JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - In this matter the Applicant seeks to appeal against the decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mitter and Akram JJ., dated July 24, 1939, in Appeals from Original Orders No Section 1 and 2 of 1939. 2. The Appellant applied to this Bench for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the decision just mentioned and on April 22, 1940, this Bench granted that leave. 3. Under Order XLV, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, where a certificate of fitness to appeal is granted the Applicant shall, within ninety days or such further period, not exceeding sixty days, as the Court may upon cause shown allow from the date of the decree complained of, or within six weeks from the date of the grant of the certificate, whichever is the later date, furnish security for the costs of the Respondent. The security to be furnished in this case was rupees four thousand. That was, under the rule, due to be furnished on or before June 3, 1940. 4. On June 3, 1940, a petition to extend the time for putting in the security deposit by a month or more was made on behalf of the Applicant. [Here his Lordship dealt with the grounds stated in the petition for extension of time and then continued:] 5. A point has been taken that it is not within the competence of this Bench to extend the time for furnishing the security. We have been referred to a case decided by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nilkanth Balwant Natu v. Satchidanand Vidya Narsinha Bharati ILR (1927) Bom. 430, where it was held that the Court can, under Order XLV, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Rule 9 of the Privy Council Rules, 1920, enlarge the time for furnishing security and making the deposit, beyond the period prescribed by Order XLV, Rule 7. 430, where it was held that the Court can, under Order XLV, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Rule 9 of the Privy Council Rules, 1920, enlarge the time for furnishing security and making the deposit, beyond the period prescribed by Order XLV, Rule 7. I have great respect for the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court, but there is a decision, viz., Govind Narain Singh v. Shamlal Singh (1926) 39 C.W.N. 651, 652 of a Bench of this Court consisting of Rankin C.J. and C.C. Ghose J. where it was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for furnishing security by an Appellant to the Privy Council beyond the maximum provided for in Order XLV, Rule 7, that is to say, ninety days from the date of the decree plus sixty days or six weeks from the date of the certificate, whichever is later. In the case last mentioned the time expired on November 8, 1926. The Appellants filed an application on November 10 which was dealt with by the Registrar of this Court on November 12. The Registrar purported to give them a week's time and on November 17, the deposit was made. The Respondents moved the Court to set aside the order receiving the deposit and Rankin C.J. stated in his judgment: The only order which it is open to us to make is that the certificate for the admission of the appeal dated August 2, 1926, should be cancelled. The Appellants security will be treated as though it had not been deposited for the purpose; that is to say, the Appellants can have it back. 6. That case goes a long way, since it treats as null and void the deposit which the Registrar had allowed to be made. Rankin C.J. at page 652 of the report says: It is, however, quite clear that what the Court is prohibited from doing the Registrar cannot do and the object of Rule 7 was to put a limit definitely, finally and completely upon the amount of extension that the High Court could grant in the matter of these appeals to the Privy Council. 7. 7. Later he says: It does not seem to me possible to maintain that the Court in its discretion under Rule 9 of the Order" (i.e., the Order of His Majesty in Council) "made on the 9th day of February, 1920, could refuse the application made by the Respondent. 8. The application in that case was made by the Respondent to cancel the certificate. 9. That case has been followed by Rankin C.J. and Manmatha Nath Mukerji J. in Debendra Nath Sadhukhan v. Naharmul Jalan (1931) P.C.A. 13 of 1930, decided on Feb. 23, where Rankin C. J. said: This is an application for extension of time for furnishing paper-book costs and security within Rule 7 of Order XLV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It appears that the decree complained of is dated December 18, 1929, and the date of presentation of this application is more than ninty days plus sixty days from that date. The certificate that the case is a fit one to be taken on appeal is dated January 7, 1931, and we are now more than six weeks from that date. In these circumstances, as this Court has held on more than one occasion, it is not within the power of this Court having regard to the express terms of Order XLV, Rule 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as it now stands to give any extension of time. The application must be refused. 10. For my part I feel bound to follow the decisions of Rankin C.J. in the cases I have mentioned. 11. The result is that this application for extension of time to furnish the security must be dismissed and for the reasons I have given. 12. The certificate of fitness will be cancelled and the Appellant to England will pay the costs of this application--the hearing-.fee being assessed at two gold mohurs. Mukherjea J. 13. I agree.