Judgement Appeal (No. 54 of 1937) from a decree of the High Court (January 31, 1936) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lyallpur (January 31, 1935). One, Ishar Singh, who died childless on October 6, 1905, leaving him surviving a widow, Bishan Devi, and a brothers son, Sundar Singh, by his will, dated September 19, 1905, left certain properties, including " lands, situate at Lyallpur," to his wife, and declared that she should be the exclusive owner of them. He declared that his nephew, Sundar Singh, was of bad character and was to be totally disinherited. On November 12, 1906, Sundar Singh filed a suit in the Court of the District Judge, Peshawar, against Bishan Devi and others, claiming a declaration that the will of Ishar Singh was not valid and binding upon him as regards certain of the properties disposed of thereby, on the ground that they had all been acquired out of joint funds of a joint family business; the plaint stated that "a separate suit will be "brought for recovery of the ornaments, valued at Rs.15,000, "other movable property and lands situate at Lyallpur "which are in possession of the defendants." The suit of 1906 was compromised in June, 1907, and on June 11, 1907, a decree was passed on the terms and under the conditions embodied in the deed of compromise, which provided (inter alia) that the lands at Lyallpur should belong to Bishan Devi for her life and on her death to Sundar Singh and his male descendants. On February 7, 1929, Bishan Devi purported to make a gift of one portion of the Lyallpur lands to her sisters son, Sangat Singh, and of another portion to a certain Gurdwara. In these circumstances the appellants, three of the sons of Sundar Singh, as the nearest reversioners of Ishar Singh, brought a suit on August 7, 1933, against Sangat Singh and the Gurdwara, and the fourth son of Sundar Singh, claiming a declaration that the gifts of land to Sangat Singh and the Gurdwara had no validity and effect beyond the life of Bishan Devi, The facts appear more fully from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge, basing his judgment on his findings as to the validity and admissibility of the compromise, decreed the suit against the defendants. The trial judge, basing his judgment on his findings as to the validity and admissibility of the compromise, decreed the suit against the defendants. On appeal the High Court (Rashid and Addison JJ.) held that the compromise deed was inadmissible for want of registration, and that it had not been established that Bishan Devi signed it after fully understanding its meaning and effect, and they allowed the appeal. 1939. Nov. 27, 28, 30, Dec. 1, 4. Sir Hari Singh Gour and R. K. Handoo for the appellants. Both sides accepted the compromise and acted upon it, and in this suit it has been repudiated for the first time. It is contended that the gift of the Lyallpur lands was bad as being beyond the powers of Bishan Devi. If the compromise is binding upon her, that is the end of the case. It was a perfectly good, fair and equitable compromise; there was no undue pressure, she was a free agent, and she was consulted on, and consented to, the compromise, and she signed it. The question of registration of the compromise deed does not arise, the matter became a proceeding in Court, and decrees do not require registration s. 17 (1.) of the Indian Registration Act, III. of 1877. The case is concluded by the authority of Bindesri Naik v. Gangasaran Sahu (( 1897) L. R. 25 I. A. 9.), where it was stated that s. 17 of the Registration Act does not apply to judicial proceedings, whether pleadings of parties or orders of Court, and by the plain provisions of the Registration Act itself and of the Code of Civil Procedure. This compromise being a pleading in the case, intended to be a pleading and drafted as one, it does not require registration. The pleading merged in the decree, and the question is whether the Court had pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction over the Lyallpur property when the suit was instituted. Neither of the two Courts below had jurisdiction to go into the impropriety or appropriateness of the decree; they were only entitled to go into the question whether the decree passed was a nullity, and nothing else. In connection with the finality of the decree, the main relief claimed was for a declaration of the invalidity of the will. Neither of the two Courts below had jurisdiction to go into the impropriety or appropriateness of the decree; they were only entitled to go into the question whether the decree passed was a nullity, and nothing else. In connection with the finality of the decree, the main relief claimed was for a declaration of the invalidity of the will. If fraud and collusion are eliminated from s. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there is left the simple statement that any party may defeat a judgment by showing that it was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it. If it was delivered by a Court competent to deliver it that decree is final, and s. 40 of the Evidence Act says that it becomes absolutely conclusive. Therefore the decree in question became irrevocable, final and conclusive. It is submitted, therefore, that whatever the plaint may mean, whether it has been wrongly or even perversely construed, the Court is now concerned here only with s. 40 of the Evidence Act, and is precluded by statute law from going into any question of the compromise or of the will. The High Court had, therefore, no jurisdiction to look at the proceedings, or to criticize or comment upon what the plaint did mean. The Board is not concerned here with the compromise or the will. The compromise is merged in the mandate of the Court, and the construction of the will was settled by the compromise, and the final decree is the final decision. The appellants are not under any obligation to refer to s. 375 of the Code of 1882, because they are prevented from doing so by reason of the decree which has been passed. If the compromise deed did not require registration, and it is submitted that it did not, the next question is whether it was understood by the widow. There is evidence showing that she understood what she was doing, and that she affixed her signature to the deed fully understanding it. The compromise is not therefore open to attack upon the sole ground stated by the High Court. With regard to the construction of the will, it is submitted that there was a gift to the widow of a limited interest for life, and then to Sudar Singhs sons. The compromise is not therefore open to attack upon the sole ground stated by the High Court. With regard to the construction of the will, it is submitted that there was a gift to the widow of a limited interest for life, and then to Sudar Singhs sons. That view should prevail in view of the customary law of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V. of 1912), s. 20; Indian Succession Act, XXXIX. of 1925, s. 88. R. K. Handoo followed. Eddy K.C. and M. H. Rashid for the respondents. With regard to the will, the intention of the testator was completely to disinherit Sundar Singh, and this Board will regard with jealously a compromise alleged to have been entered into in complete violation of the wishes of the testator. No more need be said about the will except that the word "malick" has been dealt with by the Board in Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (( 1897) L. R. 24 I. A. 76.); Surajmani v. Rahi Nath Ojha (( 1907) L. R. 35 I. A. 17.); and Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury.(( 1921) L. R. 49 I. A. 25.) With regard to the principle that an express positive devise cannot be controlled by subsequent ambiguous words, see Jarman on Wills, 7th ed., vol. i., p. 550; vol. iii, p. 2145. It was obligatory on the appellants to show in respect of the suit and the compromise that there was available to Bishan Devi disinterested advice. As to the compromise, the High Court have said that there is ample evidence on the record that Bishan Devi was purdanashin. It is submitted that the evidence justifies the view of the High Court, and that there is really no evidence the other way. The Subordinate Judge took the view that the advice of independent advisors was available to Bishan Devi, but it is contended that the two alleged independent advisors were partisans. It is submitted that the evidence justifies the view of the High Court, and that there is really no evidence the other way. The Subordinate Judge took the view that the advice of independent advisors was available to Bishan Devi, but it is contended that the two alleged independent advisors were partisans. The authorities on purdanashin are Sudisht Lal v. Mussummat Sheobarat Koer (( 1881) L. R. 8 I. A. 39, 43.); Kali Bakhsh Singh v. Ram Gopal Singh (( 1913) L. R. 41 I. A. 23, 28-9, 31.); Sunitabala Debt v. Dhara Sundari Debt Chowdhurani (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 272.); Kalyan Mal v. Ahmad Uddin Khan (A. I. R. ( 1934) P. C. 208.); and Benoy Krishna Sadhukhan v. Panchanan Sadhukhan.