Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No.43 of 1939) from a decree of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (March 31, 1938), which confirmed, with a minor variation, a decree of that Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction (May 24, 1937). The suit which gave rise to these appeals was brought by the respondent, Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, as the assignee of an administration bond, against the appellant, the General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld., as surety, claiming Rs.3,98,060, or such part thereof as might represent the loss to the estate of his father, one Abdul Rahim, through the failure of his mother, one Hawabai, to carry out the obligations under the bond. The defendant (appellant) did not admit the alleged loss to the estate of Abdul Rahim; denied the alleged breaches of duty, and contended (inter alia) that the bond had not been validly assigned in law to the plaintiff (respondent), and that the purported assignment was the transfer of a mere right to sue and, as such, was void and inoperative, and that the plaintiff was not therefore entitled to maintain the suit. It was further alleged that the claim of the plaintiff was barred by the law of limitation. The trial judge (Engineer J.) passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs.1,04,831-1-0, and costs, and for interest on the judgment sum at six per cent, until payment. On appeal the Appellate Court (Beaumont C. J. and Kania J.) in separate but concurring judgments confirmed the decree of the trial judge, subject to a variation in the date from which the interest should run. The principal question for determination in the present appeal was whether the suit was barred by limitation. The High Court in appeal, holding themselves bound by the decision in Manubhai Chunilal v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld. (( 1936) I. L. R. 60 B. 1027.), had held that the defence of limitation was not open to the present, appellants. The facts and the terms of the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. 1940. July 4, 8, 9. Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. and W. W. K. Page for the appellant. The question which arises at the outset is one of limitation, and if that point is a good one it disposes of both the appeal and the cross-appeal. 1940. July 4, 8, 9. Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. and W. W. K. Page for the appellant. The question which arises at the outset is one of limitation, and if that point is a good one it disposes of both the appeal and the cross-appeal. Neither of the Courts below has dealt with this question, inasmuch as each Court considered itself bound by the decision in Manubhai Chunilal v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld. (( 1936) I. L. R. 60 B. 1027.) The bond was in the form required by the Bombay High Court Rules. The material upon which the limitation point is to be decided is The Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 416 ( 1939- 1940) General Accident Fire v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim 172 Supreme Court Charter of December 8, 1823, which in cl. 45 gave jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to require security by bond before the grant of letters of administration, and there was a provision in cl. 46 of the Charter that if a bond was to be put in suit it was to be done under the order of the Court directing the Registrar to file the suit; the Letters Patent of the High Court, of June 26, 1862, which provided that the High Court had all the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; the Amended Letters Patent of December 28, 1865; the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, ss. 78 and 79; the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which is a consolidating Act; the Bombay High Court Rules of 1922, rr. 495, 582 and 630; and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, art.68, which has to be read with s.2, sub-s.3, which contains the definition of " bond,” and art. 120. [Detailed reference was made to the foregoing material.] It is submitted that this is a simple action on the bond, and that the cause of action arose at the very latest on the death of the widow, Hawabai—namely, on April 27, 1929, and the suit having been instituted on November 2, 1932, was time-barred under art.68 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. Article 120 has no application. The decision of the Appellate Court in Manubhai Chunilal v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld. Article 120 has no application. The decision of the Appellate Court in Manubhai Chunilal v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld. (( 1936) I. L. R. 60 B. 1027.), which related to a similar bond similarly assigned, was to the effect that the bond had been taken under the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881; that it had been assigned under s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925; that the provisions of that section provided a new starting point of time for the purposes of limitation, and that art.120, and not art. 68 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was the article applicable to a suit on such a bond. It is submitted that Manubhais case (1) was wrongly decided. The bond in suit in the present case was not taken under the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, and the respondent, as assignee of the bond under s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, did not, it is contended, acquire by virtue of the assignment a fresh and independent cause of action. [Reference was made to Manubhai Chunilal v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld. (Ibid. 1042, 1052, 1057.); In the Goods of Young (( 1866) L. R. 1 P. & Div. 186, 189.); Maung San U v. Maung Kyaw Mye (( 1923) I. L. R. 1 R. 463, 466, 468.); Kanti Chandra Mukerji v. Ali-i-Nabi (( 1911) I. L. R. 33 A. 414, 420.); Ramanathan Chetty v. Ragammal (17 Mad. L. T. 61.); and Ahmed Moolla Dawood v. Fatima Bee Bee.