JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is an application u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by one Shiva Charan Lal plaintiff. 2. The circumstances out of which this application has arisen are that the applicant on the re-opening of the Civil Courts on the 10th July, 1939, filed a plaint in the Court of the Judge of Small Causes in Lucknow, founded on a promissory note dated the 6th July, 1936. Limitation for this suit expired on the 6th July, 1939, and the plaint had to be filed on the opening day. On that date the applicant filed his plaint affixing to it only a court-fee stamp of 12 annas and stated as follows: Is waqt court-fees maujud nahin hain is wajah se barah anna ka ticket lagakar dakhil kiya jata hai." He goes on to say that he will file the remaining court-fee within one week. The order of the Court shows that the ordinary office entry was made, "Register" but the other words in this routine stamped order, namely "and issue summonses" were scored out and the Court passed the following order: No reason shown why extension of times for court-fee should be made. Rejected as insufficiently stamped. 3. It is quite clear that the learned Judge of the Small Cause Court interpreted the statement in the plaint "is waqt court-fees maujud nahin hain" as meaning that the plaintiff was not in possession of the necessary amount of court-fees and was therefore asking for time to make good the deficiency, but without stating any reason for his failure to stamp his plaint with the full amount of court-fees. 4. On the present application two points are raised. First it is said that the real fact of the matter was that owing to a rush of cases the stamp vendors' stock of court-fee stamps had been exhausted. The second point urged is that as a matter of law the learned Judge was bound to give the plaintiff time to make good the deficiency, and unless and until he did so, he was not entitled to reject the plaint. 5. As regards the first point an affidavit is now filed to the effect that the stock of court-fee stamps had run out. 5. As regards the first point an affidavit is now filed to the effect that the stock of court-fee stamps had run out. It may be that that is a fact but that is not the reason which the applicant gave for failure to stamp his plaint sufficiently and in my opinion so far as the merits of the order go, the "Judge of the Small Cause Court was fully entitled to say that as no reason was given for extension of time there was no reason for him to grant such an extension. 6. As regards the second point learned Counsel points first of all to Section 6 (2) of the Court Fees Act as amended up to 1938. That clause or sub-section provides that 'Notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-section (1), a Court may receive a plaint or memorandum of appeal in respect of which an insufficient fee has been paid, but no such plaint, or memorandum of appeal shall be acted upon unless the plaintiff or the appellant as the case may be, makes good the deficiency in court-fee within such time as may from time to time be fixed by the Court." 7. There is no dispute that a Court has a discretion to grant extensions of time for the making good of a deficiency in court-fee. 8. Learned Counsel goes on to refer to the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VII deals entirely with the filing of plaints in suits and an examination of that order indicates that on the filing of a plaint, a Court having registered the plaint, may either under Order VII Rule 10 return it for presentation to the proper Court or under Rule 11 reject it, or if it does not reject, proceed to act upon it, that is to say may admit it, in which case the provisions of rule 9 come into effect. 9. The order "register", as it seems to me, does not in any sense amount to an order of admission necessitating that the Court should give time to make good any deficiency. 9. The order "register", as it seems to me, does not in any sense amount to an order of admission necessitating that the Court should give time to make good any deficiency. The question is whether Clause (c) of Rule 11 makes it incumbent on a Court to grant time for making good any deficiency in court-fee stamp or only prescribes rejection where a plaint is insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff after having been given time (that is assuming that the Court was prepared to give time) has failed to make good the deficiency. There can be no doubt that the provision in the Code which really enables a Court to grant time making good a deficiency in court-fee stamp on the plaint is not Rule 11 of Order VII but Section 149. That section provides: Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any time, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. 10. It is clear that this section gives the Court a discretion either to grant time or to refuse to grant time according to the circumstances of the case. Where the Court thinks that the failure is bonafide and not due to negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it will doubtless make an order u/s 149 granting time; where, however, the application to the Court to grant time shows no reason for the grant of time but merely states that the applicant has not got the amount of court-fees necessary without offering any explanation, the Court would naturally refuse to make an order granting time. 11. Learned Counsel has referred to several cases on which he relies for the proposition that Order VII Rule 11 (c) is in a sense mandatory and compels a Court to grant time. 11. Learned Counsel has referred to several cases on which he relies for the proposition that