(A. I. R. ( 1935) Cal. 671.) There is no evidence that this compromise was ever read over to Bishan Devi, that it was explained to her, or that she really had knowledge of its contents. It is for the appellants to satisfy the Board that she did understand it; and they must have failed in that. There was no evidence of independent advice. She was purdanashin, and the conditions as to agreements affecting such persons have not been complied with. It is suggested by the appellants that inasmuch as the compromise included Lyallpur property, and inasmuch as the parties or their agents signed the document, the suit must be deemed to be amended, to be widened, so as to include the Lyallpur property. It is submitted that the presentation of the petition asking the Court to make a decree in the terms of the compromise in no way had any effect upon the framework of the suit. It was still a suit in which no claim to relief in respect of the Lyallpur property existed. [With regard to amendments reference was made to Order vi., it. 16 and 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure.] It is submitted that the compromise document did plainly purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or “extinguish" rights or a right to or in immovable property," and required registration under the Registration Act, 1877, s. 17 (&). [With regard to amendments reference was made to Order vi., it. 16 and 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure.] It is submitted that the compromise document did plainly purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or “extinguish" rights or a right to or in immovable property," and required registration under the Registration Act, 1877, s. 17 (&). The contract or compromise on which the Court passes a decree is a concluded contract plus the command of the Court to carry it out Mullas Code of Civil Procedure, 10th ed., p. 898; Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Tarubala Dasi.(( 1930) L. R. 57. I. A. 133, 138, 143.) The Court had a duty, not discretion, to record the compromise, and it was an instrument which ought to have been registered. Under s. 49 of the Registration Act the effect of non-registration is that it could not be received as evidence. The compromise document cannot therefore be looked at. [Reference was made to Bindesri Naik v. Gangasaran Sahu. (( 1897) L. R. 25 I. A. 9, 15)] The appellants contend that the compromise was merged in the decree. The respondents, however, submit that the decree was a nullity and passed without jurisdiction, because it did not comply with s. 375 of the Code of 1882; the compromise was not recorded within the meaning of that section, and the Court has only jurisdiction under that section to pass a decree so far as the compromise relates to the suit, in other words, it had not power to pass any decree extending to the Lyallpur property. Further, the decree was final so far as it related to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as was dealt with by the compromise, in other words, as the suit did not deal with Lyallpur property the decree was not final. This Board dealt with the meaning of "recorded" in Order XXIII., r. 3 (formerly s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882), in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. This Board dealt with the meaning of "recorded" in Order XXIII., r. 3 (formerly s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882), in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 240, 245.) With regard to s. 375 of the Code of 1882, it is submitted that three consequences flow from the compromise (a) Such agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded; (b) and the Court shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit; and (c) and such decree shall be final so far as relates to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement, compromise or satisfaction. As to (a), the compromise shall not be filed, not referred to, but recorded, and that means putting on permanent record the terms at which the parties have arrived. It is plain from Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. (Ibid. 240, 246, 247.) that filing is not enough. [Reference was also made to Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee (( 1899) L. R. 26 I. A. 101.) and Ghulam Mustafa v. Ghulam Nabi.(( 1923) I. L R. 4 Lah. 263.)] With regard to (6), it is important to look at the nature of the present suit; because it is submitted that the judge in passing the decree acted without jurisdiction, and that the decree was a nullity. The decree was without jurisdiction because in truth all that the plaintiff could get in that suit for a declaratory decree was a declaration —a mere declaration that the will was invalid and not binding on him. It was a nullity because that suit never could have been widened to include the terms contained in the compromise. The sole jurisdiction of the Court was to give a declaratory decree, and inasmuch as the Lyallpur lands had been expressly excluded from the suit there was no power to pass a declaration in relation thereto the authorities on the point are collected in Mullas Code of Civil Procedure, 10th ed., pp. 894, 900. Lastly, as to (c), first, the plaint excluded the Lyallpur lands; secondly, the compromise referred to them; and thirdly, it is submitted that the decree, inasmuch as it was dealing with something excluded from the suit could not be final as to the Lyallpur property. It was unenforceable. 