JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Bennett J. 1. This is a second Civil Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge of Hardoi on the 31st March, 1937, setting aside the decree of the learned Civil Judge of Hardoi, dated the 25th September, 1936. 2. The suit was brought by a mortgagee for possession of property mortgaged to him on the 3rd September, 1927, and also for damages or compensation for non-delivery of possession. 3. According to the plaint the mortgage-deed provided for immediate possession of part of the mortgaged property to be given to the mortgagee, and in respect of the remaining property, which was at the time in the possession of tenants, the mortgagors contracted to deliver possession on the 1st July, 1928. They had obtained a decree for arrears of rent against the tenants u/s 61 of the Oudh Rent Act and they engaged to secure their ejectment by the end of June, 1928. The annual rent payable by these tenants was Rs. 131-1-6, and the mortgagors undertook to pay this amount to the mortgagee for the period between the execution of the mortgage-deed and delivery of possession in July," 1928. 4. As possession was not given to the, mortgagee in accordance with this agreement, he sued the mortgagors and their representatives in 1936 on the basis of a breach of contract. It was. stated in the plaint that the cause of action for recovery of possession accrued on the 1st July, 1928, when possession was not given in accordance with the terms of the mortgage-deed, and for recovery of compensation on the 1st July, 1931. It was also said in the plaint that the suit for the years 1929-30 was beyond limitation and, therefore the plaintiff claimed for six years only, namely, from 1931. He claimed at the rate of Rs. 131-1-6 which he would have been entitled to obtain from the tenants if he had secured possession. 5. The defendants admitted the mortgage, but pleaded that when in June, 1928, they recovered possession of the plots in suit from the then tenants, the plots were given with the concurrence of the plaintiff to other tenants on a rental of Rs; 294. It was agreed that the plaintiff should realize rent from these tenants to the extent of Rs. 131-1-6, the balance being realised on behalf of the defendants. It was agreed that the plaintiff should realize rent from these tenants to the extent of Rs. 131-1-6, the balance being realised on behalf of the defendants. This, it was said, had since been done. 6. The trial Court found that the plaintiff had not been put in possession of this portion of the mortgaged property and that the plots in suit had not been re-let to tenants with his consent. This finding is not now in question. 7. The trial Court then considered the question of limitation. The plaintiff's contention was that Article 116 of the Limitation Act applied to the case, while the defendants' contention was that the Article applicable was Article 109. Article 116 provides a period of six years in a suit brought for compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered, while 8. Article 109 provides for a period of three years in a suit for the profits of immoveable property belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant. 9. The trial Court held that Article 116 applied and awarded the plaintiff a decree both for' possession and for a sum of Rs. 941-12-6. There was no suggestion in that Court that the suit was barred by limitation even if Article 116 applied. 10. The defendants appealed to the District Judge in regard to the amount awarded. They disputed the finding of the trial Court that the suit for recovery of six years' rent was within time, and contended that the suit should have been regarded not as a suit for compensation, but rather as a suit for mesne profits, that is to say, we understand, they contended that Article 109 of the Limitation Act was applicable, and not Article 116, though they did not expressly refer" in their grounds of appeal to either article. 11. But although the defendants would appear from their grounds of appeal to have challenged the finding of the trial Court on this point as a whole, they confined the valuation of their appeal "for purposes of jurisdiction" to a sum of Rs. 650 from which it would appear that they did not contest the decree to the extent of Rs. 291-12-6. 12. 650 from which it would appear that they did not contest the decree to the extent of Rs. 291-12-6. 12. The learned District Judge concurred with the learned Civil Judge in his finding as to the applicability of Article 116, but was of opinion that even so the suit for damages or compensation was barred by limitation, although, as in the trial Court, this was not argued by counsel. The District Judge pointed out that the breach of contract' occurred on the 1st July, 1928, when the mortgagors failed to deliver possession of the property in accordance with the contract. He referred to several rulings to support his view that there was not a continuing or successive breach of contract as was contended before him. The mortgagors had not, he said, expressly or impliedly contracted to pay the amount of Rs. 131-1-6 annually, and the breach of contract happened once for all when possession was not delivered on the 1st July, 1928. 