JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal from the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge of Unao allowing the appeal of the present respondent No. I, defendant No. 3, and dismissing against him the suit of the plaintiff which had been dismissed by the trial Court against the defendants 1 and 2 but decreed against the defendant. 2. This appeal arises out of the following circumstances. 3. On the 20th March, 1919, a mortgage by conditional sale for a period of three years was executed by Har Bakhsh Singh defendant No. 1 and Beni Madho Singh, since deceased, husband of defendant No. 2 Mst. Idrana, in favour of the defendant No. 3 Surajpal Singh, the consideration being a sum of Rs. 260. Interest was payable at 1 per cent, per mensem com-poundable annually. On the 16th March, 1934, when limitation for a suit on foot of the mortgage was about to expire a sum of Rs. 7 was paid and Was endorsed on the back of the mortgage-deed as received "babat dastawez haza". This endorsement was signed by Har Bakhsh Singh and Beni Madho Singh the executants of the mortgage. On the 15th August, 1936, the defendant No. 3 sold his mortgagee rights under this deed to the present plaintiff Swami Khat Khata Nand for a sum of Rs. 450, and accordingly the vendee Khat Khata Nand on the 17th December, 1936, filed a suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 797-11-0, impleading on the one hand the original mortgagors Har Bakhsh Singh and Beni Madho Singh's widow, and on the other his own vendor the original mortgagee Surajpal Singh. The defendants 1 and 2 pleaded that the suit against them was time-barred, while the defendant No. 3 pleaded that the suit so far as it related him was premature and bad for multifariousness. The learned Munsif held that the suit was time-barred against the original mortgagors and dismissed the suit against them. As against the original mortgagee the plaintiff's vendor he held that the suit was neither premature nor defective on the ground of multifariousness, and he accordingly decreed the suit against him. 4. Against the dismissal of his suit as against the defendants 1 and 2 the plaintiff filed no appeal and therefore prima facie that decree became final. As against the original mortgagee the plaintiff's vendor he held that the suit was neither premature nor defective on the ground of multifariousness, and he accordingly decreed the suit against him. 4. Against the dismissal of his suit as against the defendants 1 and 2 the plaintiff filed no appeal and therefore prima facie that decree became final. The defendant No. 3, however, appealed against the decree made against him and he impleaded the defendants 1 and 2 along with the plaintiff as respondents. The lower appellate Court proceeded to- hold, differing from the Munsif, that the suit as against the defendants 1 and 2 should not have been held to be barred by limitation. He conceded that this point was unimportant in the appeal as it was filed before him, bur none the less he felt it necessary to decide the point. Secondly he held that the suit against the defendant No. 3 who was the appellant before him. was premature and bad for multifariousness, and accordingly allowed the defendant No. 3's appeal and dismissed the suit. The attention of the learned Additional Civil Judge was not apparently drawn to the provisions of Order XLI Rule 33, and he was not asked to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, against the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 5. n this appeal the first point for consideration is the finding on the point of limitation, and it may be said at once that, it is practically conceded by all parties to this appeal (and I should note that the original mortgagee the defendant No. 3 and the defendants I and 2 are all separately represented in this appeal) that the decision of the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation cannot possibly be supported. I need scarcely discuss his arguments but merely state how the matter stands. It was sought to establish that in virtue of the payment of Rs. 7 on the 16th March, 1934, limitation as against the original mortgagors was saved. This payment was not specified as being towards either principal or interest. It could not be credited to interest by the creditor unless it was paid towards interest as such. It is not competent for a creditor to establish by evidence ''aliunde" that a payment, the record of which does not itself show that it was made towards interest, was so made. It could not be credited to interest by the creditor unless it was paid towards interest as such. It is not competent for a creditor to establish by evidence ''aliunde" that a payment, the record of which does not itself show that it was made towards interest, was so made. It follows that this payment cannot be treated as having been made towards interest. In order that it should be treated as having been made towards principal, it would be necessary to show either that it was made towards principal by the debtor or that the creditor appropriated it to principal. In the light of the recent pronouncement on this subject by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ram Shah v. Lal Chand 1940 AWR (P.C.) 58 : 1940 OA 298 : 194C OWN 315 in order that an appropriation by the creditor towards principal may operate to save limitation that appropriation must have been made before the period of limitation had expired. There was, however, no evidence on the record to show that the creditor had ever made an appropriation of the payment towards principal, much less that he had made such an appropriation within the period of limitation. 