Judgement Appeal (No. 109 of 1936) from a decree of the High Court (December 21, 1934) reversing a decree 52 Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 386 ( 1939- 1940) Musammat Har Naraini Kunwar V. Sajjan Pal Singh 153 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Etah (August 26, 1930). One Hans Kunwar, a Hindu widow, on February 27, 1891, entered into an agreement to refer to arbitration disputes with certain collaterals of her late husband, who died sonless, as to the ownership of certain ancestral property—4 biswas out of 20 biswas—in mauza Isauli, paragana Jalesar, district Etah. The widow executed the agreement "in her right "and as mother and natural guardian of minor daughters "Musammat Har Naraini and Het Kunwar...."By their award the arbitrators decided that the ancestral property in mauza Isauli should remain in the possession and occupation of the widow during her life, and that after her death it should be divided among the collaterals. The widow died in 1928, and Musammat Har Naraini, the sole survivor of her three daughters, brought, on January 11, 1930, the suit out of which this appeal arose, against the collaterals, claiming that under Hindu law she alone became entitled to succeed to the property in Isauli on the death of her mother, and that the agreement to refer and the award were not binding upon her. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. On appeal the High Court (Niamat Ullah and Allsop JJ.) set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff now appealed, and the main question was whether the agreement to refer and the award were binding on her. 1940. June 10, 11. J. M. Parikh for the appellant. The daughters took no interest in the ancestral property under the will of their father, and the following argument is based on that footing. On the widows death, there having been no adoption, there was intestacy in respect of the ancestral property, and the surviving daughter, the appellant, would take; her chance of success was in no way dependent on the wishes of the widow. It is said for the respondents that the agreement to refer, together with the award, constitute a family settlement, a compromise by the widow, which is binding on the appellant. It is said for the respondents that the agreement to refer, together with the award, constitute a family settlement, a compromise by the widow, which is binding on the appellant. That is not so; neither the agreement nor the award is binding on her. The widow had no power to enter into any agreement which might affect the rights of her daughter. Ramsumran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 342.) has no application to the facts of the present case. [Reference was also made to Srimati Rajlakshmi Dassi v. Bholanath Sen (( 1938) L. R. 65 I. A. 365), and Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga. (( 1863) 9 Moo. I. A. 539, 604.)] What was said in Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gay a Singh (( 1917) L. R. 45 I. A. 35.) with regard to the power of a natural guardian is very strongly in the appellants favour. The right of succession of the appellant was not a transferable right either under Hindu law or under statute law in India Harnath Kuar v. Indar Bahadur Singh (( 1922) L. R. 50 I. A. 69.); Annada Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mullick (( 1923) L. R. 50 I. A. 239); and s. 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882). The decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored. W. Wallach for the respondents. This is not the case of a guardian, but of a Hindu widow representing the estate of her deceased husband. It has always been held that the power of this limited owner extends as far as the rights of the deceased male Hindu owner; if he could enter into a compromise, the widow, as representing his estate, could also enter into such a compromise, so long as it was a bona fide arrangement. This Board has adopted that view in more than one case. The question is whether the compromise is a valid one, and is good in Hindu law. The widow represented her late 52 Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 386 ( 1939- 1940) Musammat Har Naraini Kunwar V. Sajjan Pal Singh 154 husbands estate, and was capable of entering into a compromise binding the estate. The compromise which she made was to refer the dispute to arbitration. The widow represented her late 52 Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 386 ( 1939- 1940) Musammat Har Naraini Kunwar V. Sajjan Pal Singh 154 husbands estate, and was capable of entering into a compromise binding the estate. The compromise which she made was to refer the dispute to arbitration. It is submitted that under the reference the arbitrators had the power to distribute the property in the way they thought fit amongst the claimants. The agreement to refer was valid, and the arbitrators had power to pass the award they did, and the award is valid on the face of it. So far as the decision of the arbitrators is concerned, there was nothing inequitable in it, and nothing which might not have been the decision of a Court of law. Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gay a Singh (( 1917) L. R. 45 I. A. 35) has no application, the facts are entirely different. Although Ramsumran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 342.) is the case of a compromise of claims by or against the estate as a whole, and did not touch the right of a reversioner, the general principle in it covers the present case, where the Hindu widow represents the estate, and is therefore entitled to enter into a bona fide compromise. Raoji V. R. Kolhati v. Kunjalal Hiralal Agarwala (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 177.) contains the same principle. In the present case the widow did her best for the estate to avoid litigation, and therefore the reference to arbitration was a reasonable one, and the decision of the arbitrators, which cannot be attacked as unfair, or fraudulent or prejudiced, was also a reasonable one, and ought to stand. J. M. Parikh replied, and referred to Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gaya Singh (( 1917) L. R. 45 I. A. 35,); Ramsumran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 342.); and Raoji V. R. Kolhati v. Kunjalal Hiralal Agarwala.(( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 177.) June 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN. In order to explain the reasons why their Lordships think that this appeal should succeed, the barest statement of the relevant facts will be sufficient. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN. In order to explain the reasons why their Lordships think that this appeal should succeed, the barest statement of the relevant facts will be sufficient. One Jiwa Ram made his will, dated August 20, 1890, by which, after stating that, being a member of a divided family, he was the owner of the divided property specified below, he provided that (in the events which happened) his wife, Hans Kunwar, should "remain the owner in possession of the entire property left by me like a "Hindu widow till her lifetime,” and after her death "all the married and unmarried daughters who be alive or "whose male issue be alive shall get the estate acquired, i.e., "the property, in equal shares.” At the end of the will were specified four items of property, of which the first was described as “ancestral property in mauza Isauli, pargana Jalesar, district Etah—4 biswas out of 20 biswas." The other three items were non-ancestral property which had been acquired by the testator. The testator, who never had a son, died on August 26 or 27, 1890. He was survived by his wife and two daughters, namely, a married daughter, Kawal Kunwar, and the plaintiff, who was then aged three. A third daughter (Het Kunwar) who was born posthumously, died at about the age of seven years. The will has been construed as containing no disposition, in the events which happened, of the ancestral property in mauza Isauli after the death of the widow. It would accordingly (the testator being divided, and having no son) in the normal course belong to the daughter or daughters living at the death of the widow. Shortly after the death of the testator disputes arose. Certain collaterals claimed the ancestral property, alleging that they were joint with the testator. One Nem Kunwar claimed that her son, Narain, had been adopted by the testator, and that the testator had made a later will leaving the whole property to him. On February 27, 1891, an agreement was entered into between the various claimants of the one part, and the widow and the testators married daughter of the other part, by which it was agreed to refer the disputes to arbitration. The material recital states “There is a dispute between us, the parties, in 52 Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. On February 27, 1891, an agreement was entered into between the various claimants of the one part, and the widow and the testators married daughter of the other part, by which it was agreed to refer the disputes to arbitration. The material recital states “There is a dispute between us, the parties, in 52 Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 386 ( 1939- 1940) Musammat Har Naraini Kunwar V. Sajjan Pal Singh 155 respect of the property specified below....and it is not settled, hence for its decision, we the parties, unanimously, have accepted to abide by the decision of the arbitrators regarding the dispute." The specified property consisted of the four items specified by the will. By their award the arbitrators decided that, as to the ancestral property in mauza Isauli, the widow should remain in possession and occupation during her life and that after her death it should be divided among the collaterals in certain detailed shares, the testators daughters not having any concern therewith nor any share therein. As to the acquired property, the widow was to remain in possession and occupation during her lifetime, and after her death it was to go to the daughters as therein mentioned. The widow died on February 12, 1928, leaving the plaintiff as the sole survivor of the three daughters. The Isauli property was mutated in favour of the collaterals. As to the other property, the plaintiff succeeded thereto, and the present litigation is not in any way concerned with it. The plaintiff instituted the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Etah, on January 11, 1930, against the collaterals, claiming that under Hindu law she alone became entitled to succeed to the property in Isauli on the death of the widow, and that the agreement to refer and the award were not binding on her for a number of reasons specified in the plaint. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. On appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad the decree of the Subordinate Judge was set aside, and the suit was dismissed with costs in both Courts. From that order the plaintiff has now appealed to His Majesty in Council, and a number of points have been argued before the Board. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. On appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad the decree of the Subordinate Judge was set aside, and the suit was dismissed with costs in both Courts. From that order the plaintiff has now appealed to His Majesty in Council, and a number of points have been argued before the Board. It is, however, unnecessary to express an opinion upon any except one, which, in their Lordships opinion, is covered by authority of this Board, and is decisive of this case. It was contended, and this was the foundation of the High Courts judgment, that a Hindu widow represents her husbands estate, and can compromise claims so as to bind reversioners. That this is true as regards such matters as claims by creditors who are claiming to be paid out of an estate, but are not disputing the title of those beneficially interested in the estate, is beyond doubt; but whether the principle necessarily applies when the claim is one which disputes such title, is another question. But it need not be investigated in the present case for the simple and sufficient reason that in making the agreement to refer, the widow in no way purported to bind the estate, or to act as representing the estate of her husband. The agreement is clear upon the point. She and her married daughter executed the agreement as the second party, and the widow is expressly described as doing so in a double capacity, namely, " in her right and as "mother and natural guardian of minor daughters, Musammat "Har Naraini"—i.e., the plaintiff—" and Het Kunwar," She was, as guardian, contracting on behalf of her infant children. In those circumstances she was attempting to do what this Board has said in Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gay a Singh (( 1917) L. R. 45 I. A. 35.) cannot be done. In that case an infant was under Hindu law entitled to succeed on the death of his mother to property which originally belonged to his maternal grandfather. Under a compromise in arbitration with certain agnates who claimed the property, in which compromise the infants father, Rajander, acted for his son, an arrangement was come to, during his mothers lifetime, which deprived the infant of his reversionary interest in his grandfathers property. Under a compromise in arbitration with certain agnates who claimed the property, in which compromise the infants father, Rajander, acted for his son, an arrangement was come to, during his mothers lifetime, which deprived the infant of his reversionary interest in his grandfathers property. On the mothers death the son brought a suit to recover the property, and it was held that he was not bound by the compromise. It will be observed that the interest of the plaintiff in the property in suit in the present case is identical with that of the infant son; and in relation to that interest their Lordships made use of the following language (Ibid. 52 Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 386 ( 1939- 1940) Musammat Har Naraini Kunwar V. Sajjan Pal Singh 156 39.) "A Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in praesenti in the property which the female owner holds for her life. Until it vests in him on her death, should he survive her, he has nothing to assign or to relinquish, or even to transmit to his heirs. His right becomes concrete only on her demise; until then it is mere spes successionis. His guardian, if he happens to be a minor, cannot bargain with it on his behalf or bind him by any contractual engagement in respect thereto. Rajanders action, therefore, in referring to arbitration any matter connected with his sons reversionary interest was null and void." Their Lordships are of opinion that the present plaintiff is in precisely the same position as was the son in the case cited, that her mother had no power to bind her by the agreement to refer, and that consequently her right to the property in suit is unaffected by the award. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, that the decree of the High Court should be discharged, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings in both the Courts in. India.