JUDGMENT Radha Krishna, J. - The fact of this case are that respondents Nos. 3 to 8 and the appellants, in all 9 persons, filed a suit for profits u/s 108 Clause (15) of the Oudh Rent Act against Sheikh Mohammad Ibrahim, lambardar, and Mst. Amina Bibi, respondents Nos. 1 and 2, for profits for the year 1338 to 1340 Fasli. On the 13th March, 1936, the trial Court decreed the suit for Rs. 405 against defendant No. 1 and for Rs. 22 against defendant No. 2. 2. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendants filed cross-objection. The learned District Judge dismissed both the appeal and the cross-objection and ordered the parties to bear their own costs in his Court. 3. The appellants, who were plaintiffs Nos. 4, 7 and 8 in the trial Court have come up in appeal against the decree of the Court of the learned District Judge. The other plaintiffs are respondents Nos. 3 to 8 in this Court. 4. The point involved in the appeal before the Court below was the question of profits in respect of Bazar Ghafurganj and Wahabganj and the Phulwari in mahal Shaikhana. The learned District Judge held that there were no profits from the Phulwari, and as regards the profits of the two Bazars he held that there was no satisfactory evidence on the record. The learned District Judge held that it was not possible to take into consideration the past decrees for profits in respect of these Bazars and distinguished the case reported in Sooriah Row v. Rajah Enoogunty Sooriah (1838) 2 M.I.A. 72 which was cited before him on the ground that that was a case in respect of mesne profits and the case of mesne profits was very different from the case of profits of a Bazar. 5. In appeal in this Court the learned Counsel for the appellants has argued that the finding of the Court below in respect of the profits of items in dispute is vitiated in law because he omitted from consideration the evidence furnished by earlier decrees, which evidence was admissible in law. It has been further argued that the plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to adduce all the evidence which they wanted to produce in the trial Court. 6. I have heard the parties at length. It has been further argued that the plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to adduce all the evidence which they wanted to produce in the trial Court. 6. I have heard the parties at length. I find that there are at least four judgments in profits suits in respect of the properties in dispute as detailed below: 1. Judgment dated 30th September, 1924, by Mr. Janki Prasad, Sub-Divisional Officer, Salone, Rae Bareli. 2. Judgment dated 3oth September, 1927, by Mr. Anand Swarup Sub-Divisional Officer, Salone, Rae Bareli. 3. Judgment dated 27th August; 1929, by Mr. Altaf Husain, Sub-Divisional Officer, Salone, Rae Bareli. 4. Judgment in appeal dated 27th October, 193o, by Mr. Raghubar Dayal, District Judge, Rae Bareli. 7. In my opinion these judgments are admissible in evidence on the question of profits accruing to 'defendants' in respect of the properties in dispute. The fact of their relevancy has not been questioned by the learned Counsel for the respondents before me. In the Privy Council case referred to by the lower Court, i.e. Sooriah Row v. Rajah Enoogunty Sooriah (1838) 2 M.I.A. 72, which was a stilt for mesne profits, the evidence of either side was found to be unsatisfactory and the accounts produced by the plaintiffs were held to be spurious. On appeal the appellate Court, though dissatisfied with the evidence on the record, estimated the amount of mesne profits from the average of the preceding years. This method of calculation was not taken exception to by their Lordships of the Privy Council. In my opinion the judgments in suits of profits for previous years are admissible in evidence for the purpose of estimating the profits for the years in suit specially in this case where the defendants, although in possession of valuable properties, have abstained from producing any accounts whatsoever. The distinction drawn by the learned District Judge to the effect that the Privy Council case related to mesne profits of a village property while the present suit relates to profits of Bazars does not appeal to me. I do not see any distinction in the two cases. I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgments in previous cases should have been taken into consideration. 8. I do not see any distinction in the two cases. I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgments in previous cases should have been taken into consideration. 8. As regards the other point, I find that on the 10th January, 1936, when the case came on for hearing the Court framed the issues in the case and the patwaris were directed to prepare statements on the basis of gross as well as actual incomes and the case was fixed for the 21st January, 1936. The 21st January, 1936, was a holiday and so the case came up before the Court on the 22nd January, 1936, and the 5th February, 1936, was fixed for evidence. On this date, i. e., the 22nd January 1936, an application was made on behalf of the plaintiffs for the issue of a commission for local inspection of Bazars Ghafurganj and Wahabganj and the Phulwari in mahal Shaikhana and for the assessment of the profits thereof. The only order passed on this application is that it should form part of the record. On the 5th February, 1936, the case was adjourned to the 22nd February, 1936, and after several adjournments the case came up for hearing on the 28th; February, 1936, on which date certain statements of witnesses were recorded. On the 25th February, 1936, a fresh application was made by the plaintiffs inviting the attention of the Court to the previous application dated the 22nd January, 1936, and for the summoning of certain witnesses on whom summonses had not been served and for certain interrogatories being served upon defendant No. 1. Curiously enough, no order was passed on this application. The only order that I find on this application is the stereotyped order "shamil misl men ho". In a case like the present where the plaintiffs are suing for their shares of the profits of properties like the Phulwari and the Bazars, the exclusive possession of which is with the defendants, the burden of proving the actual profits lies heavily on the defendants who are in actual possession thereof. The defendants refused to produce any account-books and put the plaintiff to the proof of profits. The. The defendants refused to produce any account-books and put the plaintiff to the proof of profits. The. plaintiffs in the absence of accounts had to fall back upon having the profits estimated through a commissioner appointed by the Court, and I am of opinion that an enquiry into the probable profits on the basis of local inspection and enquiry was absolutely necessary. The plaintiffs applied to have a commissioner appointed but the Court did not consider their application and did not pass any orders. The result has been that the plaintiffs, inspite of their efforts to bring such evidence as it was possible for them to bring on record, were precluded from doing that by the action of the Court. In my opinion the plaintiffs on the facts stated above did not get the opportunity, to which they were entitled, of producing their evidence. 9. The appellants lodged a complaint in the Court below against the action of the trial Court in not issuing a commission as prayed for by them in their ground of appeal No. 6, but the Court below omitted to take that ground into consideration. 10. For the reasons given above I am of opinion that the case should be tried afresh after a consideration of the entire admissible evidence on -the record and such evidence as the parties may produce hereafter. The appeal succeeds and the decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial Court for a trial de novo in the light of the observations made above. The appellants will get their costs of this appeal in this Court but the costs incurred up to now and hereafter in the Court below shall abide the result.