JUDGMENT Yorke and Bennett, JJ. - This is an execution of decree appeal against an order of the learned Civil Judge of Partabgarh, dated the 22nd October, 1937, allowing an Application of the decree-holder-respondent for bringing on the record in execution proceedings the appellant Ram Kirpal in place of his father, Ram Sukh, deceased. 2. The circumstances giving rise to the respondent's application are as follows : One Behari Lal obtained a decree against the Raja of Kaithaula and to satisfy that decree Ram Sukh executed a promissory note for Rs. 3,350 in favour of Behari Lal. Ram Sukh was a member of a joint Hindu family. His father, Ram Narain, was alive when Ram Sukh incurred this liability and he is still living. Admittedly the liability was incurred by Ram Sukh as a personal liability and not as manager of the joint Hindu family. It is conceded that he never was manager of the family. 3. Behari Lal obtained a decree against Ram Sukh on the basis of the promissory note and Ram Sukh satisfied this decree by borrowing the amount required from the respondent Lala Bhurumal, on another promissory note. Lala Bhurumal then obtained a decree on foot of it against Ram Sukh. 4. On Ram Sukh's death the respondent sought to execute the decree against Ram Sukh's son, the present appellant, Ram Kirpal. It was prayed in the application that as the original judgment-debtor, Ram Sukh, had died some one and a half years ago, and his son, Ram Kirpal, was in possession of his entire assets and there was no other heir, Ram Kirpal might be appointed representative of the judgment-debtor under Order 21, Rule 22, of the CPC and the property in his possession be attached and put to sale. This application was opposed by Ram Kirpal. He pointed out in his objection that his grandfather, Ram Narain, who was still alive, was the manager and head of the family, and he contended that on the death of Ram Sukh he and Ram Narain became owners of the entire property as survivors. He was not in possession of any property as the heir or representative of Ram Sukh, but was in possession on the strength of his own title. 5. In additional objections by the appellant it was alleged that Ram Sukh was of extravagant habits and that the debt was fictitious and without consideration. He was not in possession of any property as the heir or representative of Ram Sukh, but was in possession on the strength of his own title. 5. In additional objections by the appellant it was alleged that Ram Sukh was of extravagant habits and that the debt was fictitious and without consideration. 6. It may be mentioned here that there is a third member of this joint family, namely, Ram Sunder, a nephew of Ram Narain. He is referred to in the application of the respondent. 7. The learned Civil Judge after stating the history of the debt observed that it was evident that the debt was not immoral and that as the decretal amount had been borrowed to pay off another decree it had become an antecedent debt. He added that a son is bound to pay off his father's debts if not immoral, and the fact that the father was not the manager or that there were others who were members of the family does not affect this liability., Consequently, the son's share in the joint family property was liable to discharge this debt and could be taken in execution by the decree-holder. He accordingly allowed the application. 8. Against this order it has been contended first of all that Ram Kirpal cannot be held liable for the debt because it was due for a promise made without consideration, reference being made to Section 298 of Mulla's Hindu Law (9th Edn.). The learned Counsel could not, however, refer us to any authority which would show that a son could not be held liable for a decree passed against his father on the basis of a promissory note executed for the purpose stated, and we do not consider that on the facts it can be said that the debt was due for a promise made without consideration such as would relieve the son of his liability. 9. But the principal contention put forward on behalf of the appellant was that a son is not liable to pay his father's debts when he has succeeded on his father's death by survivorship along with other co-parceners. 10. We were referred by Counsel to a number of rulings bearing on the question of a son's liability for his father's debts. But the principal contention put forward on behalf of the appellant was that a son is not liable to pay his father's debts when he has succeeded on his father's death by survivorship along with other co-parceners. 10. We were referred by Counsel to a number of rulings bearing on the question of a son's liability for his father's debts. In earlier cases the Allahabad High Court held that the pious duty of sons to discharge their father's debts is confined to property received from the father and that it cannot be held that the sons have received such property from their father in cases of succession by survivorship where there are other co-parceners. The cases to which we were referred in support of this view were : Binda Prasad v. Raj Ballabh Sahai (1925) 48 All. 245 : AIR 1925. All. 220 and Official Liquidator, U.P. Oil Mills Company, Ltd. v. Jamna Prasad (1933) 55 All 417 : 1933 I AWR 587. 