894, 900. Lastly, as to (c), first, the plaint excluded the Lyallpur lands; secondly, the compromise referred to them; and thirdly, it is submitted that the decree, inasmuch as it was dealing with something excluded from the suit could not be final as to the Lyallpur property. It was unenforceable. [Reference was also made to Great North-West Central Ry. v. Charlebois.([ 1899] A. C. 114.)] 1940. Feb. 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR GEORGE RANKIN. This appeal is brought from a decree of the High Court at Lahore, dated January 31, 1936, reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge, Lyallpur, dated January 31, 1935, and dismissing the appellants suit. The subject-matter of the dispute is some 6f squares of land in the district of Lyallpur, in the Punjab, which (as is now admitted) belonged to one Ishar Singh, who died childless on October 6, 1905, leaving him surviving a widow, Bishan Devi, also a brothers son, Sundar Singh, who died on January 10, 1922. On February 7, 1929, the widow purported to make a gift of one portion of the land to Sangat Singh (respondent No. 1), and of another portion to a certain Gurdwara (respondent No. 2). The present suit was brought on August 7, 1933, by the appellants, who are three of the four sons of Sundar Singh. The fourth son was made a defendant, and is now respondent No. 3. The claim of the plaint is for a declaration that the gifts of land to Sangat Singh and to the Gurdwara have no validity or effect beyond the life of Bishan Devi. Ishar Singh, on September 19, 1905, made a will, of which probate was granted to Bishan Devi by the District Judge of Peshawar on November 3, 1900. Apart from an interest in the family house at Rawalpindi, Ishar Singh by his will declared himself to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the property which he disposed of thereby. He declared that Sundar Singh, his nephew, was disobedient and of bad character, and was to be totally disinherited. He made the following dispositions in favour of his wife— "4. My wife is Musammat Bishan Devi. She has greatly served me. She has all along been faithful to me. He declared that Sundar Singh, his nephew, was disobedient and of bad character, and was to be totally disinherited. He made the following dispositions in favour of his wife— "4. My wife is Musammat Bishan Devi. She has greatly served me. She has all along been faithful to me. I make this will in her favour that she shall be exclusive (illegible) owner of the following properties after my death— (a) Entire cash including pro-notes for Rs. 13,000 and other items. (b) Liquor, Charas, Opium, etc. of all kinds. (c) Land, situate in Nathe. (d) Lands situate in Lyallpur. (e) Three-quarter share in Nowshahra property. (f) All ornaments. "Sundar Singh or any other person shall have no connection therewith, nor shall they interfere in the management thereof. My wife, Musammat Bishan Devi, may manage the said property in whatever way she likes. She shall have all kinds of powers to deal with the property aforesaid. She shall be considered full owner. So long as Malik Arjan Singh is alive, he will manage the land in Lyallpur. "7. After the death of my wife, Musammat Bishan Devi, whatever property remains shall be owned by the sons of Sundar Singh. Sundar Singh shall have no connection or concern therewith. Besides, my wife, Musammat Bishan Devi, shall not be entitled to sell immovable property. "The sons of Sundar Singh shall also have no such right. "8. The remaining movable or immovable property of mine shall be exclusively owned by my wife, Musammat Bishan Devi." Mutation of the lands at Lyallpur into the name of Bishan Devi was obtained from the Colonization Officer on March 13, 1907, but the entry was restricted by the condition so long as she is alive and does not remarry.” This was in accord with the customary law of the parties independently of her husbands will. On November 12, 1906, Sundar Singh filed a plaint in the Court of the District Judge, Peshawar, against Bishan Devi and other defendants. By this plaint, as amended, he claimed a declaration that the will of Ishar Singh was not valid or binding on him as regards (inter alia) the immovables at Mahal Nathe and Nowshahra, or the stock of liquor and opium, etc., at Peshawar, or the Government promissory notes for Rs. 13,000 in deposit at the Treasury, Peshawar. By this plaint, as amended, he claimed a declaration that the will of Ishar Singh was not valid or binding on him as regards (inter alia) the immovables at Mahal Nathe and Nowshahra, or the stock of liquor and opium, etc., at Peshawar, or the Government promissory notes for Rs. 13,000 in deposit at the Treasury, Peshawar. The sole relief claimed was a declaration, and the suit was brought upon a Court fee of Rs.10 only, though valued for purposes of jurisdiction at over Rs.26,000. The case made was that the business of dealers in intoxicants, etc., under excise licences was not the separate business of Ishar Singh, but a joint family business