Suprokash Das v. Indian Tea Licensing Committee — 1939 DIGILAW 265 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - These are two appeals against a decision dated April 27th, 1939, given by Mr. Justice Edgley under the Indian Tea Control Act of 1938. The Appellant had appealed to this Court under the provisions of sec. 7 (2) of the Act against the decision of the Indian Tea Licensing Committee which had granted him an export quota for tea and fixed what is called the crop basis in respect of his tea estate. 2. The Appellant preferred his appeals (1) on the ground that the Committee had wrongly fixed his crop basis and export quota at too low a figure (Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 46 of 1939) and (2) on the ground that he was entitled to a higher quota by reason of hardship under see. 14 (3) (b) of the Act. 3. In both the appeals which are entitled "under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent" the Appellant cited the Indian Tea Licensing Committee as Respondents. After those appeals had been entered the Appellant asked Mr. Justice Edgley to strike out the Indian Tea Licensing Committee as Respondents. This Mr. Justice Edgley refused to do and the present appeal is directed against that refusal to strike out the Indian Tea Licensing Committee as Respondents. 4. The Appellant is the owner of a tea estate in Assam. The Indian Tea Control Act of 1938 was passed by the Indian Legislature and received the assent of the Governor-General on March 28th, 1938; it succeeded and replaced the Indian Tea Control Act of 1933. 5. The circumstances which led up to the passing of this Act are well known. The price obtained abroad for tea had fallen to an unremunerative level and the purpose of the Act was, in conjunction with Ceylon and the Netherlands India, to control the export of tea from India, Ceylon and the Netherlands India in such a way as to bring back prices for exported tea to a remunerative level. The heading of the Act 13 as follows: An Act to provide for the control of export of tea from, and for the control of the extension of the cultivation of tea in, British India. 6. The heading of the Act 13 as follows: An Act to provide for the control of export of tea from, and for the control of the extension of the cultivation of tea in, British India. 6. The preamble reads: Whereas it is expedient for the purpose of implementing the agreement which the Central Government has entered into with the Governments of Ceylon and the Netherlands India to give effect to the provisions of the International Agreement made between associations representing the tea growers of India, Ceylon and the Netherlands India to provide for the control of the export of tea from, and for the control of the extension of the cultivation of tea in, British India; It is hereby enacted as follows : -- .... 7. Shortly, the effect of the Act is to set up a Committee called the Indian Tea Licensing Committee which shall grant to the growers of tea and the owners of tea plantations, permission to export certain determinable quantities of tea each year and no more. The total quantity of tea to be exported from India is determined in conjunction with the other Governments, and each estate is allowed to export a certain fraction (export quota) of that total. No other export is allowed. The amount of the export quota for each estate is related to what is called a "crop basis" of that estate, a quantity of tea based in general on the production of previous years. 8. The Act provides in sec. 3 that the India Tea Licensing Committee shall consist of a number of members from various bodies, namely, the Indian Tea Association of Calcutta, the Assam Branch of that Association, the Surma Valley Branch of that Association, the Dooars Planters Association, the India Tea Planters Association, Jalpaiguri, and the Terai Indian Planters Association, Terai, acting together, and the Darjeeling Planters Association and the Terai Planters Association, acting together; and members elected from tea planters in Assam, in Southern India and members representing tea estates in the Indian State of Travancore and other Indian States. 9. The Committee itself is intended to be representative of the tea-growing and marketing interests throughout India. The Committee is given power to fix crop bases and export quotas and in sec. 7 (1) it is stated to be subject to the control of the Central Government. By sec. 9. The Committee itself is intended to be representative of the tea-growing and marketing interests throughout India. The Committee is given power to fix crop bases and export quotas and in sec. 7 (1) it is stated to be subject to the control of the Central Government. By sec. 7 (2) any person who is aggrieved by an order of the Committee under sec. 14 under which crop basis and export quotas are fixed, may appeal to either the Central Government or the High Court of the Province within which the tea estate is situated. The Appellant may not appeal to both the Central Government and the High Court. 