(( 1914) 8 L. B. R. 99.)] D. N. Pritt K.C. and 5. P. Khambatta for the respondent. Even if art. 68 of the Limitation Act applies the respondent does not necessarily fail. There are two main questions with regard to arts.68 and 120 and the true nature of this cause of action. First, which article applies? and that depends simply upon examining the true nature of the cause of action. Secondly, whatever exactly may be the cause of action, when did it actually arise, and in the present case that really means, when is it to be said that the breach on which the suit can be launched occurred and was complete so that the cause of action arose. Secondly, whatever exactly may be the cause of action, when did it actually arise, and in the present case that really means, when is it to be said that the breach on which the suit can be launched occurred and was complete so that the cause of action arose. The suggestion that the death of the widow makes all the difference is without foundation; the death does not amount to a breach. When the widow became administratrix and gave the bond, she and the appellant surety were liableunless by the diligence of a new administrator 4 de bonis non the estate was duly administered. There is nothing to crystallize the cause of action as starting from the widows death; a breach of the conditions cannot be established simply by saying that she died before the conditions were fulfilled. There is not a breach until a full and proper opportunity has been given for all the conditions to be fulfilled. As a second limb to that argument, even if the bond be good, because the condition has not been fulfilled, still there is no cause of action until the amount of loss is ascertained, and if there is no loss there is no cause of action. The cause of action is the promise to pay, which promise would be void in certain events by the construction of the bond, and will be void by equity if no damage has been suffered. The foregoing argument is designed for the purpose of suggesting that, even under art. 68, the cause of action would not arise, as the judges below have said, until somebody entitled to ask for the estate did ask for it and had failed to get it. Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 416 ( 1939- 1940) General Accident Fire v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim 173 It is contended, however, that art. 68 does not apply, and that art.120 does. It is not simply a cause of action on a bond subject to a condition, because it is something more. If the respondent had brought this bond into Court and had proved a breach of the condition, and had stopped there, he would have shown no cause of action. The last point turns on the wording of s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. If the respondent had brought this bond into Court and had proved a breach of the condition, and had stopped there, he would have shown no cause of action. The last point turns on the wording of s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. First, even assuming that art.68 ought to be applied, s. 292 does create a cause of action sufficiently different from the original one, being a new cause of action starting again. Secondly, reliance is placed upon s. 292 as being a positive statutory provision that if the Court thinks fit on a petition to direct the assignment of the bond to some person, that person shall thereupon be entitled to sue upon the said bond as if it had originally and validly been given to him. The only possible construction of the words "shall thereupon be entitled to sue on the said bond " must be " shall have a cause of action subject to all proper defences.” Sect. 292 by its very words emphasises the fact that this is intended to be a new cause of action, and does in terms create a title to sue, and therefore creates a title in respect of which the statute cannot begin to run before the title is created, and so in that sense provides a new starting point for the Statute of Limitation. The decision in Manubhai Chunilal v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld. (I. L. R. 60 B. 1927.),and the reasoning whereon it is based are right and ought to be approved. S. P. Khambatta followed. To see whether death excuses you, the nature of the obligation must be looked at. The nature of the obligation is that the estate shall be well and truly administered, and until there has been a loss as a result of that administration the obligation does not arise Devey v. Edwards.((1826) 3 Add. 68; 162 E. R. 406.) Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. replied. The latest time for the beginning of the running of time was the date of the death of the widow. The character of the bond was in no way changed by assignment, and accordingly art. 68 applies. [On the point of a new cause of action reference was made to s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act (Act IV. of 1882).] Sept. 17. The character of the bond was in no way changed by assignment, and accordingly art. 68 applies. [On the point of a new cause of action reference was made to s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act (Act IV. of 1882).] Sept. 