6. On the assumption that the lower appellate Court was right on the question of limitation and therefore right in holding that the trial Court had wrongly dismissed the suit against the defendants and 2, learned Counsel for the plaintiff appellant has contended that the lower appellate Court should have acted under the provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 and given the plaintiff a decree against the original mortgagors defendants 1 and 2, and that he was entitled so to do in view of the fact that those defendants had been made parties to the appeal by the defendant No. 3, and for this purpose reliance was placed on Dirg Singh v. Manbhar (1910) 7 IC 69 (All ). It may be that the lower appellate Court could have done so, but I feel considerable doubt whether in second appeal this Court would have been justified in applying the principles of Order XLI Rule 33, that point not having been raised in the lower appellate Court. It may be that the lower appellate Court could have done so, but I feel considerable doubt whether in second appeal this Court would have been justified in applying the principles of Order XLI Rule 33, that point not having been raised in the lower appellate Court. However, in view of my finding on the question of limitation the question whether Order XLI Rule 33 should have been applied by the lower appellate Court or should be applied by this Court now no longer arises, and I do not propose to go into it. 7. The question which doss arise, however, is whether the plaintiff's suit against defendants 1 and 2 having been dismissed as barred by limitation, the "plaintiff was entitled and is entitled to a decree against the defendant No, 3 his vendor as held by the Trial Court. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has referred to the notes in Chitaley's CPC (III Edition) Vol. 2, page 1264, under Order I Rule 3, and to the provisions of Order II, Rule 3 and Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has also referred to the same case in Dirg Singh v. Manbhar, to which I have referred above, and which is one of the cases quoted in Chitaley's Commentary under Order I Rule 3. Two objections have been put forward to the right of the plaintiff to get such a decree. First, it has been argued that the plaintiff's suit against defendant No. 3 was premature and that the plaint as against him showed no cause of action ; secondly, it has been argued that the suit as against him was bad for multifariousness, that is I suppose as somehow contravening the provisions of Order I, Rule 3, or Order II Rule 3 or both. The two questions are rather mixed up one with the other. 8. Taking the question of prematureness first the argument is that the plaintiff was not entitled to combine a suit against the original mortgagors with a suit against his own vendor, because his cause of action against his own vendor would only arise on the dismissal of the suit against the original mortgagors as time-barred. 8. Taking the question of prematureness first the argument is that the plaintiff was not entitled to combine a suit against the original mortgagors with a suit against his own vendor, because his cause of action against his own vendor would only arise on the dismissal of the suit against the original mortgagors as time-barred. The same criticism might be levied against a large proportion of suits which are filed against two persons in the alternative, and the claim is made against one first and the other as a second string. 9. Order I Rule 3 provides that- all persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged, to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative where, if separate suits were brought against such persons, any common question of law or fact would arise. 10. I think it is reasonable to say that the transaction out of which the present suit has arisen both against the defendants 1 and 2 and the defendant No. 3 is the sale by the defendant No. 3 of his rights under the mortgage to the plaintiff. There can be no doubt that in the suit against both common questions of law and fact do arise, and therefore prima facie this suit J is not barred by the provisions of Order 1 Rule 3. 11. Order II Rule 3 seems to me of doubtful applicability. It relates to joiner of causes of action and provides that- save as otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants-jointly. 12. Some reference has also been made-to Order II Rule 6 which provides that- Where it appears to the Court that any causes of action joined in one Suit cannot be- conveniently tried or disposed of together, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient. 13. This is an enabling rule and the fact: that a Court has not chosen to avail of it is not, in my opinion, a ground for interference in second appeal. Doubtless the trial Court could have acted under the provisions of this rule, if it had thought it desirable to do so. 14. 13. This is an enabling rule and the fact: that a Court has not chosen to avail of it is not, in my opinion, a ground for interference in second appeal. Doubtless the trial Court could have acted under the provisions of this rule, if it had thought it desirable to do so. 14. In the case of Dirg Singh v. Manbhar (referred to above) in somewhat similar circumstances the same questions was raised whether the plaintiff was entitled to impaled his assignor (the original mortgagee) in the same suit along with the original mortgagors. The head note runs as follows: D. the assignee of a mortgage, brought a suit on the mortgage and made the original mortgagor and the original mortgagee parties to the suit. The mortgagor admitted the execution of the deed but denied the receipt of consideration : Held, that the original mortgagee was rightly impleaded in the suit and that the plaintiff was entitled to ask for a relief against him if he failed to obtain a decree against the mortgaged property. 