JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - The question involved in this appeal is as to the effect of sub-sec. 17 C.W.N. 833 (1913) of sec. 20 of the Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act III of 1913). The matter arises in this way: -- Three persons, Golam Rahaman, Esahaque and Kabiruddin purchased a certain holding in equal shares. Kabiruddin's one-third share was subsequently separated, and the interest of Golam Rahaman and Esahaque formed a distinct whole. Golam Rahaman died, leaving as heirs Ersad Ali, Defendant No. 41 C.W.N. 1173 (1937), and several other persons who are represented by Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4. On Esahaque's death, his interest passed to his widow Meherjan Bibi, Defendant No. 26 C.W.N. 138 (1920), to a daughter Kasturi Bibi, Plaintiff No. 41 C.W.N. 85 (1936), and to a daughter's daughter Hayatan Bibi, Plaintiff No. ILR (1939) 2 Cal. 858 : S.C. 43 C.W.N. 1098 (1939). It follows accordingly that after the deaths of Golam Rahaman and Esahaque, the tenancy devolved on all the heirs of these two persons I have just indicated. It appears, however, that in the settlement record, the holding was recorded only in the name of Ersad Ali and Meherjan Bibi. This being a khas mahal tenancy, a certificate was taken out for recovery of arrears of rent due in respect of the holding; but the only persons who were made certificate-debtors were Ersad Ali and Meherjan Bibi. The holding was afterwards put up for sale in execution of the certificate, and purchased by Defendant No. 1. The present Plaintiffs thereupon instituted this suit in respect of their five-ninths share in the holding, asking for a declaration that it was not affected by the certificate sale at all. The learned Munsif gave effect to this contention and decreed the suit. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the decision, holding that the entire holding passed. He seemed to think that this followed from sub-sec. (3) of sec. 20 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, and was further of opinion that as all the tenants whose names were borne on the landlord's rent-roll had been made certificate-debtors, the holding must be deemed to have been fully represented as laid down in sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 2. In my opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge failed to appreciate the position correctly. I do not think it is enough to refer to sub-sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 2. In my opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge failed to appreciate the position correctly. I do not think it is enough to refer to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 20 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, and say that the holding passed. The sub-section (quoting only the material part) is as follows: -- Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec, (1), in areas in which Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is in force, where a tenure or holding is sold in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, the tenure or holding shall.... pass to the purchaser subject to the interests defined in that Chapter as 'protected interests' but with power to annul the interests defined in that Chapter as in cumbrances. 3. As is expressly stated herein, this is a provision by way of an exception. The general rule is laid down in sub-sec. (1), which says that where property is sold in execution of a certificate, there shall vest in the purchaser merely the right, title and interest of the certificate-debtor at the time of the sale, even though the property itself may be specified, 4. which means, in other words, that a certificate sale ordinarily operates as a mere money decree under the Code of Civil Procedure. The object of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 20 is to provide as an exceptional case that where the certificate is one for arrears of rent, it will have the effect of the decree in a suit for recovery of such arrears in the manner described in Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This, however, assumes that there is a proper certificate for arrears of rent, that is to say, a certificate obtained in such circumstances that if instead of a certificate, it was a Civil Court decree, the sale in execution thereof could pass the tenure or holding. As to what would constitute such a certificate, that is a matter not dealt with in this subsection at all, and would depend on other considerations. There is nothing in sub-sec. (3) to suggest that by enacting it the legislature intended to place a certificate for rent on a higher footing than a decree for rent as regards the effect of a sale in execution of it. 5. There is nothing in sub-sec. (3) to suggest that by enacting it the legislature intended to place a certificate for rent on a higher footing than a decree for rent as regards the effect of a sale in execution of it. 5. In the case of a decree for arrears of rent, Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides that the execution sale will pass the tenure or holding, but in order that the sale may have this consequence, it is necessary as a general rule that all the co-sharer tenants must be parties to the suit. The same result may also follow where only some of the co-tenants are made parties, provided, however, that those who are Defendants to the suit may be supposed to represent the entire body of co-sharer tenants in the tenure or holding for the rent of which the suit is brought. This is on the principle of representation, and it is expressly recognised in sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 6. In my opinion, it must follow that if a certificate sale for arrears of rent is similarly to pass the tenure or holding, as distinguished from the right, title and interest of the certificate-debtors in the same, the certificate must likewise be obtained against the whole body of co-sharer tenants, but if it is only against some, it may have the same effect, provided the principle of representation can be held to apply, and provided in that case the whole of the tenants' interest has been acutally represented ' in the proceedings. This last is a question of fact to be determined in each case upon evidence, and it is not answered merely by showing that all the persons whose names are entered in the landlord's rent-roll or in the settlement record have been joined as parties, as the learned Subordinate Judge seems to think. 7. In this case, as already pointed out, the certificate-debtors were only two out of several co-sharer tenants. The first question, therefore, that arises is, whether or not the principle of representation applies in the case of proceedings for recovery of rent under the Public Demands Recovery Act. It must be conceded that the provisions of sec. 7. In this case, as already pointed out, the certificate-debtors were only two out of several co-sharer tenants. The first question, therefore, that arises is, whether or not the principle of representation applies in the case of proceedings for recovery of rent under the Public Demands Recovery Act. It must be conceded that the provisions of sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act have not been made applicable in terms to certificate proceedings: there is in fact no provision corresponding to this section in the Public Demands Recovery Act. If and in so far as the principle of representation, therefore, rests on this statutory, basis, its applicability will doubtless have to be ruled out in the case of certificate proceedings. It is, however, well-settled now that this principle neither depends on, nor is circumscribed by the terms of, sec. 146A. This section is only legislative recognition of a doctrine which exists apart from, and independently of, it, and even so, it does not profess to be an exhaustive statement of the doctrine. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 146A in its various clauses specifies certain circumstances in which a tenure or holding will be deemed to be fully represented, even though all the co-sharer tenants have not been made parties to the suit, but this does not mean that representation cannot be otherwise established. As I understand the matter, the effect of this sub-section is to raise a statutory presumption of representation where the parties Defendants to the suit include all the different categories of co-sharer tenants mentioned in the different clauses, and it may also be that if the co-sharer tenants falling under any one of these categories are left out, that by itself will operate to negative representation [see in this connection the latest judgment of Mitter, J., in Ramanath v. Girish Chandra 45 C.W.N. 119 (1940)]. But giving full effect to sec. 146A, -- and I agree with M.C. Ghose, J., that this must be done [Raja Nagendra Nath v. Niranjan 41 C.W.N. 1173 (1937)], -- it cannot be said that consistently with the provisions of this section, there may not still be other conditions in which the presence of even one or some of the tenants as Defendant will be as effective as that of all. 8. 8. Take, for instance, a case where one of a number of tenants is put forward by the rest as their representative in their dealings with the landlord: there is no reason why he cannot be regarded as the sole tenant for the purposes of a suit for arrears of rent within Chapter XIV. I do not think that there is anything in sec. 146A which may be supposed to have destroyed the effect of decisions like Chamatkari Dasi v. Triguna Nath Sardar 17 C.W.N. 833 (1913)., where Jenkins, C.J., laid down this proposition as a view sanctioned by the authorities, or like Srimati Faijunnessa v. Ramtaran Chowdhury 26 C.W.N. 138 (1920), where Mookerjee, C.J., observed that if all the tenants hold out one of them to represent them in the matter of the tenancy, they cannot complain if a decree for rent is obtained by the landlord against that representative, and the entire tenancy brought to sale, even though they are not all parties to the decree. These cases were all decided before sec. 146A was brought into the statute by the amending legislation of 1928, but as Mitter, J.'s judgment in the recent case of Ramanath v. Girish 45 C.W.N. 119 (1040) already referred to, as also in an earlier case Ayesha Khatun v. Md. Hossain 41 C.W.N. 85 (1936) shows, the principle of these decisions still remains unaffected. 9. If, then, the principle of representation holds good apart from statutory provision in the case of suits and decrees for rent, I do not see why it should not likewise be given effect to in certificate proceedings for recovery of rent, particularly in view of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 20 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, the object of which, as already explained, is to assimilate the position in respect of a certificate-sale to that of a sale in execution of a rent decree. The mere fact that sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act has not been extended in explicit terms to certificate proceedings is in my opinion not decisive of the matter at all. Sec. 146A may not apply, but the principle embodied therein will. The certificate procedure is no doubt a summary mode for recovery of arrears of rent, but sub-sec. (3) of sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act has not been extended in explicit terms to certificate proceedings is in my opinion not decisive of the matter at all. Sec. 146A may not apply, but the principle embodied therein will. The certificate procedure is no doubt a summary mode for recovery of arrears of rent, but sub-sec. (3) of sec. 20 of the Act makes it clear that the certificate-holder may yet bring the tenure or holding to sale. He can, of course, do so by joining as certificate-debtors all the persons interested in the tenancy, but even where he has not done so, he can succeed by showing that the persons against whom the proceedings are taken also represent the interest of those who have been left out, in other words, that the persons named in the certificate as debtors do in fact represent the tenancy in its entirety. 10. In support of this conclusion, I need refer only to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court which is exactly in point, Baj Roga Khatun v. Province of Bengal ILR (1939) 2 Cal. 358: S.C. 43 C.W.N. 1096 (1939) and to a recent Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court, where a similar question has been considered in connection with the analogous provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914, Hari Prasad Singh v. Lal Behari Saran Singh ILR 19 Pat. 618 (1940). 11. The next question is whether on the facts of the present case it can be said that the two certificate-debtors named in the certificate did represent the entire holding. On this point, as I have already shown, the Court below took a wrong view, presumably under the idea that the matter fell to be governed by the terms of sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Even so, I do not think it would be enough to show that the recorded tenants had been all joined as certificate-debtors. That may be a necessary, or even the first, step in establishing the plea of representation, but that is not all. Whether one or some of the co-sharer tenants can be regarded as a representative of the whole body of ccr-tenants is essentially a question of fact which has got to be determined on evidence like any other fact, and where as here it has to be decided dehors the provisions of sec. Whether one or some of the co-sharer tenants can be regarded as a representative of the whole body of ccr-tenants is essentially a question of fact which has got to be determined on evidence like any other fact, and where as here it has to be decided dehors the provisions of sec. 146A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the tests laid down therein may only serve as a guide so far as they go. As it is clear that the learned Subordinate Judge did not look at the matter from this point of view, I do not think that his judgment can be supported any more than that of the trial Court. The matter requires to be investigated on further evidence. The result is that this appeal must be allowed, and the judgments and decrees of both Courts set aside, and the case remitted to the Court of first instance for retrial on such further evidence as the parties may choose to adduce on the question of representation. Costs of both the lower Courts as also of this appeal will abide the result.