which had been carried on by him jointly with his brothers and after their deaths with the plaintiff Sunda Singh, and that all the properties had been acquired out of the joint funds of the business. Sundar Singh claimed to be the sole heir to, and possessor of, the property above mentioned, and sued for a declaration that the will is unlawful and null and void and has no effect upon the rights of the plaintiff who holds proprietary possession over the property in question.” The plaint stated that a separate suit will be brought for recovery of the ornaments, valued at Rs.15,000, other movable property and lands situate at Lyallpur which are in possession of the defendants.” This suit was compromised in June, 1907, and as the validity and effect of the compromise is now in question it becomes necessary to notice it in detail. On June 9, a petition to the Court of the District Judge was signed by Bishan Devi and by Sundar Singh. It set forth that the parties had made the settlement therein expressed, and it concluded "hence "this application by way of a compromise is submitted with "the prayer that it may be accepted and the case decided in "terms thereof." The main terms were that the lands at Mahal Nathe and at Lyallpur should belong to Bishan Devi for her life, and on her death to Sundar Singh and his male descendants. An iron safe, a cow and a calf were to belong to Bishan Devi. Sundar Singh was to pay her Rs.8150 in cash. Government promissory notes to the value of Rs. An iron safe, a cow and a calf were to belong to Bishan Devi. Sundar Singh was to pay her Rs.8150 in cash. Government promissory notes to the value of Rs. 13,000 deposited in the Treasury were to be entered in the names of the sons of Sundar Singh. Bishan Devi was to be absolute owner of all ornaments, clothes and other movables in her possession. Sundar Singh was to get the book-debts, stock-in-trade and other trade movables, and to be liable to pay any debts of Ishar Singh. The petition of compromise was signed at Rawalpindi, and was handed over to one Mohan Singh, an honorary magistrate, who sent it by post to the District Judge. On June 11, the case came on before the District Judge, and Bishan Devi was represented by her agent, Jagat Singh, and by a pleader. Sundar Singh was present in person. As appears by the note of the District Judge, Jagat Singh stated to the Court "Musammat Bishan "Devi signed the compromise in my presence, but she subsequently stated that she only accepted it if the Rs.8150 "was paid at once, and if the Rs. 13,000 was invested in a "bank. She signed of her own free will, knowing the contents "of the deed." By his decree the District Judge "ordered that a decree "be and the same is hereby passed on the terms and under "the conditions embodied in the deed of compromise, dated "9th June, 1907, as a whole, with this reservation that "the sum of Rs.8150 shall be paid into Court within fifteen "days from to-day, in case of failure, defendant No. 1 (Bishan "Devi) to be entitled to recover that amount by execution." On some date between June 26 and July 15, 1907, an application for execution was filed by Jagat Singh on behalf of Bishan Devi against Sundar Singh, asking that a sum of Rs-7535 lying in the Treasury on account of Ishar Singh be paid to Bishan Devi on account of the sum of Rs.8150 due to her under the compromise. This application was successful, and on July 15, a receipt was given by Jagat Singh on the ladys behalf for Rs.7535 received through Court. Other instances of action taken under the compromise are in evidence but need not here be referred to. This application was successful, and on July 15, a receipt was given by Jagat Singh on the ladys behalf for Rs.7535 received through Court. Other instances of action taken under the compromise are in evidence but need not here be referred to. The gifts made on February 7, 1929, by Bishan Devi to the first and second respondents of the lands at Lyallpur are contrary to the terms of the compromise of June, 1907, whereby these lands were to belong to her for her lifetime only, and she was not to be competent to alienate them. Hence the present suit brought by sons of Sundar Singh on August 7, 1933. The defence of Bishan Devi (original defendant No. 1), was that she was purdanashin, that she signed a blank paper and not the completed deed of compromise, that her signature was obtained by undue pressure, and without independent advice, and that she never agreed to the compromise. She contended further that the compromise could not be put in evidence for want of registration, and that the Court at Peshawar was not competent to pass the compromise decree. Other contentions need not now be referred to. It was maintained for the plaintiffs that the will of Ishar Singh gave to his widow a life interest and no more, and that the plaintiffs were entitled, as his nearest reversioners, to the declaration