JUDGMENT Panckridge, J. - This is an application made by Arayilagath Chandroth Mohamed and Arayilagath Chandroth Abdul Rahaman for an order under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, requiring the Corporation of Calcutta to rescind the sanction given to the Dost Mohamed Estates, Limited, in respect of certain proposed buildings on plot No. 18, Scheme No. 38 of the Calcutta Improvement Trust, District No. II, and alternatively for an order calling on the Corporation to act in accordance with the law in relation to the application for which sanction has been granted. The petitioners are the owners of Nos. 6, 8 and 10, Weston Street and of a two-storeyed building thereon. To the south of these premises is an open plot of land, known as plot No. 18, Scheme No. 38 of the Calcutta Improvement Trust. 2. Plot No. 18 has been purchased by the Dost Mohamed Estates, Limited, which is, I understand, a private Company controlled by one Dost Mohamed. 3. Plot No. 18 is on the north side of a public street known as Mission Row extension. The site Is one of very great value. 4. On August 25th, 1939, the Dost Mohamed Estates, Limited to which I will refer as "the Company," submitted a plan to the Corporation for a sanction for the erection of a seven-storeyed building on plot No. 18. It will be convenient here to summarize the relevant provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. A "new building" is defined by sec. 3 (46), and it is admitted that the building which the Company desire to erect is covered by the definition. 5. Chapter XXI of the Act is entitled "Buildings," and sec. 319 provides that no new building shall be erected otherwise than in accordance with the Chapter and Schedule XVII of the Act. 6. Under sec. 331 such relaxation of the provisions of the Chapter and Schedule may be made as the Corporation may think fit, but only provided that such relaxations are not likely prejudicially to affect the sanitation or ventilation of the building or other buildings in its vicinity. 7. Rule 30 of Schedule XVII contains very elaborate provisions as to backspace, and r. 32 requires that every courtyard and open space prescribed by r. 30 shall be open to the sky throughout its entire area subject to certain concessions as regards the erection of privies. 8. 7. Rule 30 of Schedule XVII contains very elaborate provisions as to backspace, and r. 32 requires that every courtyard and open space prescribed by r. 30 shall be open to the sky throughout its entire area subject to certain concessions as regards the erection of privies. 8. Part VII of the Schedule prescribes the procedure for the applying for and granting of sanction. 9. I should add that the Corporation exercises its functions under Chapter XXI and Schedule XVII through its Standing Building Committee. 10. To return to the history of the present dispute. 11. On November 6th, 1939, the Building Committee refused sanction. The Company however asked for reconsideration of this decision, and the matter came up again before the Committee on December 12th, 1939, and on that occasion sanction was given to erect a building, but subject to considerable modifications of the Company's plans. The present Petitioners say that as the building, as sanctioned, substantially conformed to the building regulations, they did not object to it. 12. This was followed by a further application on the part of the Company, with the result that the original plan was sanctioned on January 23rd, 1940, in spite of the Petitioners' objections, but subject to what they describe as a small variation. 13. On April 20th, 1940, additional plans were submitted by the Company for the erection of two sets of privies on each of the floors of the new building. Sanction was refused in the first instance, but ultimately granted on June 11th, 1940. 14. Now it has not been contended that the plan sanctioned on December 12th, 1939, does not infringe r. 30 of Schedule XVII, and it is also conceded that the plan sanctioned on June 11th, 1940, infringes r. 33. It is also clear from the plans that the departure from the rules prejudicially affects the sanitation and ventilation of the Petitioners' building. 15. The defences which has been put forward take the form of submission that some or all of the necessary conditions, which would justify the Court in making an order under sec. 45, are absent. 16. I may here say that another case, where the Corporation has purported to sanction plans, which violate the statutory building regulations, was dealt with by Ameer Ali, J., on June 10th, 1940. 17. The case [In the matter of an application under sec. 45, are absent. 16. I may here say that another case, where the Corporation has purported to sanction plans, which violate the statutory building regulations, was dealt with by Ameer Ali, J., on June 10th, 1940. 