JUDGMENT Zia-ul-Hasan and Bennett, JJ. - This case has been referred to a Bench u/s 14 (2) of the Oudh Courts Act. 2. The case arises out of an application u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act for redemption of a mortgage executed in the year 1866. The Defence was that the mortgage of that year had been extinguished in the year 186.9 on the sale of the property mortgaged by the mortgagor to the mortgagee and that the mortgagee and his successors had been in possession of the property since the sale as proprietors. 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit on its findings on the first and the fourth issues, which were : (1) Whether the plaintiff retains the rights of the mortgagor? If so, is he entitled to redeem the property? (4) Whether the defendants have acquired the proprietary rights of the share in dispute by adverse possession? 4. It appears that on the 25th November, 1869, an agreement was executed between the mortgagor and the mortgagee for sale of the property. This agreement was registered. On the same date a sale deed by which the agreement was put into effect was executed but this sale deed was not registered as it could not have been validly registered at the registration office where the agreement was registered. 5. The trial Court held that the unregistered sale deed was invalid and inadmissible in evidence and no title could pass by it to the vendee. A mutation order in favour of the vendee had however, been passed in 1871 giving effect to it, and subsequent mutation orders had been passed in favour of the mortgagee's descendants, showing that they have throughout since 1871 been recorded as proprietors of the property. Since then the names of the mortgagor and his descendants have not appeared as mortgagors. The trial Court concluded that the mortgage-deed had been extinguished and that the character of possession from the date of the execution of the sale deed and the registered agreement had changed and become adverse to the mortgagor. 6. Since then the names of the mortgagor and his descendants have not appeared as mortgagors. The trial Court concluded that the mortgage-deed had been extinguished and that the character of possession from the date of the execution of the sale deed and the registered agreement had changed and become adverse to the mortgagor. 6. The District Judge in appeal upheld the judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit He considered the effect of the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, it being contended before him that in view of this proviso neither the sale deed nor the agreement could be produced in evidence for any such purpose as, was contemplated in the case. Under the proviso an unregistered document affecting immoveable property and required by the Registration Act of the Transfer of Property Act to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance, 6r as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. The District Judge thought that the agreement could be used as evidence to indicate the changed nature of the possession enjoyed by the transferee. It was presumably argued before him, as it was argued before us, that although the agreement was registered, yet for the purpose of affecting title to immoveable property it must be considered as unregistered, since it was not registered at the registration Office where it was necessary to register the sale deed. The District judge appears to have accepted this argument as he considered the effect of the agreement on the assumption that it was not registered. In this we think that he was right. 7. Against this appellate judgment an application in revision u/s 115 of the CPC was made in this Court and after hearing Counsel for the applicant a learned Judge of this Court referred the case to a Bench. 8. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite-party that no application u/s US of the CPC lies, because no question of jurisdiction enters into the matter and there has been no illegality or irregularity committed. We are inclined to agree. 9. 8. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite-party that no application u/s US of the CPC lies, because no question of jurisdiction enters into the matter and there has been no illegality or irregularity committed. We are inclined to agree. 9. We have, however, heard learned Counsel for the applicant on the merits as the case was referred to a Bench on the merits. He has contended that section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable because it would not apply retrospectively to documents executed before the 1st April, 193o, and because no act was, he argues, done by the transferee in - furtherance of the contract. On this last point we consider that the payment of consideration and the steps taken to effect mutation constitute acts in furtherance of the contract. As regards the question whether section 53-A has retrospective effect there has been some conflict of opinion between the High Courts. It was held by this Court in Rantji Lal v. The Secretary of State for India in Council 1936 OWN 514 : AIR 193 Oud 306 that it was not intended that retrospective effect, should be given to this section. Learned Counsel for the opposite party referred us to a later Full Bench ruling of this Court and argued that this ruling tends to throw doubt on the earlier ruling. In this case, Kundan Lal v. Faqir Bakhsh 1938 OWN 401 : AIR 1938 Oud 127, it was held that the provisions of the amended Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act have retrospective effect, except in regard to acts done before the 1st April, 193o, in any proceeding pending in any Court on that date. The earlier ruling was referred to in the later case and one of the judgments in this later case lends some support to the suggestion that it is still a matter of doubt whether Section S3-A has retrospective effect. 10. If Section 53-A is applicable, there can in our opinion be no doubt that the decision of the lower Courts was right, but even if it be considered not applicable we see no reason to dissent from the view taken by the lower Courts. 10. If Section 53-A is applicable, there can in our opinion be no doubt that the decision of the lower Courts was right, but even if it be considered not applicable we see no reason to dissent from the view taken by the lower Courts. In a case decided by the late Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, Bijai Partab Singh v. Raghuraj Singh (1922) 25 OC 116 : AIR 1922 Oud 7, it was held that though an unregistered compromise deed could not confer rights in immoveable property in view of the provisions of Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, yet the effect of the compromise was that both parties, the mortgagor as well as the mortgagee, treated the mortgagee rights as having come to an end and the mortgagee as holding under-proprietary rights. 11. In load Ali v. Dwarka AIR 1926 Oudh 145, this Court held that an agreement to relinquish the equity of redemption in favour of the mortgagee, though not binding, if not properly evidenced by document, will start adverse possession against the mortgagors; and in another case of this Court, Ram Udit Upadhiya v. Bhagwati Prashad AIR 1926 Oud 590, it was held that a purchaser taking possession under an invalid sale deed and holding it for more than 12 years can acquire title by prescription, and the sale deed, though invalid, can be referred to in order to determine the nature of his possession. 12. In our opinion there is sufficient evidence in the present case, apart from the sale deed and agreement, to show that the nature of the transferee's possession had changed from that of a | mortgagee to that of a vendee, and we consider, therefore, that the dismissal of the application u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, was justified. 13. We accordingly dismiss this revision application with costs.