JUDGMENT Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J. 1. The Plaintiff is the Appellant. He is the proprietor of the Kirlampudi, Dontamuru estate in the district of East Godavari. The estate originally belonged to Sri Raja Chelikani Venkayamma alias Vengayamma, Zamindarini of Jaggampeta. On 4th March 1938 she sold the estate to the father of the Appellant. The land, about the rent of which disputes have arisen, known as Lokareddi Cheruvu Istuva, is situate in this estate. That land was even at the date of the sale part of the ryoti lands of the estate in the occupancy of a relation of the zamindarini, one Chelikani Dharmarayanim Garu. In the amarakam accounts of the village the land was entered as jeroyati land against this Dharmarayanim Garu. The rent that was derivable from this land during the period prior to the sale was Rs. 1,078-7-0, though it would appear that only Rs. 35 was being collected and the balance remitted on account of kindness or grace towards the ryot. On the same date when the sale deed came into existence and prior to it there were two other documents executed by and between the zamindarini and Dharmarayanim Garu. They were; (i) a permanent patta by the zamindarini by which the suit land was demised in perpetuity at a favourable rent of Rs. 374 only; (ii) corresponding to this patta, Dharmarayanim Garu also executed a muchilika in favour of the zamindarini. The execution of these documents is expressly referred to in the sale deed, Exhibit I, executed in favour of the Appellants father and the muchilika taken from Dharmarayanim Garu was actually handed over to the purchaser. There can be no doubt therefore that this transaction between the zamindarini and Dharmarayanim Garu was a genuine arrangement intended to bind not only the zamindarini who was a party to it but also the purchaser from her, namely, the Appellants father. There is no reason whatever to regard this transaction as suspicious or for thinking that it was a hole and corner affair. 2. If the matter had stood there and a dispute had subsequently arisen between the purchaser and Dharmarayanim Garu, we have no doubt that the terms settled between the parties as aforesaid would have been held binding upon the parties. This is not contested by the Appellants learned Advocate. 2. If the matter had stood there and a dispute had subsequently arisen between the purchaser and Dharmarayanim Garu, we have no doubt that the terms settled between the parties as aforesaid would have been held binding upon the parties. This is not contested by the Appellants learned Advocate. The whole of his case here and in the Courts below was based on the contention that under Section 26 of the Madras Estates Land Act this arrangement by which a remission of rent was granted could be held valid only during the lifetime of the zamindarini and could not bind either her successor in interest or a purchaser from her except during the period of her lifetime. 3. Section 26 of the Madras Estates Land Act is as follows: (1) Where for the purpose of clearing and bringing waste land in the estate into cultivation or for the purpose of making any permanent improvement or for planting trees on the holding or where under a contract made prior to the commencement of this Act for any premium, loan or other valuable consideration, a ryot has accepted a patta from, or has entered into an engagement with, his landholder at a rate of rent lower than the lawful rate previously payable upon the land or than the rate lawfully payable upon land of similar description and with similar advantages in the neighbourhood, such rent shall not be liable to enhancement during the period for which such lower rate is payable by contract or custom, so long as the ryot shall substantially fulfil the terms upon which and the purposes for which such lower rate was allowed. (2) After the expiry of the period for which such lower rate or rent is payable or if the terms upon which and the purposes for which such lower rate was allowed have not been substantially fulfilled, the landholder shall be entitled to the full rate. (3) Except as provided by Sub-section (1) no rate of rent at which land may have been granted by a landholder shall be binding upon the person entitled to the rent after the lifetime of the landholder if such rate is lower than the lawful rate payable by the ryot before the date of the grant upon the land or upon land of similar description and with similar advantages in the neighbourhood. 4. 4. This section occurs in Chapter III of the Act headed "General provisions relating to the rates of rent payable by ryots". By Clause (1) and subject to the conditions contained therein, an engagement entered into between a landholder and a ryot by which the rent lawfully payable in respect of the land is reduced is not interfered with and such rent is not liable to enhancement during the period for which the lower rate is fixed. There is no doubt that in the present case the patta and the muchilika, Exhibits II and II-a, do constitute an engagement within the meaning of the clause. Two objections are raised to its applicability to the case on hand. Firstly, it is said that an engagement within the sub-section must be supported by valuable consideration and that the engagement in question does not satisfy this requirement. Secondly, it is said that the clause is applicable only to a term lease, that is to say, a lease for a definite period, and not to a permanent lease or a lease in perpetuity which it is urged, falls outside it. The learned Deputy Collector who tried the suit was of opinion that the patta was not supported by valuable consideration and also that a permanent lease such as is evidenced by Exhibits II and II-a is outside the provisions of Section 26, Clause 1 of the Act. On this view he decreed the suit. An appeal was taken to the District Court. The learned District Judge apparently agreed with the Deputy Collector on this point, though he has expressed himself in a somewhat indefinite way. He has observed: In Exhibit II Vengayamma Bahadur Garu purported to grant a remission of the major portion of the rent for five different reasons. None of these obviously amounted to cash consideration. The learned Deputy Collector held that valuable consideration, as that term is used in Section 26(1) must be akin to the other words used in the section itself i.e. loan or premium. None of these obviously amounted to cash consideration. The learned Deputy Collector held that valuable consideration, as that term is used in Section 26(1) must be akin to the other words used in the section itself i.e. loan or premium. He also held, construing that term consideration with reference to the definition in the Contract Act there was no consideration at all for the grant of Exhibit II The Respondents Vakil contended that past services and provision for maintenance would certainly amount to consideration, which would validate an alienation or a contract I agree that under certain circumstances a contract based on past services as consideration can certainly be enforced. But all the items set forth in Exhibit II, though they may amount to consideration, which would validate a gift or an ordinary