JUDGMENT Bennett, J. - This is a defendant's appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Unao, on the 15th September, 1937, allowing an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Munsif, South Unao. 2. The suit was brought by one Hasan Khan for a declaration of title in certain property left by his father-in-law Abdul Ghani, this property consisting of four groves. The plaintiff based his case on a will executed by Abdul Ghani on the 16th April, 19o8. This will was registered. By it Abdul Ghani bequeathed a life interest to his widow, Mst Faizan, with no power of alienation, and with remainder on her death to their daughter, Mst. Aziman, and the latter's husband, the plaintiff Hasan Khan. 3. When this will was executed Abdul Ghani had, so for as appears from the record, only one other heir, namely, his sister Mst. Bashiran. 4. Abdul Ghani appears to have died not long after the execution of the will and his sister is said to have died within an hour of his death. Subsequently Mst. Aziman died. The widow, Mst. Faizan, was alive when the suit was instituted and consequently the plaintiff asked merely for a declaratory decree. Mst. Faizan died during the pendency of the suit and the plaint was then amended to ask for the consequential relief of possession also. 5. On the 2nd February, 1936, the widow Mst. Faizan executed a deed of gift in favour of some relative on her side of the family, namely, defendant No. 1, Faqir Mohammad Khan. The suit was brought against him, and Mst. Safilan, daughter of the plaintiff, was also impleaded. 6. The Munsif dismissed the suit. He held that a life interest could not be conferred under a will by a Sunni Mohammedan and that therefore Mst. Faizan obtained a complete title under the will, if she obtained anything at all. But he held that the will was invalid because the consent of other heirs had not been proved. On this view he concluded that the possession of Mst Faizan could not be referred to a lawful title. He dismissed the suit because if the will was held valid it must at the same time be held that Mst. But he held that the will was invalid because the consent of other heirs had not been proved. On this view he concluded that the possession of Mst Faizan could not be referred to a lawful title. He dismissed the suit because if the will was held valid it must at the same time be held that Mst. Faizan took the whole of the property under it and therefore the plaintiff took nothing : if it was held invalid, although Mst. Faizan had no power to execute the deed of gift in favour of defendant No. 1, the plaintiff could claim no title in the property on the basis of it 7. The lower appellate Court held that the will was valid and that under its terms Mst. Faizan was entitled only to a life interest and therefore had no power to execute the deed of gift The learned Civil Judge accordingly decreed the suit on the basis of the will by which the property was left to Mst Aziman and, her husband after the death of Mst. Faizan. 8. The first question which has been agitated in this Court is whether under Mohammedan Law it is permissible for a Mohammedan to execute a will leaving a life interest only to his widow with remainder to another heir or to a J stranger. 9. The lower appellate Court in support of the view taken by it that it was so permissible has referred to a number of authorities and In particular to Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan (1936) 2 OWN 83 : AIR 1926 Oudh 568 : 28 O.C 265; Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan (1989) 6 OWN 483 (P.C) : AIR 1929 P.C. 149 : 56 IA 213 and AIR 1931 177 (Oudh) . The first case cited was a case of the judicial Commissioner's Court and related to a gift and not to a will. There was a difference of opinion on the point between the two Additional Judicial Commissioners who decided the case, but the view of Wazir Hasan, A. J. C that a gift conferring a life estate by a husband on a wife was permissible has been since adopted by this Court. 10. There was an appeal in this case to the Privy Council. 10. There was an appeal in this case to the Privy Council. As I read the judgment their Lordships did not expressly concur in the view taken by Wazir Hasan, A. J. C, because it was in their opinion unnecessary to decide the point in that case. They merely concurred in the conclusion arrived at by Wazir Hasan, A. J. C. on the construction of the document then under consideration, namely that under it one Mst. Waziran acquired merely a life interest in the property together with a power of alienation over one-third of the property. 11. Referring to the argument that under the Mohammedan Law applicable to the case there could not be a transfer of any interest in property by way of gift inter vivos except an absolute interest, their Lordships said: In their Lordships' opinion it is not necessary to express any opinion on the last mentioned argument, because in view of the construction of the deed which their Lordships have adopted, the plaintiff-appellant is on the horns of a dilemma. If the interest acquired by Mst. Waziran was of a life estate only, and if such an interest can be acquired under the Mohammedan Law, by way of a gift, that interest came to an end on the death of Mst. Waziran, and the plaintiff claiming as her heir has no title to the property. On the other hand if, as argued on behalf of the plaintiff, under "the Hanafi Law such a limited interest as a life estate could not be transferred to Musammat Wazirari by way of gift inter vivos, then Mst. Waziran acquired no interest in the property under the deed of the 17th January, 1905 and the plaintiff claiming as her heir, can have no title to the property. 