Judgement Appeal (No. 117 of 1936) from a judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court (June 4, 1935) on a reference made under s. 66, sub-s. 2, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Tribune newspaper and Press were owned by one, Sardar Dayal Singh, who, on June 15, 1895, executed a will by which he created three separate trusts which were to be administered by three independent committees of trustees. The third trust was for the maintenance of the Tribune newspaper and Press in an efficient manner, and for their establishment on a footing of permanency. Clause XXI. of the will provided that "It shall be the duty of the said "Committee of Trustees to maintain the said Press and "newspaper in an efficient condition, keeping up the liberal "policy of the said newspaper and devoting the surplus income "of the said Press and newspaper, after defraying all current "expenses, in improving the said newspaper and placing it "on a footing of permanency.” The appellants, the Trustees of the Tribune Press, Lahore, were the committee of that trust. Sardar Dayal Singh died in September, 1898. The Tribune Trust had been functioning since his death, and income from the Press and newspaper had been assessed to income-tax since 1917-18, when, after defraying all current expenses, there was a small surplus. Objection to the tax was first taken by the Trustees in the assessment of 1932-33. On January 31, 1933, the Income-tax Officer, Lahore, assessed the Trustees of the Tribune Press for the year 1932-33 on the income of the previous year, 1931-32, namely Rs. 61,629. The assessment of income-tax was Rs. 9941-2-0, and of super-tax Rs. 2307-8-0, making a total tax of Rs. 12,248-10-0. The assessees filed an appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer under s. 30 of the Indian Income-tax Act, to the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, who confirmed the assessment. The Commissioner, on the application of the assessees, then referred the following two questions to the High Court (1.) Is the income of the Tribune Trust liable to be assessed in the hands of the Trustees under the provisions of the Income-tax Act ? (2.) If so, is it not exempt under s. 4, sub-s. 3 (i.), of the Act ? (2.) If so, is it not exempt under s. 4, sub-s. 3 (i.), of the Act ? The reference was heard by a Division Bench (Jai Lal and Skemp JJ.), who agreed that the first question should be answered in the affirmative. On the second question, however, they disagreed. Jai Lal J. held that the Tribune Press and newspaper was property which was vested in the trustees, and was devoted to charitable purposes as defined in the Indian Income-tax Act, and consequently its income was exempt from assessment to income-tax. Skemp J. held that the trust was not for charitable purposes. They accordingly referred the case to a Full Bench (Young C.J., Addison and Tek Chand JJ.), who delivered three separate judgments. The Chief Justice and Addison J. concurred in holding that the second question referred should be answered in the negative, while Tek Chand J., in a dissenting judgment, was of opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative. The judgments are reported at ( 1935) I. L. R. 16 Lah. 829. The assessees now appealed. The facts and the terms of the trust and of the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. 1939. May 11, 12. Latter K.C. and H. W. Williams for the appellants. The Tribune Press and newspaper were not begun with any idea of pecuniary gain, but to educate public opinion in social and political spheres. The trust appears to be one for the advancement of objects of public utility. There is 02 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 241 ( 1938- 1939) Trustees of the Tribune Press v. Commnr. of Income-Tax 104 danger in arguing from English to Indian statutes Armstrong v. Estate Duty Commissioner. ([ 1937] A. C. 885, 896.) The meaning of " charitable purpose " in English law was considered in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel ([ 1891] A. C. 531. 587.), but this trust should be interpreted without reference to English decisions. The words " public utility " are adopted in the Indian Act from In re Macduff. Macduff v. Macduff ([ 1896] 2 Ch. 451.), in which Kendall v. Granger (( 1842) 5 Beav. 300.) is cited. English cases show that a trust for public utility is not necessarily a charity. The Indian Act goes beyond that and deliberately makes " public utility" a charity. Macduff v. Macduff ([ 1896] 2 Ch. 451.), in which Kendall v. Granger (( 1842) 5 Beav. 300.) is cited. English cases show that a trust for public utility is not necessarily a charity. The Indian Act goes beyond that and deliberately makes " public utility" a charity. The question is whether at the date of the will and the death of the testator this newspaper was one for the advancement of objects of public utility and benefit. Is the object of the trust here to obtain a change of law or to educate the public ? Bowman v. Secular Society, Ld. ([ 1917] A. C. 406, 441.); In re Scowcroft. Ormrod v. Wilkinson. ([ 1898] 2 Ch. 638.) The primary object here was the maintenance of a newspaper, without private gain, to meet a need— namely, to educate the public and afford an opportunity for the expression of views without advocating any particular political creed. It falls within the exemption in the statute. [Reference was made to In re Hood. Public Trustee v. Hood ([I931] l Ch. 240, 242, 248-9.); In re Tetley. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, Ld. v. Tetley ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 258.); and In re Hummeltenberg. Beatty v. London Spiritualistic Alliance, Ld. ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 237.)] The advancement of education would be a charitable purpose Commissioners for Special Purposes v. University College of North Wales (( 1909) 5 Tax Cas. 408, 414.) ; Smith v. Kerr. ([ 1902] 1 Ch. 774.) On the other hand, the trust was held to be for purely political purposes, and therefore not charitable, in Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue. (( 1933) 17 Tax Cas. 508, 511, 516-7.) The words here must be construed without reference to 43 Eliz. c. 4. It was primarily a trust for the establishment and maintenance of an efficient newspaper in the English language in a populous district where there was a need for such a newspaper. Such a trust may be regarded as of an educational character, or, secondly, for the advancement of an object of general public utility—" public " does not mean all mankind, but a considerable number. The reference in the will to " liberal policy " does not convert the trust to one simply for political propaganda. Such a trust may be regarded as of an educational character, or, secondly, for the advancement of an object of general public utility—" public " does not mean all mankind, but a considerable number. The reference in the will to " liberal policy " does not convert the trust to one simply for political propaganda. Even if it were so, it would still be open on the words of the Act to say that it was within the Act, for the development of those principles would affect a large section of the community, the principles being quite lawful. " Liberal," as the facts show, meant free, and not " liberal " in the sense understood in English party politics. H W. Williams followed. J. M. Tucker K.C. and E. L. Norton for the respondent. The newspaper was used mainly for political propaganda, with articles of general news and on other matters. It is the character of the newspaper in 1895 that must be looked at. Primarily, the Commissioner has to find on the facts whether its object was one of public utility. The question is not whether the Board on the facts would have come to the same conclusion, but whether the Commissioner can be said to be wrong in law in coming to the conclusion at which he arrived. Notwithstanding the definition of charitable purpose in the Indian Income-tax Act, the statute of 43 Eliz. c. 4, must still be looked at. The definition merely adopts Lord Macnaghtens classification of charities in In re Macduff. Macduff v. Macduff. ([ 1896] 2 Ch. 451, 466.) If the object is substantially a political object, it is not one of public utility. [Reference was made to Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Temperance Council of the Christian Churches of England and Wales (( 1926) 10 Tax Cas. 748.) ; Bowman v. Secular Society, Ld. ([ 1917] A. C. 406.) ; and In re Tetley. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, Ld, v. Tetley. ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 258.)] The question here is what is the main substantial object of the trust. The Commissioner appears to have had no doubt that the character of the newspaper was essentially political. It was one advocating political progress, temperately, it may be, but nevertheless advocating the advancement of particular political ideas, though containing items of general news. ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 258.)] The question here is what is the main substantial object of the trust. The Commissioner appears to have had no doubt that the character of the newspaper was essentially political. It was one advocating political progress, temperately, it may be, but nevertheless advocating the advancement of particular political ideas, though containing items of general news. The purpose of the trust was to carry on the liberal policy of the newspaper, i.e., to continue propaganda. The trust is not one 02 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 241 ( 1938- 1939) Trustees of the Tribune Press v. Commnr. of Income-Tax 105 for the advancement of an object of general public utility within the meaning of s. 4, sub-s. 3, of the Act. Latter K.C. replied. June 13. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir George Rankin. The trustees of the Tribune Press, Lahore, appeal from the decision given on June 4, 1935, by the majority of the judges composing a Full Bench of the High Court at Lahore upon a reference made to that Court under s. 66, sub-s. 2, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. On January 31, 1933, the Income-tax Officer, Lahore, for the year of assessment 1932-3 assessed the appellants to tax upon an income of Rs. 61,629, calculated upon the figures for the previous year. No question now arises as to the amount of the assessment or the computation of the tax. The sole question is whether the income of the appellants is not exempt from tax under the first clause of sub-s. 3 of s. 4 of the Act, which provides — "(3.) This Act shall not apply to the following classes of "income — "(i.) Any income derived from property held under "trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or "charitable purposes, and in the case of property so held "in part only for such purposes, the income applied, or "finally set apart for application, thereto. " In this sub-section charitable purpose includes "relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the "advancement of any other object of general public utility." Sardar Dayal Singh, a Sikh inhabitant of the Punjab, died in 1898, having by his will, dated June 15, 1895, created three separate trusts, to be administered by three independent " committees of trustees." Two of the trusts were for the establishment and maintenance of (1.) an Arts College, (2.) a public library. The third trust was declared by the 20th and 21st paragraphs of the will in the following terms — " XX. That my property in the stock and goodwill of the "Tribune Press and Newspaper in Anarkali, Lahore, shall "vest permanently in a Committee of Trustees consisting of "the following members, viz.— "1. Babu Jogendra Chandra Bose, M.A., B.L., Pleader, "Chief Court, Lahore. "2. Mr. Charles Golak Nath, B.A., LL.B., Barrister-at-"Law. "3. Mr. Harkishen Lal, B.A., Barrister-at-Law, Lahore." "XXI. That it shall be the duty of the said Committee of "Trustees to maintain the said press and newspaper in an "efficient condition, keeping up the liberal policy of the said "newspaper and devoting the surplus income of the said press "and newspaper, after defraying all current expenses, in "improving the said newspaper, and placing it on a footing of " permanency." By a deed of compromise, dated December 1, 1906, whereby certain litigation as to the validity of the will was brought to an end, it was agreed between the parties thereto that " in case the Tribune newspaper should cease to exist or "be impossible to exist " the property belonging to the Tribune Press should become the property of the Arts College Trust. Since the death of Sardar Dayal Singh in 1898 the trust in respect of the Tribune Press has been 02 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 241 ( 1938- 1939) Trustees of the Tribune Press v. Commnr. of Income-Tax 106 carried out, and the newspaper of that name has continued to be published. The profits of the Press and newspaper have been assessed to income-tax since 1918. The claim to exemption was first made by the appellants in respect of the year 1932-3—that is, in the proceedings out of which this appeal arises. of Income-Tax 106 carried out, and the newspaper of that name has continued to be published. The profits of the Press and newspaper have been assessed to income-tax since 1918. The claim to exemption was first made by the appellants in respect of the year 1932-3—that is, in the proceedings out of which this appeal arises. The claim was made for the first time before the Assistant Commissioner, and, on his rejecting the appellants contention, they applied to the Commissioner praying that on this point (and on another point which is not now in controversy) he would either accept their contentions or make a reference to the High Court. On January 20, 1934, the Commissioner referred to the High Court two questions framed in the following terms ;— " (1.) Is the income of the Tribune Trust liable to be assessed "in the hands of the Trustees under the provisions of the "Income-tax Act? "(2.) If so, is it not exempt under section 4 (3.) (i.) of the "Act?" Upon the second question, which alone need now be referred to, the Commissioner, having set out clauses 20 and 21 of the will, gave as his opinion " It will be very difficult "to say whether the running of a newspaper is an object of "general public utility, but the mere fact that income is used "for the improvement of the paper is not enough to take it out "of the category of a business concern.” The learned judges of the Division Bench, before whom the reference was first heard, were of different opinions, Jai Lal J. holding that the appellants income was exempt from tax, and Skemp J. holding that it was not. The question was referred to a Full Bench with the result that Young C.J. and Addison J. held that the income in question was not exempt, Tek Chand J. dissenting. From this decision (June 4, 1935) the present appeal to His Majesty was brought, and at the first hearing—on July 22 and 23, 1937—it was considered by the Board to be desirable that the powers conferred by sub-s. 4 of s. 66 of the Act should be employed to obtain further information. From this decision (June 4, 1935) the present appeal to His Majesty was brought, and at the first hearing—on July 22 and 23, 1937—it was considered by the Board to be desirable that the powers conferred by sub-s. 4 of s. 66 of the Act should be employed to obtain further information. Accordingly, by an Order in Council, dated July 29, 1937, it was directed in accordance with the advice tendered by the Board " (2.) that the case "ought to be remitted to the High Court of Judicature at "Lahore with a direction that the said High Court shall "refer the case back to the said Commissioner under Section 66 " (4.) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1932, first for the addition of such facts during the life-time of the testator Sardar "Dyal Singh as may bear upon the proper interpretation of "the expression keeping up the liberal policy of the said " newspaper in clause XXI. of the will of the said testator "dated the 15th day of June, 1895, and secondly, for the "addition of such facts as to a compromise dated the 1st day " of December, 1906, as may show whether the said compromise "is binding on all parties interested in the estate of the said "testator." There is now before their Lordships a supplementary statement made by the present Commissioner, Mr. K. C. Basak, who has carefully assembled considerable material explanatory of the direction given by the testator in the phrase V keeping up the liberal policy of the said newspaper,” and showing, as their Lordships think, very fairly, the nature and purpose of the trust. The first issue of the paper was dated February 2, 1881, and contained an article entitled " Our-"selves,” which was a statement of the papers aims and objects. Two years later (February 3, 1883), a further article of the same character was published headed " Our Second "Anniversary.” Extracts from issues of the paper between 1881 and 1898 have been selected by the Commissioner and by the appellants to throw light on the character and policy of the paper in the lifetime of its founder. Two years later (February 3, 1883), a further article of the same character was published headed " Our Second "Anniversary.” Extracts from issues of the paper between 1881 and 1898 have been selected by the Commissioner and by the appellants to throw light on the character and policy of the paper in the lifetime of its founder. The sole use which their Lordships are concerned to make of these materials is to arrive at a true construction of the trust, the testator having expressed his intentions by reference to a newspaper which had been published in his lifetime and to a policy the character and purpose of which must 02 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 241 ( 1938- 1939) Trustees of the Tribune Press v. Commnr. of Income-Tax 107 necessarily be collected from its previous issues. It is not necessary or relevant to inquire as to the manner in which the trust has been, or is being, carried out since the date of the testators death. The question is as to the true nature and character of the trust. No question here arises such as was dealt with in Brighton College v. Marriott ([ 1926] A. C. 192.), where it was held that the English Act, as it then stood, provided no exemption for profits of a trade carried on by a charity, even if the carrying on of the trade was the sole and only purpose of the charity. In the letter of reference there is no suggestion that the income under assessment is not derived from property held under the trust declared in the 20th and 21st paragraphs of the will. Their Lordships are not prepared to hold that the property referred to in these paragraphs of the will is held for the purpose of " education " in the sense of that word as it appears in s. 4 of the Act. Prima facie, therefore, the only question for decision is whether that property is held under trust wholly for the advancement of an object of general public utility. This was the view taken in the High Court by Tek Chand J., who contrasted the wide terms of the exempting clause in the Indian Income-tax Act with the observations of Lindley L. J. in In re Macduff. Macduff v. Macduff ([ 1896] 2 Ch. This was the view taken in the High Court by Tek Chand J., who contrasted the wide terms of the exempting clause in the Indian Income-tax Act with the observations of Lindley L. J. in In re Macduff. Macduff v. Macduff ([ 1896] 2 Ch. 451, 467.), where, after referring to a well known passage in Lord Macnaghtens speech in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel ([ 1891] A. C. 531, 583.), Lindley L.J. held that in English law there might be some purposes of general utility which might be charitable and some which might not, the true test being the spirit or intention of the statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. c. 4). Learned counsel for the respondent in the present case, while not apparently conceding that under the Indian statute the sole test to be applied to the object of a trust was that of general public utility, was willing that this should be assumed in the present case. He suggested that the question whether an object was of general public utility was a question of fact to be found and stated by the Commissioner, and not a question of law for the Court. Their Lordships, while unwilling to pronounce upon any matter which has not been argued before them, consider that the Courts in India might be misled if the Board appeared to cast doubt upon the viewthat the admissibility of a claim to exemption from income-tax must be determined by the language of the special provision made by the Act in that behalf. They are also of opinion that the question whether a particular object is of general public utility, like the question whether a particular trust is charitable, is a question of law, though doubtless it is for the Commissioner to find and state any facts bearing thereon. [Cf. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Temperance Council of the Christian Churches of England and Wales. (( 1926) 10 Tax Cas. 748, 772.)] In the present case the Commissioner properly stated it as a question of law under s. 66, and answered it as such—indeed, he put the point as being " whether the Trust can be deemed to be a charitable "trust ? (( 1926) 10 Tax Cas. 748, 772.)] In the present case the Commissioner properly stated it as a question of law under s. 66, and answered it as such—indeed, he put the point as being " whether the Trust can be deemed to be a charitable "trust ? " The importance of applying correct principles in such a matter is manifest by reason of the rule against perpetuity laid down as to wills in s. 114 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and as to transfers inter vivos by s. 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. As to the latter, by s. 18 exception is made for transfer of property " for the "benefit of the public in the advancement of religion, "knowledge, commerce, health, safety or any other object "beneficial to mankind." By a long course of judicial decisions following English authority an exemption for charitable trusts has been implied or read into s. 114 of the Succession Act, and by s. 118 restrictions are imposed upon bequests for " religious or charitable uses.” And s. 2 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, contains the same definition of charitable purpose as is given by the Income-tax Act, but with the addition of words excluding religious purposes. It was considered by Jai Lal and Tek Chand JJ. that on the question whether a particular object or purpose was of general public utility, the true test is not what the Court considers to be beneficial to the public, but what the testator considered to be so. In so holding they were following what was said by Chitty J. in In re Foveaux. Cross v. London Anti-Vivisection Society. ([ 1895] 2 Ch. 501.) That case was on this point dissented from by Russell J. in In re Hummeltenberg. Beatty v. London 02 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 241 ( 1938- 1939) Trustees of the Tribune Press v. Commnr. of Income-Tax 108 Spiritualistic Alliance, Ld. ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 237.), where it was held that though the personal or private opinion of the judge is immaterial, nevertheless for a charitable gift to be valid it must be shown (1.) that the gift will, or may be, operative for the public benefit, and (2.) that the trust is one the administration of which the Court itself could if necessary undertake and control ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 242.) "If a testator by stating or indicating his view that a trust is "beneficial to the public can establish that fact beyond "question, trusts might be established in perpetuity for the "promotion of all kinds of fantastic (though not unlawful) "objects." Their Lordships are in agreement with this view, and see nothing in the Indian Income-tax Act to discharge the Court of its responsibility in coming to a finding as to the character of the object of a trust—a matter which bears directly upon its validity. It is to be observed, moreover, that under the Income-tax Act the test of general public utility is applicable not only to trusts in the English sense, but is to be applied to property held under trust " or other " legal obligation "—a phrase which would include Moslem wakfs and Hindu endowments. The true approach to such questions, in cases which arise in countries to which English ideas—let alone English technicalities—may be inapplicable, was considered by the Board in Yeap Cheah Neo v. Ong Cheng Neo (( 1875) L. R. 6 P. C. 381.), and it was well said by Sir Raymond West in Fatima Bibi v. Advocate-General of Bombay (( 1881) I. L. R. 6 B. 42, 50.) " But useful and "beneficial in what sense? The Courts have to pronounce "whether any particular object of a bounty falls within the "definition ; but they must, in general, apply the standard of "customary law and common opinion amongst the community "to which the parties interested belong." In the High Court stress was laid by the learned Chief Justice and by Addison J. on the fact that the Tribune newspaper charges its readers and advertisers at ordinary commercial rates for the advantages which it affords. As against this the evidence or findings do not disclose that any profit was made by the newspaper or Press before 1918, and it is at least certain that neither was founded for private profit, whether to the testator or any other person. By the terms of the trust it is not to be carried on for profit to any individual. It cannot, in their Lordships opinion, be regarded as an element necessarily present in any purpose of general public utility that it should provide something for nothing, or for less than it costs, or for less than the ordinary price. By the terms of the trust it is not to be carried on for profit to any individual. It cannot, in their Lordships opinion, be regarded as an element necessarily present in any purpose of general public utility that it should provide something