JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This appeal is by the Defendant No. 6 and it arises out of a suit for rent. One Bilasbati Debi was the original Plaintiff. The Defendant No. 1 is the tenant and the Defendants Nos. 2 to 7 were made parties as co-sharer landlords. The Defendant No. 8 was joined as a party as he was formerly a co-sharer. He has no interest in the property now. The Plaintiff's case is that the Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 had a half-anna share of the landlord's interest, that the Defendant No. 6 had a 131/2 as share therein and that the Defendant No. 7 a 2 annas share. The Defendant No. 7 by three separate kobalas transferred his 2 annas share to the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The Plaintiff has sold a 1 anna share and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 a one-half anna share each. The original Plaintiff sued for the rent of her share for the period 1341 to Asar, 1344 B.S. The Defendant No. 6 was the real contestant and it is with respect to the contention of this Defendant that appeal is concerned. The Defendant No. 1 pleaded payment, but that plea has been disbelieved by both Courts and that point is no longer in controversy. The Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 joined the Plaintiff and they are now the Plaintiffs in the suit. The defence taken by the Defendant No. 6 briefly is this. He says that on the 5th May, 1924, there was an agreement by way of a family settlement between the Defendant No. 6 and the father of the Defendants Nos. 7 and 8 in which it was settled, inter alia, that if any of the co-sharers wished to sell his property, he would inform the other co-sharers and give them one month's time within which they could purchase the property. It is contended that as there was this agreement, the Defendant No. 7 was prevented from selling his share in the property to the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and that they could derive no title by the sale in their favour which was effected on the 31st March, 1935. 2. The second ground upon which the Defendant No. 6 resisted the suit is this. On the 29th June, 1934, the co-sharer landlords referred their disputes to arbitration. 2 and 3 and that they could derive no title by the sale in their favour which was effected on the 31st March, 1935. 2. The second ground upon which the Defendant No. 6 resisted the suit is this. On the 29th June, 1934, the co-sharer landlords referred their disputes to arbitration. The arbitrators were to partition the property among them. On the 24th March, 1935, the arbitrators pronounced their award and by it the property alleged to have been sold by the Defendant No. 7 to the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was awarded to the Defendant No. 6. It is contended that as this award came into effect on the 24th March, 1935, the Defendant No. 7 had no interest in the property on the 31st March, 1935, when the kobalas were executed in favour of the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3. These are the two grounds upon which the Defendant No. 6 relied. 3. The trial Court held that the Plaintiff could not be affected by the family arrangement giving the co-sharers a right of pre-emption as she was not a party thereto and had no notice of it. As regards the second contention the Court held that no title passed to the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 by the transfer made by the Defendant No. 7 inasmuch as the transfer was made after the award. It held, however, that the Plaintiff was entitled to get rent for a certain period, for reasons which I have not been able to appreciate, and gave the Plaintiffs a partial decree and dismissed their suit with regard to the rest. The Plaintiffs appealed and there was a cross-objection by the Defendant No. 6. The appeal succeeded and the cross-objection was dismissed. The Defendant No. 6 appeals. 4. The only point which has been argued before me is that the award had the effect of depriving the Defendant No. 7 of all right to the property which was the subject-matter of the transfer and that the transfer having been made after the award, the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 derived no title thereto. This was the only contention urged on behalf of the Appellant, the other ground of objection regarding the family arrangement by which a right of pre-emption was given to the co-sharers being abandoned. 5. 2 and 3 derived no title thereto. This was the only contention urged on behalf of the Appellant, the other ground of objection regarding the family arrangement by which a right of pre-emption was given to the co-sharers being abandoned. 5. The contention urged on behalf of the Respondents is that the award was not pronounced on the 24th March, 1935, but on the 5th June, 1935, and therefore, it had not the effect of depriving the Defendant No. 7 of his rights in the property until that date. It is contended, therefore, that the Defendant No. 7 had title in the property till 31st March, 1935, when he made the transfer to the Respondents. 6. These are the only arguments advanced before me by either side. The only point for decision in this appeal, therefore, is whether the award took effect on the 24th March, 1935, or whether it took effect on the 5th June, 1935. If it took effect on the 24th March, 1935, then it is conceded that the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 got no interest in the property by the transfer in their favour by the Defendant No. 7. If it did not take effect till the 5th June, 1935, then it is conceded that the Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 have acquired title to the share of the Defendant No. 7 and are entitled to get a decree for rent. 7. The controversy as to when the award took effect arises out of the fact that although the award was signed on the 5th June, 1935, there is a statement in the award to the effect that it was "declared" on the 24th March, 1935, in the presence of the parties. In the last paragraph of the award, there is the following statement-- After declaring this award on the 24th of March, 1935, in the presence of both the parties, we have signed it. Finis. Dated the 5th Jane, 1935. 8. On behalf of the Appellant, the argument is that the award was made on the 24th March, 1935, and that it took effect from that date. The learned Advocate argued that the signing of the award on the 5th June, 1935, was a mere formality and did not postpone the award taking effect till that date. 8. On behalf of the Appellant, the argument is that the award was made on the 24th March, 1935, and that it took effect from that date. The learned Advocate argued that the signing of the award on the 5th June, 1935, was a mere formality and did not postpone the award taking effect till that date. On behalf of the Respondents it is argued that this last paragraph of the award means that on the 24th March, 1935, the arbitrators indicated to the parties what their award would be and that the award was really made on the 5th June, 1935, and took effect from that date. I have heard the learned Advocates at some length on this point and I have come to the conclusion that the contention urged on behalf of the Appellant is the correct one. There is a clear statement in the last paragraph that this award was "declared" in the presence of both parties on the 24th March, 1935. There can be no doubt that on this date the arbitrators, had finally decided "the question which was submitted to them. Not only had they finally decided the question on this date, but they published their decision to the parties. The award became effective on the date on which the parties were made aware of it. The effectiveness of the award was not postponed to the date on which it was signed. I am fortified in this view by certain statements made in paragraph 3 of the award. It is said there that upto the month of Chaitra, 1341 B.S. (corresponding to about the 12th of April, 1935) the parties to the submission would be equally liable for the rents due to the malik's estate and would be entitled to realise in equal shares the rents due from the tenants. The arbitrators then go on to say that from Baisakh 1342 B.S. (corresponding to the 14th April, 1935), each party will go on separately enjoying and possessing the land and jama in his own share according to the partition made by this award and paying the rent thereof. The arbitrators then go on to say that from Baisakh 1342 B.S. (corresponding to the 14th April, 1935), each party will go on separately enjoying and possessing the land and jama in his own share according to the partition made by this award and paying the rent thereof. It is thus quite clear that the partition was made before Baisakh, 1342 (=April, 1935) and that the parties were given the right by the award to be in separate possession of the share allotted to them from Baisakh, 1342 B.S. By the very terms of the award it took effect from Baisakh, 1342 (corresponding to April, 1935) and not from the 5th June, 1935, when it was recorded on a stamped paper and signed. This award was published to the parties on the 24th March, 1935, and from that date the Defendant No. 7 ceased to have any interest in the property which is the subject-matter of this suit. The Plaintiff and the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, therefore, acquired no title to the property by their purchase on the 31st March, 1935, and they cannot get any rent for the period subsequent to the last date of Chaitra, 1341 B.S. inasmuch as by the terms of the award the interest of the Defendant No. 7 in the property in suit was transferred to the Defendant No. 6 from the first of Baisakh, 1342 B.S. The result is that this appeal must be allowed, the decree passed by the Court below must be set aside and that of the trial Court restored with costs both here and in the Court below.