JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - These are nine connected appeals from the decrees of the District Judge of Gonda dismissing the plaintiff's suits under Sections 127 of the Oudh Rest Act which had been decreed by the trial Court of an Assistant Collector, first class, of Gonda district. 2. The circumstances out of which these appeals have arisen put shortly are as follows: On the 18th November, l869, the predecessors of the present defendants-respondents got a decree from the Settlement Court in the capacity of "Dahiyak" holders allowing them 10 per cent of the profits. This decree was interpreted in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh on the 13th July, 1913, as a decree granting heritable non-transferable rights commonly called the rights of per petual lessees, in fact a kind of occupancy tenancy. In 1917 Raja Abdul Hasan Khan instituted a suit for ejectment u/s 52 of the Oudh Rent Act and obtained a decree, but it is not in dispute that this decree was never put into execution. There is no evidence whatsoever as to the circumstances in which or the reasons on account of which the decree was not executed and the defendants of these suits not ejected, but it is probable that it had some connection with other litigation which was going on during those years. It is stated that the defendants somewhere about 1910 purchased proprietary rights in a Court sale, so that about the same time when this ejectment decree was obtained they combined the capacities of proprietors and perpetual lessees, and that may explain why, although a decree for ejectment was obtained, it was never executed. Subsequently in 1926 the defendants whose purchase of proprietary rights had led to litigation right up to the Privy Council, lost those rights. In the same year were entered as tenants "bila tasfia lagan", and continued to be so entered up to the present day. The learned Assistant Collector who tried the suit and gave a decree for rent (damages for use and occupation) and ejectment u/s 127 held, relying on the order in the correction of papers case of 1926 and on the rest of the history of the case, that the defendants were "bila faisla" tenants, and decreed the plaintiff's suit accordingly. 3. The learned Assistant Collector who tried the suit and gave a decree for rent (damages for use and occupation) and ejectment u/s 127 held, relying on the order in the correction of papers case of 1926 and on the rest of the history of the case, that the defendants were "bila faisla" tenants, and decreed the plaintiff's suit accordingly. 3. In the appeals to the lower Court the contention put forward was that as the defendants were never actually ejected in spite of the decree of 1917, they continued to hold the plots in suit in their former capacity of perpetual lessees and hence were not liable to ejectment on a suit u/s 127 of the Oudh Rent Act. This is the view which has found favour with the lower appellate Court. The District Judge in the body of the judgment wrote as follows: The question is can the defendants be ejected u/s 127? The decree of 1917 not having been put in execution can have no effect now. The appellants hold the same position as they held before. Being perpetual lessees they could not be ejected u/s 127, even if they refused to pay the rent demanded. This happened in 1917 and the proprietor himself thought that the appellants should be ejected by a suit u/s 52. It is argued that on refusal to pay the de. mended rent the appellants ceased to have any right to retain possession of the land and so could be ejected u/s 127. They certainly ceased to have any right, but it does not mean that they became trespassers They ought to he ejected in a regular manner and so long as it is not done they would have the same rights 4. The argument which finds a place in this portion of the lower appellate Court's judgment would certainly have been very effective had Section 127 still been worded as it was in 1917, but that is not the case. 5. On behalf of the appellants strong reliance is placed on this remark of the learned District Judge that defendants certainly ceased to have any right, and it is contended that the further remark which follows that the defendants did not become trespassers (within the meaning of Section 127) is not sound. I have been shown a series of cases ending with the case relied upon by the lower appellate Court. I have been shown a series of cases ending with the case relied upon by the lower appellate Court. In Deputy Commissioner, Fyza-bad for Nanemau Estate v. Gur Dayal Singh (1912) 16 OC. 311 it was held that where a tenant was ejected formally under the provisions of Section 60 of the Oudh Rent Act, but nevertheless continued to cultivate the holding in question without any break for any period, however small, held, that the provisions of Section 127 of the Oudh Rent Act could not apply to such a case." 6. That was a case of 1912, and with the greatest respect I do not think that that decision is any longer sound in view of the present wording of Section 127. In point of fact I doubt its inherent soundness. If an ejectment decree is put into execution and formal "dakhl" is given, the tenant then and there ceases to be in possession, and any subsequent taking of possession by the ex-tenant is within the meaning of Section 127 taking possession without being entitled to such possession. 