JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is an application in revision u/s 276 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act of 1939 from the appellate decree of the District Judge of Gonda dated the 4th November, 1939. 2. This was a suit for arrears of revenue u/s 108 clause (15) in which a first appeal lay to the District Judge u/s 119 of the Oudh Rent Act. It was not a case in which any second appeal lay and accordingly an application was filed in revision. 3. A preliminary objection is taken that no application lies in revision either u/s 115 of the CPC or u/s 276 of the New Tenancy Act. Learned Counsel for the applicant contends that even prior to the New Tenancy Act such an application was entertainable by this Court under the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and he contends that since the enactment of the New Tenancy Act such a right is specifically provided for by Section 276 which section is couched in very similar terms to those which are found in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Learned Counsel for the opposite party contends that both the provisions relied upon on behalf of the applicant are inapplicable. He has referred to AIR 1928 214 (Oudh) ; Fateh Bahadur Khan v. Chhotey Khan (1928) 5 O.W.N. 457 and the Full Bench case of Gaya Prasad v. Kalap Nath (I929)6 O.W.N. 661 (F.B.) : AIR. 1929 Oud 389 in which it was held that no revision lay to the Chief Court u/s 115 of the CPC from the appellate decision of a District Judge in a rent suit. The cases quoted were all subsequent to those relied upon by learned Counsel for the applicant. 5. As regards the applicability of Section 276 of the New Tenancy Act he points out that the Tenancy Act only came into force on the 1st January, 1940. He admits that in the ordinary way changes in procedure or law have a retrospective effect but he contends, as I think with great force, that changes in procedure or law cannot operate retrospectively so as to affect rights which have accrued before the Act which makes those changes came into force. He admits that in the ordinary way changes in procedure or law have a retrospective effect but he contends, as I think with great force, that changes in procedure or law cannot operate retrospectively so as to affect rights which have accrued before the Act which makes those changes came into force. In a recent case of Mi Mohammad v. Khalil Ahmad 1940 OA 468 : 1940 AWR (C.C.)241 : 1940 OWN 545 it was held that- the provision of a second appeal in clause 2 (a) of Section 45 of the U P, Encumbered Estates Act, as it stands alter the amendment of the Act in 1939, has no retrospective effect. 6. This decision was based in the main upon the principle that the right of having an order treated as final vested in a party cannot be taken away by a subsequent enactment in the absence of express word to that effect. The position here is that the opposite-party had on the 4th November, 1939, obtained an appellate decision in their favour which was final. That advantage could not be taken away from them by any. enactment of procedural law which, was not expressly stated to have retrospective effect upon cases finally decided before the enactment came into force. 7. The decision rests ultimately on principles laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1927 242 (Privy Council) where their Lordships remarked: the principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the. Board in the Colonial Sngar Refining Co v. Irving 1905 A.C. 369 where it is in effect laid down that, while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions, which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute ace not, to. be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders, which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which though existing lights. 8. In my opinion it is perfectly clear that the preliminary objection must be sustained. Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders, which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which though existing lights. 8. In my opinion it is perfectly clear that the preliminary objection must be sustained. There was no right of application in revision against the present order prior to the enactment of the New United Provinces Tenancy Act, and the provisions of the New Act which allow applications; u/s 115 of the CPC cannot be applied with retrospective effect so as to deprive the opposite-party of the benefit of the final order made in their favour on the 4th November, 1939. 9. In these circumstances it is unnecessary to go into the question whether this application really involves any question of jurisdiction or the question whether there fir any substance in the application on the merits. The preliminary objection is sustained, the present application is not maintainable and- is dismissed accordingly with costs.