JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is an execution second appeal by the decree-holder whose application for execution of his decree was dismissed by the Court of first instance and whose appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge of Fyzabad. 2. The facts set forth in the judgment of the lower appellate Court are not as full as they might have been, and it looks rather as if learned Counsel appearing in that Court had made something of an attempt to conceal facts from that Court. The decree-holder appellant obtained an installment decree for Rs. 614-11-0 with costs Rs. 97-8-0 and future interest at six per cent per annum on the 9th December, 1929. It was directed that the judgment-debtor would pay the amount of the decree in five equal installments on the 9th December, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934. It was further stated in the decree that in case of any default the decree-holder would have a right to execute the decree for the whole outstanding amount. On the 5th December, 1930, the judgment-debtor paid into Court the sum of Rs. 142-7-0 purporting to be the full amount of the first installment. An application was made to execute the whole decree on the 8th January, 1931, that is to say the decree holder claimed then and there to exercise his option to realize the whole decretal amount The decree-holder's application was dismissed' on the following day, that is the 9th January, 1931, on an office report that the first installment had been paid. Against this dismissal of the application an appeal was filed by the decree-holder who claimed that Rs. 142/7/- was not the full amount due as the first installment. It appears on a rough calculation of the future interest which would have accrued during the first year that the amount of the first installment would have been not less than Rs. 151 but that it based on a calculation only of the interest for one year and not on a calculation of the interest which would accrue over the whole period of 5 years. If that is taken into consideration the amount of the first installment would have been considerably higher. The decree-holder's appeal was allowed and the execution case restored, and it seems to have proceeded in the Court of first instance for several months. If that is taken into consideration the amount of the first installment would have been considerably higher. The decree-holder's appeal was allowed and the execution case restored, and it seems to have proceeded in the Court of first instance for several months. It was ultimately consigned to records on the 10th July, 1931, both parties being absent on that date. It was in' these circumstances that no further application for execution was filed by the decree-holder until the 5th January, 1938. Extension of time for filing this application was sought on a plea that the decree-holder had on the 10th May, 1934, filed a certificate of payment of Rs. 5 and a further plea that on the 15th April, 1935, a sum of Rs. 10 had been paid to the decree-holder. No certificate of payment of this amount had been filed and in view of the decisions that the certifying of a payment of an amount, towards a decree is not a step-in-aid of execution, these two payments cannot be considered to have any bearing on the case at all. No other point was raised in the trial Court which accordingly dismissed the application. 3. In the lower appellate Court a further point was taken that limitation should be extended under the provisions of Section 15 of the Limitation Act by reason of the fact that under a letter of the Chief Court execution proceedings were stayed in the Subordinate Courts pending the debt legislation which was then on the legislative anvil. There is some dispute as to the period for which this so-called stay order was in force. On behalf of the appellant it is said to have remained in force up to some time in November, 1935, while, on behalf of the respondent it is said that it came to an end on the 30th April, 1935. The learned Additional Civil Judge held that in any case the letter of this Court which is being construed as a stay order related only to the stay of execution proceedings pending at that time, and he also stated, incorrectly as it happens, that the decree had already become time barred before the orders of the Hon'ble Chief Court. The incorrect statement seems to have been due to an incorrect statement, of facts by learned Counsel appearing in his Court. The incorrect statement seems to have been due to an incorrect statement, of facts by learned Counsel appearing in his Court. Actually in view of the fact that the first application for execution was consigned to records on the 10th July, 1931, the period of limitation for a fresh application, would have expired on the 9th July, 1934, that is to say during the period after the issue of this letter. On the other hand I am in full agreement with the learned Additional Civil Judge that this letter could not have operated to prevent the filing of fresh execution applications, although it would have led the Courts in which such applications were filed to stay them also. The letter requests the District Judges to stay all execution proceedings in Civil Court decrees passed against agriculturists as defined in the Agriculturists' Relief Bill until that Bill should become law, and also asks them to instruct the Courts subordinate to them to the same effect. It is obvious that this was no more than an administrative instruction to the Courts to keep execution cases pending against certain classes of persons until further orders. 4. There are two points in this connection. In the first place there is nothing whatsoever on the record of the present case to show that the judgment-debtor respondent was an agriculturist as defined in the Bill as it stood at that date, and therefore to induce the application of this letter. Secondly I am clearly of opinion that the issue of this letter could not in any case induce the application of Section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act. That section provides that- in computing the period or limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution of execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded. 5. It is to my mind perfectly clear that this section has application only to injunctions and orders judicially made, and could have no application whatsoever to such an instruction as this letter issued by the Chief Court to District Judges in 1934. The learned Additional Civil Judge therefore rightly declined to consider this letter. 5. It is to my mind perfectly clear that this section has application only to injunctions and orders judicially made, and could have no application whatsoever to such an instruction as this letter issued by the Chief Court to District Judges in 1934. The learned Additional Civil Judge therefore rightly declined to consider this letter. Failing the application of this letter it is clear that the present application, made on the 5th January, 1938, was hopelessly time barred. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant had suggested that by the application of Section 15. in connection with this letter the application for execution might not have been time-barred with regard to the installments falling due on the 9th December, 1933, and the 9th December, 1934. In my opinion even to that extent his appeal, would have been entirely without force because the moment the decree-holder exercised successfully the option to execute his decree for the whole amount, he at once converted the decree from being an installment decree into an ordinary decree for the realization of the Cull decretal amount. He could not again claim to realize any of the installments as they fell due or rather within three years from the date on which they fell due. 7. The learned Additional Civil Judge rightly dismissed the decree-holder's appeal. There is no force in the' present appeal which therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.