13. The learned District Judge accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of the Civil Judge in regard to the award of Rs. 941-12-6. He did not apparently take into consideration the fact that the appellants in his Court had valued their appeal at Rs. 650 only. 14. Nor did he in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit altogether require those appellants to pay the deficiency in the court-fee. This deficiency has been made good in this Court. 15. In the present appeal the plaintiff, Daulat Ram, has contested the view taken by the District Judge that the suit was barred by limitation and his learned Counsel has argued that there was an implied contract on the part of the mortgagors to continue payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 131-1-6 per annum unless and until possession of the property was delivered by them to the mortgagee. This he asks us to infer from the fact that they paid at this rate for the first year, that is to say, up to the end of June, 1928. 16. On a consideration of the mortgage-deed, we are unable to take this view. There can be no doubt that neither party contemplated the possibility of possession not being given on the 1st July, 1928. 16. On a consideration of the mortgage-deed, we are unable to take this view. There can be no doubt that neither party contemplated the possibility of possession not being given on the 1st July, 1928. Under the mortgage deed as it stands the mortgagee was to realise the rent from the tenants from the 1st July, 1928, and not from the mortgagors. There is no suggestion whatever in the mortgage deed that the amount should be paid by the mortgagors in respect of any period subsequent to the 30th June, 1928. 17. There can be no doubt that the mortgagee could have recovered damages or compensation from the mortgagors at this rate on a suit brought within six years from the 1st July, 1928, when the breach of contract occurred. But as we cannot agree with the appellant's learned Counsel that there was any implied agreement that the mortgagors should continue to pay rent to the mortgagee if possession was not given, we cannot hold that a breach of contract occurred in each year subsequent to 1928 by reason of the fact that such payment was not made by them. 18. We have considered the rulings referred to by the lower Court. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that they are not applicable to the facts of the present case. No doubt there are some differences in regard to the facts, but we think that nevertheless, they are applicable. 19. In Nirbhai Sinha v. Tulsi Ram (1916) 311 C. 804 the Allahabad High Court held that where a usufructuary mortgagee sued for possession of the mortgaged property within six years of the date from which he was to have received possession and also claimed mesne profits for the same period on the allegation that the mortgagor had never given him possession in accordance with the terms of the deed, the claim was in substance one for compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered and was governed by Article 116, and not by Article 109, of the Limitation Act. 20. In Madan Lal v. Reoti Singh (1987) 4 A.L.J 249 the mortgagee was kept out of possession of a portion of the property. A suit brought by him for possession was dismissed. 20. In Madan Lal v. Reoti Singh (1987) 4 A.L.J 249 the mortgagee was kept out of possession of a portion of the property. A suit brought by him for possession was dismissed. Subsequently he brought a suit more than six years after the date of the mortgage to recover compensation for non-delivery of possession and for costs incurred in the first suit. It was held by the Allahabad High Court that the suit was one to recover damages for breach of contract to which Article 116 was applicable, and the suit having been brought more than six years after the date of the mortgage was barred. 21. In the Secretary of State for India in Council v. P. Venkayya (1917) 40 Mad. 910 the plaintiff had obtained from the Collector of Godavari district, acting as Agent to the Government a lease in writing registered of a piece of land of a certain area. He obtained only a portion of this area and unsuccessfully demanded possession of the rest. He sued for damages for non-delivery of possession of this latter area. It was held by the Madras High Court that the cause of action for- breach of the covenant to give possession occurred at the inception of the lease, and that as more than six years had elapsed from that date, the suit was barred under Article 116 of the Limitation Act. It was also held that breach of a covenant to give possession is not a continuing breach. It appears to us, therefore, that the learned District Judge correctly held that although Article 116 and not Article 109 of the Limitation Act was applicable, nevertheless the suit was time-barred. 22. It has been urged that the District Judge should not have set aside the decree of the trial Court altogether, as the valuation of the appeal in his Court was only Rs. 650. In view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act we are not prepared to hold that the order passed by the District Judge was not justified, though he should certainly have required the appellants in his Court to pay court-fee on the whole decretal amount. We may also observe that this point has not been raised in the grounds of appeal against the District Judge's order. 23. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.