12. The last case cited above was a case of a will and not of a gift. Nanavutty J. appears to have taken the view that the question had been definitely settled by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case cited above. He observed: It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Amjaa Kkan v. Ashraf Khan that a Sunni Mohammadn could validly make a gift of a life estate together with a power to alienate a third part. 13. He observed: It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Amjaa Kkan v. Ashraf Khan that a Sunni Mohammadn could validly make a gift of a life estate together with a power to alienate a third part. 13. He proceeded to say that the view taken by Wazir Hasan, C. J. had found favour with their Lordships of the Privy Council, and it was now settled law that- A Sunni Mohammedan like a Shia Mohammedan could also create a life estate by the terms of his will if he be so minded. 14. Other authorities to which I have been referred in support of this view are Rasoolbibi Vs. Yusuf Ajam Piperdi, AIR 1933 Bom 324 and Mst. Subhanbi v. Mst. Umraabi AIR 1936 Nag. 113. In the first case (at page 777) reference was made to the case of Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan by the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court. He observed that the Judge from whose decision the appeal before him was being heard was of opinion that a life interest was void under the Mohammedan law, but he did not agree with that opinion. He also observed that the principle propounded in the Privy Council case of Antjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan was in his opinion as much applicable to a will as to a deed inter vivos. In the Nagpur case it was held by a Bench that a life interest is not unknown to Mohammedan Law and that a bequest of property to A for his life and after his death to B confers, a life estate only upon A. 15. Learned Counsel for the appellant has referred me to a case of the Allahabad High Court, Babu Lal v. Ghanskam Das AIR 1928 All. 205, in which the Allahabad High Court held that a provision in a gift that the done shall have no right of transfer is void under the Mohammedan Law and the done takes an absolute estate. But there is no reason why I should not follow the previous ruling of this Court, supported as it is by the Bombay and Nagpur Courts. 16. But there is no reason why I should not follow the previous ruling of this Court, supported as it is by the Bombay and Nagpur Courts. 16. The next question for consideration is whether the will, by which the whole property was left after the death of the widow to the daughter and her husband jointly, is valid, having regard to the provisions of Mohammedan Law that a bequest to an heir is invalid unless the other heirs consent to the bequest after the death of the testator, and that a bequest of more than one third of the property to a non-heir is void without the consent of the heirs. 17. As I have mentioned there is nothing in this case which suggests that there were any other heirs except those members of the family already referred to. The lower appellate Court relied on the case of Daulat Ram Khushal Chand v. Abdul Kayum Nuruddin (1902) 26 Bom. 497. In this case it was held by the Bombay High Court that: Were a Mohammedan, by his will bequeaths more than one third of his whole property to a stranger the consent of his heirs to such bequest need not be express: it may be signified by conduct. 18. As the will was registered it may be presumed that all the parties concerned had knowledge of it, though this has been disputed by learned Counsel for the appellant, and the conduct of the widow and daughter would appear to indicate consent to it. The main difficulty relates to the sister Mst. Bashiran, who died very shortly after her brother Abdul Ghani. It is not shown that she Left any heirs, but if she did-as has been suggested by the learned Counsel for the appellant-then their consent may be presumed as the bequest was not challenged by any of them during the long period that elapsed between the death of Abdul Ghani and the institution of the suit. The Additional Civil Judge also observed that as none of the parties to the suit is claiming as an heir of Abdul Ghaai's sister therefore none of them is entitled to challenge the will on the ground that the will excluded her. The Additional Civil Judge also observed that as none of the parties to the suit is claiming as an heir of Abdul Ghaai's sister therefore none of them is entitled to challenge the will on the ground that the will excluded her. He thought that the fact that the sister was alive for about an hour after the testator's death was immaterial when none of the parties to the suit claimed through her, and, it not being proved or even expressly alleged that she left any heirs, the only persons who could challenge the will on this ground were the two legatees under it. I agree. 19. I can find no reason to dissent from the view taken by the lower appellate Court that the will of Abdul Ghani is valid and effective in favour of Mst. Aziman and the plaintiff and that his wife Mst. Aziman being dead, the plaintiff is entitled to the property, the deed of gift executed by Mst. Faizan being invalid. 20. I accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.