17. The case [In the matter of an application under sec. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, In re Lakshmimoni Dassi Since reported in 45 C.W.N. 401 (1940) has not been reported as yet, but I have read a transcript of the judgment, which makes it clear that the same arguments, which have been raised before me, were considered by Ameer Ali, J. and rejected by him. First it is said that the applicants do not satisfy proviso (a) to the section, inasmuch as they have no property, franchise or personal right, which would be injured by the erection of the Company's building. It is certainly true that, as the Company's property was purchased from the Improvement Trust, which had acquired it under the provisions of its Act and of the Land Acquisition Act, the owner of an adjoining plot can have no right of easement over it. 18. This being so, it is argued that the cases, both in England and India, show that the Court will not enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a local authority at the instance of any ratepayer or other person who chooses to apply. 19. In this connection reference has been made to The Queen v. The Guardians of the Lewisham Union, L.R. (1897) 1 Q.B. 498 where an application by a District Board of Works to compel the Guardians of the Local Union to carry out the duties imposed on them by the Vaccination Acts was refused on that ground. On the other hand in The Queen v. Cotham, L.R. (1888) 1 Q.B. 802. Licensing Justices were compelled by mandamus to observe the provisions of the Licensing Acts at the instance of a person whose only interest was apparently strong temperance opinions. 20. Again in The King v. Manchester Corporation L.R. (1911) 1 K.B. 560the Court considered that the fact that a limited Company had secured the insertion of a certain clause in an Act of Parliament gave it a sufficiency of interest to obtain its enforcement by an application for mandamus. 21. It is also said that Fletcher, J., in Prosad Chandra De v. Corporation of Calcutta ILR 40 Cal. 21. It is also said that Fletcher, J., in Prosad Chandra De v. Corporation of Calcutta ILR 40 Cal. 836 s.c. 17 C.W.N. 929 (1913). indicated that, in a dispute as to the sanction of building plans between an owner and the Corporation, the owner's remedy in a proper case was an application under sec. 45. On the other hand in J.M. Sen Gupta v. Cotton ILR 51 Cal. 874 (1924) it was held that a tax-payer had no such "property," "franchise" or "personal right" as would entitle him to compel, by an order under the section, the President of the Bengal Legislative Council to disallow a motion in the list of business to be brought before the Council. 22. Again in The Bank of Bombay v. Suleman Somji ILR 32 Bom. 466 : s.c. 12 C.W.N. 825 (P.C.) (1908) the Judicial Committee, treating the suit on the principles applicable to an application for a mandamus, held that the Plaintiff had no specific right as a share-holder to inspect the register. 23. The authorities are not altogether easy to reconcile, but I have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the present case, where the amenities and sanitation of the applicant's property will be substantially prejudiced, if the present plans, which violate the regulations, are sanctioned, they have the right to call upon the Corporation to see that the provisions of the statute are observed. 24. Another point urged is that the applicants have another specific and adequate legal remedy within the meaning of proviso (d) to the section. This remedy, it is suggested, is provided by secs. 17 and 18 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. The scheme of these sections is that the Local Government, if of opinion that any of the duties imposed by or under the Act has not been performed, or has been performed in an imperfect, inefficient or unsuitable manner, may direct the Corporation to perform it to their satisfaction, and if the Corporation fail to take action, appoint some other person to do so. 25. By sec. 19 the Local Government may annul illegal proceedings of the Corporation. 26. Now it will be noticed that these sections do not purport to confer rights upon aggrieved parties. 25. By sec. 19 the Local Government may annul illegal proceedings of the Corporation. 26. Now it will be noticed that these sections do not purport to confer rights upon aggrieved parties. Although in fact the Local Government is unlikely to take action except in cases where materials are furnished by such parties, the scheme of the Calcutta Act to my mind makes The Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. The Bombay Corporation 32 Bom. L.R. 416 (1930).inapplicable, because under sec. 515 of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, the Governor in Council has only power to take action upon complaint being made to him and after such enquiry as he thinks fit. 27. Similarly in Passmore v. The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council, L.R. (1898) A.C. 387 the reason why the House of Lords refused the mandamus was that under sec. 15 of the Public Health Act, 1875, provision was made for a complaint to the Local Government Board. 