Judgement Appeal (No. 6 of 1939) from a decree of the High Court (March 31, 1937), which had affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Allahabad (May 14, 1934). This appeal was concerned with the validity of a declaration, dated March 7, 1930, made by the Local Government of the United Provinces under s. 8 of the United Provinces Court of Wards Act (IV. of 1912), declaring, upon the grounds of extravagance, and failure, without sufficient reason, to discharge his debts, that the appellant, Raja Bhagwan Baksh Singh, was incapable of managing his property. In his suit, instituted on March 19, 1932, the appellant prayed for a declaration that the declaration of the Local Government was ultra vires and void. The facts, and the relevant statutory provisions, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge dismissed the suit, and an appeal from his decision was dismissed by the High Court (Harries and Rachhpal Singh JJ.). The appeal is reported at I. L. R. [ 1937] A. 736. The only two questions raised in the present appeal were (1.) whether land revenue was or was not to be deducted before ascertaining what were “the gross annual profits" in proviso (a) to sub-clauses (iii.) and (iv.) of sub-s. 1 of s. 8 of the Courts of Wards Act; and (2.) whether the appellant was prohibited from challenging the action taken by the Local Government under s. 8 of the Act by reason of the provisions of s. 11 of the Act. 1940. Feb. 1, 2. 7. D. Caswell K.C., R. R. Handoo and J. L. Roy for the appellant. With regard to s. 11 of the Act, the limits of the Local Governments jurisdiction must be found in the statute which delegated their authority to them; there are four propositions in that respect (a) If the words have a clear and well-recognized meaning, then the interpretation based on that ordinary meaning must be followed. It is submitted, however, that in respect of this statute the words are not so unequivocal that they must be given some ordinary general meaning, (b) In cases where a statute takes away an individuals important right to manage his own property, and, further, his right of access to the Courts, any provisions to the latter effect will be particularly and jealously watched by the Courts Oldaker v. Hunt (( 1854) 19 Beav. 485.), and In re Vexatious Actions Act, 1896. In re Boaler. ([ 1914] 1 K. B. 21, 36.) (c) Where a Court takes upon itself to exercise jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision is a nullity Attorney-General v. Hotham (Lord). (( 1827) 3 Russell, 415.) (d) No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide the question of the existence or the extent of its jurisdiction it must always be a matter of appeal. There is a strong presumption in English law that a subordinate court cannot be its own judge as to its jurisdiction. If, therefore, s. n, which limits the jurisdiction given to the Court, were intended to apply to the proviso to s. 8 it should have said in plain language not only that " no declaration ". . . . shall be questioned in any civil court," but that the jurisdiction to make a declaration shall not be questioned Wingrove v. Morgan ([ 1934] 1 ch 423.) and Rex v. Board of Education. ([ 1910] 2 K. B. 165, 173, 184, 187.) Sect. 11 does not go on to say " nor shall the proprietor be "entitled to question their jurisdiction." [Reference was also made to Estwick v. City of London. ((1671) 82 E. R. 515.)] At the best it can be said on behalf of the Local Government that they had discharged a discretion in coming to the conclusion whether " gross annual profits " had to be assessed on a certain basis or another; if it appeared that that decision was wrong, then it is submitted that they have not used their discretion judicially, and on that ground that Court would go behind the word " satisfied." [Reference was made to Rex v. Moreley ((1760) 2 Burrows, 1041.) and Dartford Brewery Co. v. County of London Quarter Sessions. ([ 1906] 1 K. B. 695, 699.)] The King v. Tomlinson ((1829) 9 B. & C. 163.) lays down that if the delegated authority is acting on a wrong principle the sovereign power as represented by the Court with its residual power can always review the decision of the delegated authority. It is submitted that the words of s. 11 are not sufficiently wide to take away the residue of power in the sovereign power to say whether the delegated authority has exercised its jurisdiction. It is submitted that the words of s. 11 are not sufficiently wide to take away the residue of power in the sovereign power to say whether the delegated authority has exercised its jurisdiction. [Reference was also made to His Highness The Gaekwar of Baroda v. Gandhi Kachrabhai Kasturchand. (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 60.)] With regard to " profits," there are English authorities which say that the words " gross profits " mean nothing at all. One must, however, attach some meaning to them in this statute. The words of proviso (a) are " gross annual "profits of the property," not "the profits of the proprietor V or "the profits of the property after deducting the land "revenue." There can be nothing bigger than gross profits. Land revenue must be paid out of the gross profits, otherwise there would be some unknown form of profits which is larger than gross profits. The word " profits " has received judicial interpretation in many cases Glasier v. Rolls, (( 