which they sought independently of the compromise. The learned Subordinate Judge dealt with a number of questions which are no longer in dispute. He found (inter alia) that the land at Lyallpur was Ishar Singhs and not his wifes, that the business in which he was engaged was his separate business and not a joint family business, that Sangat Singh (respondent No. 1) was not adopted by him. But in the High Court the issues were narrowed to three questions only, (1.) whether by her husbands will Bishan Devi got an absolute interest in the Lyallpur lands, (2.) whether the compromise was brought about by coercion and undue influence, or whether she signed the deed after fully understanding its contents, (3.) whether the deed was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. On the question as to the true construction of the will of Ishar Singh the trial Court and the High Court were agreed in holding that its effect was to make Bishan Devi absolute owner of the Lyallpur property. Their Lordships are of the same opinion. The prohibition against selling the immovables is not addressed to the widow only, but is extended to the sons of Sundar Singh under clause 7, and is not, in their Lordships view, to be regarded as showing an intention to give to the widow an interest for life or the estate of a Hindu woman, but as a condition which the testator was proposing to attach to an absolute interest. Clause 4 is in clear and emphatic language, consistent only with the gift of an absolute interest, and the phrase "whatever property remains" in the first part of clause 7 of the will is in keeping with this intention. The prohibition against selling must be disregarded as repugnant to the absolute gift to Bishan Devi. Clause 8 is a residuary clause which does not affect the land at Lyallpur. It is therefore necessary for the plaintiffs-appellants to rely upon the compromise of June, 1907. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the deed was admissible in evidence; that the compromise was entered into by Bishan Devi with knowledge of its contents and voluntarily; and that the case of coercion and undue influence was untrue. The learned judges of the High Court have held that the deed is inadmissible for want of registration, and that it has not been established that it was read over to her or that she signed it after fully understanding its meaning or effect. They do not appear to hold that coercion or undue influence has been proved. At the root of their judgment is an opinion formed by them to the effect that by not including in the suit of 1906 a claim to recover possession of the Lyallpur lands Sundar Singh had forfeited all right therein by virtue of Order II., r. 2, C.P.C. (s. 43 of the Code of 1882). They are mistaken in supposing that the claim to Rs. 13,000 Government promissory notes and to the land at Nowshara was not included in the suit. They are mistaken in supposing that the claim to Rs. 13,000 Government promissory notes and to the land at Nowshara was not included in the suit. The plaint was on the footing that Sundar Singh was in possession of these and other items and required only a declaration to clear his title, whereas the land at Lyallpur and the ornaments were in Bishan Devis possession, and the claim to them must necessarily be put as a claim to recover possession. In these circumstances their Lordships cannot agree with the High Court in regarding the compromise as bad by reason that Bishan Devi was not advised that she could safely treat the claim of Sundar Singh to the Lyallpur lands as barred. On the contrary, such advice, had it been given, would, in their Lordships view, have been rash rather than sound. The lands at Lyallpur being situate in the Punjab, outside the district of Peshawar, a claim to relief in respect of them could have been entertained by the District Judge under s. 19 of the Code of 1882. The High Court would seem to have assumed that s. 19 was not merely permissive also that the claim to recover possession of the Lyallpur lands and the claim to a declaration as regards the other lands were claims in respect of the same cause of action (cf. Payana Reena Saminathan v. Pana Lana Palaniappa.