JUDGMENT Zia-ul-Hasan, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal against an appellate decree of the learned Civil Judge of Lucknow dismissing his suit on a mortgage. 2. The mortgage deed in question was alleged to have been executed by Chhedi father of respondent No. 2, in favour of Gaya Prasad, uncle of the plaintiff-appellant, and the suit was for recovery of Rs. 227-7-9. 3. The other respondents are subsequent transferees of the mortgaged property. The plaintiff's case was that he formed a joint Hindu family with his uncle Gaya Prasad and that on Gaya Prasad's death he succeeded to the joint property by right of survivorship. The suit was contested by defendant No. 4 only who denied the mortgage deed in suit. He also pleaded that even if the deed be held to have been duly executed by Chhedi the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit as Gaya Prasad's wife was living and as the plaintiff was not a member of a joint family with him. In any case, he urged, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree without producing a succession certificate. There was also a plea of limitation and the defendant claimed to be an agriculturist. 4. Issues were framed by the trial Court on all these points and all of them were decided in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff as prayed. The defendant appealed and the following three points were urged before the learned Civil Judge who heard the appeal- (1) That the plaintiff had failed to prove the execution of the mortgage deed in suit ; (2) That the plaintiff was not a member of a joint family with his uncle Gaya Prasad, and (3) That the defendant-appellant was entitled to the benefits of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. 5. The latter two points were decided by the learned Civil Judge in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant-appellant but on the first point he held that the mortgage-deed in suit had not been proved according to law as no attesting witness had been called by the plaintiff. The appeal of the defendant was therefore allowed and the plaintiffs suit dismissed. 6. The appeal of the defendant was therefore allowed and the plaintiffs suit dismissed. 6. The plaintiff brings this second appeal and urges that as the contesting defendant had not "specifically denied" the execution of the mortgage deed, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to produce an attesting witness. It appears that in proof of the deed in suit, the plaintiff examined himself. There were two attesting witnesses but one of them was said not to be traceable and about the other the plaintiff stated that be did not want to produce him as he had refused to give evidence in his favour. The learned Munsif was of opinion that there was no specific denial of the execution of the document by the defendant and that therefore the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act applied. The learned Civil Judge was however of the contrary opinion and held that the denial of execution by the defendant was a specific denial within the meaning of the proviso to Section 68 and that therefore it was incumbent on the plaintiff to produce at least one of the attesting witnesses. I am of opinion that the learned Civil Judge was right in his opinion. The defendant not only denied the execution of the document but stated in his written statement that it was not genuine. I agree with the learned Civil Judge that by taking this plea the defendant put the plaintiff to proof of the document and that the plaintiff should have proved it according to law. 7. I also agree that the fact that one of the attesting witnesses had turned hostile was no sufficient ground for not producing him. The plaintiff could undoubtedly have obtained the Court's permission to cross-examine the witness. In (Talluri) Peda Manikyam Vs. Vantabattina Periagadu and Others, AIR 1932 Mad 148 it was held that the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act were mandatory and the fact that when called the said witness would prove hostile did not excuse the party producing the document from this duty of calling the said witness. In the case of Surmdra Bahadur Singh v. Behari Singh 1939 A.W.R. (P.C.) 69 : 1989 O.W.N. 450 : 1939 OA. In the case of Surmdra Bahadur Singh v. Behari Singh 1939 A.W.R. (P.C.) 69 : 1989 O.W.N. 450 : 1939 OA. 427 which was a suit on the basis of a mortgage, the defendant pleaded that he did not admit the execution of the mortgage deed and it Was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that the execution of the mortgage deed was "specifically denied" by the defendant within the meaning of the proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence Act. In that ease one of the five attesting witnesses had been examined by the plaintiffs but as his evidence was held to be unreliable, it was held by their Lordships that the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act had not been complied with. 8. It was argued that what the contesting defendant denied was the execution of the document and not its attestation according to law but it has been held in various cases that the word "execution" as used in the proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence Act in the case of a mortgage bond means and includes not only the signature or the executants but the whole series of acts or formalities which are necessary to give the document validity as a mortgage-vide e.g., Hare Krishna Panigrahi v. Jogneswar Panda (1940) 187 I.C. 644. 9. I am therefore of opinion that the finding of the learned Civil Judge on the point is correct. The learned Counsel for the appellant urged that if it be held that the plaintiff had failed to prove the mortgage deed, opportunity might be given to him now to produce one of the attesting witnesses. I am afraid, I cannot accede to this request at this stage. In the case of (Talluri) Peda Manikyam Vs. Vantabattina Periagadu and Others, AIR 1932 Mad 148 already referred to, it was held that where in the trial Court the pleading and the issues cover the question regarding proof of execution of a document required by law to be attested and the plaintiff has given evidence though insufficient to prove its execution, the plaintiff cannot be allowed in second appeal to adduce fresh evidence as regards the execution and that he cannot thus be allowed to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up the omissions. In the case of Kazim Husain v. Shambhoo Nath (1931) 8 O.W.N. 627 : AIR 1991 Oudh 298 also it was held that when a party could have applied to the lower Court for an adjournment to call further evidence but does not do and takes the chance of a judgment in his favour on the evidence then at his disposal, he will not be allowed to call it in the appellate Court. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee also held in the case of AIR 1931 143 (Privy Council) that the provisions of Section 107 as elucidated by O. 41, R. 27 are clearly not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak, parts of his case and fill up omissions in the Court of appeal. In the present case the plaintiff did make an attempt in the trial Court to get the case adjourned for producing one of the attesting witnesses but this request was eventually given up and while the case was in the lower appellate Court no attempt was made by the plaintiff to produce an attesting witness or to get the case remanded to the trial Court for the evidence of an attesting witness. In these circumstances it would not in my opinion be just to the defendant-respondent to send the case back for the evidence of a witness whom the plaintiff should have produced long before this. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.