7. The next case quoted was Anporna Kuer, Thakurain v. Ram Raton Singh (1926) 3 OWN (Sup.) 162 : AIR 1926 Oudh 505 in which it was held that: where a suit by a tenant to contest the notice of ejectment has failed but the landlord does not succeed in ejecting him and in getting possession of the land, suit by the landlord against the tenant for ejectment from the land in his possession is not maintainable in the Civil Court. As-long as the tenant continues in the occupation of his holding and is not legally ejected be cannot be treated as a trespasser. 8. This decision appears to me to be really irrelevant to the question for decision in the present case. The real ratio is that the defendant was a person who was either a tenant or a person to whom the provisions of Section 127 of the Oudh Rent Act were applicable, and therefore no suit for ejectment lay in a Civil Court. In this particular case the formal "dakhl" was found to be a fictitious proceeding, and therefore the tenant had never actually been ejected at all, but again this was a suit to which the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act prior to its amendment were applicable. 9. In this particular case the formal "dakhl" was found to be a fictitious proceeding, and therefore the tenant had never actually been ejected at all, but again this was a suit to which the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act prior to its amendment were applicable. 9. Lastly reliance has been placed on AIR 1930 202 (Oudh) in which it was held that: where a notice of ejectment is issued against a tenant and the notice is not contested or if a suit is instituted to contest the notice but is unsuccessful and the notice is upheld, in either of these cases the tenancy is determined only when tenant actually surrenders possession of the holding or when proceedings for actual ejectment are taken u/s 60 of the Oudh Rent Act. Where the tenant does not surrender possession of the holding and the landlord does not take proceedings u/s 60 of the Oudh Rent Act, the tenant must be deemed to have continued as a tenant holding over and cannot be considered to be a trespasser and Section 127 does not apply. 10. Reliance was placed on the case of Anporna Kuer, Tkakurain (2) referred to above. No reference was made in this case to the terms of Section 127 of the Oudh Rent Act, and the decision is founded purely on the proposition that the legal status of the tenant (or in the present case perpetual lessee) does not change by reason of a decree for ejectment, unless that decree is actually put into execution. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that this case also is founded on the original wording of Section 127 as the case related to a compromise dated the 18th April, 1921, whereas the amending Act (Act TV of 1921) had not received the assent of the Governor of the United Provinces until the 28th November, 1921, and of the Governor-General until the 18th January, 1922, and was only published u/s 81 of the Government of India Act on the 11th February, 1922. The old wording was as follows: any person in possession of land occupied without consent of the landlord shall at the option of the person entitled to eject him as a trespasser be treated as a tenant, and shall thereupon be liable etc. 12. The old wording was as follows: any person in possession of land occupied without consent of the landlord shall at the option of the person entitled to eject him as a trespasser be treated as a tenant, and shall thereupon be liable etc. 12. After the amending Act the present wording was substituted and the section now runs as follows: A person taking or retaining possession of lard without being entitled to such possession may at the option of the person entitled to eject him as a trespasser be treated as tenant and shall thereupon be liable etc. 13. Learned counsel contends that as the section is now worded a tenant holding over, whether after formal ejectment or without formal ejectment ever having taken place, comes directly within the scope of Section 127 as being a person retaining possession of land without being entitled to such possession. He points to the remark of the learned District Judge himself where he says that after the ejectment decision of 1917 the defendants ceased to have any right. 14. A further contention is put forward that this being a case of ejectment this Court is just as much bound by the entries in the revenue papers as the trial Court was, save only where the defence is a plea of proprietary title. The entry of the defendants as "bila faisla" tenants was made under an order of Court in 1926, and if the defendants were not satisfied with that entry, of which they must be presumed to be aware, they should have taken steps to get rid of it. 15. In my opinion it is not possible to hold I that Section 127 as now wooded is inapplicable to the circumstances of the present | case. The result of the decree of 1917 is at any rate this much that since the defendants are persons whose ejectment has once been ordered, from the date of that decision (subject of course to any appeal that might have been against it) the defendants are persons who are not entitled to possession of the land in respect of which their ejectment has been ordered. They have none the less retained possession of that land, and in my opinion they fall within the mischief of Section 127, and they are liable to have a decree given against them for rent at a fair and equitable rate, and they are also liable to ejectment. 16. In my opinion the learned District Judge has wrongly held that the defendants could not be ejected u/s 127. I accordingly allow these appeals with costs of this and the Court below, set aside the decrees of the learned District Judge and restore those of the trial Court.