JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is an application on behalf of the plaintiff u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act from the decision of the Additional Civil Judge of Unao exercising the powers of a Small Cause Court. 2. The plaintiff had instituted a suit to recover Rs. 475 on the basis of an installment bond said to have been, executed on the 4th August, 1932 and providing for payment of the amount due by a first installment of Rs. 22-8-0 and subsequent installments of Rs. 20. The first installment fell due on the 13th December, 1932, the next on the 9th May, 1933, the 3rd on the 1st December, 1933, and sub sequent installments Up to the date of soft in May, 1934, December 1934, May 1935, December 1935 and May 1936. The suit was filed on the 30th November 1936 and the plaintiff claimed the whole amount due, excluding the first two installments, which were, of course, time barred and which the plaintiff alleged to have been in any case paid up. The cause of action was stated in the plaint to have a listen on the 3rd December, 1933, in respect of the default of the 1st December, 1933, and on dates subsequent to each of the' other five installments prior to the date of suit. 3. The "learned Judge of the Court below held that the bond was duly executed and was for consideration, that' is in lieu of earlier debt. On the 2nd issue, ''were the first two installments paid? If so, its effect?" he held that only Rs 20 were paid which were credited towards the first installment of Rs. 22-8-0. That payment was held to have been made and accepted on the 24th August 1933, subsequent to the default on the 2nd installment which was due on the 9th.May, 1933. The learned Judge, therefore held that the first two installments had not been paid in full and therefore the averment in the plaint on which the cause of action was laid as arising on the third default was not correct. He proceeded to hold that in these circumstances the plaintiff could not be deemed to have waived the option of recovery of the whole amount outstanding which arose on the date of the first and second defaults. He proceeded to hold that in these circumstances the plaintiff could not be deemed to have waived the option of recovery of the whole amount outstanding which arose on the date of the first and second defaults. The sole question which is to be decided on this application is whether in the circumstances of the present case it has been rightly held that the plaintiff is not to be deemed to have waived the benefit of the provision, and whether therefore the plaintiffs suit which is based on each of the subsequent defaults prior to the date of suit should not have been decreed. 4. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff; applicant relies on the, principles underlying the decision in Nageshar Prasad. Dube v. Bakridi (1932) 9 OWN 250 : AIR 1932 Oudh 176; AIR 1934 455 (Oudh) and Jagat Jit Singh of Kapurthala v. Manodat. In the first of these cases the head note runs as follows: In order to claim the benefit of Article T6 of the Limitation Act, it is necessary for the oblige to show that he has waived the benefit of the provisions entitling him to sue on an earlier default and that he bases his claim on the subsequent default in respect of which there is no waiver. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what would or would not constitute a waiver within Article 75. Where the principal amount due on a money-bond is payable in four annual installments and it is provided that in case of default in payment of any installment the oblige would have the option to recover the whole amount, a suit by the oblige not basing his claim on the provision entitling him to institute a suit on the occurrence of the first default but showing that the cause of action accrued to him on the defaults which occurred in case of each of the last three installments must be held to be under Article 76 and the plaintiff should be deemed to have waived the benefit of the provisions which entitled him to sue for the whole amount on the occurrence of the first default, notwithstanding the fact that he states that he has been paid his first installment and fails to prove the same. 5. 5. The main distinction between that case and the present case is that in the present case the suit is based upon the option although the cause of action is shown as having accrued on the defaults which occurred in the case of the last six installments and not of the first two. The principle enunciated in this case is, to my mind, fairly clearly applicable to the pre- sent case. The learned Judge recognized that the. plaintiff had pleaded payment of the first installment and had been unable to prove it to the satisfaction of the lower Court, and he remarked that the only effect of it was that it was not possible to say that the plaintiff waived the benefit of the provision in respect of the first installment. I think that by this he meant that the effect really was that the plaintiff had not claimed waiver in his plaint. He went on to hold that the plaintiff was to be deemed to have waived the claim arising on the first default (in the present case it would be on the first two defaults) because he based his cause of action on the subsequent defaults, and the option which arose on those subsequent defaults. The wording is not too satisfactory in one or two places but this is what I understand the learned Judge to have meant. He says at another place in the judgment, the very fact that the cause of action has been based on the defaults which occurred in the case of each of the last three installments shows that the plaintiff placed reliance on each of the defaults and did not avail himself of the provision which gave him the option to sue for the whole amount on the happening of the first default." 