JUDGMENT Bennet and Verma, JJ. - The suit which has given rise to this appeal was one for pre-emption in respect of a sale of zamindari property made in favour of the Appellant on the 5th of October, 1932. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit but the lower appellate Court has decreed it. 2. The only point that arises 0 for consideration in this second appeal can be stated thus. The Plaintiffs, Respondents before us, claimed that they were entitled to pre-empt as they were co-sharers. One of the pleas of the vendee, Defendant-Appellant, was that he too was a co-sharer and had an equal right of pre-emption with the Plaintiffs and that therefore the Plaintiffs were not entitled to any preference over him. In reply it was pointed out by the Plaintiffs that the Appellant was the proprietor merely of a specific plot of land in each of the two chaks in which the property sold by the saledeed of the 5th of October, 1932, was situated and that he was not a "co-sharer" but a "petty proprietor." That the Plaintiffs are "co-sharers" and are entitled to pre-empt is admitted. Thus the pleading of the vendee Defendant was that although the Plaintiffs had an undoubted right to pre-empt, he, the vendee, also had an equal right. The Court of first instance held that although the vendee Defendant was the proprietor of only one specific plot of land in each of the two chaks in question, he came within the meaning of the word "co-sharer." The sale-deed by which the Defendant vendee had purchased these two plots of land is of the 21st of January, 1924. The lower appellate Court has remarked that this sale-deed does not state that the purchaser would be entitled to any interest in the joint lands of the mahal or to take part in the administration of its affairs. It has further found that it is not proved that the Defendant No. 1 is entitled to any interest in the joint lands of the mahal or to take part in the administration of its affairs. 3. This finding, which on the face of it is a finding of fact, is attacked by the learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant on the ground that the lower-appellate Court has cast the burden of proof on the wrong party. 3. This finding, which on the face of it is a finding of fact, is attacked by the learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant on the ground that the lower-appellate Court has cast the burden of proof on the wrong party. His contention is that it was for the Plaintiffs not only to show that the Appellant was the owner merely of specific plots of land in the mahal but also to show that he was not entitled to any interest in the joint lands of the mahal or to take part in the administration of its affairs, in other words, that it was for the Plaintiffs to prove the negative. We are not prepared to accept that contention. In the recent decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mst. Phula Devi v. Riaz-ud-din 1935 A.W.R. 950 (P.C.), the view of the High Court that the burden of proving that he was a co-sharer and that he had a right to take part in the administration of the mahal lay on the Plaintiff in that case, has been approved. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that that observation was made because in that case the person who was the owner of specific plots of land and was claiming to be a co-sharer was the Plaintiff and that the burden was cast on him because he was the Plaintiff. It seems to us, however, that the burden must be laid on the party that asserts that in spite of the fact that he is the proprietor merely of a specific plot or specific plots of land, he is a co-sharer. The Appellant before us, although he was the Defendant in the suit, was claiming to have a right of pre-emption equal to that of the Plaintiffs and it was on that ground that he wanted to defeat the claim of the Plaintiffs. It was for him to establish that he had such a right of pre-emption. In our opinion, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council mentioned above is a clear authority for the proposition that the burden lies on the party that claims the status of a co-sharer although he is shown to be the proprietor only of a specific plot, or specific plots, of land. In our opinion, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council mentioned above is a clear authority for the proposition that the burden lies on the party that claims the status of a co-sharer although he is shown to be the proprietor only of a specific plot, or specific plots, of land. We would also like to point out that the view of the Court of first instance to the effect that the method in which the name of the proprietor of a specific plot of land was entered in the khewat or the question whether he was or was not jointly responsible for the revenue of the mahal was relevant for the decision of the question whether such a proprietor had the status of a co-sharer or not, is not correct. The language of the definition of "petty proprietor" in the Agra Preemption Act shows that these are not relevant considerations. In our opinion, the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court is a finding of fact and is not vitiated by any error of law and is correct. 4. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal with costs.