for nothing, or for less than it costs, or for less than the ordinary price. An eleemosynary element is not essential even in the strict English view of charitable uses Commissioners for Special Purposes v. University College of North Wales. (( 1909) 5 Tax Cas. 408, 414.) There seems to be no solid distinction to be taken under the phrase "general public utility" between a school founded by a testator, but charging fees to its pupils, and a paper founded by a testator and sold to its readers. The purpose of providing the poor or the community in general with some useful thing without price, or at a low price, may doubtless be in itself a purpose of general public utility. But, if another object be independently in itself of general public utility, the circum stance that the testators bounty was only in respect of the initial capital assets, or had only to meet a working loss temporarily and not permanently, will not, necessarily at least, alter the character of the object. The main objection now taken to the appellants claim for exemption is on the ground that the Tribune newspaper, as its founder intended it to be carried on, would contain matter in the nature of political propaganda, and would be devoted to the advocacy of particular legislative measures considered by its founder to be measures of reform. It is not suggested that the views or measures to be advocated were in any way unlawful, but, even so, the political character, it is said, prevents the trust from being held to be for an object of general public utility. Lord Parker said in Bowman v. Secular Society, Ld. It is not suggested that the views or measures to be advocated were in any way unlawful, but, even so, the political character, it is said, prevents the trust from being held to be for an object of general public utility. Lord Parker said in Bowman v. Secular Society, Ld. ([ 1917] A. C. 406, 442.) "A trust for the attainment of "political objects has always been held invalid, not because "it is illegal, for everyone is at liberty to advocate or promote "by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the "Court has no means of judging whether a proposed change "in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and "therefore cannot say that the gift to secure the 02 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 241 ( 1938- 1939) Trustees of the Tribune Press v. Commnr. of Income-Tax 109 change is a "charitable gift." And in In re Tetley. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, Ld. v. Tetley ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 258.), where the gift was for " patriotic " and charitable objects, Russell J. said ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 262.) " But must every "application of the fund for a patriotic purpose be beneficial "to the community and therefore charitable? It seems to "me that it is impossible to hold that. What is or is not "patriotic is in many cases mere matter of opinion. Sub-sidising a newspaper for the promotion of particular political "or fiscal opinions would be a patriotic purpose in the eyes "of those who considered that the triumph of those opinions "would be beneficial to the community. It would not be "an application of funds for a charitable purpose." Again, in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Temperance Council of the Christian Churches of England and Wales (( 1926) 10 Tax Cas. 748.), Rowlatt J., finding that the first purpose of the assessees was legislative temperance reform, though the work was to be of a strictly non-party character, observed (Ibid. 752.) " Any "purpose of influencing legislation is a political purpose in "this connection. Under these circumstances, this is mainly "a trust to secure a certain line of legislation, and if that is so, "I do not understand it to be disputed that that would "not be a charitable trust. 752.) " Any "purpose of influencing legislation is a political purpose in "this connection. Under these circumstances, this is mainly "a trust to secure a certain line of legislation, and if that is so, "I do not understand it to be disputed that that would "not be a charitable trust. I think the authorities are "clear upon it and I am not going to say anything more "about it." On the other hand, it is to be observed that in that case Rowlatt J. rejected, but only upon the facts, the argument that the purpose of the Council was temperance and that legislation came in a subsidiary way. And in In re Scowcroft. Ormrod v. Wilkinson ([ 1898] 2 Ch. 638.), the devise of a building known as the Conservative Club and Village Reading Room in a certain parish to be maintained " for the furtherance of "Conservative principles and religious and mental improvement, etc." was held to be a gift for religious and mental improvement. Stirling J. said ([ 1898] 2 Ch. 641.) " It is, therefore, a gift "in one form or another for religious and mental improvement, "no doubt in combination with the advancement of Conservative principles ; but that limitation, it appears to me, "is not sufficient to prevent it from being a perfectly good "charitable gift, as undoubtedly it would be if it were a gift "for the furtherance of religious and mental improvement "alone." In re Hood. Public