows: An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular pace. 6. A provision for such an order is however made in Sub-clause (3) of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure which runs as follows: An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular pace. 6. The obvious conclusion from the terms of this sub-clause is that no order u/s 144 can be issued to the public generally except when "frequenting or visiting a particular place". This is a clear limitation paced by the law upon the power given to the Magistrate to issue an order to the general public u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure and any order which ignores this limitation must be held to be bad in law. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that the order passed by the learned District Magistrate of Allahabad in the present case was one which be bad no power lawfully to promulgate within the meaning of Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure. It necessarily follows that the conviction of the Applicants u/s 188 I.P.C. is bad in law and must be set aside. My attention has not been drawn to any case decided by this Court either for or against the interpretation which I have placed upon the terms of Section 144 Code of Criminal Procedure. But I find that the view that I have taken is fortified by several decisions of other High Courts. I need only refer to the following cases:--Queen Em press v. Lakmidas Makandas (1889) 14 Bom 165, Bmperor v. Bhdgubhai Dwarkadas (1914) 16 B.L.R. 684. D.V. Belvi v. Emperor AIR 1931 Bom. 325; Motilal Gongadhar Kabre v. Emperor AIR 1931 Bom. 513; Ashutosh Roy v. Harish Chandra Chatto padhya (1925) 29 Cal. W.N. 411, Abdul Majid Basunia v. Nripendranath Mazumder (1931) 35 Cal. 556 R. Ponnappa Aiyangarv. Venamamalai Ramanujar Jeer Swamigal AIR 1920 Mad. 847. 7. The result therefore is that I allow this application in revision and set aside the conviction of the Applicants. The fine if any paid by them shall be refunded.