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by VISCOUNT MAUGHAM. There are here two consolidated appeals from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in its appellate jurisdiction, dated March 31, 1938, confirming, with a variation, a judgment and decree of that Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The facts are very complex, and the questions raised on the appeals are questions of considerable importance. The appellants, however, who were the defendants in the suit, besides disputing liability on a number of grounds, have raised the contention that the suit was barred by art.68 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX. of 1908). This question was based on substantial grounds, and their Lordships thought it right to hear the arguments of both sides upon it before embarking on the other questions raised on the appeal and the cross-appeal, and in the result they have come to the conclusion that the point of limitation raised by the appellants is well founded, and accordingly it has not been necessary for them to go into the other matters above referred to. In order to deal with the questions of limitation it is necessary to state the following facts. On September 18, 1924, Abdul Rahim died intestate at Bombay, leaving him surviving a widow, Hawabai, three sons and three unmarried daughters. All his children were then minors. According to the law by which he was governed his three infant sons became entitled to his estate in equal shares subject to the right of his widow to maintenance pending re-marriage or death, and to the rights of his daughters to maintenance until marriage or death, and to their marriage expenses. On March 17, 1925, the widow of Abdul Rahim (Hawabai), having been duly empowered by the High Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. On March 17, 1925, the widow of Abdul Rahim (Hawabai), having been duly empowered by the High Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 416 ( 1939- 1940) General Accident Fire v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim 174 Court, filed a petition in the High Court for the grant to her of letters of administration to the estate of her deceased husband for the use and benefit of his three minor sons, and limited to the period of minority of any of them. It was stated in the schedule to the petition that the movable and immovable properties of Abdul Rahim were valued at Rs.2,75,791, and for the purposes of probate duty the estate was valued at Rs. 1,99,025 after deducting funeral expenses and debts. On May 6, 1925, it was ordered that on the sureties being justified for the whole of the estate of Abdul Rahim, and on filing the necessary administration bond, and on payment of fees and stamp duty, letters of administration should issue as prayed to Hawabai. On May 14, 1925, Hawabai and the present appellants as sureties executed a bond for Rs.3,98,060 in favour of the Registrar of the High Court in its testamentary and intestate jurisdiction and the head assistant to the Prothonotary and Registrar of the Court. The conditions of the bond were in the usual form. The obligation was to be void and of no effect if Hawabai (1.) should make, or cause to be made a true and perfect inventory of the property and credits of the deceased which had or should come to her hand, possession or knowledge, or to the hands or possession of any other person or persons for her, and should exhibit or cause to be exhibited to the High Court such inventory on or before November 14, 1925; (2.) should well and truly administer such property and credits according to law; (3.) should make or cause to be made a true and just account of her administration on or before May 14, 1926; and (4.) All the rest and residue of the property and credits which should be found remaining upon the said account after being first examined and allowed by the High Court should deliver and pay unto such person or persons as shall be lawfully entitled to such residue. On June 9, 1925, the letters of administration were duly issued to Hawabai on behalf of the three minor sons of the intestate for their use and benefit until one of them should attain his majority. It is alleged by the plaint that on July 2, 1925, Hawabai, who was a purdanashin lady, and illiterate, appointed one Bhatra, who was related to her, being the son of her maternal uncle, her attorney to act for her in all matters relating to the estate of Abdul Rahim. This person, however, misapplied the property and subsequently (on October 22, 1928) committed suicide. Hawabai commenced various proceedings in an endeavour to recover the property forming part of the estate of Abdul Rahim, but on April 27, 1929, she died. On November 14, 1931, the eldest son of Abdul Rahim, Janmahomed Abdul Rahim (who will be called "the plaintiff ") attained his majority. On March 24, 1932, an order was made by the High Court that the Court should assign the administration bond to the plaintiff, his heirs, executors or administrators, and it was further ordered that on such assignment the plaintiff, his heirs, executors or administrators- should be entitled to sue on the bond in his or their name or names as if the same had been originally given to him or them, and should be entitled to recover thereon as trustee or trustees for all persons interested the full amount recoverable in respect of any breach thereon. By a deed of assignment, dated August 14, 1932, certain officers of the Court, appointed for that purpose by an order of the Chief