Judgement Appeal (No. 80 of 1938) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (December 4, 1936) affirming a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mymensingh (February 27, 1933). The appellant, Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury, was the proprietor of the Bailor Estate, in the district of Mymensingh, Bengal, and on attaining his majority in 1913 he appointed his grandmother, Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani, as trustee for the management of the estate. Between 1914 and 1917 they had Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 309 ( 1939- 1940) Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury V. Suradhani Debya Chaudhurani 108 jointly borrowed considerable sums of money from the Maharaja of Mymensingh on four mortgage deeds. The first of those mortgages was paid off by moneys raised from one Anath Bandhu Guha by means of a mortgage entered into on March 18, 1918. The other three mortgages were paid off with money raised by means of a mortgage of August 18, 1918, in favour of the first respondent, Suradhani Debya Chaudhurani, who lent Rs.1,20,000. The appellant and his grand mother also borrowed further sums from Anath Bandhu Guha under two mortgage deeds in 1920 and 1923. The suit out of which this appeal arose was brought by the first respondent against the appellant and his grandmother for the enforcement of the mortgage of August 18, 1918. The respondents two to five, who were defendants three to six, were impleaded as the representatives of Anath Bandhu Guha, who had died before suit, and they were impleaded as being subsequent mortgagees of the whole property contained in the mortgage deed in suit. Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani, the second defendant, died before trial, and the appellant, the first defendant, was substituted in her place. On July 18, 1931, issues were framed, including one as to the sums due on the respective mortgages in favour of the plaintiff and of the defendants three to six, and also one on the question whether Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani, who was a purdanashin lady, had had the contents of the mortgage deed in suit read over to her and had understood them. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge gave judgment for the plaintiff. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge gave judgment for the plaintiff. He found that the bond in suit was read in the presence of Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani, " but there is no evidence that "the effect of the bond was explained to her," but he was of opinion that she " was fully aware of the nature of all the "mortgage bonds put in this suit, and that she understood "the effects thereof," save that she did not understand that there was a stipulation in the bond making her personally liable. He further ordered that the amounts due to defendants three to six under their bonds should be entered in the decree. An appeal by the appellant to the High Court (Ghose and McNair JJ.) was dismissed. On the question whether Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani was bound by the mortgage bond in suit, they upheld the finding of the Subordinate Judge that she executed the document fully understanding what she was doing, although she did not understand that there was a stipulation making her personally liable. They accordingly held that the mortgage bond in suit was a valid document, and that the suit had been rightly decreed. 1940. May 6. S. P. Khambatta for the appellant. There being a total failure of proof of any explanation of the contents of the mortgage deed the document is inoperative against Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani. The doctrine relating to deeds executed by purdanashin women is that they either give an intelligent consent or they do not, and therefore where the deed contains more than one important term, and there is no contractual assent to one of those terms on her part, that must apply to the whole contract, and the Court cannot hold the purdanashin to the bargain at all, inasmuch as the different promises are inter-related matters connected with the same transaction. In the absence of affirmative and conclusive evidence that the deed was fully and carefully explained the Court cannot act on a mere inference and spell out a contract where there is none; that would be contrary to the established doctrine the above propositions are supported by Farid-un-nisa v. Mtikhtar Ahmad (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 342, 350.), and Tar a Kumari v. Chandra Mauleshwar Prasad Singh.(( 1931) L. R. 58 I. A. 450.) With regard to the mortgage deed the properties mortgaged vested in the trustee, Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani, as the owner " by virtue of the trust deed of 1913, and therefore the mortgagee took such right, title and interest as she could take only from the trustee Chhatra Kumari Devi v. Mohan Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 309 ( 1939- 1940) Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury V. Suradhani Debya Chaudhurani 109 Bikram Shah.(( 1931) L. R. & I. A. 279, 297.) The beneficiary (the appellant) had by virtue of the trust deed divested himself of all his estate, and had nothing to mortgage; he had no fund of credit to pledge; and the mortgagees right against him was only a right to an ordinary money decree on the footing of a simple contract debt Tara Kumari v. Chandra Mauleshwar Prasad.(( 1931) L. R. 58 I. A. 450, 457.) The admission of ownership by the beneficiary will not be binding on him, nor will he be precluded from asserting the contrary in order to obtain the relief to which, upon a true construction of the law, he may appear to be entitled Tagore v. Tagore.(( 1872) I. A. Supplmt. 47, 71.) The appellant ought to have been allowed to put in a written statement to contest the claim of defendants three to six before relief could be given to them in a decree in this suit. The case ought to have been sent back for re-trial Civil Procedure Code, Order XXXIV., r. 4, cl. 4. Charles Bagram, for respondent number one, was not called upon to argue. May 23. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR GEORGE RANKIN. The appellant, Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury, was the first defendant in a suit brought by the first respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Mymensingh to enforce a mortgage. 4. Charles Bagram, for respondent number one, was not called upon to argue. May 23. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR GEORGE RANKIN. The appellant, Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury, was the first defendant in a suit brought by the first respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Mymensingh to enforce a mortgage. The suit was filed on March 6, 1931, and the mortgage deed (exhibit 1) was dated August 18, 1918. The property mortgaged thereby was a taluk (Gangaram Rai) numbered 237 in the books of the Mymensingh Collectorate, and comprising ten mouzas; also another taluk (Sambhu Chandra Roy) numbered 239 in the same Collectorate, and comprising seven mouzas. The mortgage deed had been executed in favour of the plaintiff by two persons as mortgagors—the appellant and his paternal grandmother, an old lady, whose name was Sm. Nabin Kishore Chaudhurani. The appelant had inherited the mortgaged properties, together with other properties, from his father at some date before 1914, while he was yet a minor. The fathers will, made in 1891, states that Nabin Kishore, the testators adoptive mother, had managed and administered his zemindari and other properties during his minority, and was efficient in doing all business relating thereto. The appellant in 1913, on attaining majority, executed a trust deed (3rd Falgoon 1320 B.S.) vesting all his properties in her so that she might continue to manage them. Between 1914 and 1917 they had jointly borrowed considerable sums from the Maharaja of Mymensingh on four mortgage deeds. The first of these mortgages, dated in 1914, was paid off by money raised from one Anath Bandhu Guha by means of a mortgage (exhibit S) entered into on March 18, 1918, a few months before the mortgage in suit. The other three mortgages were paid off by means of the mortgage in suit, which was for the sum of Rs. 1,20,000— Rs.1,00,423-4-6 due on the three mortgages already mentioned, Rs.4,000 due on a note of hand to the plaintiff (respondent number one), and Rs.15,576-11-6 cash advanced. The appellant and his grandmother in 1920 and 1923 had borrowed further sums from Anath Bandhu Guha under two mortgage deeds (exhibits R and T). The properties comprised in the respective mortgages to Anath Bandhu Guha were as follows. His prior mortgage of March 18, 1918 (exhibit S), comprised four out of the seventeen mouzas mortgaged to the plaintiff. The appellant and his grandmother in 1920 and 1923 had borrowed further sums from Anath Bandhu Guha under two mortgage deeds (exhibits R and T). The properties comprised in the respective mortgages to Anath Bandhu Guha were as follows. His prior mortgage of March 18, 1918 (exhibit S), comprised four out of the seventeen mouzas mortgaged to the plaintiff. His subsequent mortgage of 1920 (exhibit R) comprised the same seventeen mouzas, and his last mortgage of 1923 (exhibit T) comprised in addition to these seventeen mouzas a house and lands known as Bailor House. Anath had died before suit, and the present respondents two to five were impleaded as his representatives. They were defendants three to six, and may be referred to as the Guha defendants. Nabin Kishore was impleaded as the second defendant in the suit. She died on September 8, 1932, Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 309 ( 1939- 1940) Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury V. Suradhani Debya Chaudhurani 110 before the trial, and the appellant was substituted in her place on September 13, 1932. The time originally allowed by the Subordinate Judge to the defendants for filing written statements was extended by him until June 4, 1931, on which day the Guha defendants put in a written statement. The appellant was given further time until June 25. On that day he asked for still more time. The Subordinate Judge gave him two days only, remarking that he had had two and a half months already; also that he had no right to look into the Guha defendants written statement before filing his own. (This may have meant no more than that he should file his own written statement independently in the first instance.) On June 29, Nabin Kishore filed her written statement, and on July 6, the Guha defendants filed an amended pleading in which, for the first time, they sought to have their prior and subsequent mortgages enforced in the plaintiffs suit. On July 18, issues were framed, including an issue as to the sums due on the respective mortgages in favour of the plaintiff and of the Guha defendants. On August 29 an issue, not now of importance, was amended at the instance of Nabin Kishore. On July 18, issues were framed, including an issue as to the sums due on the respective mortgages in favour of the plaintiff and of the Guha defendants. On August 29 an issue, not now of importance, was amended at the instance of Nabin Kishore. After her death in September, 1932, the appellant, who had filed no written statement on his own account, asked leave, on November 1, 1932, to file a new written statement as her representative. He was given leave, but as he applied late, leave was only given on the terms that he could take no fresh ground of defence apart from those already raised by her previous written statement. He filed a written statement on November 14, 1932, of which paras. 