1889) 42 Ch. D. 436, 453.) It is submitted that " gross profits " are the entire sum without deduction. " Profits " can be used in more than one sense —commercial or chartered accountants use, and in the wider sense of rents and profits of land Last v. London Assurance Corporation. (( 1885) 10 App. Cas. 438.) It was said in Vulcan Motor and Engineering Co. v. Hampson ([ 1921] 3 K. B. 597, 601-2.) that " It is better not "to use the expression gross profits. but to use the word " returns as contrasted with net profits. " [Reference was also made to John Stuart Mills Principles of Political Economy, vol. i., book 2, c. 15, p. 484, s. 1; and to the definition of " gross " in the Oxford Dictionary as meaning the entire amount.] In the present case the Legislature must be taken to mean the entire amount without deduction. In Lindley on Partnership, 10th ed., at p. 36, it is said that "Profits and net profits are for all legal purposes synonymous "expressions." If the Legislature had intended that the term "gross annual profits " should mean the total income resulting after deduction of the land revenue it would have been easy to say so. J. M. Tucker K.C. and W. Wallach for the respondent. J. M. Tucker K.C. and W. Wallach for the respondent. The words " gross annual profits " are undoubtedly bound to give rise to some difficulty, but in construing them the Court has the assistance of the context and the purpose of the Act in which they appear. The purpose of the Court of Wards Act, so far as relates to a disqualified proprietor, is to prevent him from entering on a course of extravagance which is likely to dissipate the property. There must be some test which the Local Government can apply in deciding whether the estate owner was entering upon such a course, and what better test can there be than to take what the spendable income is and test it by his annual charges in the shape of the interest on the debts which he has incurred. This statute, which is an enactment by the Local Government itself, was passed in an atmosphere entirely different from that to which one is accustomed in England; and it was also passed in n atmosphere of complete knowledge of the system of land tenure in India and as to the importance of land revenue. In India, land revenue comes before everything —the powers of recovery of land revenue are very stringent s. 146 of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act (U. P. Act III. of 1901). The land revenue is a fixed amount, and is on an entirely different footing from local rates and income tax in England. It is not, therefore, difficult to believe that the Legislature in using the words in the context in which they are found can only have meant the gross profits of the property which belonged to the proprietor himself. The use of the words is to prevent the deduction of things which are under the control of the proprietor—such as the management of the estate. Other Indian Acts would appear to indicate that the use of the word " profits " has meant " profits after "deducting land revenue." The theory undoubtedly is that the owner of the land is the State, and the proprietor holds it on payment of revenue; he never really owns the gross rent, everything comes to him impressed with a charge in favour of the Government. That would prevent land revenue being treated as any part of the profits which come to the proprietor. That would prevent land revenue being treated as any part of the profits which come to the proprietor. It is submitted that what are meant are " gross "annual profits" of the property which come to the proprietor. The other point, on s. 11 is undoubtedly one of difficulty, and for this reason if once it is admitted that a Court can examine any action of the Local Government and decide whether the Local Government was satisfied, or ought to have been satisfied, or whether there were any real grounds for its satisfaction, it is difficult to see what is implied by s. 11. In this case s. 11 is imperative. The effect of s. 8 is to confer on the Local Government jurisdiction to make this declaration, and the proviso is merely directory, it is not a thing which takes away the jurisdiction. It is submitted that the judge in Deputy Commissioner, Kheri v. Pandit Daya Chand Chaubey (( 1935) I. L. R. 10 Luck . 670.) put the matter clearly, and that the judges of the High Court in the present case in adopting that view came to a right decision. Sect, n is entirely prohibitive; the moment an attempt is made to cut it down difficulties appear. The act of the Local Government is not one in excess of their jurisdiction; at the most they have exercised their jurisdiction; at the most they have made a mistake of law in deciding the question of fact whether the circumstances existed. That being so, there would have been a right of appeal to the civil court but for s. n, which in any event governs s. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. The right of appeal which would otherwise have existed under s. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code has been clearly taken away. [Reference was also made to Narindra Bahadur Singh v. Oudh Commercial Bank, Ld. (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 494.)] J. D. Caswell K.C. replied, and referred to Haji Rehemtulla v. Secretary of State. (A. I. R. ( 1926) Bom. 50.) March 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PORTER. The appellant is the proprietor of the Amethi estate, in the Sultanpur District of Oudh in the United Provinces of India. (A. I. R. ( 1926) Bom. 50.) March 4. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PORTER. The appellant is the proprietor of the Amethi estate, in the Sultanpur District of Oudh in the United Provinces of India. On March 7, 1930, he was declared by the Governor in Council of the United Provinces, who claimed to be acting under the powers conferred upon him by the United Provinces Court of Wards Act (IV. of 1912), to be incapable of managing his own property. The appellant maintains that the declaration was ultra vires, and on March 19, 1932, instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Allahabad claiming a declaration that the declaration above mentioned was wholly illegal and of no effect against the plaintiff. His suit was dismissed on May 14, 1934, and this dismissal was confirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on March 31, 1937. From this decision the appellant has appealed to His Majesty in Council. The Governors action was taken under ss. His suit was dismissed on May 14, 1934, and this dismissal was confirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on March 31, 1937. From this decision the appellant has appealed to His Majesty in Council. The Governors action was taken under ss. 8 and 9 of the Court of Wards Act, which are as follows— "(8.)—(1.) Proprietors shall be deemed to be disqualified to "manage their own property when they are— "(a) minors; "(b) females declared by the Local Government to be incapable of managing their own property; "(c) persons adjudged by a competent civil court to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing their own property; "(d) persons declared by the Local Government to be incapable of managing or unfitted to manage their own property— "(i.) owing to any physical or mental defect or infirmity unfitting them for the management of their own property; "(ii.) owing to their having been convicted of a non-bailable offence and being unfitted by vicious habits or bad character for the management of their own property; "(iii.) owing to their having entered upon a course of extravagance; "(iv.) owing to their failure without sufficient reason to discharge the debts and liabilities due by them "Provided that no such declaration shall be made under "sub-clause (iii.) or (iv.) unless the Local Government is "satisfied— "(a) that the aggregate annual interest payable at the "contractual rate on the debts and liabilities due by the "proprietor exceeds one-third of the gross annual profits of "the property and "(b) that such extravagance or such failure to discharge the said debts and liabilities is likely to lead to the dissipation of the property. "(2.) No declaration under clause (d) of sub-section (1.) shall "be made until the proprietor has been furnished with a detailed "statement of the grounds on which it is proposed to disqualify "him and has had an opportunity of showing cause why such "declaration should not be made. "9.—(I.) The Local Government may direct the Collector "or such other person as it may appoint, to make an inquiry "into the circumstances of any proprietor and the extent of "his indebtedness. . . "9.—(I.) The Local Government may direct the Collector "or such other person as it may appoint, to make an inquiry "into the circumstances of any proprietor and the extent of "his indebtedness. . . ." So far as they are relevant to this appeal the facts are as follows— On July 13, 1929, an inquiry under s. 9, sub-s. 1, of the Act of 1912 was instituted by the Local Government into the debts and liabilities of the appellant. After the inquiry the appellant received a letter from the Commissioner of Fyzabad, dated September 17, 1929, enclosing a statement of the loans contracted by the appellant, and a statement of the gross annual income, gross annual profits, and land revenue derived from his property. By the letter and statements the appellant was informed that his debts totaled Rs. 14,45,160-7-9, on which the annual interest at the contractual rates amounted to Rs. 1,22,110-9-0; that the gross annual income from his estates amounted to Rs.5,71,626-10-9; that the amount payable in respect of land revenue, etc., was Rs.2,65,117-14-4; that the gross annual profits from his estates (arrived at by deducting the amount payable as land revenue, etc., from the gross annual income) amounted to Rs.3,06,508-12-5; and that therefore the annual interest payable at the contractual rates exceeded one-third of the gross annual profits. Further, the letter charged the appellant with failure, without sufficient cause, to discharge his debts and liabilities, and said that such failure was likely to lead to the dissipation of the property. Finally, the appellant was informed that, under s. 8, sub-s. 1 (d) (iii.), (iv.), provisoes (a), (6), of the 1912 Act, he was liable to be declared by the Local Government to be incapable of managing his property, but that, under s. 8, sub-s. 2, of that Act, he could show cause against such a declaration being made. As a result of this communication the appellant attempted to show cause why no declaration should be made, but was unsuccessful and, as stated above, the declaration was made. From the statement sent to him it is apparent that in calculating whether the