(( 1913) I. R. 41 I. A. 142.) Their Lordships think that both assumptions are highly debatable. But in any case the claim of the present appellants as reversioners of Ishar Singh would not have been barred so far as regards the question whether Ishar Singhs will gave to his widow an absolute interest or an interest for her life. Moreover, so long as the suit of 1906 was undisposed of, it was always possible that the Court, if it thought that there was anything in the point as to Order II., r. 2, would give leave to the plaintiff to amend by including a claim to recover possession of the ornaments and Lyallpur lands. It does not appear that the lawyers advising Bishan Devi thought anything of the point now taken by the High Court, and with all respect to the learned judges their Lordships cannot regard it as a good one. It does not appear that the lawyers advising Bishan Devi thought anything of the point now taken by the High Court, and with all respect to the learned judges their Lordships cannot regard it as a good one. By the decree of June 11, 1907, the District Judge had purported to direct that the terms of the compromise should be carried out as a whole. He had not in terms excluded the Lyallpur land from the operative part of the decree, and he had not recited the contents of the deed. Though it is clear that his decree was made upon the petition, and that both documents would become part of the same record, he had neither marked and exhibited the deed nor scheduled it, or a copy of it, to the decree. He had referred to the deed by date, and in a manner which has given rise to no doubt or difficulty. No proceedings were taken at any time during the next twenty years for having the decree set aside, whether on the ground of some defect in the agreement of compromise or some error or irregularity in the decree itself. On the contrary, the decree was enforced as to one of the terms of the compromise by execution proceedings taken on behalf of Bishan Devi; and it may well be a question whether, after taking this advantage under the decree, she would have been entitled in equity to have the decree set aside. Under the Registration Act (III. of 1877), no question of registration arises as regards decrees [s. 17 (i.)]. In these circumstances their Lordships agree with the argument of Sir Hari Singh Gour, on behalf of the appellants, that the first question is one of jurisdiction in the strict sense of the term. Had the learned District Judge at Peshawar jurisdiction to pass this decree as regards the lands at Lyallpur, or is his decree so far as regards these lands a nullity, which Bishan Devi was entitled to disregard without taking any proceedings to have it set aside or varied? As the learned judges of the High Court thought that the claim to the Lyallpur lands came within Order II., r. 2, they must have considered that this claim was within the jurisdiction of the District Judge. As the learned judges of the High Court thought that the claim to the Lyallpur lands came within Order II., r. 2, they must have considered that this claim was within the jurisdiction of the District Judge. In any case, when it was agreed that Bishan Devi should have the Lyallpur lands for her life, there was no doubt or difficulty as to the jurisdiction of the District Judge at Peshawar to include these lands within the declaration made as to the other lands and assets. It was no longer a question of a decree for possession, but merely of a judicial determination as to the reversionary rights of Sundar Singh or his descendants. Whether the District Judge acted irregularly, and failed to comply strictly with s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 matters nothing. He acted by consent, and within his jurisdiction; his decree was enforced in execution by Bishan Devi, and no proceedings have at any time been taken to have it set aside. He might have acted more strictly in compliance with the terms of s. 375 had he first amended the plaint by including the reversionary interest in the Lyallpur lands within the declaration sought, but the mere fact that he could have done so shows that he was not devoid of jurisdiction. In these circumstances it is clear that in 1928 Bishan Devi was not entitled to treat as a nullity this judicial determination to the effect that she had only a life interest in the lands at Lyallpur. Their Lordships, considering the compromise of 1907 (as the Courts in India have considered it) as a contract, are further of opinion that it was valid and binding upon Bishan Devi. The learned judges of the High Court held that the District Judge had not acted correctly under Order XXIII., r. 3, C.P.C. (meaning s. 375 of the Code of 1882), and had not ordered the compromise to be recorded. Their Lordships have already noticed that the decree directs effect to be given to the whole compromise, and have dealt with the position so created. But in any view the decree, in their Lordships opinion, recorded the compromise though the compromise was not recited textually either in the body of the decree or in a schedule thereto. In Hemanta Kumari Debt v. Midnapur Zemindary Co. But in any view the decree, in their Lordships opinion, recorded the compromise though the compromise was not recited textually either in the body of the decree or in a schedule thereto. In Hemanta Kumari Debt v. Midnapur Zemindary Co. (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 240.), the Board was careful to avoid laying down any method of compliance with s. 375 of the Code of 1882 as the only method. Lord Buckmaster was at pains to say that (Ibid. 246, 247.) their