5 to 7, setting up an interest of third parties in the mortgaged property, were struck out by order of November 19. The first and main contention of the appellant throughout has been that Nabin Kishore was a purdanashin lady, that the mortgage deed sued upon was not explained to her, and that for this reason the mortgage is invalid even against him. Both Courts in India held on very convincing evidence that though an old lady, Nabin Kishore had considerable capacity for business; that the deed was read over to her, though it was not explained; that she understood its effect, except that she did not understand that she was making herself personally liable to repay the money borrowed from the plaintiff. Neither Court in India appears to have appreciated that, if for want of explanation the lady did not understand an important feature of the transaction, it cannot be held that her mind and free consent went with her act in executing the deed. A purdanashin woman is not required to understand every technical detail of a bargain. In the judgment of the Board, delivered by Lord Buckmaster, in Sunitabala Debi v. Dhara Sundari Debt Chowdhurani (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 272.), this is pointed out, and the " proper and necessary test " was held to have been applied by the Subordinate Judge, who had found " that the "lady had sufficient intelligence to understand the relevant "and important matters, that she did understand them as "they were explained to her, that nothing was concealed, "and that there was no undue influence or misrepresentation.(Ibid. 278.) And in Farid-un-nisa v. Mukhtar Ahmad (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 342.), the Board stated the requirement as being that the disposition made must be substantially understood and must really be the mental act, as its execution is the physical act, of the person who makes it."(Ibid. 350) Though there may not be "a clear understanding of each detail of a matter which may be greatly involved in legal technicalities" (2)—to use Lord Buckmasters words—there may still be an intelligent comprehension of the bargain on the part of the lady. In such a case the bargain is good, and is good as a whole. But, if a feature of the transaction affecting in a high degree the expediency of her entering into it, is not understood by the lady, the bargain cannot be divided into parts or otherwise reformed by the Courts so as to uphold certain portions of it while rejecting others. Her answer to a suit upon the deed is not that she has an equitable defence to the enforcement of a certain stipulation, but that it is not her deed. The protection extended to a person in her situation is protection against being held bound by a transaction which never had her free and intelligent consent. Their Lordships must accept the concurrent finding of the Indian Courts that the lady did not understand that she was incurring personal liability for the loan, and on this view must dispose of the case on the footing that the mortgage deed did not bind her at all. What defence is that to the Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 309 ( 1939- 1940) Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury V. Suradhani Debya Chaudhurani 111 appellant? That he had the beneficial interest in the property is agreed, though the trust deed of 1913 is not before the Board. He was competent to mortgage his interest. No doctrine of the law of India has been indicated to their Lordships which prevents a beneficiary under a trust from dealing with his interest by way of mortgage, though it is true enough that in India such an interest is not technically regarded as an equitable estate. If Nabin Kishore had a life interest in one of the villages, as she would appear from her sons will to have had under her husbands permission to adopt, that in no way affects the present suit. If Nabin Kishore had a life interest in one of the villages, as she would appear from her sons will to have had under her husbands permission to adopt, that in no way affects the present suit. The life interest has come to an end. The mortgage is not being enforced against it, but is good and enforceable against the appellants interest in the village—an interest which came to him as his fathers heir, though subject, it may be, to certain life interests outstanding in his fathers mother and widows. The plaintiffs mortgage is plainly enforceable against the appellant, whose defence is neither honest nor substantial. The only other question raised by the appeal has reference to the relief granted to the Guha defendants in respect of their subsequent mortgages of 1920 and 1923 (exhibits R and T). No relief whatever was given to them in respect of their prior mortgage of March 18, 1918 (exhibit S), and no personal decree was given to them in respect of either of the subsequent mortgages. Under Order XXXIV., r. 4, clause 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, they were at least entitled to redeem the plaintiff, or to receive their own mortgage money under exhibits R and T out of the surplus sale proceeds remaining after satisfaction of the plaintiffs mortgage. If they pay off the plaintiff they become entitled to apply for a final decree for sale in the plaintiffs stead. They have been given this relief and nothing more. The appellant claims to have a grievance that some objection to the validity of these subse quent mortgages was taken by him, but has not been tried. But their Lordships have not succeeded in ascertaining the nature of the objection which requires still to be tried. The execution of the deeds is not disputed, there is no ground for objecting to the rate of interest, the sums due upon the deeds have been enquired into and ascertained. The trial judge rightly refused to allow the appellant to set up the interest of his fathers widows, and the decree will not bind them. The appellant has not shown to their Lordships any ground for dissatisfaction with the orders of the trial judge upon his belated written statement of November, 1932—orders which have been already detailed in this judgment., On this part of the case also the appeal must fail. The appellant has not shown to their Lordships any ground for dissatisfaction with the orders of the trial judge upon his belated written statement of November, 1932—orders which have been already detailed in this judgment., On this part of the case also the appeal must fail. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of respondent number one.