15. The view stated supports the appellant's argument but it is an unfortunate fact that the reasoning on which this decision was founded finds no place in the judgment. All that the learned Judges say is: The learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff did not disclose any cause of action against Manbhar (the original mortgagee) that he was simply a pro forma defendant and no relief ought to have been asked against him so long as it was not decided that the mortgage deed in suit was void for want of consideration. We do not agree with the learned Subordinate Judge upon this point. We think that Manbhar was rightly impleaded and that the plaintiff was entitled to ask for the relief against him if he failed to obtain a decree against the mortgaged property. 16. At page 1264, Vol. II (3rd Edition) of his Commentary on the CPC Chitaley refers to several other cases of an analogous description. 17. We think that Manbhar was rightly impleaded and that the plaintiff was entitled to ask for the relief against him if he failed to obtain a decree against the mortgaged property. 16. At page 1264, Vol. II (3rd Edition) of his Commentary on the CPC Chitaley refers to several other cases of an analogous description. 17. Learned Counsel for the respondent presses the argument that the plaint did not show any cause of action against the defendant No. 3, and in fact a reference to the plaint shows that there is no distinct statement of a cause of action, and indeed there could in a sense not be any such statement because the immediate cause of action against the defendant No. 3, must necessarily be the failure of the suit against the defendants 1 and 2. The plaint however did explain how and why belief was sought against the defendant No. 3 and what relief was. claimed, and it does not seem to me really possible to say that such a suit which claims a relief in the alternative can reasonably be held to be premature. In my opinion the learned Additional Civil Judge was wrong in the view he took that the suit was premature because it did not disclose a cause of action already arisen against the defendant No. 3. 18. As to the second question whether the suit was bad for multifariousness, in this connection reference was made by the learned Additional Civil Judge to Section 99 of the CPC which provides that No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any mis-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not effecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. 19. A reference in this connection has been made to rule 9 of Order I which provides that- No suit shall be defeated by reason of The mis-joinder or non joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests,, of the parties actually before it. 20. Learned Counsel for the respondent points out that there is no similar provision in the case. 20. Learned Counsel for the respondent points out that there is no similar provision in the case. of mis-joinder of causes of action or joining a suit for which there is an existing cause of action with one for which there is only a possible cause of action. He argues that the indemnity clause contained in the sale deed of the plaintiff gives him a right of suit against his vendor only on the arising of certain eventualities- which could not arise until the plaintiffs suit against the original mortgagors failed. The learned Munsif on this point remarked : I fail to find how this suit is bad for mis-joinder of cause of action. 21. The learned Additional Civil Judge considers that the suit is bad for mis-joinder of causes of action because the cause of action of the plaintiff had not yet arisen and because that mis-joinder was not protected by the provisions of Section 99. His argument on this point is that the defendant No. 3, if sued separately after the decision of the case against defendants I and 2, could have raised,, various pleas in defence, for instance that that suit failed on account of want of proper prosecution, on account of collusion or for want of due diligence and so on. To my mind there is no force in this argument because the defendant No. 3 by being joined as a defendant in the same suit along with the defendants 1 and 2 was placed in a position to see that the suit was prosecuted in the fullest possible manner, that is that there was not want of proper prosecution, that there was no collusion, and no absence of due diligence. It is not suggested that there is any other way in which the joinder of the defendant No. 3 along with the defendants 1 and 2 could possibly have affected the merits of the case, and in these circumstances it seems to me clear that even if there had been any mis-joinder of parties or causes of action Section 99 would have applied and the judgment of the trial Court could not have been set aside on that ground. The learned Additional Civil Judge has reversed it on the clear finding that Section 99 did not protect the decision of the trial Court. I hold that on this point the lower appellate Court is wrong. The learned Additional Civil Judge has reversed it on the clear finding that Section 99 did not protect the decision of the trial Court. I hold that on this point the lower appellate Court is wrong. 22. I accordingly allow this, appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. The plaintiff will have his costs in all Courts as against the defendant No. 3. His appeal as against the respondents 2 and 3, defendants 1 and 2, has failed and he must pay the costs of these defendants.