JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is a second appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for redemption of a shop which was decreed by the trial Court but dismissed on appeal by the lower appellate Court. It is a pity that this appeal had to be heard ex parte as no appearance was put in on behalf of the respondents. The point for decision is not free from difficulty, and I should have preferred to have been able to hear learned Counsel on both sides in the appeal. 2. This suit relates to a shop in the Bazar or small town of Nwabganj in the district of Gonda. On the 26th April, 1889, a simple mortgage in respect of this shop was executed by the plaintiff 'Angna Ram's elder brother Bachchu Lal and their mother Mst. Umrai for a gum of Rs. 200. Interest was stated to be at Rs. 15 per cent per annum and the period for payment was three years. It was stated on behalf of the plaintiff that the mortgagees had been put in possession of this shop as lessees at Rs. 3 per mensem, probably about the year 1886, and that it was agreed (presumably subsequently) between the parties that the rent would be credited first to interest and second to principal. As the rent would have been Rs. 36 per annum and interest only Rs. 30 pet annum, that would have meant that there would have been a surplus of Rs. 6 to be credited annually to principal which. would thus have been progressively reduced and paid off within a period of 33 years at the most. In fact as the principal became reduced by the annual payments, the annual interest would also have been reduced, and therefore the whole amount of the loan Would have been paid off probably) in about 50 years. 3. The present suit was filed after 47 years from the date of the mortgage on the 24th September, 1936 A number of pleas were raised. The statement on behalf of the plaintiffs has already been mentioned. 3. The present suit was filed after 47 years from the date of the mortgage on the 24th September, 1936 A number of pleas were raised. The statement on behalf of the plaintiffs has already been mentioned. On behalf of the defendants it was pleaded that the shop was sever let out to the mortgagees Hanoman and Ganesh, but that when the period fixed for payment expired and the mortgagees demanded the money from Bachchu Lal, Bachchu Lal pleaded inability to pay and transferred the shop to the mortgagees outright by an oral sale, and that thereupon the mortgagees entered into possession of the shop as owners. They subsequently rebuilt it after obtaining permission from the Notified Area authorities and spent about Rs. 500 in making sew constructions, The defendants contended that in any case they and their predecessors had been in adverse 'possession of the shop in dispute to more than 12 years. 4. The learned Munsif held that the plaintiff had failed to prove the letting of the shop to the original mortgagees or the agreement that the rent of the shop would be credited towards interest and principal. While holding that the defendants had failed to prove the oral sale he held that the mortgagees had entered into possession as mortgagees and were bound to keep accounts u/s 76 of the Transfer of Property Act which they had not done, but that the plaintiff had failed to adduce evidence as to the amount of the profits. He further held that the defendants' allegations as to the amount spent on rebuilding the shop were exaggerated, that the defendants had not acquired title by adverse possession, and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the shop on payment of Rs. 200 principal and Rs. 90 interest for three years at Rs. 15 per cent per annum. 5. The lower appellate Court took a different view of the case and held that the possession of the defendants - was adverse, that although their story" of the oral sale had failed, it could not be said that they had come into possession as mortgagees, and therefore they were not liable to keep accounts. In as much therefore as the defendants' possession was adverse, the plaintiffs could not maintain the suit for redemption. 6. In as much therefore as the defendants' possession was adverse, the plaintiffs could not maintain the suit for redemption. 6. The position which emerges from the findings of fact of the Courts Below is this much that there undoubtedly was a mortgage of this shop in the year 1889. The period for redemption in the case of an usufructuary mortgage would not in the ordinary way finally expire until the year 1949. Secondly we have it found that the defendants were not lessees of the shop, nor was there any agreement that rent should be credited towards the amount due under the mortgage, nor on the other hand is it proved that the defendants came into possession under an oral sale. It is not the contention of either party that the mortgagees got possession as mortgagees. The resulting facts then are that the defendants are or rather were mortgagees under this simple mortgage of 1889, and that they have somehow or other come to be and are in possession of the mortgaged property since many years (the defendants say 1892 while the plaintiff himself says 1886) "and have rebuilt the house or at any rate spent money on it. The question is what is the proper inference in law to be drawn from these facts. On the one hand it is contended that the defendants must be in possession as mortgagees, and on the other hand it is contended as was held by the learned Additional Civil Judge that their possession is adverse to the plaintiff. 