JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. - This is a reference made by the learned Commissioner of Lucknow Division u/s 289 1940 A W R (H C) 383 : 1940 Rev. Rep. 129 : 1940 R D 274 of the U.P. Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939) and arises out of a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent u/s 127 of the Oudh Rent Act (XXII of 1886) filed by the appellant against the respondent. 2. The suit was dismissed on the 24th September, 1939, by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Muhamdi, district Kheri. The appeal was filed before the District Judge on the 30th October, 1939, but it was returned by him on the 29th January, 1940, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal which in his opinion should be filed before the Commissioner Accordingly he returned the appeal to the appellant for presentation before the Commissioner. 3. The learned Commissioner is of the opinion that the appeal was rightly filed in the Court of the District Judge as it is that Court to which the appeal from the order u/s 127 of the Oudh Rent Act lay under the old Act. He has taken the view that Section 296 of the U. P. Tenacy Act does not apply as the word "suit" used in that section does not include an appeal. The Oudh Rent Act (XXII of 1886) has been repealed by the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 from the 1st January, 1940. Under the former Act appeals in such cases lay to the District Judge while under the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 the appeal in a similar suit lies to the Commissioner. The learned Commissioner has made a reference to this Court for the decision of the question of jurisdiction. 4. The only question raised by the reference is whether the appeal against the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Muhamdi u/s 127 of the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 lay to the District Judge or whether in view of the provisions of Section 296 of the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 it lies to the Commissioner. 4. The only question raised by the reference is whether the appeal against the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Muhamdi u/s 127 of the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 lay to the District Judge or whether in view of the provisions of Section 296 of the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 it lies to the Commissioner. Section 296 of the U. P. Tenancy Act runs as follows: A suit under any of the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 or the Oudh Rent Act, 1886, which is pending at the commencement of this Act or a decree under any of the provisions of either of these Acts, which has not been satisfied in full at such commencement, shall be decided or executed, as the case may be, in accordance with the corresponding provision of this Act and if there is no such corresponding provision the proceedings relating to such suit or decree shall be quashed 5. The word "suit" has not been defined in the Act. On the other hand, we find that suits and appeals have been separetely treated in the Act (Vide, Chapter XIV). We are of opinion that the word "suit" used in Section 296 means nothing more nor less than a suit contemplated under the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 or the Oudh Rent Act of 1886, and there is no warrant for holding that the meaning of the ward "suit" should be so extended as to include an appeal. All that the section lays down is that a suit under any of the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 of the Oudh Rent Act, 1886, which is pending at the date of the commencement of the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939, i.e. the 1st January, 1940, shall be decided in accordance with the corresponding provision of this Act and if there is no such corresponding provision, the proceedings relating to such suit shall be quashed. Whether there is any corresponding provision in the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 analogous to Section 127 of the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 or not, it is clear that if the word "suit" used in the section cannot be construed to include the case of an appeal this section will not apply. Whether there is any corresponding provision in the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 analogous to Section 127 of the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 or not, it is clear that if the word "suit" used in the section cannot be construed to include the case of an appeal this section will not apply. As a matter of fact this case is covered by a decision of this Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. Ram Lautan 1940 O A 496 : 1940 A W R (C C) 379 : 1940 O W N 621. It was held in this case that Section 296 of the U. P. Tenancy Act refers only to ruits which have not already been decided by the trial Court at the time when the new Act came into force, and that a suit cannot be said to be pending within the meaning of Section (sic) after it has been decided by the trial Court. A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in a case in Bindraban Katiar v. Ganga Ram 1940 A W R (H C) 383 : 1940 Rev. Rep. 129 : 1940 R D 274. 6. We have no doubt that the Legislaurte never intended to lay down that once the rights of the parties had been adjudicated by a Court according to the law prevalent at the time of such adjudication, a wholly different law should be applied to the decision of the case when the matter reached the stage of an appeal. 7. It was held by a Full Bench of the Allahahad High Court in Ram Singha and Another Vs. Shankar Dayal and Another that a right of appeal in a suit is governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit, and not by the law prevailing at the date of the decision of the suit or at the date of the filing of the appeal. Shankar Dayal and Another that a right of appeal in a suit is governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit, and not by the law prevailing at the date of the decision of the suit or at the date of the filing of the appeal. It was held that u/s 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act of 1904, unless a different intention appears, the repeal of an Act cannot affect any right, privilege obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or affect any remedy or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation, and any such remedy may be enforced, and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. 8. In Tulshi Ram v. Madho Ram 1940 O. A. 875 : 1940 AWR (CC) 420 : 1940 OWN 888 it was held that changes in procedural law cannot operate retrospectively so as to affect rights which have accrued before the Act which makes those changes come into force. 9. We are, therefore, satisfied that the right to appeal in the present case is governed by the Oudh Rent Act of 1886 and as such the appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge. We accordingly accept the reference and direct that the learned Commissioner shall return the appeal for presentation to the Court of the District Judge. This order governs Civil Reference Nos. 9, 10 and 11 of 1940 also. 10. When these appeals are re-filed before the District Judge by the appellants in the respective cases, they shall be decided on the merits and no plea on the ground that the appeals have become time barred by reason of the order of the District Judge returning the appeals for presentation to the Commissioner shall be entertained. Such time as may have elapsed is excused u/s 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. 11. Let the papers be returned to the Commissioner