Justice, purported to assign the bond to the plaintiff (the present respondent) "to hold the same unto "the assignee absolutely with all such powers rights and "remedies as are now subsisting thereon." The assignment , was effected under s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act of 1925, which is in these terms " The Court may, on application "made by petition and on being satisfied that the engagement "of any such bond has not been kept, and upon such terms "as to security, or providing that the money received be "paid into Court, or otherwise, as Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 416 ( 1939- 1940) General Accident Fire v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim 175 the Court may think fit, "assign the same to some person, his executors or adminis trators, who shall thereupon be entitled to sue on the said "bond in his or their own name or names as if the same had "been originally given to him or them instead of to the judge "of the Court, and shall be entitled to recover thereon, as "trustees for all persons interested, the full amount recoverable "in respect of any breach thereof. It should be added that under s. 291 every person to whom any grant of letters of administration, with an exception not material to the present purpose, is committed must give a bond to the District Judge, with one or more surety or sureties engaging in the due collection and administration of the estate of the deceased. The bond is in the usual form. It is the usual practice in such a case to apply s. 292, and to cause the bond to be assigned to the intending plaintiff. It does not appear to be necessary to discuss the older practice under the Letters Patent of 1823, founding the Supreme Court of Bombay. On November 2, 1932, the plaintiff (respondent) filed the present suit claiming from the defendants, the present appellants, the sum of Rs.3,98,060, or such lesser sum as represents the loss of the estate of Abdul Rahim due to the failure of Hawabai, as administratrix of that estate, to carry out her obligations under the administration bond. The plaint alleged four specific breaches of duty by the administratrix, which can be shortly stated as follows (1.) The appointment of Bhatra as her attorney to manage the estate of the intestate; (2.) allowing the sum of Rs.50,003, shown in the inventory and accounts filed by her on June 2, 1927, as being in her hands on that date, to remain in the hands of Bhatra; (3.) the failure to realize a certain share of the intestate in the estate of his deceased father, and allowing such share to remain in the hands of Bhatra; and (4.) the failure to hand over to the Accountant General of Bombay the estate of Abdul Rahim, all his heirs being minors. The learned Trial Judge and the Appellate Court (Sir John Beaumont C.J., and Kania J.) in the course of their judgments held that on the question of limitation they were bound by the decision of the Appellate ourt of Bombay in Manubhai Chunilal v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ld. (I. L. R. 60 B. 1927). That case related to a similar bond, similarly assigned, and the Appellate Court, Sir John Beaumont C.J., and Rangnekar J., overruling Blackwell J., decided that the defence of limitation under art. 68 of the Indian Limitation Act was not available. In that case, as in the present, the beneficiaries at the date of the grant of letters of administration were infants, and in other respects the facts are not distinguishable from those in the present case. The question, therefore, arises whether the decision in Manubhais case (I. L. R. 60 B. 1927) is or is not correct. Art. 68 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is one of a series of 183 articles in a schedule which relate to the limitation of suits, appeals and applications. The articles are introduced by s. 3 in the following words " Subject to the provisions "contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, "appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of "limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be "dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a "defence.” The provision contained in art. 68 is to the following effect On a bond subject to a condition," the period of limitation is to be three years, and the time from which the period begins to run is stated to be "when the condition is broken." Art. 120 is stated to relate to any suit for which no "period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule." The period of limitation is in that case six years, and the time from which the period begins to run is " when the right "to sue accrues.” The word "bond" is defined in s. 2,sub-s. 3. The word is stated to include "any instrument "whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, "on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified "act is performed, or is not performed, as the case may be." It is not in dispute that the bond in this case is a bond within the Law. The word is stated to include "any instrument "whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, "on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified "act is performed, or is not performed, as the case may be." It is not in dispute that the bond in this case is a bond within the Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 416 ( 1939- 1940) General Accident Fire v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim 176 terms of that definition, and it is clear that art. 120 has no application if art. 68 applies to the present case. It may be added that s. 6 of the Act (which deals with suits by infants) clearly has no application. Before considering the grounds on which the High Court in Manubhais case (I. L. R. 60 B. 1027.), came to the conclusion above referred to it may be desirable to point out that a Limitation Act ought to receive such a construction as the language in its plain meaning imports see the decision of this Board in Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi.(( 1909) L. R. 36 I. A. 148.) As was well stated by Mr. Mitra in his Tagore Law Lectures, 6th ed. ( 1932), vol.1., p. 256 A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly or unjustly in particular cases, but where such law has been adopted by the State....it must, if unambiguous, be applied with stringency. "The rule must be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party. The judge cannot on equitable grounds enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by it." Very little reflexion is necessary to show that great hardships may occasionally be caused by statutes of limitation in cases of poverty, distress and ignorance of rights; yet the statutory rules must be enforced according to their ordinary meaning in these and in other like cases. Their Lordships think it is possible that sympathy for the plaintiff in the case which must now be considered was allowed to affect a pure question of construction. Their Lordships think it is possible that sympathy for the plaintiff in the case which must now be considered was allowed to affect a pure question of construction. In the present case, however, it may be observed that an administration bond is as often assigned when persons of full age are concerned as when the beneficiaries are all of them infants; and that such a bond is of the nature of an additional security taken by the Court for the benefit of the beneficiaries. If a right of action under the bond become statute barred by the operation of art.68 of the Limitation Act that does not affect the rights of the benefices against the administrator. While making these observations their Lordships think it right to repeat that mere considerations of hardship in such a case should not be taken into account. In Manubhais case (I.L. R. 60 B. 1927, 1931.) Blackwell J., took the view that the bond being within the definition in the Limitation Act, and the action being on a bond subject to a condition, time began to run from the last date on which the condition was broken, and no action could therefore be brought after the expiration of three years. In coming to this conclusion he followed the decision of the Appellate Court of Rangoon in Maung San U v. Maung Kyaw Mye.(( 1923) I. L. R. 1 R. 463.) Blackwell J., in an admirable judgment, dealt with the effect of an assignment of a bond under s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act, and observed that, in his opinion, such an assignment merely deals with the question of title, and confers upon the assignee a right to sue which he would otherwise not have had previously to the assignment, and that the section thus merely entitles the assignee to recover as a trustee for all persons interested the full amount recoverable under the bond in respect of any breach of it. On appeal it was not doubted that the bond was a bond upon a condition, but the Court held that a suit to enforce the bond by a person to whom it has been assigned under s. 292 was not a suit upon a bond within the meaning of the article because, it was said, the assignment confers substantive rights upon the assignee. Their Lordships, with all respect, are unable to follow this argument, nor can they agree that there is any difficulty as regards the consideration for the assignment. It is of course true that a suit by the assignee of such a bond is a suit by a person who derives title from the assignment which is authorised by the terms of s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925; but their Lordships are unable to see how this can be held to show that the action on the bond by the assignee is not a suit on a bond subject to a condition. Every valid assignment of a bond confers substantive rights upon the assignee, but those rights are not, in any case suggested to their Lordships, greater than the rights possessed by the assignor. It may be noted that the ordinary security bond which is given by receivers in India under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Order XL., r. 3, is given to an officer of the Court (see App. F. Form No. 10); yet it has never been suggested that a suit upon such a bond, if brought by an assignee, is in any way different from an ordinary suit by the holder of a bond, the condition of which has been broken. Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 416 ( 1939- 1940) General Accident Fire v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim 177 There were two other grounds for the conclusion of the Court. First, it was held that, assuming that art. 68 applied to the case, it was impossible to say that the condition was broken until some person who was able to give a valid discharge for the estate claimed it from the administrator or his representatives and failed to obtain it. The consequence of that view was said to be that the condition was not broken within the meaning of art. 68 until the plaintiff attained his majority, which was less than three years before the suit was filed. In other words, the death of the administrator was held not to put an end to his liability as regards future events. Their Lordships cannot agree. An administrator of an intestate is merely the officer of the Court in whom the