7. The learned Additional Civil Judge relied upon Keshavrao Vasantrao Vijaykar v. Nanabhai Sadanand AIR 1929 P.C. 61 and Syed Humayun Qadar v. Suraiya Begam AIR 1931 Oudh 69. In the former of these two cases a foreclosure decree in the English form had been passed in 1875 directing that if the mortgagor failed to pay within six months $he mortgage amount, he would stand absolutely debarred and foreclosed of and from the equity of redemption. Not being in a position to find the necessary funds the mortgagor gave up possession to the mortgagee some years after. The mortgagee and those claiming through him remained in unchallenged possession for 45 years and expended large sums in improving and rebuilding the property. A suit for redemption was brought in 1921. 8. Not being in a position to find the necessary funds the mortgagor gave up possession to the mortgagee some years after. The mortgagee and those claiming through him remained in unchallenged possession for 45 years and expended large sums in improving and rebuilding the property. A suit for redemption was brought in 1921. 8. It was held that- the mortgagor acquiesced in the position that the mortgagee was entitled to hold the property as his own and that it was no longer necessary for the latter to execute the foreclosure decree. At least a mortgagor seeking to redeem after a foreclosure decree was bound to do so within a reasonable time, and was not entitled to wait for more than 45 years. 9. The significant facts in this case are that there bad been a foreclosure decree and that subsequent to that decree the mortgagor gave up possession to the mortgagee just as he would have had to do if the mortgagee had executed his decree. For this reason it was considered in effect that the position was as if the mortgage decree had been executed and the mortgagee had come into possession under that decree. 10. In the Oudh case a somewhat similar position arose. A mortgagee's suit for the recovery of the mortgage money was decreed but the mortgagor made default in payment of the decretal amount. Neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee took any further steps in connection with the decree but the mortgagee subsequent to the date of the decree entered into possession of the mortgaged property. It was held that the mortgagee's possession was adverse. It was, however, remarked that ordinarily the right to redeem subsists until a sale under a decree on the foot of a mortgage takes place and is confirmed by the Court. The Court took the view in this case that from the year 1889 right up to the present moment 1931, the houses in question had been held and possessed by the decree-holder and his representatives in the character of owners and not of mortgagees, and they proceeded to follow the decision in Keshavarao Vasautrao's case. 11. The Court took the view in this case that from the year 1889 right up to the present moment 1931, the houses in question had been held and possessed by the decree-holder and his representatives in the character of owners and not of mortgagees, and they proceeded to follow the decision in Keshavarao Vasautrao's case. 11. There is obviously a very wide distinction between cases in which there has been a -decree, and subsequent to that decree, although without execution of that decree, the mortgagee comes into possession of the mortgaged property and cases where without any decree at all during the duration of the mortgage the mortgagee who was originally a simple mortgagee comes into possession of the mortgaged property. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the Nagpur case of Awdh Singh v. Nanhai alias Jagat Singh (1917) 46 I.C. 872 (Nag.) : AIR 1917 Nag. 33 in which the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner laid down the following proposition: I hold that where a person having a mortgage in any form over a property takes possession of such property, rightly or wrongly with, without or against the consent of the mortgagor, under whatsoever claim or title, his possession will be that of a mortgagee, subject at least to the same liabilities : and such possession for any length of time Bhort of the statutory period, except in cases where the right of redemption has been released by the mortgagor, will be no bar or defence to a suit for redemption where the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to redeem. 13. This very broad proposition was said to be founded on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Khiarajmal v. Daim and with the greatest respect it does not seem to me to follow very clearly from that decision. I am inclined to think that the proposition is a little too broadly stated arid that there is somewhat too little emphasis laid upon the provisos, but substantially I would agree with it. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellant has himself referred to Khiarajmal's case (1904) 32 Cal. 296 (P. C ) but an examination of that case show's that the defendants had begun by being in possession as usufructuary mortgagees, and therefore this case did not furnish a real foundation for the proposition laid down in the Nagpur case. 15. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellant has himself referred to Khiarajmal's case (1904) 32 Cal. 296 (P. C ) but an examination of that case show's that the defendants had begun by being in possession as usufructuary mortgagees, and therefore this case did not furnish a real foundation for the proposition laid down in the Nagpur case. 15. Learned Counsel referred to the case of Karnam Kandaswamy Pillay Vs. Chinnabha alias Subbaraya Pillay and Others, AIR 1921 Mad 82 and as being one which might be taken to stand in his way. In that case there was an oral arrangement between the mortgagor and the usufructuary mortgagee, whereby the latter retained possession of a portion of the mortgaged property in full ownership in satisfaction of the mortgage debt, and enjoyed it as full owner for more than 12 years after this arrangement. On a suit being instituted by the mortgagor to redeem the property more than 12 years later, it was held that: the mortgagee had acquired by adverse possession an absolute title to the property, and that the mortgagor's right to redeem the property was barred by limitation. 16. In my opinion it is difficult to deduce any principle from this i case which is applicable to the present case. That case depended on proof of the arrangement. That arrangement being proved it was held that the possession which could not otherwise have been anything but mortgagee possession could be regarded as adverse possession in the capacity of owner, which could ripen into full ownership. 17. It appears to me that the decision of the present case must turn on the proper construction to be placed on the proved facts, excluding from consideration those which are not proved. The defendants failed to prove that they being mortgagees came into possession under an arrangement that their possession would be that of owners. On the other hand they conceded that they came into possession with the consent of their mortgagors. It would appear to me that in a case where during the subsistence of a mortgage a mortgagee is proved or admitted by both parties to have come into possession of the property with the consent of the mortgagor, the possession of the mortgagee must be taken to be possession as a mortgagee. It would appear to me that in a case where during the subsistence of a mortgage a mortgagee is proved or admitted by both parties to have come into possession of the property with the consent of the mortgagor, the possession of the mortgagee must be taken to be possession as a mortgagee. In order to avoid this position the mortgagees had to prove their allegation that they entered into possession in discharge of the debt, and that thereby the mortgage was extinguished. As I said earlier this amounts to a substantial agreement with the proposition laid down in the Nagpur case. 18. On these findings I hold that the defendants are in possession as mortgagees and that as the period for redemption of 60" years has not expired the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for redemption. 19. Coining to the second question as to the proper amount on payment of which redemption should be decreed. Once it is found that the defendants entered into possession as mortgagees they were liable tinder Section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act to maintain accounts. It has been held in Lakshmi Narain v. Mohamadi Begam, Mst. (1951) 9 OWN 60 : AIR 1932 Oudh 123 that- where a mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property, he is, during the continuance of the mortgage, under a statutory liability to keep accounts u/s 76 Clauses (g) and (h) of the Transfer of Property Act, and this is so in the case of every mortgage, whether usufructuary or otherwise. Where the mortgagee fails to keep the accounts as required by law the Court can make every presumption against him. 20. It seems to me to be a reasonable presumption since there has been no accounting between the parties throughout the period from 1892 up to date that the amount of the rent was taken to be equivalent to the interest due on the mortgage amount. The learned Munsif gave the plaintiff a decree for redemption on payment of the mortgage amount of Rs. 200 with interest for the three years during which the defendants were out of possession at the contractual rate, Re. 30 per annum. The learned Munsif gave the plaintiff a decree for redemption on payment of the mortgage amount of Rs. 200 with interest for the three years during which the defendants were out of possession at the contractual rate, Re. 30 per annum. I see no reason to differ from this view and accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge, and while restoring the decree of the trial Court with costs throughout I extend the period for payment of the redemption money which may be found due after deducting the costs of all the Courts and direct that payment be made of the sum so found due within six months from this date.