JUDGMENT Zia-ul-Hasan and Yorke, JJ. - This is a miscellaneous appeal u/s 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act from the decision' of two issues framed in a creditors' claim case u/s 14 of the Act. 2. The creditors based their claim on two mortgage deeds, one for Rs. 40,000 and one for 12,000 dated respectively 18th August, 1927,. and 23rd August, 1928. The' debtors pleaded that the written statement of the creditors was not filed within the period of limitation prescribed by the Act, having been filed 10 days before the publication of notice in the Government Gazette. He further pleaded that the consideration of the first mortgage was fictitious to the extent of Rs. 1,700 odd, and that the mortgagees did not pay Rs. 1,510 which had been left with them for payment to a creditor, one Narain. In reply it was contended that in view of the provisions of Section 15 as the mortgage debt was a decretal debt, that decretal debt could not be re-opened save in so far as is allowed under the provisions of Section 15 of the Encumbered Estates Act. 3. The learned Special Judge framed five issues : 1. Whether the deed of mortgage dated the 18th August, 1927, is fictitious for a sum of Rs. 1,704-7-6? 2. Did the claimants pay Rs. 1,510 which was left for payment with him to Narain? 3. Are the points covered by issues Nos. 1 and 2 not to be re-opened as urged by the claimants? 4. To what amount are the claimants entitled? 5. (a) Did the claimants file their claim within time as required by law? 6. If not is the claim to be deemed as discharged u/s lit of the Encumbered Estates Act as alleged? 4. On issue 3 the learned Special Judge decided that the findings of the Court which tried the mortgage suit and gave the present creditors respondents a decree could not be re-opened with reference to the points raised in issues 1 and 2. On issue 5 he held that there was nothing in the I Act to show that the claims filed before the publication of the notice in the Gazette were not to be entertained as being barred by limitation. Hence he held that the claim was within limitation and that accordingly the question raised by issue 5 (b) did not require any decision. 5. Hence he held that the claim was within limitation and that accordingly the question raised by issue 5 (b) did not require any decision. 5. A preliminary point has been raised in this appeal whether the court fee paid is sufficient, it being contended that as the appellants seek to get a decision that the whole claim is barred by limitation, they are seeking in effect to get rid of the whole claim which is For Rs. 82,000 odd and must therefore pay court-fee ad valorem. "We are of opinion that the present appeal "being an appeal against a decision only, Sails within the scope of Article 11 of Schedule II and that the court-fee paid is sufficient. 6. Coming next to the question of limitation and the interpretation of Section 9 (1) of the Encumbered Estates Act some dates must first be given. The landlord debtors filed their application under the "Encumbered Estates Act on the-6th January, 1936, and showed therein the two mortgages to which reference has been made above and the decree on foot of those mortgages. On the 15th July, 1936, they filed their written statement "under Section 8 in the Court of the Special Judge. An order was made for issue of notices u/s 9 of the Act and 11th November was fixed as the next date of hearing, it being naturally presumed that publication of the notice in the Gazette would have been made by that date. Notices were issued to creditors under the provisions of Section 9 (2) by publication in three newspapers That publication took place on the 26th July, 28th July and 30th October, 1936, and it instructed the creditors to file their written statements of claim within three months of the publication of the notice in the Gazette, that is the Government Gazette. The same notice showed that the 11th November was fixed for the next hearing in the case. It was in these circumstances that on the date fixed for the hearing, that is the 11th November, 1936, the creditors-respondents filed their written statement. The contention put forward in the Court of the Special Judge and now urged before us is that this written statement having been filed prematurely, is barred by limitation. 7. It was in these circumstances that on the date fixed for the hearing, that is the 11th November, 1936, the creditors-respondents filed their written statement. The contention put forward in the Court of the Special Judge and now urged before us is that this written statement having been filed prematurely, is barred by limitation. 7. Section 9 (1) of the Encumbered Estates Act as at that time framed, provided- The Special Judge shall publish in the Gazette a notice in English, Urdu and Hindi calling upon all persons having claims |n respect of private debts both decreed and un-decreed against the person or the property of -the landlord by or on whose behalf the application has been make u/s 4, to present to the Special Judge within three months from the date of the publication of the notice a written statement of their claims. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellants debtors applicants under the Act has contended keenly before us that the only possible interpretation of the words to present within three months from the date of the publication of the notice a written statement" is that it requires the creditor to file his statement within three months subsequent to the date of the publication of the notice. If one had to interpret the words "within three months from the date of the publication of the notice" standing entirely by themselves, it is obvious that they would imply a date which falls not later than three months after the date of the said publication. Learned Counsel has referred us to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary for the meaning of the word "from" which is defined there as being much akin to "after"; We feel no doubt on that particular point. 