contract, will not amount to a valuable consideration as that term is used in Section 26(1) of the Estates Land Act. 5. It is unnecessary to enter upon a criticism of the statement as we think it serves no purpose. We are however clearly of the opinion that the word "consideration" used in Section 26 carries with it the same legal implications as attach to it under the Indian Contract Act and it is upon this footing that the question must be considered. The learned District Judge is also of the opinion that Exhibit II must be held to be really of the nature of an alienation not of land, but only of the right to receive a certain sum as rent. As no land was in fact granted at the time of the execution of Exhibit II, Section 26(3) would not, according to him, apply to the facts of the case. In other words, Section 26(3) is rendered inapplicable, and accordingly Venkayamma Bahadur Garu was bound by Exhibit II and could not impeach the alienation. Neither could a purchaser from her do so even after her lifetime. The learned Judge accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 6. The burden of proving the validity of Exhibit II by which a remission in part of the rent lawfully payable on the land was granted is upon the ryot in view of the provisions of Section 26. The Deputy Collector has held that the Defendants, who claim under Dharmarayanim Garu and who are the Respondents here, have not proved that Exhibit II was supported by consideration. The Deputy Collector has held that the Defendants, who claim under Dharmarayanim Garu and who are the Respondents here, have not proved that Exhibit II was supported by consideration. Neither he nor the learned District Judge has taken note of the fact that the recitals of consideration in the document are at all times, prima facie at any rate, binding not only upon the executant but also on the purchaser from her and his son, the present Appellant. There was some evidence adduced on, the part of the Respondents to prove the truth of some of the recitals in the document, but that evidence has not been accepted. The failure on the part of the Respondents to affirmatively make out the consideration recited cannot take away the value of the admissions made by the Appellants predecessor-in-title in the document itself. However that may be, that evidence was confined only to one of the recitals in the document and we may perhaps pass it by. Among the five items of consideration mentioned, it appears to us to be clear that one of them, if true,--and we may say it has to be accepted as true because there is no evidence contra--is sufficient to support the document. It is this: As you have been obliging and rendering help to us both in regard to all the important matters relating to the estate and also in matters relating to our household looking to us for help.... 7. This recital means that down to the date of the document, Dharmarayanim Garu was rendering service to the zamindarini expecting some remuneration or recompense, although what and how much it should be had been left undetermined. It is perfectly legitimate to infer from this recital that service was being rendered not only on request but also on the understanding that it was to be paid for in a way left undecided. If this is so, it appears to us that the requirement of consideration in order to support a contract or an engagement is satisfied in the present case. The first contention must accordingly be negatived. 8. The second point taken is that Section 26(1) is wholly inapplicable to a permanent lease. If this is so, it appears to us that the requirement of consideration in order to support a contract or an engagement is satisfied in the present case. The first contention must accordingly be negatived. 8. The second point taken is that Section 26(1) is wholly inapplicable to a permanent lease. The argument is that the word "period" occurring in the clause, "such rent shall not be liable to enhancement during the period for which such lower rate is payable by contract", means a section or sub-division of time and cannot mean perpetuity or all time to come. We are unable to put such a limited construction upon this word taken in the context in which it occurs. The section seems to lay emphasis upon the validity of a contract or engagement if it is supported by consideration. The intention behind the clause undoubtedly was that, if there was valuable consideration given for a favourable lease and if the contract had been entered into prior to the Act, it should not be disturbed during its currency. It is difficult for us to accept ah argument which will make a lease for nine hundred and ninety-nine years or any larger number of years valid and enforceable under the statute but a lease in perpetuity null and void. We prefer to hold that the word "period" has reference to the period during which by contract a lease is made to run, and to our mind it-appears that during that period, whatever its duration, the favourable rate would be maintained. The duration of a lease may vary, and may even be for all time to come. If it is a lease in perpetuity, then the period of the lease should be regarded as indefinite and for ever and the favourable rate could not at any time be disturbed. So that the word "period" has reference to the period, whatever it might be, of the lease itself and regard should be had accordingly to the terms of the lease for the purpose of ascertaining the time during which the lease would be good. Our attention was drawn to a dictum of Ramesam J. in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Chokkalingam Naicken (1930) 61 M.L.J. 52, 57 where the learned Judge has expressed the opinion that the word "period" refers to a section of time and cannot cover a case of perpetuity. Our attention was drawn to a dictum of Ramesam J. in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Chokkalingam Naicken (1930) 61 M.L.J. 52, 57 where the learned Judge has expressed the opinion that the word "period" refers to a section of time and cannot cover a case of perpetuity. In fact it was on this decision the learned Deputy Collector relied in support of his judgment. With utmost respect to Ramesam J. we are unable to agree with this interpretation of the word. We do not see, as we have already said, any warrant for taking a perpetual lease out of the operation of Section 26(1) for no better reason than that it is possible to regard the word "period" as meaning a section or a sub-division of time. In the Oxford Dictionary, among the meanings given to the word, we find the following "the time during which anything runs its course time of duration". Quite independently of it, however, we think that in the context the word "period" should not be understood in the limited sense attributed to it by Ramesam J. 9. It therefore seems to us that the patta, Exhibit II in the case, comes within Section 26(1) and must accordingly be held binding on the Appellant. In this view it is unnecessary to discuss the effect of Clause 3 of the section as in terms Clause 1 is expressly saved by it. For the reasons explained above the appeal has to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed with costs of the first Respondent.