6. It might perhaps have been supposed that a distinction could be drawn between that case and the present case due to the fact that when the suit with which the learned Judge was dealing was filed all four installments due under the bond had become due, and therefore the decision did not go far enough to cover a case in which at the date of the suit only some of the installments had already fallen due and many others were still to fall due in the future. In the case of Jagat Jit Singh of Kapurthala v. Manodat however it was held by the same learned Judge- in a suit on an installment bond where the oblige is given the right to sue for the whole amount on the occurrence of default in payment of any installment it is open to him to waive the benefit of the provision on the occurrence of default in payment of an installment and yet to avail himself of that provision when a similar default takes place in the payment of a subsequent installment, provided the claim is within time. What amounts to waiver must depend upon the circumstances of each case and it cannot be laid down as a general rule that where ever a person omits to claim a particular amount it must be held to constitute a waiver. A creditor need not adduce affirmative evidence in support of waiver, which generally is to be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances. 7. n that particular case, however, the learned Judge for practical purposes did base the conclusion that there had been waiver on the fact that the plaintiff had omitted to claim the amount due on the first installment which had become time barred. He took the view that the plaintiff was evidently aware of his right to sue on the earliest default, and that as he did not do so, and as he framed his plaint specially with an eye on the provisions of Article 75 with a view to claim the whole of the amount of the bond (less that which had become time-barred) on the basis of the provision entitling the plaintiff to recover the whole amount on the occurrence of default in payment of any installment, he must be deemed to have waived the exercise of the option on the first installment. 8. 8. In Gaya Din's case 1936 O W 665 : AIR 1936 Oudh 384 the same learned Judge sitting in Bench with another Judge held that- if a certain amount is agreed to be paid by monthly installments with a condition that in default in payment of any installment, the whole 'remaining sum should become payable, the creditor may accept payment of installments after due date, thereby impliedly waiving his right to sue for the whole amount due and may sue upon a subsequent default in payment of any future installment It is however, not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what would or would not constitute a waiver. 9. The general current of decisions in this Court is clearly in favour of interpreting any facts which can possibly be so interpreted as favoring the view that the creditor has waived the exercise of the option on the first installment when he bases his suit on subsequent defaults which are within limitation, and does not seek to found his cause of action on the earlier defaults. 10. The question then is, are there any facts or circumstances in the present case which can lead to the inference that there has been a waiver on the part of the plaintiff?. In the light of the decision in Nageshar Prasad v. Bakridi, the view taken by the learned Judge of the Small Cause Court that in view of the fact that the plaintiff has pleaded payment he cannot be allowed to fall back on a plea of waiver is not sustainable. In the present case we have it that the first installment fell due in December, 1932, and the second in May, 1933. Despite the fact that the plaintiff had by the first default an option to sue for the whole amount at once, he did not institute any suit either before the second installment fell due nor yet within the period of three years from the date of the first default. Similarly in the case of the second installment not only did he not institute a suit within the six months before the 3rd installment fell due nor within three years, but after this default had taken place, he also accepted payment of a sum of Rs. 20 towards the amount due on the bond. Similarly in the case of the second installment not only did he not institute a suit within the six months before the 3rd installment fell due nor within three years, but after this default had taken place, he also accepted payment of a sum of Rs. 20 towards the amount due on the bond. It was said by the lower Court that a part-payment of an installment after that installment had fallen due does not amount to an implied waiver, whereas the acceptance of full payment of an installment which had fallen in default would amount to a waiver. To my mind the matter should be looked at in a different way. The payment of Rs. 20 by the defaulting borrower afforded the creditor a good motive or a good reason for not instituting a suit against his debtor, and if the plaintiff had a good motive for not exercising the option, that very fact is a reason for supposing him to have waived it. 11. Then again the learned Judge of the Court below has been led astray by thinking that the plaintiff has in effect based his cause of action on the first two installments by alleging that those installments had been paid. He says- it is to be noted that in the present case the plaintiff has not omitted to claim these first two Installments. 12. It is incomprehensible to me bow a party can be said not to have omitted to claim installments for which he deliberately says he makes no claim. The reasoning upon which therefore the learned Judge says that there could not be deemed to be any waiver by reason of the plaintiff not having omitted to claim those installments is fallacious. 13. Learned Counsel for the opposite party has argued that there is nothing whatsoever on the record to justify the view that there has been any, waiver. On the other hand there are the facts to which I have drawn attention above and the very frame of the plaint which is based on the defaults subsequent to the first and second defaults. On the other hand there are the facts to which I have drawn attention above and the very frame of the plaint which is based on the defaults subsequent to the first and second defaults. In the light of the decisions of this Court to which I have referred above I am of opinion that the circumstances present in this case do bring it within the current of decision in the cases quoted and make it obligatory upon me to hold that there was a waiver on the part of the plaintiff in respect of the option which had arisen to him on the first two defaults. 14. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court has wrongly dismissed the suit as being barred by limitation; set aside the order of the Court below and hold that the suit was not barred by limitation. As there are some points arising out of the plea that the defendants are agriculturists which are still to be decided, I remand the suit for disposal to the Court below. The applicant will in any event be entitled to his costs of this application.