10. In the previous Tea Control Act there was no appeal to a High Court against the order of the Tea Licensing Committee. This provision as to appeal to the High Court is a short one, but it has given rise to some difficulty as regards procedure. 11. When the first of these appeals under the Tea Control Act of 1938 came before the Court, my brother Nasim Ali, J. and myself sat for two days, attempting to ascertain the facts of the appeal. We discovered that it was only possible to deal with the appeal adequately if evidence were taken. 12. The Tea Licensing Committee is composed of gentlemen expert in the growing and marketing of tea and it appeared that their decisions were based upon reports received from their representatives in different parts of India and, in particular, in the part where the tea estate appealing was situated. Those gentlemen had used those reports and their technical knowledge and such statements as were handed in to them in order to come to a decision. That decision was in the nature of an administrative order. It was not possible for us to review that decision by way of appeal unless we had evidence given in the ordinary way according to law concerning the matters in issue. The consequence was that we adjourned the appeal and considered the framing of rules of procedure to deal with such appeals. 13. As a result of those deliberations the Court passed rules on March 31st, 1939, as follows: (1) Appeals shall be heard by a Judge appointed by the Chief Justice. The consequence was that we adjourned the appeal and considered the framing of rules of procedure to deal with such appeals. 13. As a result of those deliberations the Court passed rules on March 31st, 1939, as follows: (1) Appeals shall be heard by a Judge appointed by the Chief Justice. (2) The provisions of the CPC relating to the hearing and determination of suits and appeals shall, so far as the circumstances of the case permit, be applicable to these appeals 14. Those rules were described to be, as indeed they were, provisional rules. The Court had to deal with an entirely new and anomalous jurisdiction which, although called Appellate, was in part Appellate and in part original. Under those rules the appeals under the Tea Control Act coming before this Court were referred to Mr. Justice Edgley. Amongst them was the present appeal. 15. Mr. Justice Edgley in a considered decision refused to strike out the Indian Tea Licensing Committee as Respondents in the appeal. We have to consider whether in so doing the learned Judge was right. 16. The first question is whether these appeals lie to this Bench. They are stated to be brought under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent which provides that there may be an appeal from the "judgment," in certain circumstances, of one Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench of the High Court The matter appealed from must be a " judgment." The word "judgment" in cl. 15 of the Letters Patent has given rise to a great deal of discussion from early days. In the case of The Justice of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. 8 ILR 433, 452 (1872), Couch, C.J., was of the opinion that it meant -- A decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability; it may be either final or preliminary or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it leaving other matters to be determined. 17. It might be said that Mr. Justice Edgley's decision determines some right or liability, namely, the right of the Appellant to have an opponent or not. 17. It might be said that Mr. Justice Edgley's decision determines some right or liability, namely, the right of the Appellant to have an opponent or not. I am not sure that that is right; or that the words the learned Chief Justice used would be considered applicable in circumstances of this kind. 18. In Ebrahim v. Fackrunessa Begum ILR 4 Cal 531, 534 (1878), Garth, C.J., at page 534 considered what a judgment meant: A judgment or decree which decides the case one way or the other in its entirety and that it does not mean a decision or order of an interlocutory character, which merely decides some isolated point not affecting the merits or result of the entire suit. 19. Clearly Mr. Justice Edgley's decision did not purport to decide the rights of the parties finally, and would not come within that definition. 