11. Learned Counsel conceded, however, that in a later ruling a different view was taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, namely in Chhotey Lal v. Ganpat Rai (1933) 57 All 176 : 1934 III AWR 785. The head note of this case reads: The pious obligation of a Hindu son to pay his 'father's debts is not affected by the fact that the joint family also comprises members other than the father and his sons and the sons' liability based on the pious obligation does not become unenforceable against the joint family property if there happen to be co-parceners other than the sons and their descendants, like uncles, cousins, etc. The liability can be enforced by attachment and sale of the sons' undivided share in the joint family property and the purchaser becomes entitled to obtain ascertainment and partition of that share. 12. The liability can be enforced by attachment and sale of the sons' undivided share in the joint family property and the purchaser becomes entitled to obtain ascertainment and partition of that share. 12. It was held by this Court also in Malak Chand v. Hira Lal 1935 O.W.N. 1005 : AIR 1935 Oudh 510 that where the father in a joint Hindu family stands surety for payment of a debt, and a decree against the principal debtor is executed against him, bur he dies during the pendency of the execution, it is open to the decree-holder to enforce the personal obligation incurred by the surety against his sons by attachment and sale of their undivided share, in the joint family property, although the family consists of other members besides the sons. 13. Learned Counsel then argued that, admitting the sons' liability, that liability would extend only to the assets derived by them from their father's share in the joint family property. In the present case Ram Sukh had a quarter share in the joint family property. There being two other co parceners, namely, the grandfather, Ram Narain, and the nephew, Ram Sunder, in addition to the son, Ram Kirpal, the darter's inability would be only one-third of Ram Sukh's quarter share, that is to say one-twelfth in the whole joint family property. Reliance was placed for this contention on Section 288 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law where it is said that it is settled law that the heir of a deceased Hindu is liable to pay the debts of the deceased only to the extent of the assets inherited by him from the deceased, and that the heir is not personally liable to pay the debts of the deceased, even if he be a son or grandson. But this statement is made in connection with the liability of separate property for debts, and not in connection with the liability of the undivided interest of a co-parcener for the debts of a deceased co-parcener. But this statement is made in connection with the liability of separate property for debts, and not in connection with the liability of the undivided interest of a co-parcener for the debts of a deceased co-parcener. In Section 290 it is said that where the sons are joint with their father, and debts have been contracted by the father for his own personal benefit, the sons are liable to pay the debts provided they were not incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose, and that the liability exists irrespective of the fact whether the joint family includes persons other than the father and son. Further on it is stated that the liability is limited to the interest of the son in the joint family property. This was laid down by the Lahore High Court in Devi Das v. Jada Ram (1933) 15 Lah 50 : AIR 1933 Lah. 887. 14. It may now also be considered settled law that the sons are liable for their father's debts in their father's lifetime when no property of their father has been obtained by them. In AIR 1934 1 (Oudh) it was held by this Court that when a joint Hindu father governed by the. Mitakshara law is adjudicated an insolvent, his joint sons' shares do not vest in the receiver and it is open to the receiver in insolvency to seize a son's share and sell it in order to satisfy the debt payable by the father when the debt payable by the father is one which it is the pious duty of the son to pay. 15. It is clear, therefore, that the liability of a son is not limited to the accretion to the family property which he receives by survivorship on his father's death; it extends to the whole of his share in the joint family property, including that portion of it to which he was entitled before his father's death. A creditor is not Following in such cases the assets of the father in the hands of the several surviving members of the joint Hindu family; he is executing his decree against the son's share in the joint family property, the son being under a pious obligation to discharge the debt therefrom. 16. A creditor is not Following in such cases the assets of the father in the hands of the several surviving members of the joint Hindu family; he is executing his decree against the son's share in the joint family property, the son being under a pious obligation to discharge the debt therefrom. 16. For these reasons we are clearly of opinion that the view taken by the lower Court was correct and we accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.