annual interest at the contractual rates exceeded one-third of the annual profits of his property, the Local Government, in order to ascertain the gross annual profits of the estate, deducted the land revenue from the gross annual income. From the statement sent to him it is apparent that in calculating whether the annual interest at the contractual rates exceeded one-third of the annual profits of his property, the Local Government, in order to ascertain the gross annual profits of the estate, deducted the land revenue from the gross annual income. If this deduction was rightly made it was evident that the annual interest on the appellants debts exceeded one-third of the gross annual profits—if, on the other hand, the land revenue should not have been deducted, the annual interest on the debts is less than one-third of the gross annual profits. Though some question of the right of the Local Government to deduct certain cesses and annual charitable contributions was also raised, it is conceded that they were not of sufficient amount to have any bearing on the question at issue, and in argument consideration of them was put aside. The sole question considered was whether land revenue was or was not rightly deducted before ascertaining what sum was to be regarded as the gross annual profits. Altogether apart, however, from the question whether the construction which he put upon those words was accurate or inaccurate, the respondent maintained that the appellant was prohibited from challenging the action taken by reason of the provisions of s. 11 of the Court of Wards Act. That section is as follows— "No declaration made by the Local Government under "section 8 or by the court of wards under section 10 shall be "questioned in any civil court." A number of other questions had been raised and argued before the Courts in India, but before their Lordships the respondent rested his case solely upon the two points mentioned. It may be, as stated by Jessel M.R., and repeated by Lord Bramwell in Last v. London Assurance Corporation (( 1885) 10 App. Cas. 438, 456.), that of itself the phrase " gross annual profits" has no definite meaning. It must take its colour from its surroundings. In the present case, therefore, it is necessary to consider those surroundings by an examination of the scheme of the Court of Wards Act, the way in which land tax is regarded in India, and any provisions of the Land Revenue Act which bear upon the matter, in addition to the exact wording of s. 8 itself. In the present case, therefore, it is necessary to consider those surroundings by an examination of the scheme of the Court of Wards Act, the way in which land tax is regarded in India, and any provisions of the Land Revenue Act which bear upon the matter, in addition to the exact wording of s. 8 itself. The object of disqualification under s. 8 is, no doubt, threefold—it will protect persons incapable of managing their own affairs—it will prevent the splitting up or, as the Act itself says, " the dissipation of the property,” and in either event it will enable land revenue to be more easily and more certainly collected. That the collection of land revenue is an important con sideration is apparent both from the objects aimed at and. from the fact that by s. 4 of the Act the Board of Revenue is made the Court of Wards for the United Provinces. Indeed, in earlier schemes in respect of the disqualification of proprietors, the necessary provisions were contained in the Land Revenue Acts themselves, and even in the present Act the definition of proprietor is only reached by reference to " Mahal " and its meaning in the Land Revenue Act from time to time in force. Moreover, though minors, certain females and lunatics—to take three of the classes mentioned in s. 8 of the Act—may require protection, whether their property be in land or personality, it is to be observed that under that section only proprietors, i.e., those beneficially interested in a mahal, are dealt with, and mahal rimarily means a local area held under a separate engagement for the payment of land revenue. No doubt, when once a proprietor is made a ward, all his property is, under s. 16, sub-s. 1, of the Act, put under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, but the original assumption of wardship is only possible in the case of proprietors or land owners paying land revenue. In considering the way in which land revenue is regarded in India no comparison with tenures in England is of much (if any) assistance. Its universality, its quantum, and the tendency of the Indian outlook to regard the Government as a sharer in all the produce of the land are matters of importance. By s. 58 of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Land Revenue Act (III. Its universality, its quantum, and the tendency of the Indian outlook to regard the Government as a sharer in all the produce of the land are matters of importance. By s. 58 of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Land Revenue Act (III. of 1901), it is provided— "58.