Lordships are not aware of the exact system by which documents are recorded in the Courts in "India," and it was not intended by pointing out one perfectly proper and effectual method to alter or nullify the rights of parties which for many years past had depended on the previous Indian practice being treated as valid. That s. 375 was sufficiently complied with by a reference to the compromise being made in the decree appears from the judgment delivered by Lord Watson on behalf of the Board in Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee (( 1899) L. R. 26 I. A. 101,106.), where it was said that the order of the learned judge, if it had referred to or narrated these terms of compromise, would have been judicial evidence, available to the appellant, that the respondents had agreed to transfer to her the moiety of land now in "dispute.” (See also Hemanta Kumaris case.(( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 240.)) The only remaining question is whether Bishan Devi entered into the compromise voluntarily and with understanding of its effect. It does not appear that she was purdanashin in the strictest sense, and her evidence is that of an intelligent woman. She took the benefit of the compromise and acted on it for many years before repudiating it. As she not only got rid of the claim of Sundar Singh to be sole owner of her husbands lands and other assets, but enforced one of the terms of the compromise against him, there is more than sufficient prima facie evidence that she understood the transaction. It is satisfactorily proved that the terms of the compromise were settled after much haggling in the course of which Jagat Singh conveyed her instructions to the retired District Judge, Bhagat Narain Das, who was acting as conciliator between the parties, and who witnessed her signature to the petition of compromise. It is satisfactorily proved that the terms of the compromise were settled after much haggling in the course of which Jagat Singh conveyed her instructions to the retired District Judge, Bhagat Narain Das, who was acting as conciliator between the parties, and who witnessed her signature to the petition of compromise. The case that she signed a blank paper is, in their Lordships opinion, disproved. They reject as worthless the evidence of Jagat Singh on this point, and also the evidence to the effect that she was brought to agree by his threat to cease acting for her in the suit. The allegation that undue pressure was brought upon her by certain members of the baradri (brotherhood) is the only matter which requires serious consideration upon this part of the case. It is said that she was told that certain members of the family would not take part in the marriage ceremonies of her sisters son, Nidhan Singh (brother of Jagat Singh), unless she compromised with Sundar Singh. But as the Subordinate Judge noticed, there is no reason to think that this threat, if made, would have greatly troubled Bishan Devi. Her own evidence is that she said at the time that she did not care, and that "if they "would not let the marriage take place let them do so.” The learned judges of the High Court do not appear to find that undue influence was used, but proceed upon the view that Bishan Devi is not proved to have understood the compromise or to have voluntarily entered into it. After twenty years and more, when Bhagat Narain Das is dead, direct oral evidence of the explanation of the petition can hardly be expected. The High Court, largely because of the argument as to the effect of Order II., r. 2, on the lands at Lyallpur, thought that the compromise was one-sided. Also they mistakenly thought that the sum of Rs.8150 was to be paid, to Bishan Devi out of the Rs. 13,000 (which is not the case bf either party). The Rs.13,000 consisted of Government promissory notes which were to be put in the name of the sons of Sundar Singh, and the sum of Rs.7535 realized in execution was a different matter. Their Lordships agree with the trial judge in holding that Bishan Devi entered into the compromise voluntarily. 13,000 (which is not the case bf either party). The Rs.13,000 consisted of Government promissory notes which were to be put in the name of the sons of Sundar Singh, and the sum of Rs.7535 realized in execution was a different matter. Their Lordships agree with the trial judge in holding that Bishan Devi entered into the compromise voluntarily. She appears to have been surrounded with legal advisers, and in Bhagat Narain Das, admittedly a man of high standing and good reputation, had a family friend specially competent to give her sound and practical advice. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, that the decree of the High Court should be set aside, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge restored. The first and second respondents will pay the appellants costs in the High Court and of this appeal.