deceased himself has reposed no trust. In other words, the death of the administrator was held not to put an end to his liability as regards future events. Their Lordships cannot agree. An administrator of an intestate is merely the officer of the Court in whom the deceased himself has reposed no trust. On the death of the former the estate of the intestate does not pass to his heirs or representatives, and no authority whatever can be transmitted by him, nor has anyone claiming under him any right to interfere with, or to complete, the administration of the property of the intestate. The office comes to an end on death (if not before), and the course which should be taken when an administrator dies is to obtain a grant of administration de bonis non, and the person to whom such grant is made will be entitled to take possession of the property. It therefore seems to their Lordships impossible to hold that the administratrix in the present case could possibly have been guilty of any default or misconduct in relation to the administration after the date of her death, though, of course, her representatives would continue liable in respect of any c such default or misconduct committed by her during her lifetime. It seems equally impossible to suggest that the condition of the bond could be broken by the administratrix by the default of some person in relation to the estate of the intestate after the original letters of administration had ceased to have any operation by reason of the death of the administratrix. The condition of the bond according to its terms was therefore broken at the latest on her death, that is, more than three years prior to the suit. The other, and perhaps the main ground, for the conclusion of the Court in Manubhais case (I. L. R. 60 B. 1927.) was that s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act had the effect of conferring a new cause of action on the assignee, and therefore provided a fresh starting point for the purposes of limitation. If the language of s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act be examined it is difficult to suppose that the draftsman intended to provide for the creation of a new cause of action upon the assignment of a bond thereunder. If the language of s. 292 of the Indian Succession Act be examined it is difficult to suppose that the draftsman intended to provide for the creation of a new cause of action upon the assignment of a bond thereunder. The essential words are taken verbatim from s. 83 of the (English) Court of Probate Act, 1857 (20 and 21 Vict. c. 77), which provides that the Court may....on being satisfied that the condition of any such bond has been broken, order one of the Registrars of the Court to assign the same to some person....and such person....shall thereupon be entitled to sue on the said bond, in his own name,.... as if the same had been originally given to him instead of to the judge of the Court, and shall be entitled to recover thereon as trustee for all persons interested the full amount recoverable in respect of any breach of the condition of the said bond." (The modern provision to the same effect is to be found in s.167 of the Judicature Act, 1925.) It has never been suggested that under either of these sections there is upon the assignment being made a fresh cause of action. The origin of the ancient practice of requiring the administration bond to be given to the judge of the Court of Probate (s. 81 of the Court of Probate Act, 1857) was no doubt to enable that Court to have control over all matters relating «to the enforcement of such bonds. It is scarcely necessary to , add that it had obviously nothing to do with the English period of limitation as regards the enforcement of such a bond, which was twenty years from the breach of the condition. It seems to their Lordships that the words used in s. 292 of the Succession Act, like those used in s. 83 of the Court of Probate Act, 1857, are far from assisting the contention that a new cause of action arises upon the assignment. It seems to their Lordships that the words used in s. 292 of the Succession Act, like those used in s. 83 of the Court of Probate Act, 1857, are far from assisting the contention that a new cause of action arises upon the assignment. The bond is assigned to a person who is thereupon to be entitled to sue on the bond in his own name "as if the same had been originally "given to him,” and he is to be "entitled to recover thereon"....the full amount recoverable in respect of any breach "thereof." These sentences do not in the least support the view that a fresh cause of action arises and that therefore the condition of the bond is not broken for the purposes of the Limitation Act until the date of the assignment. The judgments of the Appellate Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 416 ( 1939- 1940) General Accident Fire v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim 178 Court of Rangoon in Maung San U v. Maung Kyaw Mye (I. L. R. 1 R. 463.) and of Blackwell J., in Manubhai’s case (I. L. R. 60 B. 1927, 1931.), are, in the opinion of their Lordships, correct, and the decision of the Appellate Court in the latter case must be taken to be erroneous. This view makes it unnecessary to consider any of the other questions raised on the appeal and cross-appeal. The defence of limitation under art.68 was a good one, and the suit should have been dismissed with costs. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed, that the cross-appeal should be dismissed, and that the respondent to the appeal should pay the costs here and below.