—(1.) All land, to whatever purpose applied and wherever situate, is liable to the payment of revenue to the "Government, except such land as has been wholly exempted "from such liability by special grant of, or contract with, the "Government or by the provisions of any law for the time "being in force. "(2.) Revenue may be assessed on land, notwithstanding "that that revenue, by reason of its having been assigned, "released, compounded for or redeemed, is not payable to "the Government. "(3.) No length of occupancy of any land, nor any grant "of land made by the proprietor, shall release such land from "the liability to pay revenue." But not only is the incidence of the revenue universal, it is also generally fixed at a sum varying from 40 to 45 per cent, of the total income. If in addition to this percentage the proprietor has encumbered his estate to the extent of one-third of the income, between 70 and 80 per cent, of the total receipts would be removed from his control, and from 20 to 30 per cent, only remain—a small margin from which to ensure the payment of revenue and the protection of the mahal against foreclosure or sale under any mortgages created by the proprietor. In their Lordships view, these considerations inevitably lead to the conclusion that land revenue must be deducted in calculating the gross annual profit of a property. Even apart, however, from these considerations, the wording of s. 8 of the Court of Wards Act itself would lead their Lordships to the same conclusion. Under proviso (a) to sub-clause (iv.) of sub-s. 1 of s. 8 the contrast is between the aggregate annual interest payable by the proprietor and the gross annual profits—a phraseology which would naturally point to a contrast between what the proprietor received and the interest which he owed, and would so point none the less though it is the profits of the property and not of the proprietor which have to be considered. Indeed, to substitute the former consideration would bring into account a matter which is obviously extraneous to the considerations with which the Legislature was concerned, namely, the profit derived by the proprietor from his personal estate. Moreover, the words are " annual profits "—not " annual rent " or " income," and seem to refer to some profits half way between the total income of the estate and the net profits remaining after the management expenses have been paid. If the total produce or income of the estate had been intended it would have been easy enough to say so—indeed, in s. 141 of the Land Revenue Act of 1901 land revenue is said to be a first charge on the rents, profits or produce of every mahal, as opposed to the phrase " gross annual profits " in s. 8 of the Court of Wards Act. Moreover, if land revenue is not to be deducted before the gross annual profits are arrived at in calculating the ratio of charges to profit, land revenue would appear on neither side of the account, neither as a charge nor as a deduction from profits. Therefore, even accepting the view presented by the appellant that " gross profits" has of itself no definite meaning, their Lordships, bearing in mind the circumstances above mentioned, are of opinion that in the Court of Wards Act land revenue must be deducted, but no allowance for any expenses of estate management must be made, in arriving at the gross annual profit of the property. This conclusion alone would involve the dismissal of the appeal, but the preliminary question whether any action in the Courts was possible having regard to the provisions of s. 11 of the Act was fully argued, and is a matter of importance on which their Lordships think their decision should also be given. Sects. 10, 11, 12 and 13 deal with the limitations of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and are as follows— "10. A proprietor may apply to the Collector to have his "property placed under the superintendence of the court of "wards, and the court of wards may, on being satisfied that "it is expedient to undertake the management of such property, "make a declaration to this effect." "11. A proprietor may apply to the Collector to have his "property placed under the superintendence of the court of "wards, and the court of wards may, on being satisfied that "it is expedient to undertake the management of such property, "make a declaration to this effect." "11. No declaration made by the Local Government under section 8 or by the court of wards under section 10 shall be questioned in any civil court." "12.—(i.) The court of wards shall assume the superintendence of the property of any proprietor disqualified under clause (b) or (d) of sub-section (i.) of section 8 or in regard to "whose property a declaration has been made under section 10. "(2.) The court of wards may in its discretion assume or "refrain from assuming the superintendence of— "(a) the property or person and property of any proprietor disqualified under clause (a) or (c) of sub-section 1 of section 8; "(b) the person of any proprietor disqualified under clause (b) or (d) of sub-section 1 of section 8. "(3) The court of wards may assume the superintendence of the person of any minor who has an immediate or reversionary "interest in the property— "(a) of any proprietor disqualified under section 8; or "(b) of any proprietor in regard to whose property a declaration has been made under section 10." "13. If the right of the court of wards to assume or retain "the superintendence of the person or property of any disqualified proprietor is disputed by such proprietor or, if he "be a minor or of unsound mind, by some person on his behalf, "the case shall be reported to the Local Government, whose "orders thereon shall be final and shall not be questioned in any "civil