Judgement Appeal (No. 86 of 1938) from a judgment and three decrees of the High Court (August 18, 1936), reversing a judgment and decree of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Chittagong (January 31, 1935). The suit out of which this appeal arose was brought by the appellants, Probodh Kumar Das and R. K. Roy & Co., Ld., against the respondents, Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., and others, seeking (inter alia) a declaration that the respondents had no right or title to the Kaiyacherra Tea Estate, which formerly belonged to the Kaiyacherra Tea Company, Ld., which had been compulsorily wound up. The estate was purchased at an auction sale by Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., of Calcutta, who, on October 10, 1931, by an interchange of letters of offer and acceptance agreed to sell the estate to one S. Roy, who paid the first instalment of the price and entered into possession No conveyance was ever in fact executed in pursuance of that contract of sale, but the present appellants claimed to have acquired at least in part the purchasers rights under it. The respondents, Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., claimed to be proprietors of the estate under (a) a duly registered deed of assignment in their favour by the partners of Gillanders, 32 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 293 ( 1938- 1939) Probodh Kumar Das V. Dantmara Tea Company 133 Arbuthnot & Co., dated June I, 1934, which narrated (inter alia) the failure of S. Roy to complete the contract of sale of October 10, 1931, and (b) a duly registered deed of sale, also dated June 1, 1934, by the Kaiyacherra Tea Company, Ld., and the liquidators of that company and by the partners of Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co. The question raised by the appeal was whether the appellants, notwithstanding that they had taken no steps to complete their title, were nevertheless entitled under s. 53A actively to assert the rights of a proprietor in virtue of the contract of October 10, 1931, and their possession. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge held that the appellants, as plaintiffs, could enforce the provisions of s. 53A, and he decided generally in favour of the plaintiffs. On appeal by the present respondents the High Court (Mitter and Ghose JJ.) held that s. 53A (Sect. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. The Subordinate Judge held that the appellants, as plaintiffs, could enforce the provisions of s. 53A, and he decided generally in favour of the plaintiffs. On appeal by the present respondents the High Court (Mitter and Ghose JJ.) held that s. 53A (Sect. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), as amended in 1929, provided that " Where any person contracts "to transfer for consideration any "immoveable property by writing " signed by him or on his behalf "from which the terms necessary "to constitute the transfer can be "ascertained with reasonable " certainty, "and the transferee has, in "part performance of the con-" tract, tak en possession of the "property or any part thereof, or "the transferee, being already in "possession, continues in possession in part performance of the "contract and has done some "act in furtherance of the contract, "and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform "his part of the contract, "then, notwithstanding that "the contract, though required "to be registered, has not been "registered, or, where there is an "instrument of transfer, that the "transfer has not been completed " in the manner prescribed therefor "by the law for the time being in "force, the transferor or any "person claiming under him shall "be debarred from enforcing "against the transferee and per-"sons claiming under him any "right in respect of the property "of which the transferee has tak en "or continued in possession, other "than a right expressly provided "by the terms of the contract "Provided that nothing in this "section shall affect the rights of "a transferee for consideration "who has no notice of the con-" tract or of the part performance "thereof.") of the Transfer of Property Act protected an aggrieved person only as a defendant, and did not assist him as a plaintiff, and that the present appellants could not enforce the provisions of the section. They dismissed the suit. Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. and Charles Bagram for the appellants. A. M Dunne K.C. and J. M. Pringle for the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld. 32 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 293 ( 1938- 1939) Probodh Kumar Das V. Dantmara Tea Company 134 L. P. E. Pugh K.C. and J. M. Pringle for the Chandranagar Tea Company, Ld. 1939. Oct. 10. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Macmillan. A. M Dunne K.C. and J. M. Pringle for the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld. 32 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 293 ( 1938- 1939) Probodh Kumar Das V. Dantmara Tea Company 134 L. P. E. Pugh K.C. and J. M. Pringle for the Chandranagar Tea Company, Ld. 1939. Oct. 10. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Macmillan. This appeal relates to a tea garden in the district of Chittagong, known as the Kaiyacherra Tea Estate, which at one time belonged to the Kaiyacherra Tea Company, Ld. The estate was mortgaged to Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., of Calcutta, who in 1930 obtained an order for the compulsory winding-up of the Tea Company. Thereafter the estate was put up to auction by the liquidators, and purchased by Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co. Without obtaining any conveyance in their favour Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., on October 10, 1931, by an interchange of letters of offer and acceptance agreed to sell the estate to one S. N. Roy, who paid the first instalment of the price and entered into possession. No conveyance was ever executed in pursuance of this contract of sale, but the plaintiffs in the present suit, now the appellants, claim to have acquired at least in part the purchasers rights under it. The estate has been the subject of a complicated series of transactions, which it is fortunately not necessary to detail for the purpose of deciding the only question argued before their Lordships. These transactions are fully set out in the judgments of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court, and account for the varied assortment of defendants to the suit. The first defendants and respondents, the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., to whom alone it is necessary to refer, claim on the other hand to be the proprietors of the estate under (1.) a duly registered deed of assignment in their favour by the partners of Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., dated June 1, 1934, which narrates (inter alia) the failure of S. N. Roy to complete the contract of sale of October 10, 1931, and (2.) a duly registered deed of sale, also dated June 1, 1934, by the Kaiyacherra Tea Company, Ld., and the liquidators of that company and by the partners of Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co. Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co. The position, accordingly, is that the plaintiffs have no title to the estate of which they are at least partly in possession, but rely on the contract of sale of October 10, 1931, while the defendants, the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., have a duly completed title to the estate, but are not in possession of it. The real bone of contention between the parties is the right to the export quota under the India Tea Control Act (XXIV. of 1933), which was passed (inter alia) to regulate the export of tea from India. By s. 3 of that Act an Indian Tea Licensing Committee was set up, and under other provisions of the Act it was entrusted with the task of determining the total quantity of tea, termed the " export " quota/ which the owner of each tea estate should be permitted to export, and of issuing export licences. These quota rights are assignable, and are of obvious value. The Licensing Committee in 1933-34 issued the export quota rights for the Kaiyacherra estate to the plaintiffs, or to them and S. N. Roy. In 1934-35 the Committee, having become aware that the title to the estate was in dispute, declined to issue any export quota rights in respect of it. Subsequent to the execution and registration of the conveyance of the estate to the defendants, the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., the Licensing Committee have recognized them as entitled to the export quota rights of the estate. Thus the plaintiffs have in part at least possession of the estate, but have no export quota rights, while the defendants, the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., hold the export quota rights of the estate, but have not possession of it. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiffs brought the present suit in which they seek to have it declared that the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., and others have no right or title to the estate, and are debarred from enforcing any right to the estate, including the right to sell tea under the export quota allotted to it, or to transfer the quota rights to any person. They also seek an injunction. The defendants challenged the right of the plaintiffs to bring the suit, and maintained that they had no 32 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. They also seek an injunction. The defendants challenged the right of the plaintiffs to bring the suit, and maintained that they had no 32 Law. Rep. 66 Ind. App. 293 ( 1938- 1939) Probodh Kumar Das V. Dantmara Tea Company 135 title to sue. The Subordinate Judge rejected this plea, and decided generally in favour of the plaintiffs, but on appeal the learned judges of the High Court were of opinion that the suit was not maintainable and dismissed it. It was conceded by the appellants at their Lordships bar that, apart from s. 53a, which was added by amendment in 1929 to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, they had no case. But they contended that, notwithstanding that they had not chosen to sue for specific performance of the contract of October 10, 1931, and notwithstanding that they had taken no steps to complete their title, they were nevertheless entitled under s. 53a actively to assert the rights of a proprietor in virtue of the contract of October 10, 1931, and their possession. The position of the law under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, before the addition to it of s. 53A has on more than one occasion been expounded by their Lordships, and reference may be made to Pir Bakhsh v. Mahomed Tahar (( 1934) L. R. 61 I. A. 388.), where the subject was fully discussed. It is clear that the appellants were well-advised in conceding that if they could not invoke s. 53a they were out of Court. In their Lordships opinion, the amendment of the law effected by the enactment of s. 53a conferred no right of action on a transferee in possession under an unregistered contract of sale. Their Lordships agree with the view expressed by Mitter J. in the High Court that " the right conferred by s. 53A "is a right available only to the defendant to protect his "possession." They note that this was also the view of their late distinguished colleague, Sir Dinshah Mulla, as stated in the second edition of his treatise on the Transfer of Property Act, at p. 262. The section is so framed as to impose a statutory bar on the transferor; it confers no active title on the transferee. Indeed, any other reading of it would make a serious inroad on the whole scheme of the Transfer of Property Act. The section is so framed as to impose a statutory bar on the transferor; it confers no active title on the transferee. Indeed, any other reading of it would make a serious inroad on the whole scheme of the Transfer of Property Act. It was suggested that by obtaining the export quota rights from the Licensing Committee the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., as persons claiming under the transferors, were enforcing a right in respect of the property against the appellants as persons claiming under the transferee, and could be enjoined at the appellants instance from so doing, but in their Lordships view there has been no enforcement within the meaning of the section of any right against the appellants. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed. Separate printed cases were presented on behalf of the respondents, the Dantmara Tea Company, Ld., and the respondents, the Chandranagar Tea Company, Ld., who claimed to have acquired an interest in the estate, and were separately represented at their Lordships bar, but the appellants will pay only one set of costs to the respondents.