JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Zia-ul-Hasan, J. - This application for substitution arises in an execution of decree appeal. It came up for hearing before a learned Judge of this Court who has, u/s 14 (2) of the Oudh Courts Act, referred it to a Bench for decision, as in the opinion of the learned Judge there was a divergence of opinion in different 2. High Courts and that there was no decision of this Court in respect of the point involved in the application. 3. It is now admitted by the learned Counsel on behalf of the applicant that Mahadeo Prasad, respondent No. 1 died on the 14th January, 1939, and this application for substitution Was presented on the 12th July, 1939, that is beyond ninety days, but on the first day on which this Court reopened after the long vacation. 4. The application was made under Order XXII, Rule 4 for substitution of the names of the two sons of Mahadeo Prasad deceased, and it was urged that he had died on the 28th May, 1939. The application was opposed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 on the ground that Mahadeo Prasad had died on the 14th January, 1939 and the application there fore was barred by time. The parties were given an opportunity to prove the date of the death of Mahadeo Prasad. The applicant then put in an application admitting the date of the death of Mahadeo Prasad to be the 14th January, 1939, and prayed that the former application of the 12th July, 1939, be treated as an application under Order XXII, Rule 9 of the CPC for setting aside the abatement. 5. In this application the sufficient cause shown for setting aside the order of abatement is that the deceased lived 34 miles away in a village. The applicant is a lawyer practicing at Gonda. The contention on behalf of the applicant is. 5. In this application the sufficient cause shown for setting aside the order of abatement is that the deceased lived 34 miles away in a village. The applicant is a lawyer practicing at Gonda. The contention on behalf of the applicant is. that an appeal or an order arising out of an order in the course of proceedings in execution of the decree does not abate on the death of respondent in cases where an appellant fails to apply to make the legal representative of the deceased respondent a party to the appeal within the time prescribed by law because the appeals in proceedings relating to execution of a decree are mere continuation of execution proceedings and therefore Rule 12 of Order XXII is applicable to such appeals. In support of this contention the learned/Counsel. has relied on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court reported in Hakim Syed Mohammad Taqi v. Fateh Bahadur Singh (1929) 9 Pat. 372. It is true that the above decision supports the contention of the learned Counsel on behalf of the applicant, but this view was not followed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Changa Mal v. Ram Dulare Lal (1933) 66 All. 509 : 1933 II AWR 239, in which it was held that Order XXII Rule 12 of the CPC does not exempt pending appeals from the operation of Rule 8 of that order, even though the appeals arise out of execution proceedings. An appeal stands on quite a different footing, in this respect, from an application for execution. Rule 12 does not contemplate that if an appeal has been preferred from an order in execution then also Rules 3, 4 and 8 would never apply. 6. The case of Hakim Syed Mohammad Taqi v. Fateh Bahadur Singh (1929) 9 Pat. 372 it was referred to before the learned Judges of the Allahabad High' Court but they preferred to follow the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Sundayee Ammal v. Krishnan Chetti (1928) 51 Mad. 858. 7. In the Lahore High Court in the case of Mir Khan v. Sharfu (1923)74 I.C. 577 a learned Judge held the opinion that Rules 3 and 4 of Order XXII of the CPC had no application to appeals arising out of execution proceedings by virtue of the provisions of Rule 12 of that Order. 8. 858. 7. In the Lahore High Court in the case of Mir Khan v. Sharfu (1923)74 I.C. 577 a learned Judge held the opinion that Rules 3 and 4 of Order XXII of the CPC had no application to appeals arising out of execution proceedings by virtue of the provisions of Rule 12 of that Order. 8. There is a Bench decision of this Court which was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge of this Court who has made this reference. It is reported in Hari Saran Das, Mahaht v. Har Kishen Das (1984) 11 OWN 917 in which it was held that: if during the pendency of an appeal by the judgment-debtor arising out of execution of a decree for mesne profits and cash, the decree-holder respondent who happens to be a tenant for life dies, an application by the appellant judgment-debtor, who happens to be the remainderman, stating that the rights of the deceased in the decree had come to vest in him and that another person who claimed to be a legal representative of the deceased was not such representative, is maintainable. The provisions of Order 22, Rule 6 CPC impose an obligation on the Court to determine whether the applicant or the opposite-party is the legal representative of the deceased and the proceedings in appeal from any decree or order in proceedings in execution are not proceedings in execution so as to exclude application of Rule 4 by Rule 12 of Order 22, CPC they being proceedings in appeal and Rule 11 making the whole of Order 22 applicable to appeals. 9. This view is in accordance with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Changa Mal v. Ram Dulare Lal. 10. We are of opinion that law laid down in Hart Saran Das v. Har Kishan Das is correct and therefore hold that Order XXII, Rule 12 of the CPC does not exempt pending appeals from the operation of Rule 8 of that Order though the appeals arise out of execution proceedings. In our opinion an appeal stands on a different footing, in this respect, from an application for execution. Rule 12 does not contemplate that if an appeal has been preferred from an order in execution then also Rules 3, 4 and 8 would never apply. 11. In our opinion an appeal stands on a different footing, in this respect, from an application for execution. Rule 12 does not contemplate that if an appeal has been preferred from an order in execution then also Rules 3, 4 and 8 would never apply. 11. The next point urged on behalf of the applicant is that as the applicant lived about 34 miles away from the village in which Mahadeo Prasad deceased lived, he could not come to know of his death and the delay was due to his ignorance of the death of Mahadeo Prasad. This in the opinion of the learned Counsel was the sufficient cause for not applying to bring the legal representatives of the deceased on record within the prescribed period of limitation. 12. On behalf of the opposite-party it is urged that the applicant is a permanent resident of village Achalpur and the deceased was also a resident of the same village as the mortgage deed dated the 30th June, 1922, would show in which the residence is given as Achalpur. The residence of the deceased in the plaint is different. Whether the deceased was a resident of village Achalpur or not, we do not attach much importance, because in our opinion mere ignorance of the death of a respondent is not a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order XXII, Rule 9. 13. In the case of Bhagwan Din v. Muru it was held that: the procedure provided for the disposal of suits and appeals demands an active prosecution and great vigilance on the part of the parties to a litigation and the appellant in the prosecution of his appeal is under an obligation to keep himself informed as to the existence of his opponent. Mere plea of ignorance of the death of the opposite-party is not a sufficient ground for setting aside an order that an appeal should abate. 14. The applicant has failed to satisfy us that there was sufficient cause for not filing the application within the period of limitation. 15. We therefore reject the application with costs, and refuse to set aside the abatement. 16. It is conceded by the learned Counsel on behalf of the applicant that the whole appeal has abated. We therefore dismiss the appeal. No order as to costs.