20. My own view is that Mr. Justice Edgley's decision was not a judgment. If the Appellant has legal cause for complaint, it might be that he could raise that complaint after the matter is finally decided by Mr. Justice Edgley and it could be dealt with as part of a possible appeal. It would follow from my view of the matter that Mr. Justice Edgley's decision not being a judgment, no appeal lies. The question whether the Tea Licensing Committee is properly joined as Respondent has however been argued at length and as it-may be raised in other matters, it is convenient to deal with it now. 21. The Appellant has contended that the Tea Licensing Committee is, in effect, a Court which has given its decision and, therefore, cannot be a party to the appeal from its decision. It seems to me that the answer to that contention is that the Tea Licensing Committee is not a Court; it is an administrative body set up under the statute to protect and regulate the interests of the general body of tea-growers and tea-dealers. It is, as the statute prescribes, a representative body and in making its decisions it must have regard to the interests of tea-growers in India as a whole and the rights under the statute of each tea-grower and tea-dealer. It is, as the statute prescribes, a representative body and in making its decisions it must have regard to the interests of tea-growers in India as a whole and the rights under the statute of each tea-grower and tea-dealer. Moreover, it must have regard to the keeping of the agreements which had been entered into by the Government of India with the Government of Ceylon and the Government of the Netherlands India for restricting the export of tea. 22. From the necessity of the case the Committee acts, as we discovered when we explored the first case under the Tea Control Act, upon the reports made by experts from distant areas, upon the state of the ted estate whose rights are being considered, and its members being experts will naturally rely and do rely upon the expert and technical knowledge which they possess. 23. The decisions that the Tea Licensing Committee arrived at cannot, in the ordinary way, be reviewed by a Court of law in the way that decisions based on ordinary legal evidence can. Before a Court of law can attempt to interfere with or modify those decisions it must have before it evidence given according to law from which it can draw its conclusions. 24. The Court's procedure must, from the necessity of things, as I have said before, be partly in the nature of appellate proceedings and partly in the nature of original proceedings. This jurisdiction is, to some extent, though not entirely, comparable with that exercised by the Courts of Quarter Sessions in England when dealing with appeals from licensing Justices. Licensing Justices in England have the duty of deciding whether licenses should be issued to houses which sell intoxicating liquor. It is their duty to see that, amongst other things, there are not too many licensed houses and not too few. A Bench of licensing Magistrates in England may come to a decision that a license ought to be refused in the interests of the general body of the public. That decision can be challenged by way of appeal to the Quarter Sessions. At the Quarter Sessions the appeal is by way of rehearing on evidence and the Justices who gave the decision in the first instance are entitled to be represented. 25. That decision can be challenged by way of appeal to the Quarter Sessions. At the Quarter Sessions the appeal is by way of rehearing on evidence and the Justices who gave the decision in the first instance are entitled to be represented. 25. The matter is put, I think, clearly by Lord Davey in the case of Tynemouth Corporation v. Attorney-General L.R. [1899] A.C. 293, 307. Lord Davey, after remarking that the proceedings in an appeal from a decision of the Licensing Justices sitting at a licensing meeting, are still regulated by the Licensing Act of 1828, says: I think that an objector before the licensing meeting has no right to appear and be heard on the appeal to quarter sessions The only proper Respondents to the appeal are the justices them, selves, who are served and may appear in the interests of the public to support their own decision. Provision is made in the Licensing Act for their costs, bat not for those of any other person appearing to oppose the appeal. 26. That is a decision on the provisions of the Licensing Act of 1828, it is true; and as Lord Davey points out, the fact that provision is made in the Act for the cost of the Licensing Justices indicates that they are the persons who are to appear. But he also indicates that they may appear in the interests of the public to support their own decision. 27. It seems to me that the Tea Licensing Committee is in a somewhat analogous position to those Licensing Justices. They are the only body to represent the general community of tea-growers and dealers; they also represent the Government of India which has made agreements with foreign Governments as to control of the export of tea. It seems to me good sense that they should be represented if any grower or dealer thinks that his quota ought to be enlarged. The enlargement of that quota may affect the rights of other growers and dealers and it may also affect, in certain events, the position of the Government as regards their relation with those other Governments with which they have entered into agreements. 