Order VII Rule 11 (c) is in a sense mandatory and compels a Court to grant time. In AIR 1927 507 (Oudh) it was held that Courts and rules of procedure regulating their conduct are intended for facilitating justice and not for impeding it, and that the refusal to take the deficit court-fee on the ground of one day's delay in producing it was an abuse of the powers of the Court. That was, however, rather a peculiar case in which the Court had held that instead of a court-fee of Rs. 10 the plaintiff must pay a court-fee of Rs. 435 and gave time for the payment of that amount. On the last day the plaint-tiff produced Rs. 200 and was ready to pay it, but asked for more time for the balance. The application and the offer of Rs. 200 was rejected and the case ordered to be put up on the following day. On that day the plaintiff came forward with the whole amount of the deficiency but the Court refused to accept it and rejected the plaint. It is obvious there is not much in common between that case and the present one. 12. In AIR 1930 104 (Oudh) it was held that a Court which decides that a court-fee paid is insufficient ought to allow the party reasonable time within which the deficiency can be made up. The suit or appeal should not be dismissed without such opportunity being given. The principles laid down in that case again are not applicable to the present case. 13. In Muhammad Shaft Muhammad Aybu v. Delhi House of Multan AIR 1988 Lah. 274 the circumstances were that on the date for filing a suit there were a number of suits of the same kind (more or Jess the same situation that we have here) and the supply of court-fee stamps with the stamp vendors was exhausted. The Court directed the stamps to be paid the following day but thereafter the plaintiff fell ill and the suit was dismissed for default seven days after it was originally filed. The Court directed the stamps to be paid the following day but thereafter the plaintiff fell ill and the suit was dismissed for default seven days after it was originally filed. It was held that there was sufficient cause for the plaintiff not paying the court-fee on the plaint on the original day and that the Court was fully justified under the circumstances in allowing the plaintiff to pay such fee before the time ultimately fixed by it, and the court-fee having been so paid the plaint must be deemed' to have been presented on the original date. It does not stem to me that this case is very helpful. 14. Learned Counsel for the opposite-party has referred to a Full Bench case of the Lahore High Court, AIR 1938 361 (Lahore) in which it was held that- it is not incumbent upon a Court of Justice to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to make good the deficiency under Order VII Rule 11. Order VII Rule 11 is not an enabling provision and has nothing to do with the power of a Court to have the deficiency made up. It is on the other hand a disabling provision, enjoining the Court to reject a plaint if deficiency is not made good as ordered by the Court. The authority to issue the order lies in Section 149 and the penalty for default in Rule 11 of Order VII. Whether the Court condones a mala fide mistake and grants time or it does not condone bona fide one and does not grant, time, the wording of Section 149 does not stand in its way. 15. It was further held that- the discretion conferred on the Court by Section 149 is normally expected to be exercised in favour of the litigant except in cases of contumacy or positive mala fides or reasons of a similar kind. The question of bona fides in this connection should be construed in the sense that the word is used in the General Clauses Act and not as used in the Limitation Act. 16. The question of bona fides in this connection should be construed in the sense that the word is used in the General Clauses Act and not as used in the Limitation Act. 16. In the body of the judgment this last remark is amplified and it is stated that a thing should be presumed to be done bona fide if it is done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not, for the purposes of judging whether this discretion u/s 149 should or should not be exercised in favour of the litigant. 17. It seems to me, with great respect, that there can be no doubt of the correctness of the view expressed in this ruling, and that there is no doubt that Order VII Rule II does not enforce upon a Court the giving of time to make good a deficiency in court-fee stamp. The Court has a discretion u/s 149 which it may or may not exercise, subject to the proviso that it shall decide the question in a judicial manner. It would be hard to say that in the present case the Court failed to exercise its discretion in a judicial manner, and on the merits I am in no way prepared to say that the order of the learned Judge of the Small Cause Court is a wrong order. On the other hand in the circumstances of the case as they are said to be and even in the circumstances of the case as they appear from the statement in the plaint I think the learned Judge might well have called upon the plaintiff at least to explain why he was failing to pay the whole of the court-fee along with the filing of the plaint. In consideration of this fact only and because I think it is rather a hard case, I set aside the order of the learned Judge and direct that the record should be returned to him with a direction to consider the application for the grant of time for making good the deficiency on its merits. As this application has been necessitated by the fault of the applicant himself I direct that whatever costs may have been incurred by the opposite-party to this application shall be borne by the applicant.