court.” It will be observed that s. 11 is only concerned with action taken under sub-s. 1 (6) or (d) of s. 8, and under s. 10, i.e., those cases in which a declaration is made, leaving the other cases in which superintendence of the property is assumed (or possibly all cases after it has been assumed, or in which it is retained) to be dealt with by s. 13. In terms s. 11 appears to prohibit the bringing of an action disputing the validity of a declaration made by the Court of Wards under those sub-clauses of s. 8. In terms s. 11 appears to prohibit the bringing of an action disputing the validity of a declaration made by the Court of Wards under those sub-clauses of s. 8. Some limitation must, no doubt, be put upon the generality of the provision in as much as good faith at any rate is required. The appellant, however, goes further, and says that the Court of Wards is without jurisdiction, and can be declared to be without jurisdiction by the Civil Court in all cases in which the preliminary requirements of s. 8 have not been fulfilled. So far as sub-s. 1(b) and (d) are concerned, the primary requirement contained in those sub-clauses themselves is merely that the Governor in Council should declare the proprietors incapable or unfitted to manage their own property. Under (b) it seems impossible to put any limitation on that jurisdiction. Under (d) (i.) (ii.) (iii.) and (iv.) the matter again seems to be one for the discretionary judgment of the Local Government. It is conceivable that under (d) (ii.) the jurisdiction only exists provided the proprietor has been in fact convicted of a non-bailable offence, and that if this fact were non-existent the Local Government would be acting ultra vires in making a declaration, but it is difficult to imagine that in sub-clauses (i.), (iii.) and (iv.), and, indeed, in that part of sub-clause (ii.) which concerns unfitness by reason of vicious habits or bad character, the Local Government should have an absolute discretion, whereas in the final part of sub-clause (ii.) its jurisdiction should be limited. In argument before their Lordships, however, the allegation that the action of the Local Government was ultra vires was founded not upon the wording of the sub-clauses, but upon the proviso to sub-clauses (iii.) and (iv.), and it was said that if the Governor in Council showed by his decision that he interpreted the phrase " gross annual profits " wrongly in law then he could be declared to have assumed an unjustified jurisdiction. But in such an argument the same difficulty arises as is to be found on a consideration of the sub-clauses themselves. But in such an argument the same difficulty arises as is to be found on a consideration of the sub-clauses themselves. No logical distinction between fact and law was propounded to their Lordships, and, indeed, it is difficult to see why a wrong calculation under proviso (a) should be unchallengeable, whereas a wrong view as to the meaning of "gross annual "profits" should be open to question. Nor, indeed, is it easy to draw a distinction between fact or law on the one part and opinion on the other, since proviso (b), by which the Local Government are equally governed, is a matter of opinion alone. Apart from a close analysis of s.8 itself, there are other reasons for thinking the decision of the Local Government to be unfettered. Under s. 8, sub-s. 2, careful provision is made for a hearing of the proprietors case before a decision is made, and in the case of sub-clauses (a) and (c) s. 13 expressly provides for the method which shall be followed if the right of the Court of Wards is challenged, and the decision so attained is declared to be final. Moreover, the proviso itself expressly requires the satisfaction of the Local Government, not that of a Court, and it is, in their Lordships view, unlikely that a decision solemnly come to by the Governor in Council after full inquiry, and when declared by the Act to be final, should thereafter be subject to review by the local Courts of the Province. In coming to this conclusion their Lordships are in no way overlooking the importance of jealously scrutinizing the jurisdiction conferred on executive bodies, or of giving no wider interpretation than is necessary to any limitation of the powers of the Court. But however carefully the liberty of the subject has to be guarded, not only is there sound sense in making the decision of the Local Government final, but it has also to be remembered that a right construction of the Act can only be attained if its whole scope and object, together with an analysis of its wording and the circumstances in which it is enacted, are taken into consideration. From an examination of the Act alone their Lordships would have reached the conclusion that owing to the provisions of ss. From an examination of the Act alone their Lordships would have reached the conclusion that owing to the provisions of ss. 11 and 13 of the Act no resort to the Courts was left in this case under s. 8, Law. Rep. 67 Ind. App. 197 ( 1939- 1940) Raja Bhagwan Baksh Singh V. Secretary of State 52 and the other circumstances to which their Lordships have referred so far from weakening have strengthened that conclusion. Having reached a decision opposed to both the contentions put forward on behalf of the appellant, they will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed, with costs.