28. The enlargement of that quota may affect the rights of other growers and dealers and it may also affect, in certain events, the position of the Government as regards their relation with those other Governments with which they have entered into agreements. 28. Furthermore, the Tea Licensing Committee has in its possession or under its control all the facts upon which the ascertainment of crop basis or the export quota was arrived at and those can be put before the Court for its consideration. They are most material. 29. I fail to see how any injustice can be done to the Appellant if the Tea Licensing Committee are made the Respondents in the appeal; and possible injustice to other growers and dealers may be averted. 30. A further complaint was raised by the Appellant, namely, that Mr. Justice Edgley awarded against the Appellant costs when he dismissed his application and directed that they should be assessed as of Chamber Applications on the Original Side of this Court. The Appellant says that the Original Side of this Court is in no way connected with tea estates in Assam and that costs on that scale are improper. 31. I am not able to uphold this complaint. Under sec. 35 of the CPC -- the costs of and incident to all suite shall be in the discretion of the Court, and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom or out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid The fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of such powers. 32. Mr. Justice Edgley was not definitely sitting on the Appellate Side of this Court nor on the Original Side. He was sitting in that special jurisdiction which had been conferred on the Court by the Act. He had by virtue of the rules the Court has made, the powers of a Judge under the CPC of dealing with suits and appeals, and it was competent for him to order such costs as in his discretion seemed proper. 33. He was sitting in that special jurisdiction which had been conferred on the Court by the Act. He had by virtue of the rules the Court has made, the powers of a Judge under the CPC of dealing with suits and appeals, and it was competent for him to order such costs as in his discretion seemed proper. 33. There are no scales of costs on the Appellate Side to deal with original hearings in the High Court such as arise under the Tea Control Act; but there are scales of costs on the Original Side. In my view Mr. Justice Edgley was not acting otherwise than in his judicial discretion when he directed that the costs should be assessed as of Chamber Applications on the Original Side. In fact we have heard what those costs amounted to and, in my view, they are not, having regard to the circumstances of the case, unreasonable. 34. For the above reasons it seems to me just and proper that the Tea Licensing Committee should be cited as Respondents in these appeals and that the appeals should be dismissed with costs to be assessed as of an appeal against an order on the Original Side -- one Counsel. There will be one set of costs for the two appeals. The order for stay will be removed. Nasim Ali, J. 35. I agree that these two appeals which arise out of two applications made by the Appellant for striking off the Indian Tea Licensing Committee, the sole Respondent in two appeals filed in this Court under sec. 7 (2) of the Indian Tea Control Act and now pending before Mr. Justice Edgley, should be dismissed. 36. The main contention of the Appellant in these two appeals is that the Indian Tea Licensing Committee is not a necessary party in these appeals and, consequently, the Respondent should be struck off from the memoranda of appeal. 37. The main argument in support of this contention is that the principle under which the Courts against whose decisions appeals are preferred to this Court are not made parties to the appeal should apply to these two appeals also. The obvious answer to this argument is that the Courts against whose decisions appeals are filed in this Court are not at all interested in the relief claimed by the Appellant. The Indian Tea Licensing Committee is not a Court. The obvious answer to this argument is that the Courts against whose decisions appeals are filed in this Court are not at all interested in the relief claimed by the Appellant. The Indian Tea Licensing Committee is not a Court. It is a statutory body. This body and nobody else is interested In denying the Appellant's right to relief claimed in these two appeals. I therefore agree with my Lord, the Chief Justice, that the Appellant's application for striking out the sole Respondent in these two appeals was rightly dismissed by Mr. Justice Edgley. As regards costs, an appeal lies only on a question of principle. No question of principle is involved here. The learned Judge was exercising a special jurisdiction under the Tea Control Act. It was entirely within his discretion in view of the nature of the case before him to decide whether the costs should be assessed either according to the Original Side scale or according to the Appellate Side scale or in any other manner he thought proper.