9. He has also referred to a. case of the Madras High Court, in re Court Fees AIR 1024 Mad. 367 for the interpretation of the word "from" where it was held that the words "from a named date" means on and after that date, but we are inclined to think that although no question arises about that interpretation the case itself is not strictly applicable to the question which we have to decide, and that question has to be decided in the light of the object and intention of the provision in Section 9 (1). Section 9 (1) speaking generally provides a period of three months from the date of the publication of the notice as the first period of limitation for the filing of a written statement by a creditor. Section 9 (3) makes a provision for a further period of limitation. As it stood before the recent amendment it ran as follows: The written statement must be presented within the period specified in the notice, unless the claimant satisfies the Special Judge that he had sufficient cause for hot presenting it within such period, in which case the especial Judge may receive the statement if presented within a further period of two months. 10. It seems to us that these two sub-sections enact provisions fixing the latest date for the riling by the creditors of written statements of their claims, and that it cannot be said that a written statement which was filed a few days before the beginning of the date from which the calculation of the last date of limitation was to be made is liable to be treated as not filed within the period of limitation. The phrase "within three months from" in Section 9 (1) thus seems to us really only to prescribe the date of publication of the notice as the date by reference to which 'the last day of limitation is to be calculated and not as prescribing a kind of compartment of time and enacting that any written statement in order to be presented within time must be presented between the first and the last days of that compartment of time. 11. The only ground on which the view put forward by learned Counsel for the appellants could be supported would be that by filing the written statement before the date of the publication of the notice in the Gazette the creditor was to be regarded as filing a plaint before the cause of action had accrued. 11. The only ground on which the view put forward by learned Counsel for the appellants could be supported would be that by filing the written statement before the date of the publication of the notice in the Gazette the creditor was to be regarded as filing a plaint before the cause of action had accrued. -In the circumstances of the present, and indeed of all similar applications where the written statement of the creditor is filed long after the filing of the written statement by the landlord debtor and after the issue of notices in the news papers, it could hardly be said that the creditor's cause of action had not yet arisen and moreover, as learned Counsel for the respondents has pointed out, even in cases where a plaint has been filed prematurely, but the cause of action has arisen during the pendency of the suit so instituted it has been held that the suit Would not be liable to be thrown out. 12. In our opinion the learned Special Judge rightly held that the claim was within limitation. 13. The only other point which has been argued before us relates to the finding on issue 3, Learned Counsel for the appellants has sought to argue that despite the fact that the mortgages of 1927 and 1928 had merged in a decretal debt, he is entitled to raise the questions raised in issues and 2. Section 15 of the Encumbered Estates Act provides that- in determining the amount due on the basis of a loan which has been the subject of a decree the Special Judge shall accept the findings of the Court which passed the decree except in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 14. 14. The provisions of Section 15 have been the 'subject of several recent decisions of this Court in which it has been held that the only thing which the Special Judge has to look to in connection with a decretal debt is whether the findings of the Court which passed the decree are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 14. He cannot re-open questions which have been decided, nor can he permit the debtor to raise questions which he did not raise in the previous litigation-In point of fact questions not raised in the previous litigation would evidently be barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. He cannot re-open questions which have been decided, nor can he permit the debtor to raise questions which he did not raise in the previous litigation-In point of fact questions not raised in the previous litigation would evidently be barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. The learned Special Judge therefore rightly held that the points covered-by issues 1 and 2 could not be re-opened. The points which can be. re-opened "by the Special Judge and into-which he will necessarily go in dealing with issue 4 framed by him will be those points which are mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (4) of Section 14. In the present, case it appears that the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act (X of 1918) were actually applied in the previous litigation but the learned Special Judge will have to consider the effect of the subsequent amendment of that Act by the Usurious Loans Amendment Act (Act XXII of 1934) which as appears from Section 2 (4) (ii) was amended specifically with a view to proceedings for the determination of a claim under the Encumbered Estates Act. 15. On the merits we find no force whatever in the present appeal and dismiss it accordingly with costs.