Trustee v. Hood ([ 1931] 1 Ch. 240.), was a case where a testator had bequeathed his residuary estate for the purpose of spreading Christian principles and aiding all active steps to minimize and extinguish the drink traffic. On the view that the former was the dominant purpose and that the latter was subsidiary thereto, the gift was upheld even on the hypothesis that the latter purpose would not have been charitable in itself. In Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (( 1933) 17 Tax Cas. 508.), Finlay J. had to deal with a college founded in connection with the Conservative party, and, after reviewing the cases above cited, held that the question was whether the dominant purpose was a good charitable purpose or not (Ibid. In Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (( 1933) 17 Tax Cas. 508.), Finlay J. had to deal with a college founded in connection with the Conservative party, and, after reviewing the cases above cited, held that the question was whether the dominant purpose was a good charitable purpose or not (Ibid. 517.) "The fact that the education was entrusted to the Conservative "party would not, I think, affect the validity of the Trust if "in truth it was a trust for education ; but, on the other hand, "if the true view is that the Trust was a trust for the promotion of Conservative principles .... and that the "education, the lectures, and so forth, were subsidiary to that "which was the main and dominating purpose, then the fact "that the lectures, and so forth, would be educative would not "be sufficient to make the Trust a trust for charitable purposes "only.” Holding that the college was in effect an educational centre for the Conservative party, and that this was in accordance with the trust deed, the learned judge decided that the claim for exemption from tax could not be sustained. 02 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 241 ( 1938- 1939) Trustees of the Tribune Press v. Commnr. of Income-Tax 110 These English decisions are in point in so far only as they illustrate the manner in which political objects, in the wide sense which includes projects for legislation in the interests of particular causes, affect the question whether the Court can regard a trust as being one of general public utility. In the original letter of reference it was not suggested by the Commissioner that the newspaper was intended by its founder to be a mere vehicle of political propaganda, and in the case of Sardar Dayal Singh it seems unreasonable to doubt that his object was to benefit the people of Upper India by providing them with an English newspaper—the dissemination of news and the ventilation of opinion upon all matters of public interest. While not perhaps impossible, it is difficult for a newspaper to avoid having or acquiring a particular political complexion, unless, indeed, it avoids all reference to the activities of Governments or Legislatures, or treats of them in an eclectic or inconsistent manner. While not perhaps impossible, it is difficult for a newspaper to avoid having or acquiring a particular political complexion, unless, indeed, it avoids all reference to the activities of Governments or Legislatures, or treats of them in an eclectic or inconsistent manner. The circumstances of Upper India in the last decade of the nineteenth century would doubtless make any paper published for Indian readers sympathetic to various movements for social and political reform. But their Lordships, having before them material which shows the character of the newspaper as it was in fact conducted in the testators lifetime, have arrived at the conclusion that questions of politics and legislation were discussed only as many other matters were in this paper discussed, and that it is not made out that a political purpose was the dominant purpose of the trust. They think that the object of the paper may fairly be described as " the object of supplying the Province with an "organ of educated public opinion " and that it should prima facie be held to be an object of general public utility. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the time, the directions of the testator and the evidence as to the contents of the paper before 1898, their Lordships think that the present case is nearer on its facts to In re Scowcroft ([ 1898] 2 Ch. 638.) than it is to the case of the Bonar Law Memorial Trust (17 Tax Cas. 508.), or to the case put by Russell J. in In re Tetley ([ 1923] 1 Ch. 258.) of a newspaper subsidized for the promotion of particular political or fiscal opinions. They do not think that in these circumstances the case can be regarded as outside the ambit of the exemption clause of the Indian Act. It is not necessary to consider what the position would be if the trust declared by the will were for any reason to fail in the future. For the reasons given, their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should be allowed, and that the second of the two questions referred to the Court by the Commissioners letter of reference, dated January 26, 1934, should be answered in the affirmative. They will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondent will pay the appellants costs of the reference in the High Court and of this appeal.