28. In my view the Calcutta Municipal Act furnishes no specific and adequate legal remedy to persons in the position of the applicants. I must confess I listened with very little sympathy to the submission that the application should be dismissed, because it had not been shown that the remedy given by the order asked for would be complete. 29. It appears that the erection of the building has proceeded to a considerable degree, and it is pointed out that it is a matter of discretion with the Corporation whether it applies under sec. 363 to the Magistrate for a demolition order. 30. I refuse to entertain the hypothesis that, after a finding by this Court that the sanction given to the erection of the building is illegal, and that the plans infringe the statutory regulations, the Corporation will neglect its duty of making the necessary application. 31. Finally there is the argument that the applicants have been tardy in asking for the order. 32. It is true that, if an applicant delay his application, the Court will refuse to interfere, agreeably with the rule "Vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura subserviunt" - see "Tapping on Mandamus," p. 291. 33. 31. Finally there is the argument that the applicants have been tardy in asking for the order. 32. It is true that, if an applicant delay his application, the Court will refuse to interfere, agreeably with the rule "Vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura subserviunt" - see "Tapping on Mandamus," p. 291. 33. I certainly think that this application might have been made as soon as the Corporation had granted sanction on January 23rd, 1940, and there was no reason why matters should have been postponed until the Committee finally sanctioned the additional plans on June 11th, 1940. On the other hand it must be borne in mind that the matter is one primarily between the applicants and the Corporation, and that it is a matter of no interest to the latter whether they are compelled to revoke the sanction already given or not. 34. The Company is only made a party to the proceedings because of r. 5 of Chapter XXIX of the Rules and Orders of the Original Side. Moreover it must be presumed that the Company knew that their plans were not such as the Corporation had the power to sanction, and also that the position could not be cured by the consent or waiver of the owners of adjoining properties. 35. I do not say that it is not possible to imagine circumstances in which the applicant's delay in a case resembling the present case would be a ground for the refusal of relief : but having regard to the length of the delay, and the fact that the regulations are framed not only with a view to the interests of adjoining owners, but also to those of the public generally, I have come to the conclusion that the argument based on laches cannot prevail. 36. It will be remembered that after the conclusion of the argument in this case I fell ill, and was unable to take my seat in Court before the commencement of the Annual Vacation. 37. In order that the parties might know where they stood I arranged with Sen, J., that he should deliver the substance of the order I had decided to make, and he was good enough to do this on September 9th, 1940. 38. 37. In order that the parties might know where they stood I arranged with Sen, J., that he should deliver the substance of the order I had decided to make, and he was good enough to do this on September 9th, 1940. 38. The order is as follows: -- There will be an injunction restraining the Corporation of Calcutta, its servants and agents, the Dost Mohamed Estates, Limited, and Dost Mohamed from proceeding with the building mentioned in the petition on Plot No. 18, Scheme No. 38 of the Calcutta Improvement Trust, District No. II in terms of the resolutions of the Buildings Committee dated January 23rd, 1940, and June 11th, 1940. 39. There will also be an order requiring the said Corporation to deal with the plans submitted by the Dost Mohamed Estates, Limited in accordance with the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, and Schedule XVII thereto. 40. The Corporation will pay the Petitioners' costs of the application. The other Respondents will pay their own costs. 41. Costs to be taxed as of one day's hearing of a suit. Certificate for the employment of two Counsel. Certificate under sec. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, withheld.